JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a Defendants Second Appeal from the decree passed by the lower appellate court directing the defendant to remove two huts some cattle troughs and cattle pegs and a Gehraur from a piece of land shown by he letters ABCD and shaded red on the map 13-ka-2 which forms part of the tower appellate court's decree, situate in village Pitambarpur of district Azamgarh. The plaintiffs case was that one Ram Prasad and his one co-sharers were the owners in possession of an Ahata on the said land ABCD since the time of their ancestors; that the Ahata continued to exist until after the abolition of zamindari; that Ram Prasad and others had a hut therein and used it in several ways, without, however, specifying the nature of their alleged user ; and that the Chhaoni and Sehan of Ram Prasad and others have been in existence ever since to the north of that Ahata, and the said Ahata was also appurtenant to the Ckhaoni and the northern house of Ram Prasad and others. It may be here stated that Ram Prasad was a co-sharer in the proprietary rights in the village or in other words he was one of the zamindars of the village. It may be here stated that Ram Prasad was a co-sharer in the proprietary rights in the village or in other words he was one of the zamindars of the village. Further, according to the plaintiffs case, Ram Prasad and his co-sharers sold the Ahata by a registered sale-deed dated the 25th January, 1965 to the plaintiffs and they became the owners in possession ; and thereafter the plaintiffs demolished the walls of the Ahata and the huts, and removed them for raising new constructions but the defendant interfered with the plaintiffs possession over the Ahata, whereupon the plaintiff's gave a two mouths statutory notice to the Gaon Sabha and State of Uttar Pradesh, which was served-on them on the 8th February, 1965 that they did not reply and the third defendant, who is the appellant in this Court and has been referred to as the defendant, did not refrain from interfering with the plaintiffs possession, and having come to know of the plaintiffs intention to institute a suit, hurriedly, and without any right, placed two new huts shown by the letters EFGH and IJKL, cattle troughs shown by the letters M-1 to M-8 and some cattle pegs and gehraur on the land in suit shown on the sketch map at the foot of the plaint, and refuses to remove the same, hence the suit. 2. The Gaon Sabha and the State of Uttar Pradesh did not contest the suit, only the defendant-appellant contested it. He denied the plaintiffs case and correctness of the map given at the foot of the plaint. He denied the existence of any Ahata or huts on the land in suit and pleaded that the land in suit was not in the ownership or possession of Ram Prasad and others and they had no right to execute the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiffs. The land in suit was claimed to have been in possession of the defendant and others who had not been impleaded. It was the old Gharohi of the defendants ancestors, and was in the possession and use of the defendant who had his huts, cattle troughs and pegs and Gehraur, Pathnaur and Ghoor etc., thereon continuously since before the abolition of zamindari. It was the old Gharohi of the defendants ancestors, and was in the possession and use of the defendant who had his huts, cattle troughs and pegs and Gehraur, Pathnaur and Ghoor etc., thereon continuously since before the abolition of zamindari. The defendants used to sit on the Land, tether his cattle keep his Khaliban and store his things thereon, and it was settled with him under the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari and Land Reforms Act. The land to the east was in possession of others, pleas of limitation, adverse possession and nonjoinder of necessary parties were also raised. 3. The following were the issues on which the parties went to trial :- "1. Whether the land coloured red on map paper no. 13-A-2 belong to the plaintiff ?" "2. Whether the suit is barred by time ?" "3. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of Jugul and Jag Ropan as alleged by defendant ?" "4. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled ?" 4. Issue No. 3 was decided by the trial court as a preliminary issue holding the suit was not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. Issues Nos. 1 and 2 were taken up together for consideration. The trial court held that the land shaded red on the Commissioners map 13-A-2 does not belong to the plaintiffs, and they or their vendors were not proved to have been in possession of it within twelve years of the filing of the suit. The defendant had admittedly taken possession of the land. That, according to the trial court, was nine-tenth proof of ownership." It found that there is no reliable evidence either direct or circumstantial to prove that Ram Prasad owned an Abata and exercised possession over the land in suit as land appurtenant to his Chhaoni on the 1st July 1952 when Zamindari Abolition Act came into force, Ram Prasad would not therefore have the benefit of Section 9 of that Act. He was not competent to sell the land, land did not belong to the plaintiff. The plaintiffs and their vendors were not proved to have been in possession within twelve years of the date of the institution of the suit, hence the suit is barred by time. He was not competent to sell the land, land did not belong to the plaintiff. The plaintiffs and their vendors were not proved to have been in possession within twelve years of the date of the institution of the suit, hence the suit is barred by time. On issue No. 4, the trial court found, in view of its aforesaid finding, that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief ; and it dismissed the suit accordingly. 