JUDGMENT A. N. Varma, J. - This writ petition is directed against concurrent orders passed by the courts below allowing an application of the respondent- landlord filed as far back as 11th of September, 1972 under section 2 1 (l)(a) of the U.P Act No. XIII of 1972 for an order of eviction against one Daulat Ram, who was admittedly the tenant of the disputed accommodation. Both the courts below have found that the need of the landlord is bona fide and on a comparison of the relative hardship the landlord has a better claim. 2. The aforesaid application was filed on the assertion that the land- lord bona fide required the disputed accommodation which was let out to one Daulat Ram. Daulat Ram has acquired a house of his own in a vacant state and he is residing comfortably there in the same city. In the application Manghan Mal, father of the petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 was also impleadcd. In regard to Manghan Mal the landlord asserted that he was the brother-in-law of Daulat Ram. He was residing in the disputed accommodation as a licensee of Daulat Ram. The landlord never treated him as a tenant. 3. The application was contested by Daulat Ram and the heirs of Manghan Mal, as Manghan Mal died during the pendency of the application before the Prescribed Authority. So far Daulat Ram was concerned, his simple case was that he had no concern with the disputed accommodation. The case taken by the heirs of Manghan Mal was that both Manghan Mal Daulat Ram were joint tenants. On Daulat Ram's surrendering his tenancy, Manghan Mal, his brother-in-law, was in occupation of the disputed accommodation as a sole tenant. The landlord recognised Manghan Mal as such throughout. They also disputed the claim of the landlord that he bona fide needed the accommodation. They claimed that they would suffer great hardship if the application was allowed. 4. The Prescribed Authority rejected the pleas raised by the petitioners and accepted the case of the landlord. It held that the landlord bona fide required the disputed accommodation and Daulat Ram, who was the only tenant of the disputed accommodation had acquired it house of his own where he was comfortably residing. Even on a balance of relative hardship the landlord was entitled to succeed. It held that the landlord bona fide required the disputed accommodation and Daulat Ram, who was the only tenant of the disputed accommodation had acquired it house of his own where he was comfortably residing. Even on a balance of relative hardship the landlord was entitled to succeed. The Prescribed Authority rejected the claim of the heirs of Manghan Mal that Manghan Mal was a joint tenant with Daulat Rain. It disbelieved the case that Daulat Ram having surrendered his tenancy, the landlord recognised Manghan Mal as a tenant. With these findings the application of the landlord was allowed. 5. These findings have been affirmed by the appellate court in appeal. 6. Before the appellate court a new plea was raised on behalf of the petitioners Nos. 1 to 3. It was urged that in view of the facts established on the record the petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 were entitled to protection of section 14 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. This plea was repelled by the appellate court both on the ground that the same had not been raised before the Prescribed Authority as well as on merits. An another plea, also not raised before the Prescribed Authority, was that the disputed accommodation was liable to be deemed vacant in view of the fact that Daulat Ram had left the accommodation when the present application under section 21 was made and consequently the application under section 21 was made and consequently the application under section 21 could not be filed. At best the landlord had a right only under section 16. This plea too was rejected by the appellate court on merits. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted four points for my consideration. I shall deal with them one by one. 8. The first point urged was that the appellate court was not correct in taking the view that the petitioners had not raised the plea of section 14 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Learned counsel took me through the written statement filed on behalf of the petitioners and submitted that a plea under section 14 could clearly be spelled out of the averments made on behalf of the petitioners in the written statement. 9. I am unable to accept the above contention. Learned counsel took me through the written statement filed on behalf of the petitioners and submitted that a plea under section 14 could clearly be spelled out of the averments made on behalf of the petitioners in the written statement. 9. I am unable to accept the above contention. I have examined the averments made in the written statement, but I do not find that any foundation on that plea under section 14 was laid in the written statement. For the success of a plea tinder section 14 a number of issues of facts arise. It has to be established that the claimant was in occupation on the relevant dates either as a tenant or a licensee within the meaning of section 2-A with the consent of the landlord and that the claimant is not a person against whom any suit or proceeding for eviction was pending before the court or authority on the date of the commencement of the Act. 10. In my opinion the written statement filed on behalf of the petitioners does not contain averments necessary for entitling them to raise a defence under section 14 of the Act. That such plea was not even in contemplation of the petitioners is also clear front the fact that there is not even a whisper in the order passed by the Prescribed Authority about any claim founded on section 14 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The appellate court was, therefore right in its premise that no such plea was raised by the petitioners before the Prescribed Authority. However, the appellate court went into the question on merits also and came to the conclusion that on the facts established on the record the petitioners were not entitled to claim the benefit of section 14 as among other things they failed to prove that they were tenants in occupation of the accommodation in dispute on the relevant dates with the consent of the landlord. It is not necessary for me to comment on the finding of the appellate court on merits on this point. The petitioners not having raised the plea based on section 14 before the Prescribed Authority, it was not permissible for the petitioners to raise that point in appeal or even before this court. 