K. S. PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) AN unfortunate election dispute between two Advocates of this Court practising in the City of Mysore, who contested for one seat of the Senate of the University of mysore (hereinafter referred to as 'the university') from the constituency of regitered grnduates in law, has arisen for determinati 'n, fcr' which purpose, it is necessary to notice, in the first instance, the facts that are not seriously in dispute. ( 2 ) IN response to the calendar of events issued by the Registrar of the University, who was also the Returning Officer, on 1-7-1980 (Annexure, A), the petitioner, respondent 3 and 4, being registered graduates, filed their nominations for election to the senate from the 'law Constituency' before the appointed date and time. But, the pull to the said Constituency only was nott held on 2-8-1980, in obedience to an interim order made by this Court in a writ petition filed by respondent No, 4, and the same was held on 24-8-1980. ( 3 ) THE method of voting adopted was the single transferable vote system and the counting took place on 26-8-1980 in the presence of the candidates or their agents that were present. As none of the candidates secured the required minimum number of votes in the first counting, the process of transfer was resorted to, in which respondent No. 3 secured 287 votes as against 286 votes secured by the petitioner. In that view, the Returning Officer declared respondent No. 3 as duly elected to the senate from the 'law Constituency'. ( 4 ) ON 30-8-1980 the petitioner presented an election petition before the Vice-Chancellor (Annexure L) under S. 48 of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 1976 (Kar. Act No. 28 of 1976) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') challenging the election of respondent No. 3 to refer the same to the Chancellor for adjudication. Apprehending that the Vice Chan cellor was rot likely to refer his election petition or delay the reference, the petitioner printed a petition on 1-9-1980 before the Chancellor annexing a copy of the election petition presented by him before the Vice-Chancellor, on which the Chancellor initiated the proceedings. Apprehending that the Vice Chan cellor was rot likely to refer his election petition or delay the reference, the petitioner printed a petition on 1-9-1980 before the Chancellor annexing a copy of the election petition presented by him before the Vice-Chancellor, on which the Chancellor initiated the proceedings. ( 5 ) IN his election petition, as originally presented, the petitioner challenged the election of respondent No. 3 principally on two grounds and they are : (i) that the relaxation in the production of 'identity cards' at certain centres was not in conformity with the instiuctions dt. 13-7-1980 (Annexure B) that had the force of law ; and (ii) that there was large scale impersonation and various other malpractices resulting in double voting particularly at chennarayapatna and Sharada Vilas Polling centres. On the aforesaid grounds, the petitioner sought for the following reliefs :"wherefore, it is prayed that - (i) Hold an enquiry into the conduct of the election held on 24-8-1980 such that all illegal, invalid votes that are counted as valid votes be excluded totally from counting; (ii) Declare that the petitioner is the successful candidate in the election held on 24-8-1980, inasmuch as, on the basis of the valid votes polled in the election i. e. , excluding all invalid votes, the petitioner is deemed to have secured the largest number of votes". In the succeeding para, the petitioner sought for stay and in the last para he sought for general and consequential reliefs. ( 6 ) BELORE the Chancellor, respondent no. 3 fitted his objections denying the allegations of corrupt practices levelled against him and alleged that the petitioner had committed various corrupt practices. He claimed that the allegations of the petitioner, if proved also, would not meterially affect the result of his election for which reason there was no justification to set aside his election and declare the petitioner as duly elected in his place. ( 7 ) ON 17-11-1980 to which date the case was further posted for hearing the petitioner filed an application purporting to be under S. 48 of the Act read with or. 6, R. 17 and S. 151 of CPC (hereinafter referred to as IA No. I) praying for permission to raise an additional ground in support of his petition. In IA No. I, the petitioner sought leave to urge that the entire election had not been held in accordance with law. 6, R. 17 and S. 151 of CPC (hereinafter referred to as IA No. I) praying for permission to raise an additional ground in support of his petition. In IA No. I, the petitioner sought leave to urge that the entire election had not been held in accordance with law. In particular, the petitioner sought to urge that the requirement of Statute No. 22 (1) of Statutes relating to Elections to the Authorities of the university (hereinafter referred to as the statutes) of assigning voters to each polling centre had not been complied with by the Vice Chancellor and such failure vitiated the entire election. Not unnaturally, respondent No. 3 opposed IA No. I both on grounds of maintainability and on merits. ( 8 ) AS is evident from the order sheet and the proceedings, IA No. I made by the petitioner was considered along with the merits of the matter and the Chancellor by his composite order dt. 18-11-1980 has rejected the same and has dismissed the same and has dismissed the election petition (Annexure R ). In this petition under art. 