5. Before the lower appellate court, the contention raised was that the "trial court had not correctly appreciated the evidence on record and so it had wrongly dismissed the suit." The lower appellate court then recited the evidence and posed the question whether the trial court has correctly appreciated the evidence. The conclusion arrived at by the lower appellate court was : "It is established beyond doubt that previously there stood the Ahata and Mandai of Ram Prasad over the land in suit; that Ram Prasad had transferred to the plaintiffs and that since the date of transfer plaintiffs had been in possession thereof." 6. It further held that the plaintiffs had purchased the land in suit for the purposes of raising construction thereon..............that they removed the old enclosures and the Mandais standing thereon", and that the plaintiffs had been able to prove their ownership over the land in suit and the forcible possession of the defendant No. 3 thereon." I may here add that although the lower appellate court did observe that the plaintiffs had been able to prove the forcible possession of the defendant No. 3" on the land in suit, and, at the same time, that the plaintiffs had been in possession over the land after the execution of the sale-deed dated 25th January, 1965 in their favour and the suit was not time barred, the lower appellate court did not expressly or specifically decree the suit for possession over the land in suit, although in addition to the injunction claimed, the plaintiffs had also claimed that in case of need the plaintiffs may also be put in to possession over the site, or the land in suit, and the lower appellate court only stated in the operative part of its judgment that the suit is decreed with costs. 7. 7. The first question, which must be considered in this appeal is whether he plaintiffs could be said to have any title to the land in suit even if it is assumed hat Ram Prasad and his co-sharers from whom the plaintiffs purchased the land lad an Ahata on the land in suit. 8. Ram Prasad and his co-sharers were zamindar's. All his right, title and interest in the proprietary rights in the land or the zamindari of the village vested in the State on the abolition of zamindari on 1st July, 1952 under section 4 with the consequences specified in Section 6 of the Act Ram Prasad or his co-sharers had no proprietary rights left in the land on 1st July, 1952. The right, if any, had to be established under section 9 of the Act, which reads as under : "All wells, trees in abadi, and all buildings situate within the limits of an estate, belonging to or held by an intermediary or tenant or other persons, whether residing in the village or not, shall continue to belong to or be held by such intermediary, tenant or person, as the case may be, and the site of the wells or the buildings with the area appurtenant thereto shall be deemed to be settled with him by the State Government on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed." 9. Before any land could be deemed to be settled with an intermediary or zamindar or tenant or ether person, it had to be the site of a building or appurtenant to a building belonging to him and situate within the limits of an estate, and situate, not on some date in future, but on the date when the Act came into force and the estate came to vest in the State, that is to say, on the 1st July, 1952. 10. The question, which, therefore, arose, was whether the Ahata claimed to have been situate on the land was any such building of which the land could be the site or to which it could be said to have been appurtenant so as to be deemed to be settled with the owner of the Ahata. A building in common parlance means a roofed structure. A building in common parlance means a roofed structure. A piece of land enclosed on all sides by boundary walls may be said to be the prospective site of some thing which the owner intends to do or to build thereon, but surely it cannot be said to be the site of a building or appurtenant to a building simply because it is enclosed by boundary walls on all sines. It can make no difference whether the boundary wall is pucca or kachcha. Nor can it make any difference if the land is enclosed by some fence or an embankment of mud with some shrubs or plants thereat. Applying the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Ghanshiam Das v. Debi Prasad, 1966 ALJ 536. I would hold that a piece of land merely enclosed by a boundary wall or a fence or other boundary of some kind cannot be said to be the sue of, or appurtenant to any building. There is the further fact that the land is said to have been enclosed on three sides only and on the north there was no boundary between the land in suit and the Chhaoni of Ram Prasad and his co-sharers. Although it has been suggested in paragraph 2 of the plait that the Ahata in suit was appurtenant to the Chhaoni and the house on the north of Ram Prasad and others, it has not been shown by anything on the record that the laud in suit was appurtenant to any building or the house of Ram Prasad which might have been situate on the land to the north which was admittedly his Chhaoni. From the map 13-Ka, it appears that there was quite a large area of land surrounding the house of Ram Prasad on its north and east also on its west and