ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - Both these petitions are connected and they arise out of the proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. 2. The relevant facts, in brief, are these. 3. Sri Ved Prakash Gupta and his wife (Dr. Vijai Gupta) constitute a family as defined in S. 2 (f) of the said Act. Therefore, they are a person as the said expression is defined in S. 2 (i) of the said Act. There is a partnership firm known as Pearls and Beads (India) in which Sri Ved Prakash Gupta is a partner to the extent of 20 paise in a rupee. In other words, he has th share in the said property. There is a limited company which is known as Hicks Thermometer (India) Limited, of which Sri Ved Prakash Gupta is the Managing Director. Four ceiling cases were started before the Competent Authority, Aligarh. They were numbered as 211, 212, 213, and 292. It seems that statements were made under S. 6 (1) of the Act in the said four ceiling cases and draft statements were prepared under S. 8 (1) in the said cases. These draft statements were served in accordance with S. 8 (3) and objections were filed. After considering the said objections the Competent Authority. Aligarh by a common order dated 25-7-79 decided the said cases. A true copy of the said order of the Competent Authority is annexure A 1 to Writ Petition No. 7475 of 1980. Hari Prakash Gupta v. District Judge. Aligarh. In Case No. 292 the vacant land held by the aforesaid limited company, namely, Hicks Thermometer (India) Limited, was dealt with. In case No. 213, two properties held by the aforesaid partnership firm, namely Pearls and Beads India), were dealt with. In ceiling case Nos. 211 ans 212, the Competent Authority dealt with the family of Sri Ved Prakash.Gupta. It was held that the family held six properties. Out of these six properties, one property was that of the said Limited Company, Hicks Thermometer India Ltd. and two properties were those which had been dealt with in the ceiling case of the said partnership firm Pearls and Beads (India). The Competent Authority was of the view that the land which was the subject-matter of the ceiling case No. 292 was held by two persons under the Ceiling Law. The Competent Authority was of the view that the land which was the subject-matter of the ceiling case No. 292 was held by two persons under the Ceiling Law. It was held by the said Ltd. Company as a person and it was also held by Sri Ved Prakash Gupta, who was the Managing Director of the Company, therefore, this land was liable to be included in both the ceiling cases, namely, ceiling case No. 292 relating to the Company and Ceiling Cases Nos. 211 and 212, relating to the aforesaid family consisting of Sri Ved Prakash Gupta and his wife Dr. Vijai Gupta. In this view, he included the land of the said Ltd. company measuring 2464.16Sq. metre in the lands held by the said family also. Taking the same view in respect of the said two properties held by the aforesaid firm Pearls and Beads (India), he included ?th share of Sri Ved Prakash Gupta in the said partnership firm as the land of the family. He calculated such ?th share in one partnership property to be 347.25 Sq. metre and ?th share in the other partnership property was calculated to measure 2104.51 Sq. metre. These figures were accordingly included in the assessment of the cases relating to the family, namely, cases Nos. 211 and 212. The remaining three out of the 6 properties were not the subject matter of any other case and were independently dealt with in cases Nos. 211 and 212, The six properties which were dealt with in the said cases Nos. 211 and 212 were as follows : (i) Kothi Morris Road, Aligarh. (ii) Tikaram Nursing Home, Morris Road Aligarh. (iii) Properties numbered as A 12 and A 13 owned by Hicks Thermometer (India) Ltd. (iv) Properties numbered as D 57, D 58 and D 59 of Industrial Estate, Aligarh, owned by the partership firm Pearls and Beads (India) wherein the share of Sri Ved Prakash Gupta, as stated above, is ?th. (v) Khasra Nos. 2160, 2169, 2170, 2172, 2173 and 2176 compendiously known as 8/55 G. T. Road, Aligarh. This property was also owned by the said partnership firm Pearls and Beads (India), wherein, as stated above, the share of Ved Prakash Gupta is ?th. (vi) Dutta Maternity Home, Begum Bridge, Meerut. 4. (v) Khasra Nos. 2160, 2169, 2170, 2172, 2173 and 2176 compendiously known as 8/55 G. T. Road, Aligarh. This property was also owned by the said partnership firm Pearls and Beads (India), wherein, as stated above, the share of Ved Prakash Gupta is ?th. (vi) Dutta Maternity Home, Begum Bridge, Meerut. 