JUDGMENT : R.C. Patnaik, J. - "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience", so said Justice Holmes and the State of Orissa complains that its application for restoration of an execution case has been dismissed upon a theoretical approach and the decision of the Subordinate Judge, Baripada in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 69/71 suffers from exercise of jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity and failure of justice would result if the decision is allowed to stand. 2. Execution Case No. 46/59 of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Baripada has had a chequered career. It came to this Court on an earlier occasion in Civil Revision No. 136/77 at the instance of one of the judgment-debtors. I am not burdening this judgment by narrating the winding course the case has taken. Suffice it to say that there have been various defaults and restorations and such part conduct on the part of the State of Orissa has been invoked against it. 3. The execution case was levied for a sum of Rs. 79,365.25. The original decree-holder was the Mayurbhanj State Bank. In January, 1972 the State of Orissa was substituted. On 13-8-1970, the execution case got dismissed for default. The question is if the application registered as Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 69/71 should be allowed and restoration granted. 4. It is well settled that previous and subsequent conduct of the applicant is irrelevant. The reason is simple. The applicant may not have good and sufficient cause for his past default but the reason for the default in question may be very satisfying and sufficient. So the Courts have refrained from penalising the applicant for his past and subsequent defaults, if the default in question is backed by sufficient cause. 5. The applicant alleged that the Government Pleader, Baripada was in charge of the execution case. His private clerk was handling Government matters because a whole-time clerk had not been assigned to him by the Government. He as Government Pleader, was to handle Government cases before different Courts in the district. So often, in connection with such professional engagements he used to remain absent from Baripada. He used to instruct his clerk to file applications for adjournments whenever he remained absent. The execution case was posted for hearing on 13-8-1970. So he had instructed his clerk to file and adjournment petition. So often, in connection with such professional engagements he used to remain absent from Baripada. He used to instruct his clerk to file applications for adjournments whenever he remained absent. The execution case was posted for hearing on 13-8-1970. So he had instructed his clerk to file and adjournment petition. He returned a week later and ascertained from his clerk that an adjournment petition was filed and the case was adjourned. As he believed the statements of his clerk there was no occasion for him to check the veracity. Just before the summer vacation of 1971 when he looked through cases wherein Government was party to find out what further steps were to be taken in each of the cases it came to light that the execution case had been dismissed for default for failure to take steps on 13-8-1970. Immediately an application u/s 151 of the CPC was filed for restoration. 6. The judgment-debtor in spite of notice did not choose to appear to contest the restoration application. At the exparte hearing the then Government Pleader offered himself as a witness and was examined by the State of Orissa as P.W. 1. He supported the allegations contained in the restoration petition. His evidence remained unassailed, though a few questions were put by the Court. He stated: At that time I had to go to many places to conduct cases when I go outside, I leave a petition with the clerk to file the same in Court. Ram Chandra Das was then my clerk. On 13-8-1970 Execution Case No. 46/59 was fixed for steps. As far as I remember, I was absent from Baripada on that day. I had left a adjournment petition with my clerk to file the same. I returned after one week or so. After my return he told me that he had filed the time petition. He was maintaining my diary of Govt. Pleader. He was filing my petitions in all cases, I believed him in good faith that he had taken steps. Before summer vacation of 1971 in May I know that this case has been dismissed, when I checked the cases. I filed the petition for restoration on 15-5-1971. I was under the impression that steps were being regularly taken. Pleader. He was filing my petitions in all cases, I believed him in good faith that he had taken steps. Before summer vacation of 1971 in May I know that this case has been dismissed, when I checked the cases. I filed the petition for restoration on 15-5-1971. I was under the impression that steps were being regularly taken. In answer to the questions put by the Court he stated that he had not verified his diary to find out as to what happened to each of the cases during his absence for one week and he had not seen all the case records for 8 months and his clerk quit his employment 5 to 6 months after his discovery in May, 1971 about the execution case. 7. In such matters, the approach has to be realistic and pragmatic and not theoretical or idealistic. An idealistic conduct may be the goal, but we are ordinary mortals with feet of clay. If each of us conducted himself m an ideal manner there would be no chaos, no litigation and no default. 