south-west, and there was the land in suit to the south of it. The land in suit appears to have been surrounded on the east, on the south-east and on the south-west by Chaks of Ram Prasad, that is to say, the agricultural land of Ram Prasad. The land in suit appears to have been surrounded on the east, on the south-east and on the south-west by Chaks of Ram Prasad, that is to say, the agricultural land of Ram Prasad. No particular or specific purpose, for which the land in suit might have been used by Ram Prasad, has been brought out by anything on the record, except for the suggestion that there was a Mandai or a hut on the land in which Ram Prasad stored bagasse after extracting the juice of sugar-cane from his Kolhu. It is plain that neither the alleged boundary of the Ahata nor the huts, which were said to have belonged to Ram Prasad, were in existence on the land when the suit was instituted. 'It was the plaintiffs' own case that they had demolished the boundary and the huts for raising new constructions. The huts that did exist when the suit was filed were admittedly built by the defendant-appellant. 11. The question whether the plaintiffs had any title to the land in suit falls to be determined in the background of the aforesaid facts and circumstances. In view of the existence of the Chhaoni of Ram Prasad to the north of the land in suit and his Chaks to the east, the south-east and the south-west of the land in suit, it could be that the situation of the land in suit was such that Ram Prasad might have been using it so long as Gaon Sabha did not allot it to someone else But that could act have given Ram Prasad any title to the land under Section 9 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It has not been pleaded, nor has it been shown by any thing on the record that the land in suit was the site of, or appurtenant to any building belonging to Ram Prasad on the 1st July, 1952, so as to give him title to it under section 9 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Indeed, it appears that since the plaintiffs had no title whatsoever to the land, but wanted to occupy it, they got a sale-deed from Ram Prasad and his co-sharers, who were the erstwhile zamindar's of the village and had their Chhaoni situate immediately to the north and their Chaks on other sides thereof in order to have a semblance of title. But Ram Prasad and his co-sharers had no right, title or interest in the land after the abolition of zamindari on 1st July, 1952. The sale-deed conveyed nothing. 12. The finding of the lower appellate court that Ram Prasad had an Ahata and Mandai over the land in suit, and was in possession of the land, and that the plaintiffs came into possession on the transfer of the same in their favour, also needs to be examined. It is necessary to examine the correctness of that finding for two reasons. First, it was contended that even if the plaintiffs title to the land was not proved according to the true tenor of Section 9 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the land had been in possession of Ram Prasad and his co-sharers since before the abolition of zamindari, and they had not only sold the land to the plaintiffs, bur had also put them into possession. The plaintiffs thus acquired possessory title to the land the defendant-appellant, who had no title whatsoever to the land, could not have forcibly dispossessed the plaintiffs, but he having done so the plaintiffs were surely entitled to be put back into possession. Secondly, it was urged that an Ahata or a Gher had always been believed to be a building within the meaning of Section 9 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and even if the court were to take the view that an Ahata or a Gher of the kind that existed in the present case was not a building within the meaning of section 9 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the plaintiffs and before them their predecessor-in-interest had continued in possession over the land as owners thereof, as if it were settled with them under Section 9 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and they must accordingly be deemed to nave prescribed, by adverse possession, the rights conferred by Section 9 of the U.P., Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 13. Without going into the merits or demerits of the two contentions so raised, it appears proper to first examine whether the said finding of the lower appellate court which is prima facie a finding of fact, is vitiated by any error of law. 14. 13. Without going into the merits or demerits of the two contentions so raised, it appears proper to first examine whether the said finding of the lower appellate court which is prima facie a finding of fact, is vitiated by any error of law. 14. The question whether the land in suit was in the possession of Ram Prasad and whether Ram Prasad had an Ahata and Mandai thereon was determinable on the oral evidence of the parties. While the trial court had disbelieved the evidence led by the plaintiffs, the lower appellate court believed it. The first witness for the plaintiffs was Mohammad Hussain. The trial court disbelieved him because it was proved that he was inimical to the contesting defendant on account of a complaint lodged against him by the latter in the Nyaya Panchayat. The date of the complaint vide-ext. A-1, was 9th February, 1966. The date, on which the statement of Mohammad Hussain was recorded, was 3rd May, 1966. The lower appellate court disagreed with the trial courts view on the ground that the burden lay on