Supreme Pharmacy v. District Judge, Kanpur — 1982 DIGILAW 1091 (ALL)

JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. 1. This petition is directed against an order dated 5-2-1982 passed by the learned District Judge, Kanpur allowing a revision and setting aside an order dated 9th of February, 1979 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. By the Impugned order, the learned District Judge has directed the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to dispose of an application filed by the petitioner no. 2 for allotment of the disputed shop in favour of a newly constituted firm styled as M/s. Supreme Pharmacy afresh, after giving the opportunity of being heard to the landlords arrayed here as respondents nos. 3 to 5. 2. The history of the litigation giving rise to this case goes back to the year 1955 when a suit for partition was filed in respect of some properties including the disputed shop which is shop no. 24/1, the Mall, Kanpur. The suit was eventually tried by this court as original suit no. 1 of 1965. A receiver was appointed in that suit by the court to manage the properties in suit. The respondents nos. 3, 4 and 5 are admittedly the co-owners of the properties in suit including the shop. It appears that an application was moved in this court by one of the owners for an order directing the receiver to move an application for the release of the disputed shop of which one B. T. Lalwani was admittedly the tenant, so that after a final decree was passed the landlords might be able to get possession of the same for their own use and occupation. This application was allowed by an order dated 27-2-1974, a true copy of which is annexure-1 to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the landlords. This court directed the receiver to move an application for release under section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. In pursuance of this order a release application was filed against the said B. T. Lalwani. For some reason the application made no progress and was still pending in the year 1978 when an application was moved in the name of Sri B. T. Lalwani by Smt. Sunita Bahadur Lalwani (petitioner no. In pursuance of this order a release application was filed against the said B. T. Lalwani. For some reason the application made no progress and was still pending in the year 1978 when an application was moved in the name of Sri B. T. Lalwani by Smt. Sunita Bahadur Lalwani (petitioner no. 2 herein) claiming as the wife and holder of power of attorney from Sri B. T. Lalwani purporting to be under rule 10 (6) (a) of the Rules framed under U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for an order of allotment of the disputed shop in favour of the said M/s. Supreme Pharmacy. In the aforesaid application under rule 10 (6) (a) it was alleged that Sri Lalwani who was carrying on business under the name and style of Supreme Pharmacy in the disputed shop had left for Hongkong in the year 1972, after executing a power of attorney in favour of his wife Smt. Lalwani aforesaid authorising her to look after his interest in the said business. The business was suffering huge losses and had almost "come to a grinding halt" in the year 1978, as a result of which it had become necessary to induct some other experienced businessmen into the partnership. Accordingly, Mrs. Lalwani had decided to induct petitioners nos. 3 and 4 namely Ayodhya Prasad Gupta and Bal Gopal Jaipuriya who had both agreed to join her. Along with the application, a copy of the proposed partnership deed was also enclosed. The prayer in the application was that the disputed shop be allotted in favour of the newly constituted or reconstituted firm in the name of M/s. Supreme Pharmacy. This application was rejected by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer by an order dated 26-12-1978 on the ground that the terms of the partnership deed indicated that it was to be a partnership at will and if Smt. Lalwani walked away from the partnership, the tenancy rights would vest in the remaining partners. In this view, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer observed that the partnership appeared to be a mere cover for sub-letting and hence the application could not be allowed under rule 10 (6) (a). It is undisputed that upon this application, no notice whatsoever was issued either to the receiver or to the respondents nos. 3, 4 and 5. 3. In this view, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer observed that the partnership appeared to be a mere cover for sub-letting and hence the application could not be allowed under rule 10 (6) (a). It is undisputed that upon this application, no notice whatsoever was issued either to the receiver or to the respondents nos. 3, 4 and 5. 