JUDGMENT B.N. Sapru, J. - This is a defendants' appeal. 2. The Settlement plots No. 9/2 measuring 0.11 acre, 11/1 measuring 0.17 acre and 12 measuring 0.11 acre situate in village Chupper, Pargana Sheopur, Tehsil and District Varanasi which have been found to be a grove, are involved in the suit. The suit was decreed by the trial Court and the defendants' appeal has been dismissed. 3. Aggrieved the defendants have filed the instant appeal. 4. The plaintiffs case, briefly, was that he was the owner of the aforesaid plots which were bounded by a boundary wall in which there was a grove having a large number of trees. The plaintiff alleged that he had built three Kachcha rooms for accommodation of persons who purchase the fruits in the grove. When the fruit season was over, the purchaser of the fruits used to vacate the rooms. In the year 1968-69, the defendants purchased the fruits and occupied the Kachcha rooms. When the fruit season was over, the defendants did not vacate the rooms in spite of demand and hence the suit for ejectment of the defendants from the rooms in question and delivery of possession to the plaintiff was filed. 5. Out of the defendants, only defendant Pakhandi contested the suit. He did not dispute the plaintiffs ownership. Pakhandi had claimed to have constructed the Kachcha rooms himself. His further case was that he took the grove in the year 1953 and continued in possession ever since then. He pleaded that he acquired sirdari rights in the grove. The defendant also claimed to have planted some new trees and a poultry farm in the grove. The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was challenged. 6. The lower appellate Court has found that the land in dispute was a grove. The lease deed set up by the defendant was not believed. It was found that prior to the abolition of zamindari, the plaintiff who was a grove-holder had become Bhumidhar on the coming into force of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951. It also found that the plaintiff was the owner of the rooms and the defendant occupied them as a licensee. It found that the licence in favour of the defendant was revocable and had been revoked. 7. It also found that the plaintiff was the owner of the rooms and the defendant occupied them as a licensee. It found that the licence in favour of the defendant was revocable and had been revoked. 7. In this appeal it was contended by the appellant that the suit being a suit for ejectment from Bhumidhari land, should have been filed under S. 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In support of this contention, the appellant relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Bhagwati Devi v. Radhey Shyam, 1977 All LJ 74 : AIR 1977 NOC 72. 8. On behalf of the respondent, it was urged that the plea that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, could not be taken in view of the provisions of S. 331(1-A) even though the plea that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction, was taken before the trial Court. Issue No. 5 had been framed on the question of jurisdiction. 9. S. 331(1) of the Act runs as follows : "331(1). Except as provided by or under this Act, no Court other than a court mentioned in Column 4 of Sch. II shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil P. C. 1908, take cognizance of any suit, application or proceedings mentioned in col.3 thereof, or a suit, application or proceeding based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application : Provided that where a declaration has been made under Section 143 in respect of any holding or part thereof the provisions of Sch. II in so far as they relate to suits, applications or proceedings under Chap. VIII shall not apply to such holding or part thereof. Explanation: - If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue Court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the Civil Court may not be incidental to that which the revenue court would have granted." 10. S. 331(1-A) of the Act runs as follows : "331(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1), an objection that a Court mentioned in Col. 4 of Sch. S. 331(1-A) of the Act runs as follows : "331(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1), an objection that a Court mentioned in Col. 4 of Sch. II, or, as the case may be, a Civil Court, which has no jurisdiction with respect to the suit, application or proceeding, exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto, shall not be entertained by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless the objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice." 11. It will be useful to notice and will be of importance that under S. 331(1-A) the appellate or revisional Court cannot entertain a plea of want of jurisdiction unless two conditions are satisfied, namely, one that the objection as to the jurisdiction was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases at or before the settlement of issues and secondly that unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. 12. In this case, the first requirement is obviously met but it is pleaded on behalf of the respondent that there has been no consequent failure of justice as a result of the Civil Court taking the cognizance. 