JUDGMENT R.R. Rastogi, J. - This petition is directed against an order passed by the Civil Judge, Etah, on 20-10-1978 restraining the petitioners from interfering with the plaintiffs-respondents 2 to 20 in carrying on their business of parching and selling of parched grains. The petitioners are Nagar Palika Etah through its Administrator and it Officer-in-charge and the Executive Officer. The plaintiff respondents 2 to 20 are Bhurjis and they are carrying on business in parching and selling grains. For this purpose each of them has got a Bhar and the places of their business are located in G.T. Road or Civil Lines area the town of Etah. The Municipal Board, Etah framed a bye-law whereby persons carrying on this business are required to obtain a licence therefor and pay Rs. 36 per year by way of licence fee. Further a restriction has been imposed by which this business cannot be carried on in he, area of G.T. Road and Civil Lines, Etah. Apart f.om this, a person carrying on this business in the other localities of the city of Etah is required to construct a Chimney in the room in which he carries on this business and this chimney is to be of certain specific dimension and height. The plaintiff respondents 2 to 20 filed the suit in the court oi Munsif, Etah, for permanent injunction restraining the Municipal Bord and its officer-in-charge and the Executive Officer from enforcing this bye-law against them. They made an application for issue of an ad interim injunction. That application was rejected by the Munsif Etah, by his order-dated 8-2-1978. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs filed an appeal which has been allowed by the learned Civil Judge, Etah, by his order dated 20-10-1978. The learned Civil Judge has held that the plaintiffs have succeeded in proving that they have a prima facie case. Apart from that the balance of convenience was also in their favour and if temporary injection as prayed for is not granted they would suffer an irreparable loss. The plaintiffs had challenged the validity of the bye-law as well, but that question has not been gone into by the learned Civil Judge. He has, however taken the view that the restriction imposed in respect of carrying on this business in Civil Lines and G.T. Road areas smacks of some discrimination. 2. The plaintiffs had challenged the validity of the bye-law as well, but that question has not been gone into by the learned Civil Judge. He has, however taken the view that the restriction imposed in respect of carrying on this business in Civil Lines and G.T. Road areas smacks of some discrimination. 2. Several submissions were made before me on behalf of the petitioners by their learned counsel Sri M.P. Singh. These submissions are that the grant of interim injunction amounts to automatic decreeing of the suit. That unless the impugned bye-law is struck down, no junction can be granted ; that the restrictions imposed by the impugned bye-law are not prohibitive in nature but are intended to regulate the trade only and lastly that the impugned bye-law was duly notified in the official gazette dated 21-5-1977 and there would be a presumption that legal formalities in regard there to had been duly observed and the bye-law is valid. 3. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents did not dispute that at this stage the validity of the impugned bye-law cannot be gone into. Further the plaintiff-respondents have no objection on to obtain a licence for carrying on their business and pay the requisite fee. They have also no objection in putting up a Chimney as required by the bye-laws. It was, however, contended that so far as the prohibition to carry on the business in the Civil Lines and G.T. Road areas is concerned, the Municipal Board Etah, was not competent to impose it. According to the learned counsel, the State Government might have imposed such a restriction but the Municipal Board, which is a delegated authority. could not have done so. It can regulate that business, but it cannot prohibit the carrying on of a business absolutely in any particular locality. It was submitted that this restriction was discriminatory and not reasonable. 4. I have carefully considered the respective submissions. I do not agree with the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners that the interim injunction as granted would amount to the automation decreeing the suit. The question of the validity of the bye-law, which had been raised in the suit, has not been rightly gone into at this stage Certainly, if the bye-law is found to be invalid, the plaintiff-respondents would be entitled to the relief for permanent injunction. The question of the validity of the bye-law, which had been raised in the suit, has not been rightly gone into at this stage Certainly, if the bye-law is found to be invalid, the plaintiff-respondents would be entitled to the relief for permanent injunction. As for temporary injunction, what is required to be seen is: Whether the plaintiff-respondents have a prima facie case, whether balance of convenience is in their favour so as to entitle them to an interim injunction and lastly in case interim injunction is not- allowed they would suffer irreparable loss or not. It is correct that the trial court did not grant the interim injunction prayed for by the plaintiff-respondents. The appellate court has, however, taken a contrary view. It has of course been laid down in Babu Ram v. Antarim Zila Pari sad, AIR 1964 Alld 534 (FB) that a court of Appeal would not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the court below, if the discretion has been exercised in good faith, after giving due wight to relevant matters and without being awarded by irrelevant matters. If two view are possible on the question then also the court of appeal would not interfere, even though it may exercise discretion-differently, were the case to come initially before it. The exercise of discretion should manifestly be wrong. 5. It is correct that it was not the case of the plaintiff respondent that the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court had been mala fide. However, according to them the relevant considerations had not been gone into and, therefore, it is to be seen as to whether the discretion, had been exercised without regard to "relevant matters. If that was so, then afore the court of appeal could have interfered with the order passed by the trial court. 6. The trial court was influenced by the facts that smoke coming out from a Bhar causes nuisance to the public and the Nagar Palika is within its rights to regulate this business and further that the obtaining of licence and payment of Rs. 36 per month by way of licence fee are not onerous condition. That being so, in the opinion of the trial court, the plaintiffs had not been above to make out any prima facie case. 36 per month by way of licence fee are not onerous condition. That being so, in the opinion of the trial court, the plaintiffs had not been above to make out any prima facie case. It would he seen that certain relevant considerations were entirely omitted by the trial court and they have been pointed out by the lower appellate court. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff-respondents have been carrying on their business of parching and selling grains in these two localities for a considerably long time, that is, for more than 100 years, these are poor business men and if they are made to shift their business from the disputed localities certainly they should suffer considerable loss. May be, they may have to fore go the very livelihood. The prima facie case was, therefore, clearly made out. As for regulatory measures these persons could have been directed to install a chimney and as noted above, their counsel expressed before me true willingness on their part to do so. There was another circumstance and it was that the G.T. Road and the Civil Lines areas are not the only areas in the city of Etah which can be said to require the attention of the Municipal Board for the safeguard of the interests of health of their residents. There must be other quite heavily conjested localities inside the city itself. Here, it appears that the Municipal Board Etah is solicitous only of the interests of the residents of these two localities one fails to understand as to why similar precaution has not been taken for the residents of other conjested localities It would be seen that these aspects were not taken into consideration by the trial court and, therefore, the court of appeal could certainly have interfered with the exercise of discretion on its part in refusing to grant interim injunction, 7. Now coming to the merits, in my opinion, the lower appellate court has taken into consideration the relevant circumstances and the order passed by it is quite just and sound and especially mole so when now the requirement to install a chimney has been conceded before me on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents. It is correct that there would be a presumption that the legal formalities required for framing the bye law were gone into and the bye-law is valid. It is correct that there would be a presumption that the legal formalities required for framing the bye law were gone into and the bye-law is valid. The question of the validity of the impugned bye-law cannot be gone into at this stage. However, the circumstances which have been referred to above are certainly relevant and hence it cannot be said that there is any scope interference in this writ petition. 8. Section 298 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 confers power on the Board to make bye-laws. There are two lists which are appended to this section. List A provides for the subjects in respect of which bye-laws can be made by any municipality. In this list in part (g) provision has been made for offensive trades. Sub clause (xiii) of clause (a) f this part empowers the Board to take a bye-law prohibiting the use of any place as a factory or a place of business if such use is likely to cause a public nuisance oi involves risk of fires. In other words if the business which is being carried on by the plaintiff respondents in the two localities in dispute causes any public nuisance or involves risk of fire, then the Board can make bye laws in regard to the same. During the course of arguments it was contended that in regard to these very localities there was a case under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure initiated at the instance of one of the residents thereof against Gurdayal and others who are some of the plaintiff-respondents in this case and it was contended that in that case was held that this trade does not cause any public nuisance. It is not necessary for me to express any opinion on the nature of this trade because that question would be gone into by the trial court at the proper time. Suffice it to stay it the file of that criminal Revision No. 795 of 1974 was summoned during the hearing of this case and I find that it has not been decided by this court in that case that this trade does not cause any public nuisance. Suffice it to stay it the file of that criminal Revision No. 795 of 1974 was summoned during the hearing of this case and I find that it has not been decided by this court in that case that this trade does not cause any public nuisance. In fact no positive finding was given on this point because the Magistrate had not given any positive finding of fact that a physical discomfort or injury was caused to the passers by using these roads and secondly because in the notice against the proposed action the ground of physical discomfort or injury to the passers-bye had not been taken. I have referred to this matter with a view to make it clear that the question as to whether the trade carried on by the plaintiff-respondents comes within the category of an offensive trade is to be gone into by the trial court at the proper stage and decided on the evidence before it. 9. In the result, the petition has no merits and it is dismissed subject to this observation that apart from the conditions imposed by the lower appellate court, each of the plaintiff-respondents shall install a chimney within his business premises as required under the bye-law within a period of two months from the date of this order. In the event of non-compliance, the interim injunction shall stand vacated in so far as the defaulter is concerned. In the circumstances, parties will bear their own costs in this court,