3. The very next day that is on 27th of December, 1978 another application was moved again in the name of Sri B. T. Lalwani through the same Smt. Sunita Bahadur Lalwani with the same prayer. The allegations made in this application were substantially the same as in the previous application. In the fresh draft partnership agreement submitted, however, there were some changes as regards in whom would the tenancy rights vest in the event of one oi the othei of the partners retiring, obviously with the design to get ovei the objection which was taken by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in his order dated 26-12-1978. Thus, in the new draft, it was provided that on dissolution of the partnership the tenancy rights shall revert to Sri B. T. Lalwani, the tenant. In support of this application Ayodhya Prasad Gupta and Bal Gopal Jaipuriya also filed an affidavit itating that they were ready and willing to join the partnership and that on the dissolution of the partnership in whatever manner, the tenancy rights would revert to Sri B. T. Lalwani and that the tenancy rights shall not in any way affect the assets and goodwill of the firm. 4. It is pertinent to mention here that neither the Rent Control and Eviction Officer nor even the petitioners considered it necessary or desirable that notice of the application or any sort of intimation for that matter be sent to the receiver or to the respondent nos. 3, 4 and 5. It is further pertinent to mention that a final decree had in the meantime been passed by this court in the aforesaid suit on 7-9-1978 under which the disputed shop was allotted to the respondent nos. 3, 4 and 5. 3, 4 and 5. It is further pertinent to mention that a final decree had in the meantime been passed by this court in the aforesaid suit on 7-9-1978 under which the disputed shop was allotted to the respondent nos. 3, 4 and 5. Be that as it may, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer allowed the application of the petitioners ex parte by an order dated 9-2-1979 holding that the defect pointed out earlier in the previous order dated 26-12-1978 had been removed and that the terms of the new partnership agreement were in order. After making these comments, he accorded permission that Sri Ayodhya Prasad Gupta and Sri Balgovind Jaipuriya may be admitted to the new partnership proposed by Sri B. f. Lalwani. Armed with the aforesaid order dated 9-2-1979 the petitioners state that the said two partners were admitted and the newly constituted firm bearing the same name namely M/s. Supreme Pharmacy commenced its business in the disputed shop. All this seems to have been carried out almost instantly after the passing of the order dated 9-2-1979. It may also be recalled here that B. T. Lalwani, the tenant in whose name the application was moved and who was supposed to have been the third partner and the first party in the partnership deed had admittedly been out of India since 1972, having migrated to Hongkong. 5. On 3-4-1979 in pursuance of the final decree in the aforesaid suit symbolic possession was delivered over the disputed shop to the respondents nos. 3, 4 and 5. ON 21st of April 1979 the respondent no. 3 filed a revision before the learned District Judge under section 18 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 along with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act as well as an affidavit in support thereof explaining the delay in filing the revision. In this affidavit, the respondent no. 3 filed a revision before the learned District Judge under section 18 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 along with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act as well as an affidavit in support thereof explaining the delay in filing the revision. In this affidavit, the respondent no. 3 stated that in pursuance of the final decree passed in her favour on 7-9-1978 she took symbolic possession of the disputed shop on 3-4-1979 through a commissioner appointed by the court and that it was on that date that she discovered that two strangers were sitting at the shop which naturally aroused her suspicion, ON equiry as well as inspection undertaken on her behalf by Sri S. K. Nigam Advocate, it was revealed that the petitioners had surreptitiously obtained exparte orders in their favour on 9-2-1979 without any intimation or notice to the landlords. The learned District Judge considered the grounds disclosed by the respondent no. 3 as sufficient and by a separate order dated 28-2-1981 condoned the delay and directed the revision to be put up for hearing. 6. In the revision filed by the respondent no. 3 it was asserted by the landlords that the impugned order dated 9-2-79 was null and void having been passed without any notice or intimation whatever to the landlords. It was further asserted that the aforesaid application moved by the petitioners under rule 10(6) (a) was malafide, having been filed with the sole object of frustrating the application moved on behalf of the landlords under section 21 which was pending since 1974. It was alleged by the respondent no. 3 that Sri B. T. Lalwani had long since left the disputed shop and had gone to Hong-kong and his wife who had moved the application in his name had remarried one Shakeel Ahmad in the year 1973 after she had become a Mohammedan. Indeed she did not hold any power of attorney for or on behalf of Sri Lalwani. The application moved by her was a clear camouflage being an undisguised cover for sub-letting which was prohibited under the Act quite apart from being prejudicial to the landlords. The partnership was not bonafide and genuine and it was designed only to prevent the consequence of the shop being deemed vacant under section 12 (2) of the Act. The application moved by her was a clear camouflage being an undisguised cover for sub-letting which was prohibited under the Act quite apart from being prejudicial to the landlords. The partnership was not bonafide and genuine and it was designed only to prevent the consequence of the shop being deemed vacant under section 12 (2) of the Act. The aforesaid revision was contested by the petitioners principally on two grounds namely : 1. The revision was not maintainable as no order of allotment had yet been passed in pursuance of the order dated 9-2-1979. 