13. Sri K. C. Srivastava appearing on behalf of the appellant urged while conceding that S. 331(1-A) did not prevent him to raise the plea of jurisdiction in this appeal because there has been a failure of justice. He relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 and in particular on the following portion of the judgment (Para 7) : "The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 of the Civil P. C. and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of Legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both the territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate Court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits." 14. The next decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is a decision in the case of Kishori Lal v. Shambhoo Nath, 1979 Rev Dec 37 : 1978 All LJ 1273. In that case, the plaintiff filed a suit claiming that he was a Bhumidhar of the land and he prayed for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in his possession over the land in suit. The suit was decreed by the two courts below. In the High Court, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit was questioned. The learned Judge decided that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as such a suit could be filed in the revenue Court. On behalf of the respondents it was urged that the plea of jurisdiction was not open in view of section 331 (1-A) of the Act as the plea of jurisdiction has not been raised in the first instance and repelled by the Court. It was held that the first condition required by S. 331(1-A) was met, namely, the plea should have been raised before the issues were framed. The Court went to consider whether there had been a consequent failure of justice. It observed as follows (at p. 1274 of All LJ "The question is whether the second condition was also satisfied. Now, it cannot be disputed that no decree for injunction could have been granted in the present case without an adjudication of the plaintiffs right to the land. Indeed that was the principal question raised before the lower appellate Court and decided by it in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. A decree of declaration of rights granted by the revenue Court also involves the adjudication of those rights. Under Section 229-B of the Act, the State and the Gaon Sabha are necessary parties to a suit for declaration. In the suit giving rise to the present appeal the State and the Gaon Sabha have not been impleaded as defendants. The consequence is that the adjudication of the plaintiffs rights as the Bhumidhar of the land in suit on the basis of which the decree of injunction has been granted in his favour against the defendant-appellant, will not be effective against the State and the Gaon Sabha who have taken the place of the land holders after the abolition of Zamindari. It has also come on the record of the present case that the plaintiff's application for mutation was refused, vide order dated August 23, 1966 Ex. D-5, during the pendency of suit. Mr. L.N. Pandey, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, contended before me that the order has subsequently been referred by the Commissioner to the Board of Revenue. Be that as it may, while a declaratory decree of the revenue court is given effect as a matter of course, the decree for injunction in the plaintiffs favour against the defendant-appellant may or may not have that effect before the officer entrusted with the duty of maintaining the revenue records. The plaintiff-respondent has undoubtedly been found to be the Bhumidhar by the decree but so long as mutation is not effected in the revenue record a piquant situation may arise and the very object of the granting of the decree of injunction may be defeated. In view of the aforesaid situation, it is, in my opinion, not possible to say that there has been no failure of justice in the present case by reason of the suit having been filed in the civil Court." 15. It will be immediately seen from the quotation reproduced above that the plaintiffs application for mutation of his name as Bhumidhar had been rejected and so the learned Judge held, on the facts of that case, that there was a failure of justice when the Civil Court granted an injunction. 16. From the record of the present appeal, it is clear that the plaintiffs name was entered as Bhumidhar of the plots in suit. This is a vital distinction between the decision referred to in Kishori Lal's case (1978 All LJ 1273) (supra) and the present case and this case cannot be of any assistance to the learned counsel for the appellant. 17. A decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is a decision in the case of Raj Bahadur Singh v. Smt. Gaura, 1977 Rev Dec 165 : AIR 1977 NOC 149 (All) wherein while considering the provisions of S. 331(1-A) it was observed as follows: "In my view, even though the question of jurisdiction was raised at the earliest stage by the defendants-appellants still, the second condition laid down in the said provision has not been satisfied in the instant case. The second condition is that there should be a consequent failure of justice by the trial in the wrong forum. It has not been shown to me that by the trial of the suit in the civil Court there was any consequent failure of justice. This provision is in line with S. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act and S. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The purpose of these analogous provisions is not to allow a decree, delivered after contest in the wrong Court, to be questioned in the appellate or revisional Court merely on the ground of want of jurisdiction unless it is shown that prejudice has been caused or there has been failure of justice in consequence of the trial in the wrong forum. It has been judicially held that prejudice is not to be equated with the error in a finding recorded by the wrong forum. In the same manner, prejudice is not shown to be caused merely because the wrong forum has tried the suit. A reference may be made to Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 in this connection. The controversy was considered with reference to S. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act and S. 21 of the Civil P.C. and, as I observed above, in my view, the newly added provision in sub-sec. (1-A) of Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951, is substantially analogous to the aforesaid provisions in the Suits Valuation Act and the Civil P.C. In this view of the matter also, I hold that the question of jurisdiction cannot be allowed to be raised in the instant second appeal at this stage." 18. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a decision in the case of Mahabir Singh v. Smt. Illam Kaur, 1981 All WC 120 : 1981 All LJ 394. In that case, it was held that sub-sec. (1-A) of S. 331 does not preclude the objection as to the forum where a suit has to be filed if the trial Court has not given a verdict on merits at the time when the objection is taken in the appellate Court. In that case, it was held that sub-sec. (1-A) of S. 331 does not preclude the objection as to the forum where a suit has to be filed if the trial Court has not given a verdict on merits at the time when the objection is taken in the appellate Court. As to the operation of S. 331(1-A) the Court after quoting the observation in Kiran Singh's case (supra) which has been reproduced in the earlier part of the judgment, observed as follows (at p. 396 of All LJ) : "It is true that the above observations were in regard to Section 21 of the Civil P.C. but the language of sub-sec. (1-A) of Section 331 being the same as that of Section 21, no other conclusion is possible. In fact, sub sec. (1-A) was inserted in 1969 by U.P. Act No. 4 of 1969 to set at rest the controversy about the validity of an objection of jurisdiction in appeals even though the suit had been decided on merits. The Legislature thought it advisable that where a suit had been decided on merits, the judgment should not be reversed on the technical ground of jurisdiction. With a view to bring this result that sub-sec. (1-A) was inserted in Section 331 for achieving which Section 21 of the Civil P.C. had been enacted." 19. The learned counsel for the appellant has also relied upon a Supreme Court judgment in the case of Chandrika Misir v. Bhaiya Lal, 1973 Rev Dec 365 : AIR 1973 SC 2391 . In that case, the plaintiff had filed a suit for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession. In the alternative, the plaintiff also asked for a relief of possession. The plaintiff claimed to be Bhumidhar of the property in suit. The Supreme Court held that such a suit lay in a revenue Court and not in a civil Court. The Supreme Court was not called upon to decide what was the effect of S. 331(1-A) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It only considered the operation of S. 331. Thus, this case is also of not much assistance to the learned counsel for the appellant. 20. The Supreme Court was not called upon to decide what was the effect of S. 331(1-A) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It only considered the operation of S. 331. Thus, this case is also of not much assistance to the learned counsel for the appellant. 20. Apart from the authorities referred to above, one of the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the prejudice to the appellant must be found to exist because the limitation for the execution of a decree under S. 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act passed by the revenue Court was less at a relevant time than the execution of a decree for ejectment passed by the Civil Court. The submission is that the appellant's right would have been protected if after a decree for eviction had been passed by a revenue Court and the plaintiff had not applied within one year, the plaintiff would have acquired Sirdari rights whereas when such a decree was made by a Civil Court, the defendant appellant would continue to be liable for eviction for a much longer period. When the Legislature introduced S. 331(1-A) and required consequent failure of justice, it contemplated prejudice to the defendant because of the institution of a suit in a wrong forum. The Court has not to find the prejudice to the defendant in something that had happened subsequent to the decree passed in the suit. It is, therefore, not possible to hold that merely because different periods of limitation are provided for the execution of a decree by different forums, there is a prejudice to the parties. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to show that anything happened in the suit which prejudiced the appellant. The mere fact that the suit has been decreed as against the appellant does not amount to prejudice in law. The fact that the suit was instituted in a wrong forum will also not constitute any prejudice in law. 21. As I find that the provisions of S. 331(1-A) bar the plea of the appellant that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction, it is unnecessary to decide as to whether the suit was rightly filed in the Civil Court and the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 22. 21. As I find that the provisions of S. 331(1-A) bar the plea of the appellant that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction, it is unnecessary to decide as to whether the suit was rightly filed in the Civil Court and the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 22. The findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court in favour of the plaintiff respondent cannot be challenged and on these findings, the suit must have necessarily to be decreed. 23. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.