Judgment :- 1. The petitioner was selected for the post of Assistant Sub Inspector of the Railway Protection Force with effect from 15-6-1973 subject to satisfactory completion of probation for a period of two years. His probation commenced on 5-8-1974. On 30-10-1975 his probation was terminated and he was reverted. Challenging the termination of probation on the ground that it was by way of punishment for misconduct and, questioning the right of termination during the period of two years, he approached this Court in O.P No 5316 of 1975. By Ext. RI this Court rejected the contention that any punishment was involved in the termination of the petitioner's probation. However, this Court posed the question whether the probation could be terminated before the expiry of the specified period of two years, but did not express any final opinion in view of the alternative remedy available to the petitioner. Since Ext. RI has become final, it is no longer open to the petitioner to contend that the termination was by way of punishment. The only contention which is therefore urged before roe is as to the correctness of the finding of the Appellate Authority that the probation was properly terminated on 3010-1975. 2. Although it is not open to the petitioner to contend that the termination was by way of punishment, I would refer to Explanation (v) to R.41 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 (the "Rules"), for a different purpose. The relevant portion of R.41 reads: "41. Nature of penalties. The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on a member of the force, namely, Explanation. The following shall not amount to a penalty within the meaning of this rule: (v) reversion to his permanent service, grade or post of a member of the Force appointed to the Force on probation during or at the end of the period of probation in accordance with the terms of his appointment or the rules and orders governing probation; (emphasis supplied) This rule postulates reversion during probation. This rule has to be called in aid to understand R.25, which reads: "25. Probation (1) All appointments by direct recruitment or promotion shall be on probation for two years subject to the provision that the appointing authority may extend this period in special cases. This rule has to be called in aid to understand R.25, which reads: "25. Probation (1) All appointments by direct recruitment or promotion shall be on probation for two years subject to the provision that the appointing authority may extend this period in special cases. (2) The appointing authority shall, on the expiry of the period of such probation or such extended period, pass an order declaring that the probationer has completed the period of probation satisfactorily and is suitable for confirmation in that rank. If he considers him unsuitable, the probationer shall be informed in writing of the reasons for terminating his probation and given an opportunity to submit any representation be may wish to make within a reasonable time and any representation submitted within that time shall also be considered and final orders passed by such authority." Sub-rule (2) provides that reasons have to be given for terminating a probation and the probationer shall have an opportunity to submit his representation. This shows that sub-rule (2) contemplates termination of probation. The probation can be terminated only while the probation continues. If the probation had run out the specified period, there is no question of termination. In that event the probation has either to be declared to have been satisfactorily completed or the authority may refuse to make such declaration. Alternatively the probation can be extended. But in such cases the question of termination does not arise. R.25 (2) thus postulates, subject to certain conditions, termination of probation. This is what is contemplated in R.41 Explanation (v) as well. In the circumstances I am of the view that the rules, the validity of which is not in question, do provide, subject to certain conditions, for termination of probation during the specified period. 3. Accordingly I am of the view that the authority which terminated the petitioner's probation has the competence to do so. Whether the discretion vested in the authority to terminate the probation had been validly exercised is a matter which is not open to question unless there is evidence to show that the order is vitiated by reason of mala fide or the like. I am not satisfied that the impugned orders suffer from any such defect. The O. P. is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Dismissed.