2. The landlords were not entitled to any notice or intimation upon the application of the petitioners under Rule 10 (6) (a). 7. The revisional court has repelled both the aforesaid contentions and has held that the order dated 9-2-1979 was clearly unsustainable in law having been passed without any notice which was in the facts, and circumstances of the present case as well as under the scheme of the enactment, mandatory. The learned District Judge has further held that in any case, the principles of natural justice were clearly violated by the failure of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to inform the landlords of the application of the petitioners which he was considering. 8. Sri S. P. Gupta learned counsel for the petitioners submitted before me the same two points which were urged on behalf of the petitioner before the revisional court namly : 1. The order dated 9-2-1979 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer granting permission to the tenant SRI B. T. Lalwani to admit the aforesaid two partners was not revisable and consequently the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. 2. The landlords were not entitled to be heard in opposition to the application of the petitioners under rule 10 (6) (a) either under the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder or even the principles of natural justice. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some length I find no merit in either of the two contentions. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some length I find no merit in either of the two contentions. 9. Taking the first point first, the submission was that under section 18 (1) of the aforesaid Act it is only the ultimate order of allotment contemplated under rule 10 (6) (a) which could have been subjected to a revision and the order dated 9-2-1979 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, it was urged, was in the nature of an interlocutory order not affecting the rights of the parties at that stage and consequently the same was not revisable. 10. I am unable to accept the above contention. The order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 9-2-1979 is, in my opinion, a final order which will be deemed to have been passed under section 16 of the Act. Under section 18 (1) of the Act a revision lies against any final order passed under section 16 or section 19 of the Act. Section 19 has no application to the fact of the present case as the same deals with reallotment in the event of the landlord abusing an order of release. Section 16, however, clearly covers the afosesaid order dated 9-2-1979. Section 16 (1) (a) confers power on the District Magistrates to require the landlord to let any building which is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant to any person specified in the order which is called order of allotment. The next relevant provision is Section 12 of the Act which lists the circumstances in which a landlord or tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof. Sub-section (2) of section 12 is important for our purpose and the same may be reproduced here :- "12 (2). The next relevant provision is Section 12 of the Act which lists the circumstances in which a landlord or tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof. Sub-section (2) of section 12 is important for our purpose and the same may be reproduced here :- "12 (2). In the case of a non-residential building where a tenant carrying on business in the building admits a person who is not a member of his family as a partner or a new partner, as the case may be the tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building." The next relevant provision is sub-section (4) of section 12 which says : "(4) Any building or part which a landlord or tenant has ceased to occupy within the meaning of sub-section (1), or sub-section (2), or sub-section (3), subsection (3-A) or sub-section (3-B), shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be deemed to be vacant." Section 41 of the Act confers rule making power on the State Government to carry out the purposes of this Act. Section 34 sub-section (8) also seems relevant in the context and the same provides that for the purposes of any proceedings under this Act and for purposes connected therewith the authorities exercising powers thereunder shall have such other powers and shall follow such procedures, principles of proof, rules of limitation and guiding principles as may be prescribed. In the exercise of these rule making powers the State Government has framed rules, Rule 