ORDER M. Sahai, J. - Principal controversy in this petition, directed against orders of Consolidation authorities, is twofold, one whether appeal under section 11, U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, could be filed only by a person who was objector or opposite party before Consolidation Officer or Assistant Consolidation Officer or it could be filed even by a person who could be deemed to be party, and whether consolidation officer committed any illegality or impropriety in not condoning delay in filing of objection by petitioner under section 9, filed simultaneously along with appeal, may be by way of abundant caution. 2. Before examining these aspects facts in brief may be mentioned. From pedigree disclosed in para 2 of the writ petition which is not controverted in counter-affidavit, except that petitioners are denied to have any connection with the family, it is obvious that opposite parties are fathers, fathers, sons, son of Sheo Govind, (sic) who was entered over Khata Nos. 43 and 73 when consolidation was enforced. A report was submitted by consolidation staff that Sheo Govind was reported to be dead but his last rites had not been performed but as he was not survived by any son, daughter or wife his name may be expunged. On 2-2-71, opposite parties 5 and 10 appeared before Consolidation Officer and stated that Sheo Govind died 15 or 16 years ago leaving them as his sole heirs. Report of consolidation staff and statement of opposite parties, supported by Pradhan so convinced Consolidation Officer that he passed an order in their favour on same day without any inquiry or even issuing any proclamation. On 14-10-1971 petitioners sister's sons of Sheo Govind filed an objection under section 9 along with application under section 5, Limitation Act, in respect of Khata Nos. 43, 44, 50, 73, 81 and 82. They alleged that they came to know about the order substituting names of opposite parties in place of their maternal uncle on 10-10-1971. It was claimed that in fact they were the sole heirs but they were not aware of death of Sheo Govind who although not heard of for last seven years but as his last rites had not been performed they did not know of it and they came to know of his death only when they heard of the order and got the record inspected. An appeal was also filed against order dated 2-2-1971. An appeal was also filed against order dated 2-2-1971. It was dismissed on 23-2-1972 as petitioners being not party before consolidation officer the appeal, at their instance, was not maintainable. And the objection under section 9 was dismissed on 17-5-1973 as petitioners having filed appeal they obviously had knowledge of these proceedings. It was also found that there were three publications in the village and in case petitioners would have been interested they would have definitely found out about it. Therefore, it was not possible to believe that they had no knowledge of consolidation proceedings. The Deputy Director of Consolidation in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction under section 48 also did not find any illegality in any of these orders. 3. So far order dated 2-2-1971 in respect of Khata Nos. 43 and 73 is concerned it obviously is manifestly erroneous in law. It is admitted that name of Sheo Govind was recorded in revenue records along with opposite party. It was at their instance that his name was impugned and their names were mutated. In para 6 of the writ petition it has been stated that the consolidation officer did not issue any proclamation but treated the case as contested case under section 9A of the Act. Similarly in para 8 it is stated that the petitioners were not aware that proceedings for mutation would be taken without issuing any proclamation. These have not been denied in paras 8 and 10 of the counter-affidavit. It, therefore, stands admitted that the consolidation officer did not issue any proclamation in respect of these two khatas. In Ugra Sen v. D.D.C., 1970 Rev Dec 445 it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that issuing of proclamation by Consolidation authorities in mutation proceedings is mandatory and if the Consolidation Officer allows mutation without issuing proclamation then his order suffers from irregularity'. Similar view was reiterated in Bindhyachal v. Ram Kishan Rai, 1982 All LJ 458 by Brother K. N. Misra, J. It was held that an order passed by assistant consolidation officer directing expunction of name of a recorded tenure-holder by considering claim of an objector on merits in absence of any one to oppose the objection and without issuing proclamation is illegal and without jurisdiction. The order dated 2-2-1971, therefore, passed by consolidation officer cannot be maintained. The order dated 2-2-1971, therefore, passed by consolidation officer cannot be maintained. Learned counsel for opposite party urged that it was an objection under section 9, therefore, issuing of proclamation, etc. was not necessary. The submission has no merit. It is not the mention of section in the objection but the nature of relief which is decisive of whether the objection was disputing correctness of entry or seeking mutation. As opposite parties claimed to be substituted in place of Sheo Govind it was in the nature of objection seeking mutation. The order of consolidation officer, therefore, directing mutation of name of opposite parties in revenue record was illegal and cannot be maintained. 4. After this finding it was not necessary to examine the correctness of order passed by appellate authority dismissing the appeal as not maintainable but as learned counsel for parties have advanced arguments on it and the matter is of some importance it is worthwhile examining it. Right of appeal has been conferred under S. 11 against any order passed by consolidation officer or assistant consolidation officer on "any party to the proceedings u/s. W. According to learned counsel for opposite parties the Statute having restricted the right to those persons only who were parties before consolidation officer or assistant consolidation officer the appeal filed by petitioner was not maintainable. Learned counsel maintained that reasons for restricting this right were apparent. A person who did not claim any right under section 9A cannot subsequently come by way of appeal. He submitted that right of appeal is not an inherent right. It is statutory. Once the Legislature conferred it on a class of persons then others shall be deemed to have been excluded. 