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1982 DIGILAW 1063 (ALL)

Mool Chand v. III Additional District Judge, Mathura

1982-09-17

A.N.VARMA

body1982
JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - This is a tenants' writ petition. It is directed against the concurrent decrees passed by the courts below, decreeing a suit filed by three persons, namely, Brij Basi Lal, Bishambhar Nath and one Smt. Champa Devi, the mother of the first two for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent and damages. Both the courts below have decreed the suit. 2. Briefly stated the plaint case was that the plaintiffs were the owners of the house in dispute situate at Arya Samaj Road, Mathura. One Gopal was the tenant of the plaintiffs in the aforesaid shop and on his death defendant No. 1, Mool Chand illegally occupied the dispute and started claiming that his son Jagdish Prasad, defendant No. 2 had inherited the tenancy rights by virtue of his being a legal heir of the deceased Gopal. The plaintiff filed a suit No. 497 of 1946 against the defendant No. 1 for ejectment. The defendant No. 2 was also impleaded in that suit. The suit was decreed against both. It was urged that the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were in occupation of the shop as tresspassers and not as tenants. In order to save themselves from ejectment the said defendants entered into an agreement of tenancy with the plaintiff Brij Basi Lal on a monthly rental of Rs. 30/-. This was done under a rent note dated 26-2-1959 executed by the defendant Jagdish Prasad in favour of Brij Basi Lal. The defendants paid rent upto 25th of September, 1960 but thereafter they failed to pay any rent. A notice of demand dated 3 5-1965 was consequently served on the defendants. By the same notice the tenancy of the defendants was also terminated. 2A. The suit was contested by Jagdish Prasad alone, who is arrayed here as petitioner No. 2. His defence was that he was not bound by the terms of agreement executed by his father Mool Chand. It was further contended by him that Smt. Champa Devi, one of the plaintiffs having died during the pendency of the suit and her daughter not having beenimpl eaded, the suit had abated as a whole. 3. It appears that the statements of counsel for the parties were recorded under Order 10 Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure by the Court. 3. It appears that the statements of counsel for the parties were recorded under Order 10 Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure by the Court. In the statement under Order 10 Shri Rakhal Das, counsel for the plaintiffs stated that the shop in dispute was given to the defendant by Brij Basi Lal, the Karta of the Khanda on behalf of the three plaintiffs. However, in pursuance of an award which was made a rule of the court Smt. Champa Devi was granted only a life estate in the property in dispute. Consequently upon her death the other two plaintiffs alone became the sole owners and landlord. 4. On the pleadings of the parties relevant issues were framed by the trial court. The trial court held that the tenancy of the defendant had been validly determined and that the suit had not abated. Smt. Champa Devi had only a life estate under an award as a result of which the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act were attracted. 5. Aggrieved by the decree passed by the trial court the defendant filed a revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act but without my success. 6. Sri K. B. L. Gaur, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted only one point for my consideration. His argument is that the conclusion of the courts below that the suit has not abated by virtue of the failure of the plaintiffs to bring an application for substitution of all the heirs of Smt. Champa Devi is manifestly unsustainable. Relying on the provisions of Order 22 Rules 2 and 3 Civil Procedure Code, learned counsel contended that as the case was not covered by Rule 2 of Order 22 Civil Procedure Code the same could not be applied to the present case and consequently the suit must be held to have abated, inasmuch as no substitution application was made for substitution of the daughter of Smt. Champa Devi. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, it does not seem necessary to deck a the above controversy. It may, however, be mentioned that admittedly the sons of Smt. Champa Devi were already on the record as plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2. The grievance of the petitioners, however, is that Smt. Champa Devi had also left a daughter who was not substituted. It may, however, be mentioned that admittedly the sons of Smt. Champa Devi were already on the record as plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2. The grievance of the petitioners, however, is that Smt. Champa Devi had also left a daughter who was not substituted. As mentioned above, in view of the other finding of the revisional court, namely, that Brij Basi Lal alone would on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case be the landlord vis-a-vis, the petitioners, it is not necessary to pronounce upon the correctness of the above contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 8. The revisional court had adverted to the rent note (Ex. 10) executed by Mool Chand on behalf of himself and the other defendant. This rent note mentions that the shop was taken on rent from Brij Basi Lal who was the owner of the same. The rent note further states that the defendant had taken the shop on rent from Brij Basi Lal on Rs. 30/- per month exclusive of water tax and other taxes. The revisional court notes that there is no dispute that Mool Chand did in point of fact execute this rent note in favour of only Brij Basi Lal. From these facts the revisional court has concluded that Brij Basi Lal alone was the defendant lessor and that it is not open to the defendant to contend that there are other co-owners also as distinct from co-owners. 9. The above finding of the courts below is perfectly correct and is fully justified by the evidence which consists of the own document, namely, the rent note executed by the defendant Mool Chand. Upon this finding the suit of the plaintiffs respondents was entitled to succeed irrespective of whether Smt. Champa Devi was also a co-lessor and whether the suit had become defective by reason of the failure of the surviving plaintiffs to bring on record the daughter of Smt. Champa Devi also. 10. Sri Gaur, however, submits that the revisional court was not justified in spelling out a new case for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' clear case was that all the three of them were the landlords, hence it was not permissible for the revisional court to set up a new case for the plaintiffs. 11. I am not impressed by the above submission. The plaintiffs' clear case was that all the three of them were the landlords, hence it was not permissible for the revisional court to set up a new case for the plaintiffs. 11. I am not impressed by the above submission. As mentioned above, the conclusion reached by the revisional court flows from a document executed by the defendant himself. The defendant did not dispute having executed such a document. The effect of that document is inevitable. The petitioners were not, in my opinion, in the slightest degree prejudiced by the fact that there was no express plea raised by the plaintiffs in the plaint that the defendants were liable to be evicted at the instance of Brij Basi Lal alone by virtue of rent note executed by Mool Chand. In view of the absence of the possibility of any prejudice being caused to the petitioner, I am not inclined to entertain in these proceedings the technical objection raised by the petitioners that the revisional court was not justified in decreeing the suit on the alternative basis, namely, that under the rent note Brij Basi Lal was alone competent to bring the suit and to seek the ejectment of the petitioners. 12. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.