4. In Ceiling case No. 292, i.e., the case relating to the aforesaid limited company Hicks Thermometer (India) Ltd., the Competent Authority held that the total vacant land held by the company measured 2464.16 Sq. metre. After giving the benefit of 2,000 Sq. metre as the ceiling area of vacant land to which the company was entitled, 464.16 Sq. metre was declared as surplus land. 5. In the ceiling case No. 213 relating to the aforesaid partnership firm Pearls & Beads (India), it was held that the properties bearing Nos. D 57. D58 and D 59 of Industrial Estate, Aligarh, had 1736/0.24 Sq. meters as vacant land and the other partnership property described as 8/55 G. T. Road, Aligarh (comprising of seven Khasra numbers detailed above) had 10,522/57 Sq. meters as vacant land. In other words, the total vacant land in the two partnership properties was held to measure 12,258/81 Sq. meters and after deducting 2000 Sq. meters as the ceiling Area to which the partnership was entitled, 10.258/81 Sq. meters was declared to be the surplus vacant land of the said partnership in the said ceiling case No. 213. 6. In Ceiling cases Nos. 211 and 212 relating to the family of Sri Ved Prakash, I have already stated above that six properties were taken into consideration, one property numbered A 12 and A-13 of the said limited company, two properties of the said partnership firm and three properties which were considered independently. The total vacant land of the said six properties was found to be 11223/25 Sq. meters and normally after deducting 2000 Sq. meters as the ceiling area of the vacant land to which the family would be entitled, 9223/25 Sq. meters would have been declared as surplus vacant land in the case of the family. However, as it was a case in which S. 4 (11) of the Act was found to be applicable and the constructed area, including the appurtenant land, was found to be 4555/94 Sq. meters, therefore, the said area was deducted from the total vacant land measuring 11,223/25 Sq. meters. However, as it was a case in which S. 4 (11) of the Act was found to be applicable and the constructed area, including the appurtenant land, was found to be 4555/94 Sq. meters, therefore, the said area was deducted from the total vacant land measuring 11,223/25 Sq. meters. in this manner, 6,667/31 Sq. meters was declared as surplus vacant land of the family of Sri Ved Prakash in the aforesaid two ceiling cases Nos. 211 and 212 relating to the said family. 7. After declaring the aforesaid areas as surplus vacant land, the Competent Authority in paragraph 6 of his judgment directed how much surplus vacant land was to be taken from each property. I have already stated above that in all six properties were being considered in the aforesaid ceiling cases. In the first property, namely, Kothi at Morris Road, Aligarh, no land was found to be vacant land and, therefore there was no question of declaring any land as surplus vacant land. In the second property, namely, Tikaram Nursing Home at Morris Road, Aligarh, 1,751/39 Sq. meters was declared as surplus vacant land. In regard to the third property, namely that numbered as A 12 and A 13, which was the property of the aforesaid limited company, Hicks Thermometer (India) Ltd., 2,464/16Sq. meters was declared as the surplus vacant land. As regards the fourth property, namely, premises Nos. D 57, D 58 and D 59, Industrial Estate, held by the aforesaid partnership firm Pearls and Beads (India), one-fifth share of Sri Ved Prakash therein measuring 347/25 Sq. meters was declared as the surplus vacant land. In respect of the fifth property bearing No. 8/55 G. T. Road, Aligarh (comprising of seven Khasra numbers 2160, 2169, etc.) 10,552/57 Sq. meters was declared as the surplus vacant land. In the sixth property, namely, Meerut Nursing Home, the entire land was found to be covered by building and with appurtenant land, hence, there was no vacant land and there was no question of declaring any land of the said property as surplus vacant land. 8. Feeling aggrieved, three appeals were filed against the said order of the Competent Authority dated 25-7-1979. Urban Ceiling Land Misc. Appeal No. 39 of 1979 was filed against the order of the prescribed authority passed in Misc. 8. Feeling aggrieved, three appeals were filed against the said order of the Competent Authority dated 25-7-1979. Urban Ceiling Land Misc. Appeal No. 39 of 1979 was filed against the order of the prescribed authority passed in Misc. Case No. 292 i.e. the case relating to the limited company Hicks Thermometer (India) Ltd., Urban Land Ceiling Misc. Appeal No. 40 of 1979 was directed against the said order of the Competent Authority in Misc. Case Nos. 211 and 212 relating to the family of Sri Ved Prakash Gupta. The third appeal namely, Urban Land Ceiling Misc. Appeal No. 41 of 1979 was directed against the order of the competent authority in Ceiling Case No. 213 of 1979 which related to the two properties held by the aforesaid partnership firm, M/s. Pearls & Beads (India). These three appeals were decided by three separate judgments by the appellate court. Appeal No. 39 of 1979 was decided by the appellate court by its judgment dated 21-5-1980, a certified copy whereof is Annexure A/ 12 to the Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7475 of 1980. The appeal was allowed and it was held that the said limited company M/s Hicks Thermometer (India) Ltd., did not hold any surplus vacant land. Ceiling Misc. Appeal No. 40 of 1979 was partly allowed by the appellate