JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. 1. This Bench has been constituted to decide the reference made by one of us on October 23, 1980. 2. The facts, briefly stated, are these. Suit No. 23 of 1976 was filed by the plaintiff opposite party for ejectment, recovery of arrears of rent and damages against the defendant applicant in respect of premises no. 121/625, Shastri Nagar, Kanpur. The plaintiff alleged that he was the exclusive owner and landlord of the disputed premises and had let it out to the defendant on monthly rent of Rs. 180/-. In the written statement filed in Suit No. 2109 of 1971 the defendant renounced his character as that of a tenant and further denied the plaintiff's title, hence the plaintiff has acquired a right under Section 20 (2) (f) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 to evict the defendant on the said ground. The suit was contested by the defendant, and it was alleged by him that the accommodation in question was let out to him by the plaintiff's father and that he had been given to understand that the premises belonged to the plaintiff's father but was purchased and constructed in the name of the plaintiff. The defendant further asserted that he had been informed that on the death of the plaintiff's father, the property devolved upon the plaintiff's mother brothers and sisters. 3. On the pleadings of the parties, the Judge Small Causes framed a number of issues. Holding that by renouncing his character as that of a tenant and by denying the plaintiff's title as landlord, the defendant was liable to eviction under Section 20 (2) (f) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972, the Judge Small Causes decreed the suit, against which the present revision was filed. 4. The question that arose for decision before the Single Judge was whether the requirements of Section 20 (2) (f) had been established. For the plaintiff, reliance had been placed on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Hashmat Husain v. Sagir Ahmad, AIR 1958 Alld. 842. 4. The question that arose for decision before the Single Judge was whether the requirements of Section 20 (2) (f) had been established. For the plaintiff, reliance had been placed on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Hashmat Husain v. Sagir Ahmad, AIR 1958 Alld. 842. In that case, the Division Bench was called upon to consider the applicability of Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act and also the question whether Section 3 (1) (f) of U. P. Act III of 1947, which was similar to Section 20 (2) (f) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972, applied to the case. The argument advanced on behalf of the defendant was that he had not renounced his character as tenant and had also not denied the title of the plaintiff-landlord and, therefore, he could not be evicted under this clause. 5. This controversy was directly covered by the decision given in Hashmat Husain v. Sagir Ahmad (supra), wherein the view taken was that the defendants renounced their character as such when they asserted that they were not the tenants of the plaintiff whose tenants they really were. They set up a different tenancy under the plaintiff and Faiyaz Alam. The Bench further found that the claim that there was a landlord other than the plaintiff, also amounted to denial of the plaintiff's title inasmuch as the denial did not admit the plaintiff to be the sole proprietor or landlord of the accommodation which the defendants were occupying. Similar is the position in the instant case. It may be true that the defendant had merely asserted that there was some more landlords of the premises in question, but that definitely resulted in denying the sole proprietorship of the exclusive right of the plaintiff to realise the rent. That apart, the denial that the defendant was not the tenant of the plaintiff resulted in renouncing his character as such. Finding that Deoki Nandan, J. had inadvertantly held in Yograj v. Mohd. Yunus Khan, AIR 1980 All. 347 , that the question of applicability of Section 3 (l)(f) of U. P. Act III of 1947 was not decided by the Division Bench in the decision referred to above, the case was referred for decision by a larger Bench. 6. Finding that Deoki Nandan, J. had inadvertantly held in Yograj v. Mohd. Yunus Khan, AIR 1980 All. 347 , that the question of applicability of Section 3 (l)(f) of U. P. Act III of 1947 was not decided by the Division Bench in the decision referred to above, the case was referred for decision by a larger Bench. 