Balraj the (contesting defendant) to prove that by the time the statement of Mohammad Hussain was recorded, the summons of the complaint (Ext. A-1) had been served on him and he had knowledge thereof. The question whether Mohammad Hussain (P.W. 1) was inimical towards the contesting defendant was not directly in issue in the case Moreover, one could infer the lapse of three months' time between the date of the complaint and the date on which the statement of Mohammad Hussain was recorded that he must have come to know of the complaint which was filed in the Nyaya Panchayat of the village against him. The inference drawn by the lower appellate court that Mohammad Hussain was not shown to have been inimical towards the contesting defendant is, in my opinion, not justified, and that being so the reason given by the lower appellate court for relying on the evidence of Mohammad Hussain (P.W. 1). although the trial court had not relied upon his evidence is not any good. The further observation of the lower appellate court is that the contesting defendant was bound to have conformed the witness with the complaint in order to prove that his statement that he had not contested any litigation with Balraj, the contesting defendant, was false. although the trial court had not relied upon his evidence is not any good. The further observation of the lower appellate court is that the contesting defendant was bound to have conformed the witness with the complaint in order to prove that his statement that he had not contested any litigation with Balraj, the contesting defendant, was false. The copy of the complaint was tiled to show that the contesting defendant was prosecuting the witness Mohammad Hussain before he Nyaya Panchayat. That fact as proved by to filing of the copy of the complaint vide-Ext. A-1, and was sufficient to impeach the credit of the witness when he said that there was no litigation between him and Balraj the contesting defendant. The lower appellate court has not taken a correct view of the procedural law in this matter. The inference drawn by the lower appellate court that the conduct of Balraj, the contesting defendant, in not confronting the witness Mohammad Hussain with the complaint and filing it at the stage a which it as tiled that is on the date on which his statement was recorded "give out that it was not a genuine complaint but had been antedated and the copy of which had been obtained simply to show that Mohammad Hussain was an independent witness" is, in my view, wholly conjectural. It proceeds on the assumption that the contesting defendant was capable of antedating copy of a compliant that was never tiled and of obtaining such a copy from the Nyaya Panchayat to show that one of the witnesses, who appeared against him in a civil case was not an independent witness. I do not think that there is no evidence to support this assumption. On the other hand, the presumption of the law is that official acts are regularly performed, and if that presumption is made, the inference which follows from Ext A-1, and which ought to have been drawn by the lower appellate court, is that a complaint was hied by the contesting defendant on the 9th February, 1966 before the Nyaya Panchayat against Mohammad Hussain and certain others. Whether the complaint was true or false is not in issue. The only question is whether there was enmity between Muhammad Hussain and the contesting defendant, Balraj. Whether the complaint was true or false is not in issue. The only question is whether there was enmity between Muhammad Hussain and the contesting defendant, Balraj. The inference drawn by the lower appellate court from the evidence of Mohammad Hussain (P.W. 1) that "It is established beyond doubt that previously there stood an Ahata and Mundai of Ram Prasad over the land in suit, that Ram Prasad had transferred to the plaintiffs and that since the date of transfer plaintiff had been in possession thereof and the further inference that" the plaintiffs had demolished the walls of he Ahata and Mandai for raising a new construction thereon but meanwhile the defendant No. 3 took forcible possession", of it and put possession of it, is thus vitiated in law. 15. About the plaintiffs next witness Ram Prasad, the lower appellate court noticed the fact that the witness "frankly admitted that he and Balraj (the defendant) were on litigating terms since the times of ancestors of Balraj" and that it was for this reason that the trial court looked at his evidence with suspicion, but held that although he was a resident of another village it does not mean that he did not keep his cattle in the village in suit." According to the land appellate court the witness Ram Prasad had about 13 acres of agricultural in the village and his Chhaoni was quite adjacent to the land in suit and that, therefore, the testimony of Ram Prasad could not be discarded because he was on litigating terms with the contesting defendant. Here again the lower appellate court did not look into the intrinsic worth of the evidence in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances for coming to a conclusion different than that arrived at by the trial court. The fact that the Chhaoni of Ram Prasad was adjacent to the land in suit and yet it did not form part of his Chhaoni would rather show that the case now set up that it was an Ahata of Ram Prasad with a Mandai in it was not correct, for if it was an Ahata with no dividing boundary between it and the Chhaoni, it would have normally been described as a part of the Chhaoni of Ram Prasad