ORDER A.N. Varma, J. - The dispute is about a shop situated in Mandi Harbansganj, Dhampur of which the petitioner is the owner and landlord and the respondent No. 2, Ramesh Chand was its tenant on a monthly rental of Rs. 7.59. The petition is directed against an order passed by the Prescribed Authority, dismissing an application filed by the petitioner under S. 43(2)(rr) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. 2. The relevant facts are that in 1969, the petitioner as the landlord filed an application under S. 3(1) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 for permission to file a suit for eviction of the respondent No. 2 on the ground that the shop was in a dilapidated condition and was required for being demolished and re-constructed. It was asserted in that application that the shop was more than 100 years old and was a danger to human lives in view of its dilapidated condition. It was further asserted that the shop along with the other adjoining shops were in the same condition and the landlord had consequently to demolish them and reconstruct the same into a new building with the residential accommodation on the first floor and shops on the ground floor. The landlord also offered in that application that after these new shops were constructed he could let out the same to the tenants thereof on a reasonable rent. 3. The aforesaid application was contested by the tenant-respondent. He denied that the shop was in a dilapidated condition. He said that he would suffer great hardship if he was evicted therefrom, being a very old tenant. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer allowed the aforesaid application on the finding that the shop was in a dilapidated condition and was indeed a danger to human lives in view of its decaying condition and risk of falling down. While allowing the application he also took note in his judgment of the offer made by the landlord to let out one of the constructed shops to the respondent No. 2 herein. 4. Against the order dated 27-2-1970 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, allowing the aforesaid application, the tenant filed a revision before the Commissioner, Rohilkhand Division, Bareilly, who dismissed the same by his order dated 26-9-1970. 4. Against the order dated 27-2-1970 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, allowing the aforesaid application, the tenant filed a revision before the Commissioner, Rohilkhand Division, Bareilly, who dismissed the same by his order dated 26-9-1970. He endorsed the aforesaid finding of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as regards the condition of the building under tenancy. Against this order the tenant filed a revision under S. 7-F of the aforesaid 1947 Act, but without any success. 5. Thereafter the landlord filed a suit on the strength of the aforesaid permission for the eviction of the tenant. During the pendency of the suit the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 came into force. Some amendments under S. 43(2)(rr) were made in the Act No. XIII of 1972 by the U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976, whereby the landlords who had on the basis of permission granted to them under S. 3(1) of the U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 instituted suits for the ejectment of their tenants were given the right to apply for an order of eviction of their tenants straightway, if the permission which was granted to them under S. 3 of the 1947 Act had been obtained on any grounds specified in sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2) of S. 21. Purporting to take advantage of this provision the petitioner filed an application for an order of eviction against the respondent No. 2. It was asserted that as the permission granted in favour of the petitioner had become final before the commencement of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 and as the permission had been obtained by the petitioner on a ground specified in cl. (b) of S. 21(1) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, he was entitled to an order of eviction under S. 43(2)(rr). 6. The aforesaid application was contested by the tenant, who denied that the shop was in a dilapidated condition. He further asserted that the application of the petitioner was not maintainable under S. 43(2)(rr). 7. The Prescribed Authority has by the impugned order dismissed the petitioner's application on the ground that the permission relied on by the landlord was a conditional permission, that it could not come into operation unless the landlord had complied with the offer made by him before the Rent Control and Eviction Authorities, namely, to make available to the tenant an alternative shop. The Prescribed Authority has held that till that condition was satisfied by the landlord he could not claim the eviction of the tenant under S. 43(2)(rr). 8. Sri S. C. Budhwar, learned counsel for the petitioner, assailing the legality of the impugned order submitted that the view taken by the Prescribed Authority is manifestly unsustainable and is perverse. It was urged that the permission granted to the landlord was an unqualified and unconditional permission and its operations was not made subject to the performance of any prior condition by the landlord. It was further submitted that in view of the fact that the permission was granted on a ground which was specifically covered by S. 21(1)(b), the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to decline to grant the prayer of eviction made by the petitioner. In support learned counsel placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in AIR 1980 All 194 : 1980 All LJ 331 in the case of Bansi Lal Sahu v. Prescribed Authority. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some length, I am of the opinion that the above contentions are well founded and have to be accepted on the undisputed facts. The aforesaid Full Bench decision also fully supports the contention of the learned counsel. 10. True copies of the orders passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Commissioner upon the application of the petitioner for permission have been annexed to the writ petition as Annexs. 1 and 2. A true copy of the order passed by the State Government upon the representation made by the tenant under S. 7-F has been filed in one of the connected writ petitions. A bare perusal of these orders leaves absolutely no scope for argument that the permission was granted subject to the fulfilment of any condition precedent by the landlord. It is true that in granting permission the authorities were also impressed by the offer made by the landlord that he would make available to the tenant one of the newly constructed shops. However, the authorities did not choose to make the permission a conditional one to be operative subject to performance of any condition precedent by the tenant. Indeed according to the interpretation given by this Court to S. 3(1) of the U.P. Act No. III of 1947 legally there could not be conditional permission. However, the authorities did not choose to make the permission a conditional one to be operative subject to performance of any condition precedent by the tenant. Indeed according to the interpretation given by this Court to S. 3(1) of the U.P. Act No. III of 1947 legally there could not be conditional permission. (See 1963 All LJ 198) (Para 15). 11. The Prescribed Authority was therefore, clearly in error in taking the view that the permission granted to the petitioner was a conditional one to be operative only on the performance of some condition the landlord. 12. The Prescribed Authority having found that the permission was granted to the landlord on the ground that the building was in a dilapidated condition and that the same was required to be demolished and reconstructed, he was bound to allow the application of the petitioner under section 43(2)(rr). The ground upon which the application for permission was allowed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the other authorities clearly fell within cl.(b) of sub-s. (1) of S. 21. The Prescribed Authority was hence bound under law allow the application of the landlord on the undisputed fact that the permission had become final before the commencement of the Act. In the case of Bansi Lal Sahu (1980 All LJ 331) (supra) a Full Bench of this Court has ruled that the Prescribed Authority acting under S. 43(2)(rr) has no jurisdiction to embark upon any fresh enquiry as to the genuineness of the need set up by the landlord and that if the application f permission was based on one of the ground mentioned in sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2) of S. 2 the Prescribed Authority is bound to directed the eviction of the tenant. The Prescribed Authority has under that provision no jurisdiction to review the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. In the present case the order passed by the Prescribed Authority virtually amounts to reviewing the order permission granted by the Rent Control and the Eviction Officer and other authorities. 13. Sri Jagdish Swarup, learned counsel for the tenant however attempted to support the impugned order on other grounds. His first submission was that the permission was not granted to the landlord on the ground that the shop was in a dilapidated condition. 13. Sri Jagdish Swarup, learned counsel for the tenant however attempted to support the impugned order on other grounds. His first submission was that the permission was not granted to the landlord on the ground that the shop was in a dilapidated condition. He submitted that the landlord was granted the permission only on the ground that the shop was an old shop which had run out its life. This, he argued, was not the same thing as that the building was in a dilapidated condition. In support learned counsel relied on some decisions of this Court reported in 1980 All Rent Cas 240 : (1980 All LJ NOC 127), 1978 (UP) RCC 102, 1978 (UP) RCC 145 and 1976 Ren CJ 502 (All). Of these cases learned counsel relied mainly on the case reported in 1980 All Rent Cas 240 (1980 All LJ NOC 127) (supra). 14. I am unable to accept the above contention. In my judgment the orders passed by the authorities granting permission were clearly based upon the finding that the building was in a dilapidated condition. It is incorrect to say that the permission was granted to the landlord on the ground merely that the building was an old building made of a certain kind of bricks (Lakhauri). The Rent Control and Eviction Officer accepted the report of Sri Damodar Das dated 24-6-1972 in which it was clearly stated that the life of the building had run out and that it would be dangerous to leave the building standing. The Commissioner in the revision filed by the tenant also held that the building had outlived its life and that it was "in a dangerous condition". The State Government has in its order affirmed the decisions of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Commissioner. In my opinion, judged in the light of the guidelines laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, the finding of the Rent Control authorities clearly was that the building was in a dilapidated conditions These authorities have found that the shop was in a dangerous condition and had become worn out. 15. On these facts, the conclusion is inescapable that the building was in a dilapidated condition and that it requires demolition. 