Judgment The pre-emptor's case is that the disputed property of schedule 'kha' was purchased by him and by the opposite party No. 2 in 8 annas share each by a Kobala, dated 26th December, 1962. Then by a Kobala registered on the 27th April, 1974, opposite party No. 2 sold his 8 annas share in the property to opposite party No. 1 without serving any notice on him. He first came to know of the purchase on the 30th June, 1975. He obtained a certified copy of the document on the 8th August, 1975. Then the present Miscellaneous Case was filed for pre-emption under section 24 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act and alternatively under section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act on the ground that he was a co-sharer. Then he elected to proceed under section 24 of the first Act. 2. Opposite party No. 1 contested the application. His plea was that the property was purchased by the pre-emptor's father and the pre-emptor was a mere benamdar. A suit was filed against Laba Santhal and Matal Tudu regarding a portion of the property by the pre-emptor's father, who conducted the entire litigation and in that case, the benami transaction was established. 3. The learned Munsif accepted the opposite parties' version and dismissed the Miscellaneous Case. An appeal was preferred. The Appellate Court reversed the decision of the learned Munsif, held that the pre-emptor was not his father's benamdar and the pre-emptor and opposite party No. 2 jointly purchased the property and hence they were co-sharers. The prayer was, therefore, allowed and necessary orders passed. Hence, this revisional application. 4. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the decision of the Appellate Court is entirely against the weight of evidence. The evidence given by Opposite Party No. 1, Mohan, was not properly considered by the Appellate Court. Similar mistake was made by that Court regarding the statements given by O.P.W. 1, Bireswar and O.P.W. 2, Haripada. The evidence of these persons was not properly appreciated. That Court came to an erroneous decision on a question of law regarding benami because the provisions of section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act are not applicable to the facts of this case. The petitioner was not a party to that case and hence the contents of Ext. The evidence of these persons was not properly appreciated. That Court came to an erroneous decision on a question of law regarding benami because the provisions of section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act are not applicable to the facts of this case. The petitioner was not a party to that case and hence the contents of Ext. B were improperly taken into account by the learned Appellate Court. Reference has been made to the case of (1) Hiralal v. Kasturbai, in AIR 1976 SC 1853 at page 1855. It has been stated that when the decision of the Appellate Court is incorrect, such question of fact can be permitted to be raised in revision. 5. The learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of the opposite parties, has referred to the case of (2) Barkiss v. Prasonnomayee, in ILR 6 Cal 794 to show that where a deed of conveyance recited that the vendor was seized of the property intended to be sold and it purported to convey the property, in a suit for dower by the vendor's widow against the purchaser's heirs, it was held that although as between the plaintiff and the defendants, there was no estoppel, yet, since the purchaser bought the property, the recital was prima facie evidence against the purchaser and also against the persons claiming through him that the estate conveyed was what it purported to be, the same being an admission by conduct of parties, which amounted to evidence against them. There is a recital in the pre-emptor's deed of purchase that a partition had already been effected and thereafter a joint purchase was made by him and by opposite party No. 2. After such purchase, the transferee pre-emptor is bound by' such statement contained in the original deed of purchase. 6. The case of Hiralal v. Kasturbai (supra) is on a different point because the suit was brought in the Court of Small Causes under section 28 of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The allegation was that the appellant was a trespasser. 6. The case of Hiralal v. Kasturbai (supra) is on a different point because the suit was brought in the Court of Small Causes under section 28 of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The allegation was that the appellant was a trespasser. In such circumstances, it was stated that a decree against a trespasser could only be passed by a regular Civil Court in a suit brought under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure and it could not be passed by a Judge of Small Causes Court before whom a suit for eviction as a special forum was maintainable under section 28 of the Act, vide the page 1855 of the report. 7. Then about the question of law. The final Court of fact has held that the petitioner was not a benamdar of his deceased father. The question of benami is one of fact. After following the observations of the Judicial Committee, it was laid down in the case of (3) Meenakshi Mills v. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in 1956 SCA 1139 at page 1165, that the finding on the question of benami is one of fact. The observations made by Sarkaria, J. in the case of (4) Joydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra, in AIR 1974 SC 171 may also be referred to. 8. In the case of (5) M. L. & B. Corporation v. Bhutnath, in AIR 1964 SC 1336 , it has been stated that High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact in revision. It will appear from the later case of (6) M. Sethi v. R. Kapoor, in AIR 1972 SC 2379 that after following decisions in (7) Raja Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh, LR 11 IA 237, (8) Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeb Aiyar, LR 44 IA 261 and (9) N.S. Venkatagiri v. Hindu Religious Endowment Board, LR 76 IA 67 it has been stated that an erroneous decision on a question of law, which has no relation with question of jurisdiction of Court, cannot be corrected by High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The same observations have been made in the Supreme Court cases in (10) Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte, AIR 1975 SC 1297 at pages 1301 and 1302 and (11) India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin M.A. Baker, AIR 1978 SC 45 . 9. The same observations have been made in the Supreme Court cases in (10) Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte, AIR 1975 SC 1297 at pages 1301 and 1302 and (11) India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin M.A. Baker, AIR 1978 SC 45 . 9. Since the allegation is that there was an erroneous decision only on a question of law, this finding regarding benami cannot be interfered with in revision. There is no jurisdictional error or material irregularity. Hence, the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted. The Rule is discharged without any order as to costs.