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged the said order of the Chancellor. ( 9 ) THE petitioner, while reiterating the grounds urged by him in his petition, has urged that the Chancellor in rejecting IA no. I and dismissing his election petition has committed manifest illegalities. ( 10 ) THE Chancellor who is respondent no. 1 has. not filed any return. But, respondent No. 2 viz. , the Registrar and returning Officer, has filed his return justifying the manner and method of election and and also order made by the chancellor. Respondent No. 3 has filed his seprate return supporting respondent no. 2 ; respondent No. 4 viz. , Sri D. M. Rudraiah. who was unsuccessful, though duly served, has remained absent and has not filed his return. ( 11 ) SRI L. Srikantaiah, learned counsel for the petitioner, confronted with some of the contentions urged by Sri B. V. Acharya, learned cousel for respondent no. 3, urged that this Court should suo motu examine the illegallties under Art. 227 of the Constitution, undo the elections and direct fresh elections to be held in accordance with law. ( 12 ) THE scope and ambit, the distinction and difference between Artc. 3, urged that this Court should suo motu examine the illegallties under Art. 227 of the Constitution, undo the elections and direct fresh elections to be held in accordance with law. ( 12 ) THE scope and ambit, the distinction and difference between Artc. 226 and 227 of the Constitution are well settled by several rulings of the Supreme Court. While Art. 226 empowers a High Court to interfere only on an application made by or on behalf of an aggrieved party, Art. 227 empowers a High Court to suo motu interfere with an order made by a Court or a tribunal subordinate to it. The jurisdiction and power to interfere under Art. 227 of the Constitution is confined only to the courts and Tribunals that are subordinate to a High Court. But, no such limitation is placed by Art. 226 of the Constitution. Art. 226 empowers this Court to interfere with an action/order of Government or a public authority exercising administrative, judicial or quasi judicial functions. ( 13 ) THE Registrar and the Returning officer is not a Court or a Tribunal subordinate to this Court, can hardly be doubted. In this view, the action of the Returning Officer, in the conduct of election cannot be examined under Art. 227 of the constitution. ( 14 ) S. 48 of the Act empowers the chancellor to decide election disputes. The fact that, the power to decide election disputes is conferred on the Chancellor does not make him a Court or a Tribunal subordinate to this Court. At the highest, the Chancellor is only an authority against whom a writ can issue under Art. 226 of the Constitution. On any principle, it is not possible to hold that the Chancellor is a Court or a Tribunal subordinate to this court. From this it follows, that the passionate appeal of Sri Srikantaiah to correct the illegilities if any, committed either by the Registrar or the Chancellor under Art. 227 of the Constitution cannot be accepted. ( 15 ) IN his petition, the petitioner has rightly invoked the jurisdiction of this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. As I have rejected the contention of Sri srikantaiah that the matter can be examined under Art. 227 of the Constitution, it follows that this petition has to be examined only as one filed under Art. 226 and not under Art. 227 of the Constitution. As I have rejected the contention of Sri srikantaiah that the matter can be examined under Art. 227 of the Constitution, it follows that this petition has to be examined only as one filed under Art. 226 and not under Art. 227 of the Constitution. I, therefore, proceed to examine this petition only under Art. 226 of the Constitution. ( 16 ) SRI Srikantaiah urged that the chancellor committed a manifest illegality in not recording evidence and holding an Inquiry to decide the disputed questions of fact. ( 17 ) SRI Acharya urged that the nature and manner of inquiry to be held and decide the disputed questions, was a matter for the Chancellor to decide. Alternatively sri Acharya urged that the petitioner having participated in the inquiry, without proposing to lead evidence in support of his case, cannot be permitted to urge any infirmity in the nature and manner of inquiry held by the Chancellor. ( 18 ) THE Statutes do not regulate the filing of election petitions or their