15. On these facts, the conclusion is inescapable that the building was in a dilapidated condition and that it requires demolition. Indeed, as already stated, even the Prescribed Authority has by the impugned order repelled the contention of the tenant that the building was not in a dilapidated condition. 16. The next contention of Sri Jagdish Swarup was that this Court in the case reported in 1980 All Rent Cas 240 (245) : (1980 All LJ NOC 127) has held that not only has the landlord to satisfy that the building under tenancy is in a dilapidated condition and is required for being demolished and re-constructed, but that the requirements of R. 17 framed under the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 have also to be satisfied. It was urged that according to these decisions compliance of R. 17 is mandatory before an application under S. 210)(b) can be allowed. 17. I find it difficult to accept the contention. In my opinion neither the language of S. 43(2)(rr) nor its context justifies the conclusion that R. 17 has to be complied with even under S. 43(2)(rr). As has been held by the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Bansi Lal Sahu (1980 All LJ 331) (supra) the Prescribed Authority acting under S. 43(2)(rr) is not required or authorised to undertake a de novo enquiry into the state of the building. Indeed this has been made more clear by the following words occurring in S. 43(2)(rr) "and it shall not be necessary for the Prescribed Authority to satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any ground as aforesaid." R. 17 has been framed under S. 41 of the 1972 Act only to carry out the purposes of this Act and consequently the said rule has to be construed only as a provision designed to ensure that the building is not released in favour of the landlord unless the Prescribed Authority fully satisfied itself in accordance with the criterion laid down under S. 210)(b) that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for the purpose of demolition and new construction. As already mentioned under S. 43(2)(rr) all that the Prescribed Authority has to be satisfied about is that the permission obtained by the landlord was based on a ground covered by S. 21(1) or S. 21(2). In this context R. 17 cannot be attracted. As already mentioned under S. 43(2)(rr) all that the Prescribed Authority has to be satisfied about is that the permission obtained by the landlord was based on a ground covered by S. 21(1) or S. 21(2). In this context R. 17 cannot be attracted. 18. Further, R. 17 is attracted only in an application brought under S. 21(1)(b). An application under S. 43(2)(rr) does not itself become an application proper under S. 21(1)(b) so as automatically to attract the application of R. 17. 19. The problem can be viewed from another angle. S. 43(2)(rr) pre-supposes that an application under S. 3 of the U.P. Act No. III of 1947 had been filed and orders therein had become final before the commencement of 1972 Act. At the time of consideration of an application under S. 3 of the 1947 Act there could not possibly have been any occasion for compliance of R. 17 for the simple reason that at the relevant time the rule did not even exist, nor was it even in contemplation. Thus, there is no substance in the second submission either urged by Sri Jagdish Swarup. 20. The third submission of Sri Jagdish Swarup was that as the application of the landlord for permission was based both on the ground namely that the building was in a dilapidated condition and that he was willing to give one of the new constructed shops to the tenants, the application of the landlord did not strictly fall within S. 43(2)(rr). 21. I am unable to accept the above contention. The offer made by the landlord could not by any stretch be regarded as a `ground' upon which the permission was sought or granted. The application for permission was based simply on the ground that the building was in a dilapidated condition and that the same was required for being demolished and re-constructed. The application filed by the landlord was therefore clearly covered by S. 43(2)(rr). A distinction must be drawn between a ground upon which permission was sought and the various considerations which may have been taken into account by the authorities in granting the permission. Every single fact which weighed with the authorities in granting the permission could not be characterised as a `ground' upon which the permission was sought or granted for the purpose of the application of S. 43(2)(rr). 22. Every single fact which weighed with the authorities in granting the permission could not be characterised as a `ground' upon which the permission was sought or granted for the purpose of the application of S. 43(2)(rr). 