5. No exception can be taken to the argument advanced by the learned counsel as a general proposition. It further cannot be disputed that Legislature in conferring right since 1964 on, 'any party to the proceedings aggrieved by an order' as against 'any person aggrieved by the order' intended to restrict the right of appeal. Yet the question is whether the expression, any party to the proceeding' is to be understood in such narrow sense as suggested by learned counsel for opposite party. Yet the question is whether the expression, any party to the proceeding' is to be understood in such narrow sense as suggested by learned counsel for opposite party. Construed literally if 'A' was party and he died after the order was passed by consolidation officer but before expiry of limitation for period of appeal his heirs shall have no right to approach Settlement Officer (Consolidation) under section 11 of the Act. Because they were not party and Consolidation of Holdings Act does not provide for such contingency. While interpreting a provision it is not only the language but its setting, background and objective which has also to be kept in mind. The Legislature while restricting the right of appeal could not have intended to confine it to those persons only who were either objector or conte's tor. That would be too narrow a construction. If the interpretation as suggested by learned counsel for opposite party is accepted it is likely to cause 'immense hardship and would give rise to complications. 6. Even on the language of the section as it stands it appears doubtful if the submission of learned counsel can be accepted as sound. Section 11 confers right of appeal against orders passed by consolidation officer and assistant consolidation officer under section 9A of the Act. Sub-sec. (1) of S. 9A provides for determination of what is described as uncontested cases by assistant consolidation officer. Its sub-cl. (ii) reads as under : 'The assistant consolidation officer shall- (i) ............ (ii) where no objections are filed, 4 after making such enquiry as he may deem necessary to settle the disputes...........' 7. Appeal under section 11 lies against orders passed by assistant consolidation officer and consolidation officer under section 9. If the intention would have been to confine it to sub-cl (i) of S. 9A (1) it would have been mentioned there. But on the language as it stands appeal lies against orders passed under sub cl. (ii) of S. 9A (1) as well. If it is confined to party or objector or contest or then obviously no appeal would lie against such order. And yet an order passed under section 9A (1) may be prejudicial to a person. 8. In S. 96, Civil P. C., 'appeal lies from every decree passed by any Court'. The language used is of widest import. If it is confined to party or objector or contest or then obviously no appeal would lie against such order. And yet an order passed under section 9A (1) may be prejudicial to a person. 8. In S. 96, Civil P. C., 'appeal lies from every decree passed by any Court'. The language used is of widest import. But can it be suggested that an appeal can be filed by any person or stranger who has nothing to do with the decree. Even without the use of expression, any party to the decree,' the words have necessarily to be read there. In Jatan Kanwar v. Golcha Properties, AIR 1971 SC 374 appeal against order of Company Judge was refused as the appellant had not appeared when order was passed. It was held (at p. 376) : "In our opinion apart from R. 139 to which reference has been made by the High Court the Official Liquidator as well as the learned company Judge were bound by the rules of natural justice to issue a notice to the appellant and hear her before making the order appealed against. If there was default on their part in not following the correct procedure it is wholly incomprehensible how the appellant could be deprived of her right to get her grievance redressed by filing an appeal against the order which had been made in her absence and without her knowledge. It would be a travesty of justice if a party is driven to file a suit which would involve long and cumbersome procedure when an order has been made directly affecting that party and redress can be had by filing an appeal which it permitted by law. It is well settled that a person who is not a party to the suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate Court and such leave should be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the judgment." Similarly, in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh, AIR 1974 SC 994 , it was held both by majority and minority that an appeal could be filed even by a person who was not party to the proceedings. In para 84 it was held: "Firstly there is a catena of authorities. In para 84 it was held: "Firstly there is a catena of authorities. which, following the doctrine of Lindley, L J., in re Securities Insurance Co., (1894) 2 Ch 410 have laid down the rule that a person who is not a party to a decree or order may with the leave of the Court, prefer an appeal from such decree or order if he is either bound by the order or is aggrieved by it or is prejudicially affected by it. As a rule, leave to appeal will not be refused to a person, who might have been made ex nominee a party." 9. Crux of the matter appears to be the prejudice or injury which is caused to a person by the order. If there is injury then whether the statute says so or is silent, whether the language is narrow or wide the remedy of appeal provided can be availed both on principle of natural justice and existence of prejudicial order against person concerned. In light of these principles a person who is affected by an order of consolidation officer cannot be deprived of approaching the appellate authority. Learned counsel for opposite party relied on an unreported decision in Ram Lakhan v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, (Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 5885 of 1975) decided on 7.8.1980 wherein brother R. S. Singh, J. held that the right of appeal is confined to a party to the proceedings under section 9A. True but in view of the dictum laid down by Supreme Court in two decisions cited above the expression `party to the proceedings' has to be understood in the sense of including even those persons against whom orders are passed in violation of principle of natural justice or are prejudicial to them. Right to file an appeal may be restricted by the provisions of the statute but the Court, where it is satisfied that injustice is being done to any person, can always in the interest of justice come to the rescue of such person and entertain the appeal filed by him. 10. In this case it has been seen above that an order was passed in favour of opposite party which was highly prejudicial and against the interest of petitioners if they are found to be heirs of Sheo Govind. 