authority by is judgment dated 21-5-1980, a certified copy of which is Annexure A7 to the Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7476 of 1980. It was held that the surplus vacant land of the family measured 3837/24 Sq. meters instead of 6667/31 Sq. meters, as had been held by the competent authority in his order dated 25-7-1979. Ceiling Misc. Appeal No. 41 of 1979 was decided by the appellate authority by its judgment dated 21-5-1980, a certified copy of which is Annexure A/10 to the Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7475 of 1980. It was held that the said partnership firm M/s Pearls & Beads C/India) held 8415/45 Sq. meters as surplus vacant land instead of 10258/81 Sq. meters as had been held by the Competent Authority. 9. The instant two writ petitions have been filed by the aggrieved parties. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7475 of 1980, Hari Prakash Gupta v. District Judge, Aligarh, is directed against the judgment of the appellate court below in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 41 of 1979. meters as had been held by the Competent Authority. 9. The instant two writ petitions have been filed by the aggrieved parties. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7475 of 1980, Hari Prakash Gupta v. District Judge, Aligarh, is directed against the judgment of the appellate court below in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 41 of 1979. In other words, this petition has been filed by the said partnership firms appeal Beads (India) against the said appellate judgment of the court below whereby the partnership firms' appeal against the order of the competent authority was only partly allowed. The other writ petition, namely, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7476 of 1980, Sri Ved Prakash Gupta v. District Judge, Aligarh: has been filed by the family consisting of Sri Ved Prakash Gupta and his wife and the same is directed against the appellate judgment of the court below in Urban Land Ceiling Misc. Appeal No. 40 of 1979 which also had been partly allowed by the appellate authority. Both the petitions can be conveniently disposed of by one common judgment and accordingly, I am deciding both of them by the instant judgment. In support of the two petitions I have heard Sri Yudhisthira, learned counsel for the petitioner in both the petitions. The learned Standing Counsel has made his submissions on behalf of the respondents in the two petitions. I shall first take up the writ petition which has been filed on behalf of the partnership firm namely Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7475 of 1980. It has already been stated above that two properties are held by the partnership in question. The one property is that bearing Numbers D 57, D 58 and D 59, situated in the Industrial Estate, Aligarh. The Competent Authority and the appellate court both held that the vacant land in this property measured 1736/244 Sq. meters. learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the partnership firm could not be said to hold land of the said property is view of the definition of the expression to hold in S. 2 (1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. meters. learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the partnership firm could not be said to hold land of the said property is view of the definition of the expression to hold in S. 2 (1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The said definition is as follows: "to hold" with its grammatical variations, in relation to any vacant land means- 1(i) to own such land, or (ii) to possess such land as owner or as mortgagee or under an irrevocable power of attorney or under a hire purchase agreement or partly in one. of the said capacities and partly in any other of the said capacity or capacities. Explanation - Where the same vacant land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in another capacity, then, for the purposes of this Act, such land shall be deemed to be held by both such persons." It was contended that in the instant case even though negotiations had been going on between the partnership firm and the State Govt. for a lease being granted in favour of the partnership firm for industrial purpose, the same had not been completed and on the relevant date, there was no lease in favour of the partnership firm. It was not the case of any party that the partnership firm was the owner of the said land or was a mortgagee thereof. There is nothing on record to show that the land in question was held under any irrevocable power of attorney or under any hire purchase agreement. It is true that the partnership firm on different occasions set up different pleas and this aspect of the matter has been very greatly emphasised by the Competent Authority and the appellate court. However, it must be remembered that in a dispute of this kind where an expression has been given a special content and meaning by its definition in the Act, the findings of the authorities concerned should rest on a firmer