11. It is not necessary for me to comment on the finding of the appellate court on merits on this point. The petitioners not having raised the plea based on section 14 before the Prescribed Authority, it was not permissible for the petitioners to raise that point in appeal or even before this court. 11. Learned counsel contended that section 14 of the Act was enacted to confer benefit on the tenants or licensee in occupation of a building under tenancy on the relevant dates with the consent of the landlords. Even if, therefore, such a plea was not raised specifically by the petitioners the court can still recognise the claim of the petitioners to protect their interest under that provision. 12. I am unable to accept this contention. While it is true that sections 14 confers a benefit on tenants and licensees of the description mentioned in that provision, it is equally important that the landlord should also have the opportunity of establishing that on the facts of a particular case the claimants are not entitled to the benefit of section 14. Under the circumstances it was necessary for the petitioners to raise specific pleas in regard to their claim under section 14 before the Prescribed Authority and not having done that, they are not entitled to rely on the same. 13. The second submission of the learned counsel was that in view of the fact that Daulat Ram had left the accommodation in the year 1971, it was obvious that the accommodation was liable to be deemed vacant under section 12(1)(a). That being so, it was urged, section 21 could not apply. 14. The plea, again, was not raised before the Prescribed Authority. An attempt was, however, made to raise this plea before the appellate court. But what was urged before the appellate court was that in view of the fact that Daulat Ram had left the premises, the accommodation was liable to he deemed vacant. The basis on which it was said that the building be deemed vacant was that Daulat Ram having acquired a house of his own section 12 (3) was attracted. Section 12( 1)(a) was not pleaded even before the appellate court. The basis on which it was said that the building be deemed vacant was that Daulat Ram having acquired a house of his own section 12 (3) was attracted. Section 12( 1)(a) was not pleaded even before the appellate court. Now section 12(3) can have no application because Daulat Ram had acquired the building prior to the coming into force of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 19727 Section 12(1)(a) cannot also have any application because in the first instance the petitioners did not allege in their written statement that Daulat Ram had substantially removed the effects from the disputed accommodation, and, secondly according to petitioners themselves Daulat Ram had left even before the commencement of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Section 12(1)(a) has been held to he prospective in its operation by this Court. Under the circumstances section 12(1)(a) can have no application in any view. 15. The third submission of the learned counsel was that the appellate court has not compared the relative hardship. 16. This is wrong. The appellate court has compared the hardship likely to be caused to the parties at some length. The appellate court has observed that Daulat Ram had already acquired a house of his own. In regard to the other petitioners, the finding of the appellate court is that in the first place their hardship cannot be compared with that of the landlord for the simple reason that they are neither the tenants nor the members of the family of Daulat Ram and, secondly. even on merits the appellate court is not satisfied that on a comparison of respective hardship the petitioners have a better claim than that of the landlord. 17. The last submission of the learned counsel was that the finding of the appellate court on the question whether the landlord bona fide required the disputed accommodation, is vitiated because of the non-consideration of the offer made by the landlord himself before the Prescribed Authority, agreeing to provide an alternative accommodation for the petitioners on the first floor of the same building. 18. I cannot accept this contention. The appellate court has adverted to this issue also at some length. It has taken into account an application filed by the landlord before the appellate court to the effect that the offer was withdrawn for the reasons stated in that application. 18. I cannot accept this contention. The appellate court has adverted to this issue also at some length. It has taken into account an application filed by the landlord before the appellate court to the effect that the offer was withdrawn for the reasons stated in that application. The appellate court did consider the reasons given by the landlord for withdrawing the offer and has come to the conclusion that in view of the circumstances mentioned in the appellate court's order the landlord was not unjustified in withdrawing that offer. Moreover, the appellate court having found that the petitioners Nos I to 3 were not the tenants of the disputed accommodation, the landlord could not be compelled to stick to the offer made by him. The appellate court has found as a fact that notwithstanding the withdrawal of his offer the need of the landlord continued to be bona fide and pressing. This conclusion cannot be said to be wrong or vitiated by any error of law. 19. No other point was urged in support of this petition. 20. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. 21. The enforcement of the order of eviction shall, however, remain suspended for a period of four months, provided that the petitioners shall hand over vacant possession of the disputed accommodation to the respondent-landlord within this period and that the petitioners shall not directly or indirectly induct any other person into the accommodation or cause any damage to the building in any way.