JUDGMENT A. N. Varma, J. - This petition is directed against concurrent orders passed by the courts below allowing an application filed by the respondent-landlady under section 21(1)(a) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for an order of eviction against the petitioner who is the tenant of the disputed shop. The aforesaid application was filed some where in the beginning of 1976 on the assertion that the landlady had three sons besides her husband. The sons have come up of age. Some place has to be found for their business. The landlady has three shops, one of which is in occupation of the tenant while in the second one all the sons of the landlady were doing photography business. The third shop falling in between the above two shops is really a gallery measuring 6' x 12' used as passage for going up. In this passage the husband of the landlady has because of the non-availability of any shop shifted his kirana business. In the gallery adjacent to the shop in which his son is carrying on photography business, one of the son of the landlady had joined his father in the business which is somehow being carried on therein. There is then the third son of the landlady for whom there is no place whatsoever. The landlady therefore, requires the disputed shop to enable her husband and the other two sons to carry on some business in a proper way. The tenant on the other hand is happily circumstanced. His sons have already rented two shops belonging to the Municipal Board. The tenant can easily managed his business in either of these two shops. 2. The application was contested by the tenant on the ground that the need of the landlady was not bona fide at all. She had already sufficient accommodation in her occupation. She does not require any further accommodation for the purposes alleged by her. The tenant on the other hand would suffer irreparable loss. He has nothing to do with the business which his sons are carrying on in their own shops rented from the Municipal Board. 3. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application of the landlady on the finding that she bona fide required the disputed shop. The tenant on the other hand would suffer irreparable loss. He has nothing to do with the business which his sons are carrying on in their own shops rented from the Municipal Board. 3. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application of the landlady on the finding that she bona fide required the disputed shop. However, the Prescribed Authority did not compare the respective hardship as at that time the fourth proviso to section 21 which came to be inserted by U. P. Act No. 20 of 1976 was not there when the petition was filed. At that time the prevailing view was that the fourth proviso was not retrospective in its operation. Subsequently the law was clarified and it was held that the fourth proviso was retrospective in its operation. 4. The appellate court had also affirmed the order of the Prescribed Authority without comparing the respective hardship taking the same view as regards the retrospectivity of the fourth proviso. 5. Aggrieved by this order the petitioner came to this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition was allowed by an order of this Court dated 6-2-1980. The appellate court was directed to dispose of the case afresh after comparing the respective hardship likely to Be caused to the two parties and after comparing the evidence of the parties. When the matter came back the learned V Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal by the impugned order and recorded a specific finding that in comparison to the hardship likely to be suffered by the landlady by the refusal of the application, the tenant would suffer less than the landlady by the grant of the same. The appellate Court also found that the need of the landlady was bona fide and pressing and reserve a precedence over that of the tenant. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the tenant has again come to this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. Sri Sirish Prasad learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the appellate court has not complied with the directions issued by this court. The appellate court had been asked to consider the evidence on the record and then gave a finding on both the issues namely bonafide need of the landlady and comparative hardship. The appellate court has not considered the evidence on the record at all in recording its findings. 8. The appellate court had been asked to consider the evidence on the record and then gave a finding on both the issues namely bonafide need of the landlady and comparative hardship. The appellate court has not considered the evidence on the record at all in recording its findings. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I find no merit in the above contention. It is incorrect to say that the appellate court has not considered the evidence on the record. In paragraph 12 of the impugned order the appellate court has summarised its findings : "The landlady his three sons. It is not in dispute, that they all have attained age to do sonic business. Assuming that her two sons doing photography business in the eastern shop and the 3rd son is helping his father in the Kerana business in the middle portion, the fact remains that she needs the shop in question for at least expanding the Kerana business of her husband and 3rd son. The space in which at present he is keeping the shop is 6' x 12' only, and there is also entrance for the house through this very space. Therefore, there can be no doubt that her need is genuine." 9. Each of the facts on which the aforesaid conclusion of the appellate court is founded is supported by evidence on the record. Indeed, most of the facts stated in that paragraph emerge from undisputed facts. It is not denied that the landlady has three sons. It is also not denied that of the two shops belonging to the landlady which are presently in her occupation one of them is a gallery measuring 6' x 12'. It is further undisputed that this gallery is also used as a passage. On these facts the conclusion of the appellate court that the need of the landlady is genuine and bona fide cannot be said to he wrong nor can it be said that the finding is based on no evidence or on disregard of any evidence existing on the record. I, therefore, find no force in the first submission. 10. Learned counsel next assailed the legality of the finding of the appellate court on the issue of comparative hardship. I, therefore, find no force in the first submission. 10. Learned counsel next assailed the legality of the finding of the appellate court on the issue of comparative hardship. He submitted that the appellate court was not justified in taking into consideration the fact that the sons of the tenant have in their occupation two tenanted shops in the Nagar Palika market. It was urged that the tenant had filed an affidavit stating that the tenant had no concern with the business which was being carried on by the sons in the shop. Under the circumstances, the existence of these two shops could not be taken into consideration in comparing the relative hardship. 11. I am unable to accept the above contention. The appellate court has held in favour of the landlady and against the tenant by comparing on the economic circumstances of the two families. He has rightly emphasised that it is not the case of the tenant that his sons have separated from him. The appellate court was, therefore, entitled to take into consideration the fact that the sons of the tenant were happily placed. They had two shops rented in the Nagar Palika market whereas the landlady had only one shop properly speaking between four persons the other shop being only a gallery which the landlady's husband was compelled to use as a shop for want of a proper accommodation. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the tenant's sons had two shops in the Nagar Palika market was a circumstance which was extraneous to the enquiry. 12 In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed but I make no orders as to costs. The petitioner is present in the Court. He has conveyed his undertaking to the court through his counsel. The undertaking given by him is that he will handover vacant possession of the disputed shop to the respondent-landlady within six months from to-day. The undertaking further is that he will not directly or indirectly induct any other person into the accommodation. lie will also pay to the landlady either personally or through money order the entire arrears of rent due upto date as well as the damages for use and occupation for this period of six months within a period of three months from today. lie will also pay to the landlady either personally or through money order the entire arrears of rent due upto date as well as the damages for use and occupation for this period of six months within a period of three months from today. In view of this undertaking I direct that the order of eviction shall remain stayed for a period of six months from today. If the petitioner commits any default in complying with the conditions mentioned above as regards payment of rent and damages, it will be open to the landlady to apply for enforcement of the order of eviction forthwith. If the petitioner commits any breach of the undertaking, he would render himself liable for being proceeded against for breach violation of the order passed by this court.