10. In this case it has been seen above that an order was passed in favour of opposite party which was highly prejudicial and against the interest of petitioners if they are found to be heirs of Sheo Govind. It is true that they were not party and therefore, they were not covered under the expression 'any party' to the objection filed before consolidation or assistant consolidation officer but yet it was open to them to satisfy the appellate authority that the order passed against them was contrary to the principles of natural justice. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) when he dismissed the appeal as not maintainable committed a manifest error of law as he did not consider whether order passed by consolidation officer was prejudicial to petitioner. It is thus apparent that the order passed by the appellate authority cannot be maintained. 11. As regards dismissal of objection filed by petitioner as barred by time it again suffers from manifest error of law. Delay in filing the objection was sought to be explained by petitioners because of lack of knowledge of death of Sheo Govind and petitioners' residence in another village. First did not appeal to the consolidation officer because the petitioners filed an appeal also but while recording this finding the consolidation officer forgot that both the objections and appeal were filed on the same day. The filing of appeal, therefore, could not give rise to an inference that petitioners had knowledge of the proceedings. Nor was he justified in refusing to condone the delay on ground that number of publications had been made in the village and if the petitioners could have been interested they would have certainly filed objection within time. It being admitted that petitioners are residents of another District it was not possible for them to know about the consolidation in village in dispute. Further even if they would have known they could have filed objection only if they had known that Sheo Govind was dead. For this there was no evidence except statement made by opposite parties before consolidation officer that he died 15 or 20 years ago. Normally when a person dies his last rites are performed by his heirs or survivors. Further even if they would have known they could have filed objection only if they had known that Sheo Govind was dead. For this there was no evidence except statement made by opposite parties before consolidation officer that he died 15 or 20 years ago. Normally when a person dies his last rites are performed by his heirs or survivors. It is not denied that no last rites were performed, rather the consolidation staff had reported that although it was reported that Sheo Govind was dead but his last rites had not been performed till then. The explanation of petitioners in the circumstances that as his last rites had not been performed they had no knowledge about the death of Sheo Govind appeares to be quite reasonable. If last rites would have been performed by opposite parties who are distant collateral's of Sheo Govind, then petitioners who re sisters' sons would have got information. It is admitted that last rites were not performed. The explanation of petitioners, therefore, that they had no knowledge about death of Sheo Govind was liable to be believed. From the allegations in the writ petition which are not denied specifically in the counter-affidavit it was a case of civil death and such death is known or can be presumed only when the controversy in respect of death of such person arises in any proceedings or in any court of law. 12. Learned counsel for opposite parties relied on an unreported decision in Lalta Singh v. D.D.C., decided on 11.8.1980 (Civil Misc. Writ No. 7179 of 1980) in support of the submission that the finding recorded on condonation of delay is a finding of fact which should not be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction. The learned Judge while taking this view has observed that while interfering with an order passed under section 5, Limitation Act, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, what has to be taken into consideration is broad equities between parties. As pointed out above the equities as they emerged out from the facts stated above are in favour of petitioners rather than opposite parties. Apart from it the consolidation authorities did not decide the question of condonation of delay, on relevant consideration. As pointed out above the equities as they emerged out from the facts stated above are in favour of petitioners rather than opposite parties. Apart from it the consolidation authorities did not decide the question of condonation of delay, on relevant consideration. It cannot be disputed that an order passed by an authority if passed on considerations which are not relevant cannot be maintained under Article 226 of the Constitution. 13. Learned counsel for opposite parties argued that even if it is held that order is illegal then no writ can be issued in favour of petitioner as there is no equity in their favour. The submission is wholly misconceived. If petitioners are held to be sister's sons then their claim would be indefeasible. The claim of equity, therefore, advanced on behalf of opposite party cannot be accepted. 14. In the result this petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders dated 2-2-1971 and 15-5-1973 passed by consolidation officer are quashed. The order dated 24-8-1973 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation is also quashed. The consolidation officer is directed to decide the dispute between parties on merits in accordance with law. Parties shall bear their own costs.