and not as an Ahata. Further, the allegation that the walls of the Ahata and Mandai were razed to the ground immediately after the purchase by the plaintiffs because they wanted to raise construction on the land leads me to think that Ram Prasad never had any Ahata or Mandai on the land, and the story of the existence of the Ahata and Mandai was invented only to make it possible to assert that Ram Prasad and his co-sharers, who were the zamindar's of the village, and had their Chhaoni to the north of the land in suit, continued to own the land even after the abolition of the zamindari. The allegation that the walls of the Ahata and the Mandai were razed to the ground immediately after the purchase is highly improbable and the witnesses, who said that it was so should not have been believed by the lower appellate court particularly when they had been disbelieved by the trial court which had the added advantage of seeing them and watching their demeanour. The reliance placed by the lower appellate court on the commissioners report is again wholly untenable The commissioners report was an ex parte report. The plaintiffs had moved an application on the 20th April, 1965 alleging that the contesting defendant had unlawfully dispossessed them of the land in suit and placed a Mandai and Haudi etc., and were planning to raise a permanent construction. Another application was moved by the plaintiffs on the same day for preparation of a scale map of the land in suit and fixing its boundary and also to show thereon the use to which the land was put by way of Mandais or Haudia cattle page and Gurhaur etc. The application did not require the Commissioner to show whether there was any traces of a fallen down boundary wall of Ahata or Mandai on the land in suit. It may further be stated that the applications were moved along with the plaint, Indeed, the suit was instituted and registered on the 21st April, 1965. The Commissioner prepared the scale map which is paper No. 13-Ka and forms part of the decree of the lower appellate court and served the summons of the suit and the notice and the application for temporary injunction. The Commissioner prepared the scale map which is paper No. 13-Ka and forms part of the decree of the lower appellate court and served the summons of the suit and the notice and the application for temporary injunction. In the last sentence of his report under the heading, Sawal darkhwast vadi ka uttar, the Commissioner has said that "Zamin nizai per makan chhaoni Ram Prasad Ke dakkhin va Mandai nizai ke dakkhin zamin per mitti phaili bui thi." The map does not show where the earth was found to be so spread. At any rate, if the earth was of the walls of Ahata, which were said to have been razed to the ground, it should have found spread along the outer boundary lines of the land in suit. The lower appellate court was, in my opinion, not justified in drawing the inference from this observation of the Commissioner that the assertion of the plaintiff Kedar that he had drawn the attention of the Commissioner towards the fallen walls and their foundation ought not to have been disbelieved the inference that the earth of the walls of the Ahata was found spread on the land in suit is, in my opinion, not justified. The defendant's evidence that there was no Ahata and no Mandai of Ram Prasad on the land in suit, which was believed by the trial court ought to have been believed by the lower appellate court also, inasmuch as the documentary evidence and the surrounding facts and circumstances did not bring out any such balance of improbability as to displace the opinion of the trial court as to where the credibility lay. See Sarju Prasad v. Jwaleshwari, AIR 1951 SC 120 . On the other hand, as observed above, the plaintiffs case that they had razed the walls of the Ahata and the Mandai to the ground soon after the purchase of the same from Ram Prasad and his co-sharers in order to enable them to raise constructions on the land in suit is unnatural and Improbable, and ought not to have been believed, particularly when the trial court has disbelieved it on an appraisal of the oral evidence. 16. The lower appellate court has not analysed or discussed any part of the oral evidence to support its inference that the plaintiffs and before them Ram Prasad was in possession of the land in suit. 16. The lower appellate court has not analysed or discussed any part of the oral evidence to support its inference that the plaintiffs and before them Ram Prasad was in possession of the land in suit. Its inference about the plaintiffs possession is based entirely on its inference about the existence of the Ahata and the Mandai of Ram Prasad. It follows that the finding of the lower appellate court that the plaintiffs were the owners in possession of the land in suit and that the contesting defendant had forcibly dispossessed them shortly before the filing of the suit is vitiated in law. 17. I, therefore, hold that the reversal by the lower appellate court of the findings of the trial court that the plaintiffs were not the owners of the land in suit and were not in possession thereof and did not have any Ahata or Mandai thereon, was against law and the findings of the trial court on these points were correct. 18. No other point survives for consideration. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside and the decree of the trial court dismissing the suit is restored with costs throughout in favour of the three defendants who are the appellants in this Court against the plaintiff-respondents Nos. 1 and 2.