This is an application purported to be u/s. 5 of the Limita­tion Act for condoning the delay in presenting the appeal. 2. The appellant-petitioner was convicted on 11.6.82. Upon conviction he was jailed and there was none to look after his case and the only person to take steps on his behalf was his poor wife. The wife on collection of the certified copy of the judgment and other materials approached the lawyer to prepare the Memorandum of Appeal and filed it in the High Court on 26.7.82. According to the office, the appeal is barred by limita­tion by 15 days. 3. In the instant case we cannot overlook the fact that the prisoner was in jail and it was not possible for him to prepare the Memorandum of Appeal and to present it from jail. The preparation of the Memorandum of Appeal also required consi­deration of the evidence/deposition of the witness. Therefore, the wife, who had taken steps, was bound to spend some time at least for 15 days for getting necessary papers, engaging lawyer and filing the appeal. These were sufficient causes for not presen­ting the appeal within the period of limitation. The State did not provide any 'legal aid' to the prisoner 'upon his conviction, Under these circumstances, the objection of the State as to the delay by 15 days, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, cannot be upheld. Therefore, delay, if any is condoned and the appeal is admitted. 4. However, I would observe that in the instant case, Mn R. L. Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant took up another plea. His point is that there was summer recess from 11th to 25th July, 1982 (including Sundays and holidays) and this period must be excluded as the High Court was closed, as contemplated under Section 4 of the Indian Limitation Act. In support of the contention Mr. Yadav has placed before me a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in 1959 CWN 684, Akhtari Bibi vs. Rajlakshmi Devi. I am constrained to hold that the fact situation of that case was different. In the present case, the High Court no doubt declared holidays from 11th to 25th July, 1982 as Summer recess, but filing of applications, appeals and other matters was permitted throughout the working hours during the summer recess, and it was done by the order of the High Court. In the present case, the High Court no doubt declared holidays from 11th to 25th July, 1982 as Summer recess, but filing of applications, appeals and other matters was permitted throughout the working hours during the summer recess, and it was done by the order of the High Court. The relevant part of the order reads as follow : "......Filing will be open throughout the aforementioned working hours* of the days of the summer recess". B. O. Sd/-N. Hazarika Registrar (Admn.)." 5. This order clearly shows : (1) That this was an order not by the Registrar but by the High Court; (2) that the High Court was kept open for the purpose of entertaining applicat-tionsr appeals etc. during the summer recess, of course public holidays excluding. During this summer recess, 11th, 18th and 25th were Sundays whereas 23rd and 24th of July, 1982 were holidays for Id-Ul-Fitre. For these five days the petitioner is undoubtedly entitled to extension u/s. 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963. However, the High Court was open for the purpose of filing of appeals, applications etc. for the rest of the period. There is nothing to show in the instant case that the Judge-in-charge of the Administration of the High Court was absent, as in Calcutta case. Further in Akhtari Bibi (supra) the notification was issued by the Registrar and not by the High Court. Therefore the Calcutta High Court held that "the High Court was closed" as there was no order of the High Court that filing would be permissible during the holidays, (ii) the order permitting entertain­ment of the application was not by the Judge in-charge of the High Court but by the Registrar, who had no authority to direct filing of applications, appeals etc. during that period. Therefore, I am constrained to hold that the principles of Akhtari Bibi (supra) are not applicable in the instant case insofar as the period other than Sundays and other holidays is concerned. However I would observe that it is my tentativs view. Insofar as 'the other days are concerned', the appellant was not entitled to any exemption of time u/s. 4 of the limitation Act in view of the notification issued by the High Court. It is submitted at the Bar that there is a decision within this Court which has inter­preted similar notification. Insofar as 'the other days are concerned', the appellant was not entitled to any exemption of time u/s. 4 of the limitation Act in view of the notification issued by the High Court. It is submitted at the Bar that there is a decision within this Court which has inter­preted similar notification. But the same has not been produced before me for my perusal. I have merely expressed my tentative opinion which may not be considered as final. 6. In the result, the delay is condoned. The appeal will come up. for admission in presence of the learned public prosecutor.