10 prescribes a comprehensive procedure for allotment. In the exercise of these rule making powers the State Government has framed rules, Rule 10 prescribes a comprehensive procedure for allotment. Rule 10 (6) (a)-which has been the principal subject of debate at the bar-has to be reproduced in extenso in order to appreciate the controversy : "(6) A person who is deemed to have ceased to occupy a building within the meaning of section 12 (1) (b), or who is evicted under Section 21 by virtue of being a tenant referred to in Explanation (I) of Section 21(1) shall not be allotted that or any other residential building and a person who is deemed to have ceased to occupy a building within the meaning of Section 12 (2), shall not be allotted that or any other non-residential building for a period of two years from the date of such eviction or deemed cessation, as the case may be : Provided that- (a) If the District Magistrate is satisfied in a case referred to in section 12 (2) that the admission of partner or new partner is bona fide transaction and not a mere cover for sub-letting, he shall, if any application had been made in that behalf before the admission of such partner, or new partner, allot the non residential building in question afresh to the newly constituted or reconstituted firm :" 11. The above are the main statutory provisions on a true and proper construction of which the solution to the problem posed under the first point lies. A perusal of section 12 (2) read with rule 10 (6) (a) clearly points to the conclusion that clause (a) to sub-rule (6) is in the nature of an exception to the consequences which flow from admission of partner or a new partner who is not a member of the tenant's family in respect of the business being carried on in the building under tenancy. But for an order under clause (a) of the proviso to sub-rule (6) of rule 10, admission of such a partner would automatically result in the building being deemed vacant. But for an order under clause (a) of the proviso to sub-rule (6) of rule 10, admission of such a partner would automatically result in the building being deemed vacant. Under clause (a) of the proviso to sub-rule (6), the District Magistrate (or the Officer exercising his powers) has been authorised to allot a non-residential building to the newly constituted or reconstituted firm if he is satisfied that the admission of a partner or a new partner is a bonafide transaction and not a mere cover for sub-letting. Where the District Magistrate is so satisfied, he is enjoined under the said provision to allot the accommodation to the newly constituted firm, as of course provided that such an application had been made in that behalf before the admission of such a partner or new partner. The language used is peremptory and mandatory. There is no residuary discretion left with the District Magistrate after he records such satisfaction. 12. It will thus be seen that the adjudication that the transaction is bonafide and not a mere cover for sub-letting finally disposes of the proceedings. It inevitably and automatically paves the way for issuance of an order of allotment in favour of the newly constituted firm. It invests the newly constituted partnership with an immutable right of allotment. The order adjudicating upon the bonafides of the transaction has, in my judgment, full incidence of a final order as regards the authority passing it. That being so, it is clear that the order dated 9th of February, 1979 resulted in a final adjudication or decarlation of a valuable right in favour of the newly constituted firm, apart from a host of other legal consequences, which shall be referred to hereafter, directly flowing from it. Indeed, the petitioners themselves treated the said order as having become imprest with that finality. That is why the new partners proceeded straight-away to occupy the shop and commence their business without waiting for the ceremony of issuance of a formal order of allotment. 13. In my judgment, the order dated 9-2-1979 was clearly a final order deciding all the questions which are required to be determined under rule 10 (6) (a). After the order dated 9-2-1979 the issuance of a formal order of allotment in form B became a matter of mere formality. 13. In my judgment, the order dated 9-2-1979 was clearly a final order deciding all the questions which are required to be determined under rule 10 (6) (a). After the order dated 9-2-1979 the issuance of a formal order of allotment in form B became a matter of mere formality. Indeed Sri S. P. Gupta himself repeatedly submitted that the issuance of the order of allotment in consequence of the adjudication made in favour of the petitioners by the order dated 9-2-1979 was a mere ministerial act or formality and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could not refuse to issue that order after that decision. 14. Sri S. P. Gupta, however, submitted that the power contemplated under clause (9) of the proviso to sub-rule (6) is exercisable in two stages : the first is when the tenant makes the application before admitting a new partner, and, the second stage arrives after the tenant actually admits a new partner acting upon the permission granted by the District Magistrate under clause fa) of the said proviso. He argued that it is only after the second stage that the occasion to allot arises. That being so, it was urged, that an order granting permission to the tenant to admit new partner does not affect the rights of the parties until the partner is actually admitted. In support, he relied on section 16 (1) (a) of the Act and submitted that the power to make an order of allotment under rule 10 (6) (a) is referable to section 16 (1) which is the substantive provision in regard to allotment of buildings and under section 16 (1) (a) no order of allotment can be passed unless there is a vacancy or a deemed vacancy. That being so, it was urged, an order of allotment cannot be passed even under rule 10 (6) (a) until a deemed vacancy has arisen under section 12 (2) by the admission of a new partner by the sitting tenant. The landlords had thus no right of revision against the order dated 9-2-1979. I am unable to accept the above contention. The question is not whether the order dated 9-2-1979 is itself an order of allotment. In order that an order may be revisable under section 18, it is not necessary that it must be an order of allotment. The landlords had thus no right of revision against the order dated 9-2-1979. I am unable to accept the above contention. The question is not whether the order dated 9-2-1979 is itself an order of allotment. In order that an order may be revisable under section 18, it is not necessary that it must be an order of allotment. All final orders falling under section 16 are revisable under section 18, and there is no manner of doubt that the order dated 9-2-1979 is final order as it finally settles all matters affecting the rights of the parties which are required by the Statute viz., rule 10 (6) (a) to be determined. By that order the application of the petitioners stood finally disposed of. Nothing else remained to be determined. Only the ministerial act of issuing a formal order of allotment in Form B remained, if at all. As rule 10 (6) (a) was framed-as the rest of the sub-rules of rule 10-to effectuate matters of allotment contemplated under section 16, the order dated 9-2-1979 must be deemed to be one passed under section 16. 15. As regards the submission that the power under rule 10 (6) (a) is exercisable in two stages, that is, once before the admission of the partners, and, again after the admission, I find no merit whatever in it. The language of the Statute does not bear such an interpretation. In my view, power under rule 10 (6) (a) may be exercised even when the admission of the partner is fait accompli, provided the application "had been made in that behalf before the admission of such partner" (vide the language used in clause (a)). However, whether the order of adjudication upon the genuineness of the transaction is passed before or after the actual admission of the partner, that could not affect the finality of the adjudication. The statute does not envisage repetition of the adjudication of the bonafides of the transaction. Once the authority has adjudicated on the bonafides of the transaction, as in the present case, the proceedings as regards the authority exercising powers under rule 10 (6) (a) stand disposed of. In the present case the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had not kept the application of the petitioners pending. Once the authority has adjudicated on the bonafides of the transaction, as in the present case, the proceedings as regards the authority exercising powers under rule 10 (6) (a) stand disposed of. In the present case the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had not kept the application of the petitioners pending. Indeed there seems considerable tenability in the view taken by the District Judge that the order dated 9-2-1979 virtually amounts to allotment of the building afresh in favour of the newly constituted firm. The petitioners too treated the order that way. 16. Be that as it may, after the order dated 9-2-1979 the newly constituted firm came to acquire a vested right to have the shop allotted afresh in its favour. Further the disabilities to which the tenant would have become exposed under sub-rule (6) of rule 10 namely the bar of allotment of the building to him for a period of two years also ceased with the passing of the order dated 9-2-1979. Still further, the building which would have been deemed to be vacant under section 12 (2) could not be deemed vacant after the transaction had received the seal of approval of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. For all these reasons I hold that the order dated 9-2-1979 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was itself a final order disposing of the entire controversy affecting the rights of parties under rule 10 (6) (a). As undisputedly an order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under rule 10 (6) (a) is relatable to the power of allotment contained in the substantive provisions of section 16, an order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer of the nature dated 9-2-1979 being a final order must necessarily be deemed to be a final order under section 16 capable of being revised under section 18 (1). 17. Before passing on to the second point I may notice another short submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The argument was that even after the grant of a permission by the District Magistrate under clause (a) to sub-rule (6) of Rule 10 the proposed new partners might still decide not to enter into the partnership. Under such circumstances, the adjudication resulting in the grant of the permission would have no efficacy. The argument was that even after the grant of a permission by the District Magistrate under clause (a) to sub-rule (6) of Rule 10 the proposed new partners might still decide not to enter into the partnership. Under such circumstances, the adjudication resulting in the grant of the permission would have no efficacy. Therefore, it must be held that the mere grant of permission does not affect the rights of the parties. 18. I am not impressed by this argument in the least. If inspite of the permission obtained by the tenant, the new partners do not choose to join the partnership, it would not in any way derogate from the finality attaching to the order granting the permission. It would still be one which incorporates an adjudication of a final character affecting the rights of the parties. The only result of the proposed new partners not joining the tenants' firm would be that the adjudication shall have been rendered infructuous by the subsequent acts. That consideration however, does not affect the legal character of the order which the District Magistrate passes under rule 10 (6) (a) regarding his satisfaction. The second submission is equally devoid of merit. Learned counsel contended that the landlord does not come into the picture at all in these circumstances. Even if the accommodation is deemed vacant under section 12 (2), it would still be a matter between the authorities and the prospective allottees. Learned counsel in this connection placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of T. Singh and Company v. District Magistrate Lucknow, 1976 AWC 610 SC in which it was observed that a mere declaration of vacancy by the District Magistrate under rule 8 does not affect the interest of the sitting tenants and that the tenant still has a right to question the order of allotment or release passed under section 16 by filing a review petition under section 16 (5) or an appeal under section 18 (as the law then stood). 19. In my opinion, it is wrong to assume that the right or interest of the landlord is not in any way affected by the passing of an order under rule 10 (6) (a). There are numerous ways in which the landlords would be adversely affected by the grant of a permission to the tenant to admit a new partner. 20. In my opinion, it is wrong to assume that the right or interest of the landlord is not in any way affected by the passing of an order under rule 10 (6) (a). There are numerous ways in which the landlords would be adversely affected by the grant of a permission to the tenant to admit a new partner. 20. Clause (a) to the proviso to rule 10 (6) itself points out that the District Magistrate has to be satisfied that the transaction is bonafide and not a mere cover for sub-letting. The provision seems to be specifically aimed at preventing subterfuges in the garb of partnerships. What may in truth and substance be a design to sub-let the accommodation to outsiders may be so camouflaged as to give an appearance of a bonafide transaction. If the District Magistrate grants the permission the building which would otherwise have been deemed vacant under section 12 (2) would go out of the purview of section 16 thereby depriving the landlord to apply for release under clause (b) of section 16 (1) in case he needs the building under tenancy for his own use and occupation. The landlord is thus deprived of his right to apply under section 16 (1) (b). Further under Section 20 (2) (c) the landlord has a right to bring a suit for the ejectment of the tenant where the tenant has sublet "in contravention of the provisions of Section 25 or as the case may be of the old Act the whole or any part of the building." It will thus be seen that the landlord shall have lost the right to sue the tenant on the ground of sub-letting in view of the permission which the subtenant has obtained under rule 10 (6) (a). 21. Again in Section 25(1) there is an express and absolute prohibition against the tenants sub-letting the whole of the building under tenancy. Under sub-section (2) of Section 25, however, the tenant has been given the right to sub-let but only with the permission in writing of the landlord and the District Magistrate a part of the building. This provision clearly indicates that the tenant is absolutely prohibited from sub-letting the whole of the building under his tenancy and in regard to a part of the building he can do so but only with the permission in writing of the landlord. This provision clearly indicates that the tenant is absolutely prohibited from sub-letting the whole of the building under his tenancy and in regard to a part of the building he can do so but only with the permission in writing of the landlord. Explanation to Section 25 provides that where the tenant ceases within the meaning of clause (b) of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 12 to occupy the building or any part thereof, he shall be deemed to have sublet that building or part. 22. The aforesaid provisions of Section 25 clearly suggest that the landlords has a decisive voice in the matter of subletting. The explanation to Section 25 embodies a legal fiction which on the facts mentioned therein results in the building being deemed to have been sublet. It is also clear that once a permission is granted under rule 10 (6) (a), the Explanation to Section 25 cannot apply. These then are some of the repercussions which the order passed by the District Magistrate under rule 10 (6) (a) according his seal of approval to the transaction put forward by the tenant are bound to have on the rights of the landlords. Moreover, to whom does the property pass as a result of a transaction which is a mere cover for subletting cannot in these circumstances be a matter of total unconcern for the landlord. 23. The rights of the landlord in my judgment are thus directly and substantially affected by the grant of permission to the tenant under rule 10 (6) (a). The landlord ought in these circumstances to be held to have the right to demonstrate before the District Magistrate that the transaction submitted before him for his approval is a mere cloak for an outright subletting which is prohibited under the Act. The landlord was hence clearly entitled to an opportunity of being heard before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed the order dated 9-2-1979. The duties to give an opportunity to the landlord before according permission to the tenant to admit a new partner is inherent and implicit in the nature of the power exercisable under rule 10 (6) (a), having regard to the context and the scheme of the enactment. 24. Coming to the decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner reported in 1976 AWC 610 (SC), the same is clearly distinguishable. 24. Coming to the decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner reported in 1976 AWC 610 (SC), the same is clearly distinguishable. In that case a sitting tenant had approached the High Court directly under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against an order merely declaring a vacancy under rule 8 of the rules framed under U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. This court rejected that petition on the ground that the petitioner had several remedies available under the Act and that on that account the petition was premature. This order was affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal. The Supreme Court observed that the tenant had a right of review under Section 16 (5) before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer himself and a further right of appeal under Section 18 (as it then stood) against the order of allotment which may be passed in pursuance of the declaration of vacancy. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that in view of the fact that the tenant had several remedies both before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as well as before the appellate court, the petition of the tenant was rightly dismissed by the High Court as premature. In paragraph 10 of the report their Lordships of the Supreme Court however observed that an order notifying the vacancy does not cause any injury or prejudice to the interest of any party. The situation in the present case is materially different. In the present case as I have shown that the order granting permission to the tenant to admit a new partner does materially and seriously affect the rights and liabilities of the parties. The tenant becomes entitled to an order of allotment as a matter of course after this adjudication. The adjudication finally determines the rights of the parties. I have also shown above that after the transaction has been adjudged bonafide the issue cannot be investigated again by the District Magistrate under Rule 10 (6) (a). So far as the District Magistrate is concerned, therefore, the rights of the parties stand finally determined by the grant of the permission under rule 10 (6) (a). The order under rule 10 (6) (a) has thus far greater significance and potentialities than a mere declaration of vacancy under rule 8. The principles of natural justice are thus plainly attracted. 25. The order under rule 10 (6) (a) has thus far greater significance and potentialities than a mere declaration of vacancy under rule 8. The principles of natural justice are thus plainly attracted. 25. Learned counsel then submitted that in pursuance of the permission granted to the petitioner, the new tenants have been already admitted. This position cannot be reversed even if opportunity Is now given to the landlord to be heard upon the application of the petitioner. It was urged that the admission of a partner is now an accomplished fact and no useful purpose would be served by going through the exercise of granting a hearing to the landlord. 26. I am not impressed by the above submission at all. It is incorrect to say that the situation has become irreversible. The landlord shall now have an opportunity of being heard and it will be open to him to show cause against the application of the petitioner. The petitioners can still demonstrate that the proposed transaction is bonafide and not a mere cover for sub-letting. If the transaction is genuinely so, the petitioners need have no fear and they shall suffer no prejudice if the landlord is heard. If, on the other hand, the landlords succeed in proving that the transaction was not bonafide and that it was a mere camouflage for sub-letting, the tenant shall have incurred the liability of the shop being deemed vacant under section 12 (2) by the admission of the new partners. Obviously the courts cannot help a litigant or parties in regard to whom the finding is that the transaction entered into by them was tainted and was not a bonafide one. For this situation, the landlords cannot be blamed. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the tenant cannot be blamed for having admitted the two partners in pursuance of the orders dated 9-2-1979, as they were under no duty to give any notice to the landlords. The tenant should, not therefore, be made to suffer by the failure of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to give notice to the landlords. I do not find any merit in this argument. The tenant should, not therefore, be made to suffer by the failure of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to give notice to the landlords. I do not find any merit in this argument. If the law casts a duty on the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to give notice to the landlords before passing the impugned order and if no notice is given the order must be held to be completely void and ineffectual and any acts committed in pursuance thereof have also to meet the same fate. Moreover, if the tenant cannot be blamed for this situation, the landlords are equally blameless. This submission, therefore, does not advance the case of the petitioner any further. 27. Sri S. P. Gupta next submitted that there is no prohibition in the Act against the tenant's taking a partner in the business being carried on in the disputed shop and hence the landlords ought not have any say in the matter of grant of permission under rule 10 (6) (a). The argument is without any merit. The Act clearly prohibits taking of a partner which results in the accommodation being sublet or being deemed vacant. Any act committed by the tenant which amounts to subletting or the tenant's vacating the accommodation under the legal fictions created under section 12 clearly brings in the participation of the landlords. In my opinion, the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 has not gone so far as to reduce the landlord to the position of a mere mute observer, while the accommodation under tenancy is changing hands in the garb of partnerships which may be nothing but a mere cover for subletting. 28. For all these reasons I hold that the conclusion of the revisional court that the principles of natural justice were in the context clearly attracted to the present case is correct. Learned counsel relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. J. N. Sinha reported in 1971 Supreme Court 40 (Paragraph 7) submitted that whether the principles of natural justice are attracted to a particular situation or not depends on the purpose for which the power is conferred and consequently it must be held that the same were not applicable to the present case. I find no merit in this submission either. I find no merit in this submission either. I have already shown that the duty to give notice to the landlord is clearly implied having regard to the purpose for which power is conferred on the District Magistrate under rule 10 (6) (a). 29. Learned counsel also submitted that rule 9 (3) had no application to the facts of the present case and the revisional court was wrong in relying on the same. It does not seem necessary to express any opinion on this controversy as in my opinion, the landlords were entitled to an opportunity of being heard independently of rule 9 (3). 30. The result of the aforesaid discussion therefore, is that there is no substance in the second point also urged in support of this petition. The last submission of the learned counsel was that the court below was in error in condoning the delay in filing the revision. It was urged that the entire delay had not been properly explained. The impugned order was passed on 9-2-1979. The revision was filed on 25-4-1979. The revisional court considered the explanation offered by the landlords for the delay and it has passed an order, a true copy of which has been annexed as annexure-7 to the counter-affidavit. In my opinion, the learned District Judge has exercised his discretion judicially and properly in condoning the delay and this court sees no ground to interfere with that discretion. In the totality of the circumstances of the present case, I am not persuaded at all to interfere with the impugned order on the basis of the last submission of the learned counsel, in any view of the matter. 31. No other point was urged in support of this petition. 32. In the premise the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The interim orders granted by this court are hereby vacated. Petition dismissed.