determination. Under S. 72 of the Act, the earlier Statutes made regulating the disposal of election petitions continue to be in force. ( 19 ) ON the nature and manner of deciding an election dispute, Cl. 2 (c) of the earlier Statutes framed under the Mysore university Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the old Statutes') that is in force reads thus : (C) On such a reference the Chancellor may either hold the inquiry himself or : (1) may appoint a tribunal to hold an inquiry on the application and report the matter to him for his decision. (2) it shall be open to the Chancellor to direct the Tribunal to follow the proceedure laid down in the Representation of the People Act and Rules thereunder, or the CPC as the case may be in so far as they are applicable to the inquiry and which are not inconsistent with the University Act, Statutes, Ordinance and rules thereunder". In the present case, that the Chancellor himself, without referring the matter to a tribunal, held the inquiry and decided the case, is not in dispute and is borne out from the order and the records produced before the Court. In the present case, that the Chancellor himself, without referring the matter to a tribunal, held the inquiry and decided the case, is not in dispute and is borne out from the order and the records produced before the Court. The said Statute empowering the Chancellor to hold an inquiry himself or any other Statute does not indicate the nature and manner of inquiry to be held in an election dispute. ( 20 ) THE term 'inquiry' has no precise and definite meaning. The content And nature of an inquiry to be held by the chancellor cannot be the same as the content and scope of an inquiry to be held before an ordinary Civil or Criminal court. Undoubtedly the truth or otherwise of an assertion or a disputed question of fact can be better decided by allowing the parties to place evidence in support of their respective cases, can hardly be doubted. But, that does not necessarily mean that that method alone is the only method for ascertaining the truth of a disputed question of fact. In these matters. no hard and fast rule can be laid down by a Court. ( 21 ) BEFORE the Chancellor, the petitioner did not offer to place any oral or documentary evidence in support of his case. In this view, the Chancellor refusing to record evidence and decide the disputed questions of fact, can hardly arise. When the petitioner had not placed any oral and documentary evidence in support of his case, the question of respondent no. 3 who had succeeded before the electorate, placing any rebuttal or evidence in support of his case did not also arise. ( 22 ) BEFORE the Chancellor, the parties were content by relying on their pleadings, various affidavits and the documents produced by them or the Returning Officer for the perusal of the Chancellor. On such an examination, the Chancellor has reached his conclusions. In this view, it is difficult to hold that the Chancellor decided the dispute without holding an inquiry and has committed an illegality apparent on the face of the record. ( 23 ) SRI Srikantaiah has next contended that the rejection of IA No. I, applying the principles for amendment of election petitions under the Representation of the people Act, 1951 (Act 43 of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1951 Act') is manifestly illegal. ( 23 ) SRI Srikantaiah has next contended that the rejection of IA No. I, applying the principles for amendment of election petitions under the Representation of the people Act, 1951 (Act 43 of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1951 Act') is manifestly illegal. ( 24 ) SRI Acharya urged that the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court are genera] legal principles and the Chancellor had correctly rejected IA No. 1. ( 25 ) IA No. I has been rejected by the chancellor on the ground that the period of limitation for urging the same had expired ( 26 ) UNDER the old Statutes, an election petition has to be filed within 7 days from the date of declaration of results of the election and those Statutes Co not provide for condonation of delay in filing an election petition. ( 27 ) THE Act or the Statutes that are in force regulating an election dispute, do not make the provisions of the CPC applicable to an election dispute before the chancellor. In that view, Or. 6, R. 17 or s. 151 of the CPC had no application. ( 28 ) THE provisions of the Code to the extent they are necessary for the inquiry and are not inconsistent with the Act, rules and Statutes alone are made applicable to an inquiry before the Tribunal. Assuming that Cl. 2 (c) (i) of the old Statutes in terms applied to the inquiry held by the chancellor, in such an event also, it is difficult to hold that Or. 6, R. 17 of the cpc was necessary for holding an inquiry and is, therefore, applicable. In this view also IA No. I was not maintainable. ( 29 ) WHILE the limitation for filing an election petition under the old Statutes is 7 days, the limitation