22. Further, even if it be assumed that the permission was granted on both the grounds, namely, that the building was in a dilapidated condition and was required for demolition and reconstruction and also that reconstruction of a block of shops would be in the larger interest of the community at large, still, in my view, the application of S. 43(2)(rr) would not be excluded. So long as the permission was sought and granted on one of the grounds specified in sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2) of S. 21, the Prescribed Authority shall have jurisdiction to consider eviction of the tenant under S. 43(2)(rr) irrespective of whether the permission was also granted on an additional ground which is not strictly covered by sub-s. (1) or (2) of S. 21. Thus, in either view, there is no substance in this submission. 23. In this connection, Sri Jagdish Swarup relying on the decision of this Court reported in 1980 All Rent Cas 240 (245) : (1980 All LJ NOC 127) made another submission. The argument was t according to the dictum of that decision before a landlord can claim eviction and section 21(1)(b) he has to satisfy another condition prescribed by R. 17(i), namely, that the building requires demolition. Learned counsel submitted that this is additional condition and according to said decision the requirement is mandatory. 24. I find it difficult to accept the above contention. I have already held that R. 17 has no application in these circumstances while considering the scope of S. 43(2)(rr). Further, assuming that R. 17(i) prescribed an independent condition to be fulfilled in addition to that prescribed by S. 210)(b), that will not take the matter further for the petitioner. For, the requirement o S. 43(2)(rr) is that the permission should based on a ground specified in sub-s.'(1) sub-s. (2) of S. 21 and not on any other ground which may have been prescribeds under any other provisions. This is another ground for holding that R. 17(1) can have n application to the facts of the present case. In any case, even on facts the contention cannot succeed. This is another ground for holding that R. 17(1) can have n application to the facts of the present case. In any case, even on facts the contention cannot succeed. According to the finding of the Rent Control authorities granting the permission the building is intrinsically so weak and unsafe that it can legitimately be said that the same requires demolition within the meaning of R. 17(i). Thus, in either view of the matter, I find substance in the above submission. 25. My conclusion therefore is that on the facts found by the Rent Control authorities granting the permission and on the finding of the Prescribed Authority itself that the permission was granted to the landlord on the ground that the building was in a dilapidated condition and was required for being demolished and re-constructed the petitioner clearly became entitled to an order of eviction in view of the peremptory language used in S. 43(2)(rr) and the Prescribed Authority has failed in its statutory duty to order eviction of the tenant. A case for issue of a mandamus has clearly been made out. 26. In the end, Sri Jagdish Swarup submitted that if the Court was inclined to allow the application of the landlord, it should provide in the order of eviction itself that the landlord shall comply with the offer already made by him before the Rent Control Authorities, namely, that upon completion of the construction of the new building he shall give on lease one of the newly constructed shops to the petitioner. He submitted that the specific directions should be made so that the landlord while taking advantage of the permission granted to him is equally obliged to keep his words and comply with the offer made by him. In support of this contention learned counsel cited passages from the Halsbury's Laws of England (IVth Edn.) Vol. 16. 27. I am unable to accede to the request made by the learned counsel, as in my opinion, such directions would be beyond the purview of S. 43(2)(rr). The petitioner shall, however, be at liberty to pursue such remedies as may be available to him for enforcing right of re-entry in pursuance of the offer made by the landlord. I am, however, expressing no opinion on what may be the various remedies which are legally available to the tenant compel the landlord to abide by his offer. 28. The petitioner shall, however, be at liberty to pursue such remedies as may be available to him for enforcing right of re-entry in pursuance of the offer made by the landlord. I am, however, expressing no opinion on what may be the various remedies which are legally available to the tenant compel the landlord to abide by his offer. 28. Learned counsel also submitted that the tenant is legally entitled to re-enter the newly constructed shop under S. 24(2) of 1972 Act if the landlord resiles from his offer or fails to give on lease the newly constructed shop to the tenant. 29. As already mentioned, this is not the stage for expressing any opinion on the above submission. The present petition is concerned solely with the right claimed by the landlord to an order of eviction under S. 43(2)(rr). Whether the landlord (tenant?) has a right to claim re-entry under S. 24(2) or not, is a controversy which is wholly beyond the scope of the present petition and hence I am expressing no opinion thereon. 30. In the premise, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order passed by the Prescribed Authority, dated 30th Oct. 1980, is quashed. The Prescribed Authority. Nagina, District Bijnor is directed to pass an order of eviction against Ramesh Chand, respondent No. 2 herein from the building under tenancy. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs.