JUDGMENT This is a reference in revision sent up by the learned Distt. Collector, Sirmur vide his orders dated 7th July, 1981 recommending the setting aside of the partition ordered in this case by the Asstt. Collector I Greade, Nahan on 27-8-74 and the subsequent order of the Collector, Nahan Sub-Division, confirming the partition on 5-8-80. 2. The facts of the case are that S/Shri Om Parkash, Sharnsher Singh and lnder Singh of village Trilokpur applied for partition of shamlat land contained in khata/khatauni No. 81/131-251, measuring 7742-2 bighas, situated in village Trilokpur, Tehsil Nahan, District Sirmur on 15-7-197L The Assistant Collector I Grade after hearing the parties sanctioned the mode of partition which was subsequently revised m July, 1973 and directed the concerned field staff to effect the partition on the spot according to the mode of partition. After the partition was carried out on the spot the Asstt. Collector I Grade, on receipt of the papers from the field again heard the parties, visited the spot and passed final orders on 27-8-1974 Aggrieved by these orders, Shri Atma Ram and some other co-sharers tiled an appeal before the Collector, Nahan Sub-Division, Nahan on 5-2-1975 on the grounds that the area kept for charand was not fit for this purpose ; that it was not compact ; and that classification of land was not kept in view at the time of partition. This appeal was dismissed by the Sub-Divisional Collector, Nahan on 15-2-1975 as being time barred. Shri Atma Ram and others then filed a revision petition before the learned Commissioner on 7-6-1975. The learned Commissioner after hearing the parties recommended the case for orders of this court under section 17 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act. The then learned Financial Commissioner accepted the recommendation of the Commissioner vide his orders dated 17-7-1978 and held that the appeal was within limitation after allowing the period spent in obtaining the copies by the petitioners. Consequently the appeal was heard on merits by the Sub-Divisional Collector, Nahan and the same was rejected vide orders dated 5-8-1980 holding that the objections raised in the appeal were without any substance. 3. Not satisfied with the appellate orders, Shri Atma Ram and others presented a revision petition before the Collector, Sirmur who submitted it to the learned Commissioner. Consequently the appeal was heard on merits by the Sub-Divisional Collector, Nahan and the same was rejected vide orders dated 5-8-1980 holding that the objections raised in the appeal were without any substance. 3. Not satisfied with the appellate orders, Shri Atma Ram and others presented a revision petition before the Collector, Sirmur who submitted it to the learned Commissioner. The learned Commissioner vide orders dated 26-12-1980 passed an interim order staying the proceedings upto 28-1-1981 and returned the petition, in original, to the Distt. Collector, Sirmur for final disposal of the stay and also the revision petition on merits in accordance with the law. Pursuant to these orders, the learned Collector after going through the record and hearing the parties has recommended that since during the pendency of the appeal the H.P. Village Common Lands Vesting and Utilisation Act had come into force on 29-8-1974, the partition could not be ordered as the shamlat land had vested in the State Government, He has, therefore, recommended the setting aside of the orders passed by the Asstt. Collector I Grade and the Collector. It is in this back-ground that the present proceedings have arisen in this court. 4. I have heard the learned counsels for both the parties. The contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners are :-— (i) that since the appeal against the original orders was decided only in August 1980, the earlier orders had not become final; (ii) that the learned Collector should have taken into consideration the subsequent change in law on account of the enforcement of the H.P. Village Common Lands Vesting & Utilisation Act, while deciding the appeal; and (iii) that the partition is complete only after the partition deed has beeh drawn and i t is effective from the date incorporated in the instrument of partition. 5. In support of his contention that an appeal or revision is a continuation of the suit/proceedings and that the finality of the decree of the trial court comes to an end where an appeal is filed, he cited the decision of the Honble Delhi High Court S.A.O. No. 83 of 1977 decided on 27th January, 1978, C.LJ. 1978, page 4J7 in which it has been held that "It is now well-settled that an appeal is a continuation of the suit. 1978, page 4J7 in which it has been held that "It is now well-settled that an appeal is a continuation of the suit. Wherever an appeal lies against any decree and appeal is filed according to law, the finality of the decree of the trial court comes to an end. Thereafter, it is the decree and judgment of the appellate court which will replace the decree and judgment of the trial court". 6. In support of his second contention that appellate court should have taken the law as in force on the date of its hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the ruling of the Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeals Nos. 2120 to 2122 of 1972, decided on 18-3-1975 C.LJ. 1975, page 305 in which it was held "that the court can and must in certain cases take cautions cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings provided the rules are scrupously obeyed". 7. Reverting to his third contention, the learned counsel for the petitioners stated that the partition deed had not been drawn up before the enforcement of the H. P. Village Common Lands Vesting & Utilisation Act and as such, the partition proceedings could not be deemed to have been completed and the joint status of the property continued. In support of his stand the learned counsel referred to case law S. A. No. 1883 of 1919, decided on 24th January, 1923, 1924 Lahore page 155: "Partition-Deed providing a date" of separation partition is presumed as taken place on that date though parties take possession of shares earlier". 8. The learned counsels for the respondents rebutted all the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In rebuttal to the contention that finality of the decree of the trial court comes to an end after an appeal is filed, the learned counsels for the respondents pointed out that the doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of rigid and universal application. They referred to the case law contained in AIR 1967 S. C. page 681, State of Madras v Madurai Mills Co. They referred to the case law contained in AIR 1967 S. C. page 681, State of Madras v Madurai Mills Co. Ltd.; which lays down that "The doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of rigid and universal application and it cannot be said that wherever there are two orders ; one by the inferior authority and the other by a superior authority, passed in an appeal or revision there is a fusion or merger of two orders irrespective of the subject matter of the appellate or revisional order and the scope of the appeal or revision contemplated by the particular statute. The application of the doctrine depends on the nature of the appellate or revisiorutl order in each case and conferring the appellate or revisional jurisdiction., 9. They also referred to the case law reported in AIR 1958 S.C. 86, Civil Appeal No. 130 of 1956, wherein it was held that filing of appeal or revision may put the decree or order in jeopardy but unless it is reversed or modified it remains operative. 10. The learned counsels for the respondents also rebutted the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that subsequent law should have been taken into consideration by the learned Collector while deciding the appeal in 1980. In support of their rebuttal they again referred to the case law contained in AIR 1958 S.C. 86, wherein the Honble Supreme Court had held that the Police Constable, who was dismissed before the enforcement of the Constitution could not seek protection as provided in the Constitution though his final appeal was decided in April, 1950, after the enforcement of the Constitution. 11. In reply to the third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the partition proceedings had not been completed before the enforcement of the H.P. Village Common Lands Vesting & Utilisation Act, 1974, the learned counsels for the respondents referred to the decision of the Honble Punjab and Haryana High Court in LPA No. 303 of 1973 PLJ 1974 page 345, wherein it was held that the joint status of a property comes to an end from the date of order of the partition. They, on this basis, argued that since the final order in the partition proceedings had been passed before the enforcement of the H.P. Village Common Lands Vesting and Utilisation Act, the Shamlat Land ceased to exist and the question of its vesting in the State did not arise. 12. In addition to their rebuttal of the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the learned Counsels for the respondents also asserted that this Court was not competent to entertain the revision as the reyisional powers of the Financial Commissioner were limited and were at par with that of the High Court under Section 115 of the C.P.C. The learned Counsels referred to the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 163 of 1968 ^/iM966-*SC-P-153, regarding the revisional powers of the High Court. They also referred to the decision of the learned Financial Commissioner, Punjab in R.O.R. No. 304 of 1972-73, LLT-1915 page, 74 wherein it was held that it is a well settled law that questions of fact will not be raised in revision petition. Where in a case no point of law is involved in the finding of fact given by the authorities before, the Financial Commissioner will not entertain a revision petition against such a finding. 13. The learned counsel for the respondents also raised a point that on« of the Petitioners, Shri Atma Ram is not a co-sharer and, as such, not an interested party to come in revision. They referred to the decision taken in Revenue Revision No.2f>0 of 1976-77 LL7M980 page 98, wherein it was held that once it was decided to partition the property, only the recorded co-sharers are to be heard. 14. I have carefully weighed the arguments advanced and the case laws cited by the learned counsels for the petitioners and the respondents. Section 17 (3) of the H.P. Land Revenue Act empowers the Commissioner or Collector to report a case for the orders of the Financial Commissioner where he feels that the proceedings taken or order made should be modified or reversed. Under this section, it is not incumbent upon the Commissioner or the Collector to take congnizance of the matter only on receipt of an application from interested parties. Under this section, it is not incumbent upon the Commissioner or the Collector to take congnizance of the matter only on receipt of an application from interested parties. The Commissioner or Collector can take notice of an application or representation made by any body in the larger public inerest, I, therefore, do not uphold the contention of the learned counsels for the respondents that since Shri Atma Ram is not a co-sharer, the reference revision made by the Collector cannot be entertained. I also do not agree with the contention of the learned counsels for the respondents that the present revision is not maintainable because the revisional powers of the Financial Commissioner are at par with the revisional powers of the High Court. Under Section 17 of the H. P. Land Revenue Act, the revisional powers of the Financial Commissioner in respect of cases arising out of the Land Revenue Act are very vide and unfettered while on the other hand the powers of the Honble High Court have been specified under Section 115 of the C.P.C. 15. In view of my above findings on the preliminary objections of the learned counsels for the respondents, I proceed to determine the case on merits. The first point that emerges for determination is whether the Shamlat Land had ceased to be Shamlat in view of the order of the learned Assistant Collector I Grade on 27-8-1974 or not. 16. It is correct that an appeal was filed against the order dated 27-8-1°74 on 5-2-1975, which was dismissed as being time barred. The petitioners then went in revision, which was accepted by the learned Financial Commissioner on 17-74978 and the case was remanded to the Collector for hearing the appeal, holding that the same was within the time. The appeal was finally rejected on 5-8-1980. In CLJ-1978-P-437 the Honble Delhi High Court has held that the decree of the trial court comes to an end where an appeal is filed according to law and thereafter it is the decree and judgment of the appellate court, which will replace the decree and judgment of the trial court. On the other hand, the Honble Supreme Court, had held in AIR-195&-P-S6, that filing of appeal or revision may put the decree or order in jeopardy but unless it is reversed or modified, it remains operative. On the other hand, the Honble Supreme Court, had held in AIR-195&-P-S6, that filing of appeal or revision may put the decree or order in jeopardy but unless it is reversed or modified, it remains operative. In this particular case the appeal was dismissed and, as such, even according to the decision of the Honble High Court the earlier orders of partition remained in-tact as the same were not reversed. After taking into consideration the case law laid by the Honble Supreme Court in AIR-1976-P-6SI and AIR-1958-P-86,1 hold that the partition order dated 27-8-1974 though remained in operative during the period of the appeal or revision but since it was neither reversed or modified, it remained final. 17. The second point for determination is about the effect of the enforcement of the H.P. Village Common Lands Vesting and Utilisation Act, 1974 on 29-8-1974 at the time of the hearing of the appeal by the learned Collector. The case law referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable in this case. In that case, the landlord wanted to take back some of his shops on the ground that he had no such non-residential accommodation with him. Subsequently, when after lengthy litigation, the case came up for hearing before the Honble High Court, the landlord had, by circumstances, got possession of some of the non-residential accommodation. The Honble High Court took this fact into consideration while deciding his appeal which action was upheld by the Supreme Court. In this particular case, however, there was change in law but not the change of facts. 18. Section 4(c) of the H.P. General Clauses Act, 16 of 1969 provides that the repeal of any enactment will not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed, unless a different intention appears. According to this provision, the rights of the parties to partition which had taken place could not be taken away in appeal on account of the enforcement of the H.P. Village Common Lands Vesting and Utilisation Act, 1974 subsequently. The decision of the Honble High Court of Mysore in Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 1487 to 1489, AIR 1971-P-298, also supports my above conclusions. The decision of the Honble High Court of Mysore in Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 1487 to 1489, AIR 1971-P-298, also supports my above conclusions. In case No. 5 of 1940 decided on 6th December, 1940, AIR 1941 Federal Court 16, it was held that it is a well recognised rule that statutes should, as far as possible be so interpreted, as not to affect vested rights adversely, particularly when they are being litigated." I, therefore, held that the enforcement of the H.P. Village Common Lands Vesting & Utilisation Act, 1974 could not adversely affect the rights of the parties at the time of hearing of the appeal. 19. The third and last point for determination is whether after the order of partition passed on 27-8-74, the joint status of the Shamlat Land had ceased to exist or not. The procedure for partition proceedings is laid down under Chapter IX of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, 1953. The various stages envisaged are submission of application, inviting of objections, determination of question whether partition should be allowed or not and procedure on admission of application for partition. After an application had been admitted for partition, the revenue officer will dispose of questions relating to title of property and other questions. After determining all these questions, the revenue officer will determine the amount of revenue to be paid in respect of each of the holding in which land had been divided. Section 133 of the Act provides that when partition is completed, the revenue officer shall cause an instrument of partition to be prepared, and the date on which the partition is to take effect to be recorded therein. The plain reading of Section 133 provides that instrument of partition is to be prepared after the partition had been completed which means that once the distribution of revenue, rent, etc, had been determined under Section 132 of the said Act, partition is complete. Section 133 only lays down the date from which the partition is to take effect, the Honble Punjab High Court has held in the case referred to by the learned counsels for the respondents that the joint status of the property comes to an end when partition order had been passed. Section 133 only lays down the date from which the partition is to take effect, the Honble Punjab High Court has held in the case referred to by the learned counsels for the respondents that the joint status of the property comes to an end when partition order had been passed. In this particular case the partition orders were parsed on 27-8-1974 and relying on the case law laid by the Honble Punjab High Court, I hold that the joint status of the Shamlat Land had ceased to exist on this date and the partition will be deemed to have been completed on 27-8-1974. 20. In view of my above findings, the revision reference is rejected Revision reference dismissed.