8. It is, therefore, to be seen if the default can be condoned on grounds of sufficient cause. It is to be seen if the Government Pleader was negligent or his conduct fall short of the standard expected of an advocate of his standing. The relationship between the client and the lawyer is one of good faith and that between the advocate and his clerk one of trust and belief. If the Government Pleader had instructed his clerk to file an adjournment petition and ascertained from his clerk on return that such an application had been filed and the case had been adjourned, the negligence of his clerk would doubtless exonerate him from the charge of negligence and his client the State of Orissa should not suffer for the lapse that occurred on 13-8-1970. The question whether a substitute counsel should have been engaged does not arise in this case as material facts, namely, if there was sufficient time for engagement of a substitute counsel etc. are wanting. Now I better quote the trial judge If he was absent for about a week instructing his clerk to file a time petition, after his arrival it is but natural on his part to look to the diary and see as to what had happened to which cases. are wanting. Now I better quote the trial judge If he was absent for about a week instructing his clerk to file a time petition, after his arrival it is but natural on his part to look to the diary and see as to what had happened to which cases. Though immediately after his return to the headquarters this was not done, it would have been done some days thereafter, but in the instant case, the petition has been filed only on 15-5-1971 after a period of more than 9 months. It has not been specifically pleaded that the clerk played fraud on him and if really he was acting against the instruction of P.W. 1 he would have shown a false date or something like in the diary, but in this case P.W. 1 himself admits that for these 9 months he had not verified his diary. He admits that his clerk could not tell him till which date time was allowed, nor he verified the date. If the clerk could not tell it, he would have taken information from the Court itself, but that has not been done. Once trust and confidence in the clerk is assumed there is no reason why he would verify the diary on his return if the clerk had taken appropriate steps in all the cases. This is questioning the conduct by hindsight and is not permissible. A busy and senior counsel has more important and worthier matters to attend to than scrutinising and verifying the diary maintained by his clerk. The learned Subordinate Judge has further said: The Government pleader himself admits that he had not verified his diary for 8 months, so there is no meaning in throwing blame on the clerk Since inherent jurisdiction of the Court is sought, the previous and subsequent conduct of the parties has to be seen, though it may not be permissible in a case under Order 9, Rule 9, Civil Procedure or under Order 9 Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure. and thereafter holding that on certain other dates no steps had been taken and that the execution case had chequared career he held that- It cannot be accepted that for 9 months, the G.P. had not looked into his diary and the inordinate delay has not at all been explained Therefore, inherent jurisdiction cannot be exercised in favour of the D. Hr. The first sentence of the preceding paragraph questions the veracity of the then Government Pleader. There is no material on record on which he can brand him at untruthful. It should be remembered that persons do not ceases to be respectable when they appear before the Court as witnesses. It is therefore imperative that the Courts should be cautious and circumspect while passing comments on the character of a witness. It takes a life time to build a reputation. The materials must be adequate to justify the castigation. 9. I, therefore, hold that there is no material to disbelieve P.W. 1 and the learned Subordinate Judge erroneously and illegally relied on past conduct for holding that there was no sufficient cause for default in question. The standard of sufficient cause in a proceeding under Order 9, Rule 9 of the CPC is not different from that u/s 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The view of the learned Subordinate Judge that in an application u/s 151 of the CPC the past and the subsequent conduct are available for consideration is unsupportable in law and has vitiated his approach to the evidence and his decision. He has exercised jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity and I am satisfied that unless the decision is interfered with there would be failure of justice. 10. So I quash the judgment dated 12.1.1977. The judgment-debtors have appeared in this Court and contested the revision. I direct payment of Rs. 500/- as consolidated costs to the counsel for the opp. parties 1 and 5 in this Court within a period of 15 days from to-day, failing which this revision shall stand dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed