Ramesh Chandra Sharma Vikat v. Rent Control and Eviction officer, Bareilly
1982-09-23
K.M.DAYAL
body1982
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT K. M. Dayal, J. - This petition is directed against the order dated 11-12-1979 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Bareilly, ordering the petitioner to vacate the disputed accommodation under section 18(3) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. How the petitioner came into occupation of this accommodation is very relevant. The disputed quarter was occupied by one Baldeo Singh, a railway employee. The petitioner who was a Member of Legislative Council of the State, sent a letter to the District Magistrate asking him to allot the disputed quarter to him. He was already occupying another quarter in the same building. The letter addressed by him to the District Magistrate was not in the form prescribed under the Act nor it contained the information, which is required to be furnished in Form 'A' appended to the Rules framed under the Act. Orposire party No. 2. Upkar Singh, moved an application in the prescribed form for allotment of the premises in his favour on 15-9-1975. There was no other applicant. The District Magistrate asked the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to see him in that connection. On 6-10-1975. the following order was passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer without giving any opportunity of hearing to the opposite party No. 2, Upkar Singh : "Discussed with D. M. He directed allotment of the house to Sri Ramesh Bikat, R.C.I. to issue necessary orders." 3. Against the aforesaid order, an appeal was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the District Judge, which was dismissed on 23-2-1976. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 765 of 1976 was filed by Upkar Singh challenging the allotment order as well as order of District Judge, passed in appeal. U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 was amended by U. P. Act No. XXVIII of 1976 which came into force on 15th July, 1976. The writ petition came up for hearing and was ultimately allowed on 13th of November, 1979 by this Court. The allotment order in favour of the present petitioner as well as the appellate order were both quashed and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was directed to decide the matter of allotment afresh.
The writ petition came up for hearing and was ultimately allowed on 13th of November, 1979 by this Court. The allotment order in favour of the present petitioner as well as the appellate order were both quashed and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was directed to decide the matter of allotment afresh. Thereafter an application was moved by the respondent No. 2 before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer drawing his attention to the fact that inspite of the order of the High Court quashing the allotment in favour of the petitioner, he was continuing in occupation of the house. In reply to the same it was contended by the petitioner that during the intervening period, i.e. when the writ retention was pending bcfoie this Court, the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 had been amended. Due to the amendment of section 14, all the tenants or licensees, who were occupying the building with the consent of the landlord were deemed to be authorised occupants. The petitioner entered into a contract of tenancy with the landlord in pursuance of the allotment order dated 6.10.1975 and has been paying rent to him. Consequently the tenancy of the petitioner stood regularised. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the objection of the petitioner by his order dated 11.12.1979. He held that as the matter was being contested in the High Court, the benefit of Section 14, as amended by U.P. Act No. XXVIII of 1976 could not be given to the petitioner and he must vacate the accommodation. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the patties. Sri Rajesh Tandon, appearing for the petitioner, raised two points before one. His first contention is that the allotment order in his favour was passed on 6.10.1975. Thereafter he took possession of the building with the consent of the landlord. The appeal filed by the respondent No. 2 was dismissed by the District Judge on 24th February, 1976. The petitioner was in occupation of the disputed accommodation with the consent of the landlord on 15th July, 1976, when U.P. Act No. XXVIII of 1976, amending the principal Act came into fore Consequently the petitioner's tenancy stood regularised and all the subsequent proceedings were rendered infructuous. 5.
The petitioner was in occupation of the disputed accommodation with the consent of the landlord on 15th July, 1976, when U.P. Act No. XXVIII of 1976, amending the principal Act came into fore Consequently the petitioner's tenancy stood regularised and all the subsequent proceedings were rendered infructuous. 5. The second argument of the learned counsel is that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no authority to dispossess the petitioner, as his jurisdiction to order dispossession was governed by sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 18 of the Act. Point No. 1 : 6. So far as the question relating to section 14 is concerned, it may be pointed out that after the dismissal of the revision on 24th February, 1976, Civil Misc. Writ No. 765 of 1976 was filed before this Court by respondent No. 2. The petition was for quashing the order of allotment and the appellate order in favour of the present petitioner passed by the Authorities under sections 16 and 18 of the Act. Setting aside the order of allotment positively involved the question of dispossession of the petitioner, who claimed occupation of the premises on the basis of the impugned order of allotment. It may further be noted that there is absolutely no evidence on record to prove that the landlord gave consent for occupation of the petitioner prior to 15th July, 1976. No evidence in the shape of rent receipts or written agreement was produced before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to prove the same. One more thing is important. According to the petitioner's case he took possession of the disputed accommodation and entered into the contract of tenancy with the landlord in pursuance of order dated 6.10.1975, vide para 9 of Annexure 4' to the writ petition. Under the circumstances it is clear that the consent, if any, of the landlord was not given by him of his own, but it was given in compliance of the allotment order passed in favour of the petitioner. That allotment order had been quashed and consequently and thing done in pursuance of that order cannot he set up or relied upon by the petitioner. The petition had been pending before this Court till November, 1979 when it was heard and decided. The right, if any, in favour of the petitioner must have accrued on 16th July, 1976. He was the respondent in that petition.
The petition had been pending before this Court till November, 1979 when it was heard and decided. The right, if any, in favour of the petitioner must have accrued on 16th July, 1976. He was the respondent in that petition. In case his status had changed or there was any change in law, he should have pointed out the same before the Bench which disposed of the petition. That objection had not been taken before the Bench. The order passed by the learned Judge in the previous writ petition bars any such objection at this stage. I do not find any mistake in the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in refusing to give benefit of section 14 of the amended Act in view of the fact that at the relevant time the matter was pending for consideration before this Court in writ proceedings. Section 14 of the Act, was amended by U.P. Act No. XXVIII of 1976. Amended Section 14 of the Act would apply to only such case where there was no proceeding pending. In this view of the matter, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of section 14 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 as amended by U.P. Act No. XXVIII of 1976. Point No. 2 : 7. The second question raised by the learned counsel relates to the power to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under sub-section (3) of section 18 of the Act. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer has passed the order under the same provision. The learned counsel argued that sub-section (3) of section 18 of the Act had to be read along with sub-section (2) of that Section. Sub-section (2) provides that the revisional authority "may confirm or rescind the final order or may remand the case.". The petitioner's argument is that the order of the High Court in the writ petition was an order of remand. It did not rescind or confirm the allotment order. Sub-section (3) could be resorted to only when the order passed under section 16 or 19 of the Act was rescinded. It could not be invoked where there was an order of remand. This argument cannot be accepted because of two reasons.
It did not rescind or confirm the allotment order. Sub-section (3) could be resorted to only when the order passed under section 16 or 19 of the Act was rescinded. It could not be invoked where there was an order of remand. This argument cannot be accepted because of two reasons. The first reason is that the order of quashing the allotment order has not been passed under sub-section (2) of section 18 of the Act. It has been passed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Consequently sub-section (2) of section 18 has no application to that order. It may further be noted that sub-section (3) of section 18 does not mention the authority which had rescinded the order. It reads as under: "Where an order under section 16 or section 19 is rescinded, the District Magistrate shall, on an application being made to him on that behalf place the parties hack in the position which they would have occupied but for such order or such part thereof as has been rescinded, and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary." 8. From the judgment of the earlier writ petition, Annexure 2' to the present petition it is clear that the allotment order as well as the appellate order were both quashed. They did not survive. They stood rescinded. The further order for deciding the question of allotment afresh may be in the nature of remand, but it would not affect the order quashing the allotment. Under the circumstances the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was fully justified in evicting the petitioner from the disputed accommodation in the proceedings under sub-section (3) of section 18 of the Act. He was bound to put back the parties in the same position as they were before the allotment order was passed. Sub-section (2) of Section 18 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not apply to the orders passed in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by this Court. 9. Under the circumstances I do not find any merits in the present petition. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.