JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - This civil revision u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is directed against an order passed by the learned III Additional District Judge dated 30th of October, 1981 disposing of a preliminary objection raised on behalf of the applicant as to the jurisdiction of the said Court to try the suit giving rise to this revision as a Small Cause. The contention of the applicant was that the suit was not cognizable by a Small Cause Court. 2. The said objection has been repelled by the Court below by the impugned order. Aggrieved, the applicant has come to this Court. 3. In order to appreciate the controversy, it will be necessary to reproduce the substance of the plaint allegations. The Plaintiff-Respondent's case was that he was the owner of a Karkhana (mill) consisting of a building, machinery affixed therein, motor connections, shafts, cutting machines, elevators rolling machines and machines for grinding pulses, a hulling machine etc, indeed everything that goes to comprise a full fledged mill. The Plaintiff let out the said Karkhana (mill) along with the building and the various machineries and installations described in the plaint affixed therein to the Defendant No. 1, who is applicant No. 2 herein and who was doing that business under the name and style of M/s. Ajai Kumar Abhai Kumar (Defendant No. 2 in the suit), arrayed as applicant No. 1 herein, on a monthly rental of Rs. 256.25 P. In paragraph 4 of the plaint, it was stated that the aforesaid Mill was let out to the Defendants for being used as a Karkhana (mills). The term of the lease had expired and the Defendants had not vacated the leased premises despite the service of notice terminating their tenancy and hence the suit. 4. The suit was contested by the applicants on a variety of grounds which it is not necessary to elaborate here. One of the grounds taken in defence was that the suit was not cognizable by a Small Cause Court or a Court exercising the powers of such a Court. This objection of the Defendants gave rise to a preliminary issue which has been answered in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants. 5. One of the grounds taken in defence was that the suit was not cognizable by a Small Cause Court or a Court exercising the powers of such a Court. This objection of the Defendants gave rise to a preliminary issue which has been answered in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants. 5. Learned Counsel for the applicants placed reliance on a number of decisions beginning from Uttam Chand v. S.M. Lalwani 1965 Supreme Court 716 and the decisions of this Court in Pooran Chand Seth v. Prabhat Kumar 1980 AWC (SOC) page 9 : 1979 ALR 58, Chunnoo Lal v. Additional District Judge 1975 AWC 390 and Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf 1975 SC 1758 in all of which the view taken is that where what is let out is a composite property consisting of a building as well as machinery and equipments affixed therein constituting a mill or Cinema or the like, of which the building housing the mill is only an incidental component the subject matter of the lease cannot be said to be an accommodation or building. 6. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondent on the other hand placed strong reliance on a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Natraj Studios Ltd. v. Navrang Studios 1981 SC 537. 7. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties I am clearly of the opinion that the contention of the learned Counsel for the applicants is well founded. It is fully supported by the decisions cited by him. In my opinion, the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of the Uttam Chand (Supra) as well as that reported in Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf 1975 SC 1758 directly cover the controversy. These decisions were also noticed by the Supreme Court in the case cited by the learned Counsel for the Respondents, but they were distinguished by their Lordships on the ground that the controversies involved therein were different. 8. The question whether the suit in hand is cognizable by a Small Cause Court has to be decided with reference to Article 4 (as it stands after its amendment by U.P. Act No. 37 of 1972) of the Second Schedule of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 8. The question whether the suit in hand is cognizable by a Small Cause Court has to be decided with reference to Article 4 (as it stands after its amendment by U.P. Act No. 37 of 1972) of the Second Schedule of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The said Article along with its explanation read as follows: (4) a suit for the possession of Immovable property or for the recovery of an interest in such property, but not including a suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee from a building after the determination of his lease, and for the recovery from him of compensation for the use and occupation of that building after determination of lease. Explanation- For the purposes of this Article, the Expression 'building' means a residential or non-residential, roofed structure, and includes any land (including any garden), garages and out houses, appurtenant to such building and also includes any fitting affixed to the building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. 9. The question, therefore, which falls for determination is whether this is a suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee from a building. 10. In the case of Uttam Chand (Supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the question whether a 'Dal Mill' building with the machinery affixed therein in sound working order and accessories leased out on rent was a building within the meaning of Section 3(a)(y)(3) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act. The provisions of Section 3(a)(y)(3) of the M.P. Act were materially the same as in the Explanation to Article 4 quoted above. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the question whether the subject matter of a lease is a building or not has to be decided by looking into the dominant intention of the parties and finding out whether the same was merely to let out the building simplicitor or what was intended to be let out was a composite property consisting of a Mill or Cinema etc. with which the building housing the same went only incidentally. The terms of the lease were examined by the Supreme Court and it was observed that from a perusal of the same, it was obvious that the subject matter of the lease was Dal Mill and that the building with its fixtures went along with the Dall Mill only subsidiarily. with which the building housing the same went only incidentally. The terms of the lease were examined by the Supreme Court and it was observed that from a perusal of the same, it was obvious that the subject matter of the lease was Dal Mill and that the building with its fixtures went along with the Dall Mill only subsidiarily. The dominant object of the lease was that the entire business apparatus be demised. It was hence held that the subject matter of the lease was not a building within the meaning of M.P. Act, but a Mill. 11. The facts of the present case are indistinguishable from the facts of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Uttam Chand (Supra). In the present case from a perusal of the plaint allegation it is clear that a composite property consisting of a fullfedged Dal Mill of which the building in question was only an incidental or subsidiary component was let out. 12. Learned Counsel for the Respondent, however, placed strong reliance on the Explanation to Article 4 of the Second Schedule quoted above. He submitted that building has been defined as including any fittings affixed thereto. Consequently, the mere fact that there are some machineries fixed in the building would not take the leased property out of the purview of the proviso to Article 4 of the Second Schedule. 13. In the case of Uttam Chand also the term accommodation had been defined under the M.P. Act as including any fittings affixed in the building or any part of the building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. Inspite of this, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held the lease not to be a lease of the accommodation on the ground that the dominant intention of the parties was not to lease the building itself but that the building was intended to be a mere appendage to the entire factory or mill. 14. In the present case, the plaint allegations, in particular paragraph 4, leave no manner of doubt that a composite property in the shape of a full-fiedged business apparatus intended to be was leased with the Defendants for running a Dal Mill. Under the circumstances the dicta of the Supreme Court in the case of Uttam Chand as well as Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Sarraf (supra) are squarely attracted. 15. Under the circumstances the dicta of the Supreme Court in the case of Uttam Chand as well as Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Sarraf (supra) are squarely attracted. 15. The other decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the applicants also directly support his contention. In most of these cases the facts were materially the same. Following these decisions I hold that the subject matter of the lease in the present case was not a building but a composite property comprising a regular Dal Mall of which the building was only an incidental part. 16. Coming to the decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondent namely Natraj Studios (supra), in my opinion, the same is clearly distinguishable. As mentioned above, the Supreme Court had specifically considered the decision in the case of Uttam Chand (Supra) but it did not dissent from it. On the contrary their Lordships observed that the controversy involved in that decision was different. In the case of Natraj Studios Private Limited, the short question which fell for determination was whether the leased property which consisted of a building and a cinema machinery fitted therein constituted 'premises' within the meaning of Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging House Rates Control Act, and their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the leased property clearly fell within the definition of Sections 5(8), 5(8A) and 6(1) of the Bombay Act. The suit was hence cognizable by a Small Cause Court under the relevant local law. 17. The case of Natraj Studios Private Limited turned upon the peculiar features of the Bombay Act under which it was sufficient if the premises were let out or given on licence for residence, education and business etc. It was because of the special features of the Bombay Act that their Lordships held that the premises do not cease to be premises within the meaning of Sections 5(8), 5(8A) merely because the building was capable of being used for the particular business only or merely because machinery or equipments must necessarily go along with the building if it was to be used for business. Their Lordships specifically observed that if the premises had not been defined to include a building given on licence for business purposes but meant only a building which was let as such, it could well be argued that the premises would not take within its sweep a business let out as a business. 18. It would thus seem clear that the facts of the case of Natraj Studios Private Limited, turned entirely on the peculiar features of the Bombay Act. There are no such parallel or corresponding provisions in Article 4 of the Provicial Small Cause Court Act. The case is hence distinguishable. 19. My conclusion, therefore, is that on the facts alleged in the plaint, the suit was not cognizable by a Small Cause Court and that it was triable on the regular side. 20. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned III Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr is set aside. The said Court will now return the plaint to the Plaintiff-Respondent for being presented to the Court having the jurisdiction to try the same. No order as to costs.