footing than merely on the basis of inconsistent statements of the party concerned. Even if such statements were to be treated as admissions, taking into consideration the contradictory nature of such admissions, it will be unsafe to work out serious legal consequences and liabilities on the basis of such contradictory statements of the parties. Even if such statements were to be treated as admissions, taking into consideration the contradictory nature of such admissions, it will be unsafe to work out serious legal consequences and liabilities on the basis of such contradictory statements of the parties. Further, it should be seen that it was not difficult for the Competent Authority to make his own inquiry to find out the basis on which the land in question was in the possession of the partnership firm. As the ownership of the land is that of the State it could have been found, after making relevant enquiries from the authorities concerned as to how and on what basis the land in question had been given in the possession of the partnership firm. The petitioner, namely the partnership firm, had sought to file certain papers before the appellate court with a view to show that negotiations regarding the lease were still going on between the Government and the partnership firm. The said papers were not allowed to be brought on record by the appellate court. It is not necessary to go to the extent of saying that the said order was wrong because, basically, the said order was passed in its discretion by the appellate court and normally in the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution it cannot be argued that any jurisdictional mistake in this regards was committed by the appellate court. However, independently of the said matter, as I have emphasised above, there are weighty considerations which should have led the appellate court to hold that the Competent Authority should have decided the basic controversy as to whether the petitioner partnership firm held the land in question within the meaning of S. 2 (1) of the Act by ascertaining the basis by which the Govt. land was in the occupation of the said party. This was not done and a rather tenuous course of shortcut was adopted by placing reliance upon the inconsistent statements of the party from time to time. 10. Sri Yudhisthira, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that so far as the second property of the partnership firm is concerned, his objection was that the appurtenant land in respect of the buildings had not been correctly determined by the Competent Authority and by the appellate court. 10. Sri Yudhisthira, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that so far as the second property of the partnership firm is concerned, his objection was that the appurtenant land in respect of the buildings had not been correctly determined by the Competent Authority and by the appellate court. I have already stated above that the second property of the partnership is compendiously numbered as 8/55 G. T. Road, Aligarh and comprises of 7 khasra numbers, namely 2160, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173 and 2176. There are several non-residential buildings standing on the said land and the Competent Authority calculated 350.60 Sq. Mts. as appurtenant land in respect of such non-residential buildings. The Competent Authority in his impugned order has said that he calculated the said area of the appurtenant land on the basis of the spot inspection and keeping in view the building Rules and Bye-laws. No particular reference to any building bye-law has been made. It should be seen that according to the definition of the appurtenant land in S. 2 (g) it is laid down as under : " "Land appurtenant", in relation to any building means- (i) in an area where there are building regulations the minimum extent of land required under such regulations to be kept as open space for the enjoyment of such building, which in no case shall exceed five, hundred square meters, or (ii) in an area where there are no building regulation's, an extent of five hundred square metres contiguous to the land occupied by such building; and includes, in the case of any building constructed before the appointed day with a dwelling unit therein, an additional extent not exceeding five hundred square meters of land, if any, contiguous to the minimum extent referred to in sub-cl. (i) or the extent referred to in sub-cl. (ii), as the case may be." 11. It was incumbent upon the Competent Authority to have shown hat and with reference to which particular bye law or regulation the area of the land appurtenant was calculated. This was not done and a rather vague and general statement occurs in the impugned order of the Competent Authority that the calculation had been done on the basis of the spot inspection and in the light of the building Bye-laws and regulations. This was not done and a rather vague and general statement occurs in the impugned order of the Competent Authority that the calculation had been done on the basis of the spot inspection and in the light of the building Bye-laws and regulations. The learned counsel for the petitioner has disputed that the said calculation was done on the basis of any such building Bye-law or regulation. He further contended that unless the Competent Authority disclosed the basis of the particular Bye-law on which he proceeded, it is impossible to check up the correctness of the stand of the Competent Authority. In my view, this contention is correct. In the impugned judgment of the appellate court dated 21-5-1980 in Urban Land Ceiling Misc. Appeal No. 41 of 1979 the controversy regarding the appurtenant land in respect of non-residential buildings on the said property has been considered but even though the calculation of the Competent Authority has been affirmed by the appellate court, no further light has been thrown on this controversy in the impugned appellate judgments. Accordingly, in my view, the learned counsel for the petitioner's contention in this regard has to be accepted. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the entire land of this property should have been treated as agricultural. However, in my view, there is no substance in this contention. The appellate court did grant some relief treating some land of this property as agricultural on the basis of the khasra entry of 1383 F. The extract of relevant khasra was admitted by the appellate court as additional evidence in the appeal. However, it has not been shown that the land of this property (apart from the area which was treated as agricultural by the appellate court) was being used for the purpose of agriculture. The learned counsel contended that even if the land was recorded as Parti year after year as was the case in the present controversy, it could not be held that such land was not agricultural land. I should like to observe that as the record stands, there was nothing to prove that the land was really being used for agriculture. The learned counsel contended that even if the land was recorded as Parti year after year as was the case in the present controversy, it could not be held that such land was not agricultural land. I should like to observe that as the record stands, there was nothing to prove that the land was really being used for agriculture. That would be a question of fact and there was no evidence to show that the remaining land i.e. the land excluding the area which was held to be agricultural land by the appellate court, was being used for agricultural purpose. In this view, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this respect is rejected. 13. So far as the other writ petition, namely Writ Petition No. 7476 of 1980 is concerned, I have already stated that the said petition has been filed on behalf of the family of Ved Prakash Gupta and his wife. It has arisen out of the ceiling cases Nos. 211 and 212 and from the Urban Land Ceiling Misc. Appeal No. 40 of 1979 which arose from the said two Ceiling cases. I have already stated above that six - properties were considered in the said Ceiling Cases Nos. 211 and 212 relating to the family in question. Out of those six properties, there is no dispute regarding the first property, namely Kothi., Morris Road, Aligarh, because no part of the said property was treated as surplus land. Similarly, there is no dispute regarding the 6th property, Dutta Maternity Home, Begum Bridge, Meerut, because there also no land was treated as surplus land. 14. So far as the third property is concerned, bearing Nos. A12 and A13, I have already mentioned that the Hicks Thermometer (India) Ltd. had filed Urban Land Ceiling Misc. Appeal No. 39 of 1979 against the order of the Competent Authority in Misc. Ceiling Case No. 292 and the company's appeal was fully allowed and it was held that no land of the Company's property in question had any surplus vacant land. However, in the appeal of the family of Ved Prakash Gupta (Land Ceiling Misc. Appeal No. 40 of 1979). the appellate court held that out of the limited company's 246416 Sq. meters of land, 2422 Sq. meters was not liable to be included in the vacant land of the family. In other words, 42.16 Sq. However, in the appeal of the family of Ved Prakash Gupta (Land Ceiling Misc. Appeal No. 40 of 1979). the appellate court held that out of the limited company's 246416 Sq. meters of land, 2422 Sq. meters was not liable to be included in the vacant land of the family. In other words, 42.16 Sq. meters of the Company's vacant land was liable to be included in the family's vacant land according to the appellate judgment. In my view, the Competent Authority and the appellate court were not correct in thinking that S. 4 (5) of the Act is attracted to the case of a Limited Company incorporated under the Companies Act. The phraseology of the said provision makes it clear that it would not apply to the case of a Limited Company incorporated under the Companies Act. Therefore, the vacant land held by the Company could not be included while calculating the surplus vacant land of the family of Ved Prakash Gupta. Now remain three properties. So far as the second property is concerned namely, Tikaram Nursing Home, Morris Road, Aligarh, I have not found any mistake in the calculation done by the Competent Authority and affirmed by the appellate court. In my view, full benefit has been given to the family in respect of the said property regarding appurtenant land, and therefore, the vacant land held to be 1751.39 Sq. Mts. is correct in respect of the said property. So far as the other two properties are concerned, I have already stated above that they are the properties of the partnership firm, and ?th share of Ved Prakash Gupta in the partnership firm has been included in the vacant land of the family on the basis of S. 4 (5) of the Act. So far as the applicability of S. 4 (5) is concerned, in my view, there can be no doubt that the same is attracted to the facts of the case. However, I have already held, while deciding the Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7475 of 1980, that the vacant land in respect of the said two properties of the partnership has not been correctly determined by the Competent Authority or by the appellate court. I have stated my reasons above for coming to the said conclusion. 15. Accordingly, in consequence of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7475 of 1980, that the vacant land in respect of the said two properties of the partnership has not been correctly determined by the Competent Authority or by the appellate court. I have stated my reasons above for coming to the said conclusion. 15. Accordingly, in consequence of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7475 of 1980 being allowed, this Writ Petition No. 7476 of 1980 is also allowed as there are bound to be consequential changes in respect of the area of vacant land to be calculated in respect of the family after the same has been recalculated in the case of the partnership firm. 16. Accordingly, both the writ petitions are allowed and the impugned order of the Competent Authority dated 25-7-79 and the appellate orders Annexures A.7 to Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7476 of 1980 and Annexure A 10 to Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7475 of 1980. are quashed to the extent and in the manner set out above and hereinafter. The case is remanded to the Competent Authority with a direction that he will determine whether the premises Nos. D57, D58, and D 59 can be said to be held by the partnership firm within the definition of the expression to hold' in S. 2 (1). For deciding the said controversy the Competent Authority will allow additional evidence to be brought on the record. The Competent Authority will itself make further enquiries from the department concerned of the State to ascertain as to how the land of the said property has been given in possession of the party and after making such enquiry and after recording a definite finding regarding the manner and the basis on which the land is in possession of the partnership, the Competent Authority will decide the said controversy as to whether the partnership holds the said property within the meaning of S. 2 (1) of the Act. So far as the other partnership property is concerned, namely that compendiously known as 8/55 G. T. Road Aligarh (comprising of the aforesaid 7 Khasra numbers), the Competent Authority will decide afresh how much appurtenant land should be given to each of the non-residential Units on the said property and the said controversy shall be decided with reference to the relevant Building Bye-laws and regulations concerned. The Competent Authority shall clearly state the particular provision of the Building-Bye-law or the Building Regulation on which he places reliance for calculating the appurtenant land in respect of each of the non-residential units standing on the said property. After deciding the aforesaid controversies, the Competent Authority shall decide whether 1 /5th share measuring 347.25 Sq. meters of the said property nos. D57, D58, D59 is liable to be included in the vacant land of the family of Ved Prakash Gupta and his wife. After calculating afresh the area of the appurtenant land in respect of non residential units in the aforesaid second property of the partnership, namely property No. 8/55, G. T. Road, Aligarh. the Competent Authority shall deduct the same along with the built up area as mentioned in the impugned order of the Competent Authority from the total area of the said property as mentioned in the said impugned order. Thus the area of the vacant land of the said property no. 8/55 G. T. Road Aligarh, shall be determined in the light of the aforesaid directions and the ?th share of Ved Prakash Gupta, shall be included in the vacant land of his family. Lastly, the Competent Authority shall not include any part of the vacant land of the said limited company Hicks. The rmometre (India) Ltd in the vacant land of the family. It is made clear that no other controversy shall be allowed to be raised before the Competent Authority hereafter. 17. There will be no order as to costs.