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1982 DIGILAW 11 (BOM)

Wasudeo Shriram Bhonde and others v. Chintaman Waman Purohit

1982-01-14

S.W.PURANIK

body1982
JUDGMENT - Puranik S.W. J.:-The petitioners are the legal heirs of the original tenant Shriram Bhonde, who was in possession of field No. 20/2 area 10.38 acres of village Kumbhargaon, tahsil Daryapur District Amravati, as a lessee of Chintaman, the owner of the field. The petitioners allege that Shriram was-in continuous possession of the said field as a tenant from 1951–52 and that Shriram was dispossessed in the year 1962 unauthorisedly and without the permission from the competent authority. 2. It is further the case of the petitioner that Shriram started proceedings under section 49-B of the Tenancy Act fie seeking restoration of the land held by him as protected tenant. It was registered as Revenue Case No. 7/59(13-B)/1969–70. The said proceedings were disposed of by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal on 14–7-1970 on the ground that the averments in the application made by the tenant Shriram was that he was dispossessed in the year 1965, and in that event he had lost his right to claim restoration of the land. Against the said order the tenant Shriram preferred an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer vide appeal No. 25 /59(13) /1970–71 alleging inter alia that the averments in the original application that he was dispossessed in the year 1965 was made inadvertently and that he was contemplating to move an application for amendment of the said averment correcting it to the year 1962. However, it was further contended in the said appeal that because his counsel was absent such application for amendment could not be moved. The learned Sub-Divisional Officer on hearing parties held that such opportunity for correction by way of amendment ought to have been granted to the tenant Shriram, and he remanded the case to the tribunal by his order dated 31–3-1971 directing Agricultural Lands Tribunal to allow the said tenant Shriram to file an application for amendment and to consider the same on merits. By this order the landlord Chintaman felt aggrieved and he preferred a revision application before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. It was registered as Ten-A-322 of 1971. By this order the landlord Chintaman felt aggrieved and he preferred a revision application before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. It was registered as Ten-A-322 of 1971. The Revenue Tribunal after hearing counsel of both the sides came to the conclusion that” the appellate Court of Sub-Divisional Officer had erred in remanding the case to Agricultural Lands Tribunal and that no further opportunity for amendment is necessary inasmuch as the application under section 49-B filed by the tenant itself is not maintainable on the averments made therein. The revision application thus came to be-allowed. The order of the Sub-Divisional Officer was thus-set aside and that of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal was restored. This decision of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal was dated 14–7-1972. It is an admitted position that Shriram predecessor-in-title of the present petitioners thereafter did not pursue any remedy or did not invoke the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this court either under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution. 3. After the proceedings initiated by the tenant Shriram referred above were commenced before the Agricultural Lands Tribunal, the Agricultural Lands Tribunal suo motu started proceedings under section 49-B of the Tenancy Act and issued notices to Shriram the tenant and landlord Chintaman. They were registered as Revenue Case No. 606/59(10-B)/1969–70. In the said proceedings it was the case of tenant Shriram that his unauthorised dispossession has taken place in the year 1962. The landlord Chintaman objected to the said averments on the ground that the proceedings initiated by Shriram himself has averred that he was in fact dispossessed in the year 1965. It was brought to the notice of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal that the initial proceedings started by Shriram were thus pending before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and that the final order was expected shortly. It appears that the Agricultural Lands Tribunal waited for the order of the revision application pending before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and the same was communicated to the Agricultural Lands Tribunal after 14–7-1972. The Agricultural Lands Tribunal thereafter disposed of the proceedings which were started suo motu by it on the ground that the tenant Shriram was dispossessed in the year 1965 and hence could not claim any right of restoration under section 49-B of the Act. The petitioners' predecessor Shriram feeling aggrieved by the said order of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal preferred an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer, who dismissed the same. The petitioners' predecessor Shriram feeling aggrieved by the said order of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal preferred an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer, who dismissed the same. Then Shriram also preferred revision application before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal which was also came to be dismissed. It is against these orders passed by the Tribunals below that the legal representative of Shriram have preferred this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 4. I have narrated the sequence of events between the parties in the earlier proceedings to narrow down the controversy. The only question involved is whether the decision in the proceedings initiated by Shriram which came to be finally disposed of on 14–7-1972 would operate as res judicata in the subsequent proceedings and whether Shriram would be estopped from pleading that instead of 1965 he was in fact dispossessed in the year 1962. Shri A. M. Gorde the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the earlier decision would not operate as res judicata since the suo motu proceedings started by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal were contemporaneously instituted and were pending at the material time. According to him if an averment or pleading has been made by the party in an earlier proceeding through in-advertence, he was justified in a subsequent proceeding to prove that the earlier averment was through a mistake of law or mistake of fact and he ought to get that opportunity to prove that the earlier pleadings were wrong. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of (Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi and others)1. 5. Shri J. N. Chandurkar, the learned counsel for the respondent land-lord contended that the proceedings initiated by Shriram were prior to the date which were culminated by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on 14–7-1972 between the same parties. The said order is binding on both the tenant and owner, and the tenant cannot thereafter take any other plea that he was dispossessed not in the year 1965 but in the year 1962 in a subsequent proceedings. His second submission was that section 49B of the Tenancy Act contemplates one set of proceeding only i. e. to say either a suo motu proceeding on behalf of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal or on an application by a tenant. His second submission was that section 49B of the Tenancy Act contemplates one set of proceeding only i. e. to say either a suo motu proceeding on behalf of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal or on an application by a tenant. Since the original tenant Shriram had already started the proceeding which culminated by a final order dated 14–7-1972, then in fact a second set of proceeding started by Agricultural Lands Tribunal suo motu was not maintainable. Second submission on behalf of the respondent No. 1 urged by Shri J. N. Chandurkar has great substance. In my view the plain reading of section 49B contemplates only one proceeding under section 49B. The section clearly states that that the Tahsildar, notwithstanding anything contained in section 36, “either suo motu or on the application of the tenant, held an enquiry “ Thus under section 49B of the Tenancy Act, only one set of proceeding is contemplated i. e. either started by the Tahsildar suo motu or on an application of a tenant. In the instant case as per the facts narrated above the tenant Shriram had already initiated proceedings on his own application vide Revenue Case No. 7/59(13-B) /1969-70. According to him, therefore, there was. no necessity for the Tahsildar to start suo motu proceeding subsequently vide Revenue Case No. 606 /19(13-B) /1969–70. In any event, the Agricultural Lands Tribunal was right in awaiting the order of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal which was then seized with the revision application arising out of the earlier proceedings initiated by the tenant. In the earlier proceedings admittedly the tenant in his own application had averred that he was dispossessed in the year 1965. Thus, according to him, he was in possession as a lessee on the appointed day either on 1–4-1961 or 1–4-1963 and hence the application was rightly thrown out by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal as not maintainable. It is no doubt true as submitted by Shri A. M. Gorde, the learned counsel for the petitioners, that in the appeal preferred before the Sub-Divisional Officer, he had inter alia contended that the tenant Shriram was contemplating to prefer an application for amendment of his pleadings, and wanted to correct the date of dispossession from 1965 to 1962. It is no doubt true as submitted by Shri A. M. Gorde, the learned counsel for the petitioners, that in the appeal preferred before the Sub-Divisional Officer, he had inter alia contended that the tenant Shriram was contemplating to prefer an application for amendment of his pleadings, and wanted to correct the date of dispossession from 1965 to 1962. However, in spite of the fact that the Sub-Divisional Officer remanded the case and directed the Agricultural Lands Tribunal to consider such an application, if filed, on a landlord's representation against the said order the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal negatived the contention of Shriram the tenant and held that an application for amendment cannot be considered. In these circumstances, therefore, the order of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal between the landlord and the tenant in a proceeding under section 49B of the Tenancy Act had come to an end in favour of the landlord. It is also conceded by Shri A. M. Gorde, for the petitioners, that even though Shriram tenant was alive till January 1976, he had not preferred any petition under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging the adverse order of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal of 14–7-1972. Thus for all purposes the said order between the parties had become final and cannot be interfered with in this petition. Moreover, the challenge to the proceedings started suo motu which also culminated by final order of Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal adverse to the tenant and which is impugned in the present petition, the contentions of the petitioners that they ought to be allowed to change their predecessor's earlier stand that he was dispossessed in the year 1962 and not in the year 1965 cannot be taken into consideration. The general principle of res judcata are applicable to all matters and proceedings apart from civil suits. It has been so held by our Court as well as by the Supreme Court in the matter of (Satyadhyan Ghosal and others v. Smt. Deorajin Debi and another)'2 and (The Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. The Board of Trustee of the Cochin Port Trust and another)3 and of our Court in the matter of (Laxman Vithal Rewankar v. Rajaram Narayan Pohurkar)4 and (Baburao Akaram Kalaskar v. Kusum Baburao Kalaskar)5. In that view of the matter there is in fact no issue to be decided in this case. In that view of the matter there is in fact no issue to be decided in this case. The order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on 14–7-1972 is final and binding on the tenant and landlord and consequently suo motu proceeding started by Revenue Case No. 606/59(13-B) 1969–70 was not at all maintainable inasmuch as one set of proceeding is contemplated by section 49B of the Tenancy Act either suo motu or on the application of the tenant. Hence, no interference in either of the proceeding is called for. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. Rule is discharged. In the circumstances of the case there would be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----