6. After having considered the two cases, we find firstly that the observations of Deoki Nandan, J., in Yograj v. Mohammad Yunus Khan (supra) were obiter. On facts he held that the allegations made in the written statement did not amount to any renunciation of his character as tenant by the defendant or denial of the title of the plaintiff as landlord of the accommodation. The observations made thereafter by the learned Judge with regard to Hashmat Husain v. Sagir Ahmad (supra) are obiter in nature. Having held on facts that Section 3 (1) (f) of U. P. Act III of 1947 did not apply to the case, the learned Single Judge was not called upon to decide the scope of the said provision. Alternatively, we regret that we cannot share the opinion expressed by the learned Judge in the above case that Hashmat Husain v. Sagir Ahmad was not an authority for the interpretation of Section 3 (1) (f) of U. P. Act III of 1947. The said case had not only decided about the interpretation of Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act, but also Section 3(1) (f) of U. P. Act III of 1947. It appears to us that since the attention of the learned Judge was not invited to the paragraph where this question was dealt with he found that the Division Bench did not interpret clause (f) of Section 3 (1) of U. P. Act III of 1947. 7. Counsel for the defendant urged that as the plaintiff had filed an application under Section 21 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 for release of the premises in his favour treating the defendant as a tenant, filing of the same resulted in condonation of the defendant's conduct of renouncing his character in the earlier suit No. 2109 of 1971. Counsel for the defendant urged that as the plaintiff had filed an application under Section 21 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 for release of the premises in his favour treating the defendant as a tenant, filing of the same resulted in condonation of the defendant's conduct of renouncing his character in the earlier suit No. 2109 of 1971. This argument had been repelled by the single Judge on the footing that merely filing of an application for release did not amount to abandonment of the right which the plaintiff had acquired because of the written statement filed in Suit No. 2109 of 1971. No evidence had been brought that the defendant had been condoned or forgiven for the fault which he had committed by denying the title of the plaintiff. The Judge Small Causes had discussed the evidence in detail and found that the conduct of the defendant in denying the title of the plaintiff was unjustified. It was only on account of the observations made by Deoki Nandan, J. in Jograj v. Mohammad Yunus Khan (Supra) that the reference was made to the larger Bench. 8. The second question that occasioned the making of the reference to the Division Bench was the difference of opinion between the two Single Judges in Ghyasi Ram v. Ram Charan Singh, AIR 1978 Allahabad 376 and Smt. Chandra Devi v. Tapapad Sinha, AIR 1980 Allahabad 270. In Ghasi Ram's case M. P. Mehrotra, J., held that the requirements of law contained in Section 106 or Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act did not stand abrogated by anything contained in the various clauses of Section 3 of U. P. Act III of 1947. His view was that where a landlord sought to justify maintainability of his suit without the District Magistrate's permission under Sec. 3 (1) (f), he had to show that he had complied with the requirements of the notice as contained in Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act. With this view, M. N. Shukla, J., differed in Smt. Ckandra Devi v. Tapapad Sinha (Supra). This controversy has been set at rest by the Supreme Court in Pradesh Kumar v. Bonod Behari. AIR 1980 SC 1214 . With this view, M. N. Shukla, J., differed in Smt. Ckandra Devi v. Tapapad Sinha (Supra). This controversy has been set at rest by the Supreme Court in Pradesh Kumar v. Bonod Behari. AIR 1980 SC 1214 . In this case, the Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act to the extent which were in conflict with U. P. Act III of 1947 were no longer applicable. The view taken in this case, after relying on the decision in Dhanpal Chettiar v. Yasodai Ammal, AIR 1979 SC 1745 , was that once the requirements of the Rent Act were satisfied, the tenant could not claim the double protection of invoking the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or the terms of the contract. The observations of the Supreme Court in Dhanpal Chettiar v. Yasodai Ammal (Supra) in that regard were : "Even if the lease is determined by a forfeiture under the Transfer of Property Act, the tenant continues to be a tenant, that is to say, there is no forfeiture in the eye of law. The tenant becomes liable to be evicted under the State Rent Act, not otherwise.........one has to look to the provisions of law contained in the four corners of any State Rent Act to find out whether a tenant can be evicted or not. The theory of double protection or additional protection, it seems to us, has been stretched too far and without a proper and due consideration of all its ramifications." 9. For the reasons given above, we are unable to subscribe to the view expressed in Ghasi Ram's case (supra) that despite the State Rent Act, the requirements of Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act were required to be fulfilled. This case is no longer good law. 10. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed with costs. The stay order is discharged. Revision dismissed.