for filing an election petition under the 1951 Act is longer. In both the Acts, there is no provision for condonation of delay in filing an election petition. S. 87 of the 1951 Act is almost analogous to the old Statute dealing with an election petition before the Chancellor. ( 30 ) IN Ramdayal v. Brijraj Singh (1) the supreme Court examining a similar situation observed thus :"2. In both the Acts, there is no provision for condonation of delay in filing an election petition. S. 87 of the 1951 Act is almost analogous to the old Statute dealing with an election petition before the Chancellor. ( 30 ) IN Ramdayal v. Brijraj Singh (1) the supreme Court examining a similar situation observed thus :"2. An election petition has, under s. 18 (1) of the Representation of the people Act, 1951, to be filed within 45 days of the date of the publication of the result of the election. An application for selling aside the election, that dataram was below the age of 25 and on that account the election was liable to be set aside under S. 100 (1) (d) (i) of the Act on August 15, 1967, would plainly have been barred, and by amendment the ground could not be permitted to be added. This Court in Harishchandra bajpai v. Triloki Singh ( 1957 SCR 370 ) held that the Election Tribunal has power to allow an amendment in respect of particulars of illegal and corrupt practices, or to permit new instances to be included, provided the grounds or charges are specifically stated in the petition, but its power to permit amendment of a petition under Or. VI, R. 17 of the CPC will not be exercised so as to allow new grounds or charges to be raised or the character of the petition to be so altered as to make it in substance a new petition, If a fresh petition on those allegations would on the date of the proposed amendment be barred. By the amendment a new ground for setting aside the election was sought to be introduced, and the High Court was right in rejecting the application for amendment". These principles, though stated in a case arising under the 1951 Act, are general principles applicable to all election disputes where a period of limitation is prescribed and where there is no provision for condonation of delay in presenting an election petition. These principles cannot be distinguished on the ground that the same has been stated in a case arising under the 1951 Act as urged by Sri Srikantaiah. These principles cannot be distinguished on the ground that the same has been stated in a case arising under the 1951 Act as urged by Sri Srikantaiah. On the application of the above principles the Chancellor had no option but to reject IA No. I. In my view the ruling, of the Calcutta High Court in narendranath Sen v. Moni Sanyal (2) and the High Court of Allahabad in Sri Ram autar v. Kr. Satyabir (3) on which reliance was placed by Sri Srikantaiah do not really bear on the point and assist him. Hence, I reject this contention of Sri srikantaiah. ( 31 ) EARLIER, I have held that the illegalities if any, committed either by the Returning Officer or by the Chancellor cannot be examined and decided by me under art. 227 of the Constitution. Assuming that there was contravention of Statute no. 22 (7) of the Statutes, even then on the failure of the petitioner to raise that ground within the time stipulated by law, it was not open to the Chancellor to examine the same. A fortiori it follows that it is not open to me to examine the validity of the same and annul the elections on that ground. ( 32 ) SRI Srikantaiah has lastly contended that the conclusions reached by the chancellor on the two grounds urged before him are manifestly illegal. ( 33 ) SRI Acharya, while justifying the conclusions of the Chancellor on merits, urged that the same being on a question of fact, cannot be interfered with by this court. ( 34 ) AN examination of the instructions issued by the Returning Officer shows that the same was issued by him for the guidance of the Presiding Officers and Polling officers. By no stretch of imagination those instructions can be treated as law within the meaning, of that terra 'law'. ( 35 ) IN para 5 of the instructions, it is stated that the registered graduates shall be permitted to exercise their franchise, only on the production of an identity card issued by the Returning Officer. In the press note dt. 1-8-1980 (Annexure E) that requirement was relaxed for the reasons stated therein. ( 35 ) IN para 5 of the instructions, it is stated that the registered graduates shall be permitted to exercise their franchise, only on the production of an identity card issued by the Returning Officer. In the press note dt. 1-8-1980 (Annexure E) that requirement was relaxed for the reasons stated therein. ( 36 ) STATUTES No. 22 (7) of Statutes governing the identily of voters reads thus:"as each voter enters the polling centre, the Election Officer shall check up the voter's name and other particulars and take all reasonable care to ensure the identity of the voter before the issue of the ballot paper". This provision requires the election officer to satisfy himself on the identity of the voter before he issues the ballot paper to him. Statute No. 22 (7) or any other statute do not provide for the issue or production of an identity card. Hence, the provision made in the instructions for the identity cards, which is not supported by law, is in derogation of the same. In this view, the press note dt. 1-8-1980 relaxing the production of identity cards or the action of the election officers in permitting the voters to vote on their being satisfied with their identity cannot be said to be illegal. ( 37 ) ON an examination of the pleadings, affidavits and other documents, the chancellor has found that the instances highlighted by the petitioners, even if held to be proved, does, not materially affect the result of the election of the returned candidate viz. , re pendent No. 3. As an authority empowered to decide the election dispute, it was undoubtedly open to the chancellor to reach that conclusion on the material grounds urged before him In reaching his conclusions the Chancellor has kept before him the law bearing on the point. At the highest the error, if any committed by the Chancellor is on a question of fact, which cannot be corrected by this Court, in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. From this it follows that the conclusions reached by the Chancellor cannot be interfered with by this Court. ( 38 ) EVEN though the petitioner fails in this writ petition, he has shown that all is not well with the conduct of elections held by the University. From this it follows that the conclusions reached by the Chancellor cannot be interfered with by this Court. ( 38 ) EVEN though the petitioner fails in this writ petition, he has shown that all is not well with the conduct of elections held by the University. Any election to the senate or any other body of a University should not normally suffer from an illegality or irregularity. An election held by an university should be a model to others. In this view, I deem it proper to highlight some of the illegalities committed by the university, so that they may not be repeated in subsequent elections. ( 39 ) STATUTE No. 22 (1) of the Statutes requires the Vice Chancellor to decide the polling centres ai. d assign the voters to each of such centres. This is an imperative requirement and requires to be completed even before the calendar of events is issued by the Returning Officer. Unfortunately, this elementary and imperative requirement had not been complied with before the elections were held. If this requirement had been complied with, probably much of the grievance of the petitioner or the counter grievance of respondent No. 3 would not have arisen. I earnestly hope that before holding elections to the senate on the next occasion the vice Chancellor will take necessary steps to determine the polling centres and assign the list of voters for each polling centre. ( 40 ) THE Statutes do not provide for issue of identity cards. But, still the Registrar in his, instructions provided for the same and then relaxed is in his press note dt. 1-8-1980. While issuing instructions, the Returning Officer cannot act in derogation of the Statutes. Without any doubt, this was wholly unauthorised and illegal. I do hope that in future the Returning officer will not commit such a mistake. ( 41 ) A disputed question of fact cannot normally be decided without recording evidence. In election petitions, it would be more appropriate for the Chancellor to frame issues or points for determination and call upon paities to lead such evidence as they propose to place and thus avoid any criticism of not affording an a opportunity to place evidence in support of his case ( 42 ) ANOTHER matter that is not connected with the conduct of the elections but calls for remedial measures, as I apprehend, can be usefully noticed. ( 43 ) THE Governor who is the Head of the State is also the Chancellor of the universities in the State. As the Head of the State, the Governor has to perform manifold and varied functions. In addition to his duties as the Head of the State, a Chancellor, however; energetic and efficient he may be, can hardly find all the time that is necessary to decide an election dispute that raises complicated questions of fact and law. In the interest of litigants and avoid all embarassment to the Chancellor, it would be more proper that the power to decide election disputes is entrusted to a judicial body like the District judge of the area with an appeal to this court which can only be done by necessary amendment to the Act. Whether the same should be done or not, is a matter for government, the Universities and the legislature to decide. But, I have every hope that they will bestow their anxious consideration to the same. ( 44 ) IN the light of my above discussion, i hold that this writ petition is liable to be rejected. I, therefore, reject this writ petition. But, in the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .