JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arose from proceedings for eviction of the petitioner from residential accommodation initiated by Dr. A.S. Raj, opposite party no. 3, on the Small Cause Court side. The only question raised in the petition involves interpretation of Article 4 of the second schedule to the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (for short 'the Act'). The only fact that is required to be noticed for resolving the dispute is that the suit was filed for eviction from residential accommodation after termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on the plea that the accommodation in question was not governed by the U P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972). In the suit the only substantive relief claimed was eviction from accommodation. No amount of arrears of rent or compensation for use and occupation was claimed. The petitioner's case before the court below was that in view of the language of Article 4 the suit was not cognizable on the Small Causes Court side. 2. Subsection (1) of Section 15 of the Act provides that a Court of Small Causes shall not take cognizance of the Suits specified in the second Schedule as suits excepted from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes. Schedule II comprises of several articles and each article specifies the suit which is excepted from the cognizance of the Court of Small Causes. Article 4, as amended by the U. P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972(U.P. Act No.37 of 1972) reads as follows: A suit for possession of immovable property or for recovery of an interest in such property, but not including a suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee from a building after the determination of his lease, and for the recovery from him of compensation for use and occupation of that building after such determination of lease. Explanation From the above it would be seen that a suit for possession of immovable property or for the recovery of an interest in such property is excepted from the cognizance of the Court of Small Causes. Explanation From the above it would be seen that a suit for possession of immovable property or for the recovery of an interest in such property is excepted from the cognizance of the Court of Small Causes. A suit for eviction of a tenant, whose tenancy has Been determined, is also a suit for possession of immovable property but such a suit has not been excepted from the cognizance of the Court of Small Causes by virtue of the clause starting with the word 'but' and ending with the words 'determination of lease'. The learned counsel for the petitioner argues that a suit for eviction together with prayer for recovery of compensation would be cognizable by the Court of Small Causes but a suit for eviction simplicitor would not be cognizable by the Court of Small Causes. The argument is based on the use of conjunction 'and' between clause but not including a suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee from a building after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of compensation for use and occupation of that building after such determination of lease.' The learned counsel argues that the conjunction 'and' has to be given its natural meaning and if natural meaning is given to this word, the only consequence would be that in order to bring in the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes the suit should not be merely for eviction but it must also be for recovery of compensation for use and occupation. The learned counsel argues that the use of comma after the word 'lease' is of no consequence as according to him punctuation plays no part in interpretation of statute. In support of his plea that punctuation plays no part in interpretation of a statute, the learned counsel has relied upon the observations made by Vepa P. Sarathi in his The Interpretation of Statutes and also upon certain decisions. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel are : Aswini Kumar Ghose and another v. Arbindo Bose and another (AIR 1952 Calcutta 178) and Raj Kumar Singh Ji Vs. Commissioner of Expenditure Tax (AIR 968 Madhya Pradesh 107). Sarathi's book has been relied upon also for the proposition that the conjunction 'and' should be given its natural meaning unless for compelling reasons it is to be read as 'or'. 3. Commissioner of Expenditure Tax (AIR 968 Madhya Pradesh 107). Sarathi's book has been relied upon also for the proposition that the conjunction 'and' should be given its natural meaning unless for compelling reasons it is to be read as 'or'. 3. The petition has been opposed on behalf of the landlord opposite party by his learned counsel Sri K.B. Sinha. Apart from controverting the argument raised by the petitioner's counsel Sri Umesh Chandra, Sri Sinha has argued that the question of jurisdiction was sought to be raised by the petitioner before the learned District Judge by moving an application for leave to amend the written statement but later the application was not pressed. Sri Sinha, therefore, argues that in view of the fact that. the amendment application was not pressed, it is not open to the petitioner to raise the said dispute through the present writ petition. 4. I have no hesitation in accepting the argument of Sri Umesh Chandra that normally the conjunction 'and' should be given its normal meaning unless for compelling reasons it is to be read as 'or'. I have also no hesitation in accepting that punctuation should not be allowed to play a decisive role in the interpretation of a statutory provision. It cannot, however, be argued that a punctuation is of no significance at all. Sarathi himself has observed a, follows at page 277 of his 1975 Edition: (a) Punctuation is not a part of the statute, but where it is clear that the punctuation is correctly placed, there is no reason why the punctuation should not be considered as a proper guide for understanding the sense of the section. (b) In construing a statute the court should first read it without the punctuation. (c) If the section as punctuated leads to a conflict the punctuation must be ignored. In view of the proposition (b) we may now read the two clauses separated by the conjunction 'and' without the comma and find out the effect produced thereby. If the comma is removed, the excepting clause, without the words not necessary for deciding the present controversy, would read as follows: not including a suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee and for the recovery from him of compensation. If the comma is removed, the excepting clause, without the words not necessary for deciding the present controversy, would read as follows: not including a suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee and for the recovery from him of compensation. If the clause is read by retaining the comma but omitting the unessential words, it would read thus: not including a suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee, and for the recovery from him of compensation for use and occupation. In my opinion, the term suit governs both the clauses which are joined together with the conjunction 'and'. So interpreted the clause would read thus: ......not including a suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee and a suit for the recovery from him of compensation for use and occupation. This meaning will remain whether the Article is read by retaining the comma or after omitting it. Therefore in understanding the true meaning of the Article the comma used therein does not play a decisive role. Its placement only emphasises the fact that the term 'suit' governs both the clauses. When this is the only role which the comma used in the Article is playing, it is not to be ignored even under Sarathi's proposition relied upon by the learned counsel. In view of the fact that the term 'suit' governs both the clauses, the use of the Comma does not lead to any conflict. In my opinion, therefore, even by applying the test canvassed by the learned counsel it cannot be held that the suit was not cognizable by the Court of Small Causes. In order to be cognizable by the Court of Small Causes under Article 4, a suit may be for mere eviction, or it may be for mere recovery of compensation or it may be for both. 5. In view of the above finding it is not necessary to examine the argument raised by Sri Sinha that the plea of jurisdiction is not available to the applicant on account of the fact that the amendment application, after having been moved, was not pressed on his behalf. 6. For the discussion herein, the writ petition fails and a hereby dismissed with costs to the contesting opposite party no. 3. 6. For the discussion herein, the writ petition fails and a hereby dismissed with costs to the contesting opposite party no. 3. Stay order, if any, shall stand discharged but the decree for eviction shall not be executed for three months, provided the petitioner deposits mesne profits for this period in advance within two weeks. [Petition dismissed]