JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla. J. 1. This is a Habeas Corpus petition challenging the detention of the Petitioner under an order dated 9-1-1982 passed by the District Magistrate, Dehradun u/s 3(3) of the National Security Act. The Petitioner was actually arrested on 10-1-1982 and the detention order was served on him on the same date. It was approved by the State Government on 16-1-1982. 2. The first point, which was urged before us was that in this case the grounds of detention had not been served on the Petitioner till today. Although that ground was not specifically taken in the petition, yet we seriously called upon the State counsel to satisfy us on that foremost ground, which was pressed at the bar. Luckily the record of the District Magistrate was available and placed before us by Sri Girdhar Malviya, learned Additional Government Advocate. We find that full and elaborate grounds in the usual form adopted for such purposes formed part of the record and the grounds contained the endorsement in the Petitioner's own hand-writing and signature that he had received a copy thereof. It is significant that in paragraph 9 of the counter affidavit of Sri O. P. Sharma, District Magistrate, Dehradun, it was categorically stated: The order of detention together with the grounds of detention and all the other papers on which the order of detention has been based was served upon the detenu on 10-1-1982 itself. The Petitioner has signed on every paper and has put the date of 10-1-1982 in token of his having received the said papers. 3. Notwithstanding such clear assertion the Petitioner had the audacity to make the following averments in paragraph 9 of the rejoinder affidavit: He was detained at the police station till afternoon and in the afternoon he was given the copy of the detention order and the report of the police dated 7-1-1982 only. No other paper was given to him. 4. It was actually again pressed before us in argument that the District Magistrate had passed his order entirely on the biased report dated 7-1-1982 submitted by the police and copies of no other papers were supplied to him. We have carefully examined the papers. Apart from the grounds, the FI Rs relating to the various incidents constituting the grounds were also found existing and each one of them hearing the Petitioner's signatures in token of receipt thereof. We have carefully examined the papers. Apart from the grounds, the FI Rs relating to the various incidents constituting the grounds were also found existing and each one of them hearing the Petitioner's signatures in token of receipt thereof. Thus, we have no doubt that the Petitioner made a deliberately false statement, which is completely belied by the record maintained by the District Magistrate and the State Government. While it is the duty of the Court to safeguard scrupulously the personal liberty of a citizen, the Courts cannot wittingly or unwittingly encourage the tendency on the part of the detenu complaining of their invaded liberty to distort facts and present a garbled version of events and thereby bolster up a Habeas Corpus petition. On the contrary, the Courts are constrained to deal firmly with any attempt on the part of the detenu to misinform or mislead a Court of law. We have not the slightest doubt that the Petitioner has filed this Habeas Corpus petition by relying on certain averments such as the allegation of not being served with a copy of grounds of detention, which is nothing but a piece of unmitigated falsehood. We naturally view with great suspicion the facts stated by the Petitioner and have to be extra-ordinary wary in accepting them or relying on them for the purposes of decision. Thus, there is no room for any other conclusion except that in the instant case the copies of grounds of detention as well as of other relevant papers were served on the Petitioner and the contrary allegation made by him in pure concoction. Such arguments raised at the bar without compunction are surely not conducive to a proper and impartial investigation of facts and are likely to result in miscarriage of justice. 5. The next submission made by Sri T.N. Purwar, learned Counsel for the Petitioner was that the District Magistrate had mechanically adopted the report of the police dated 7-1-1982, without applying his mind to the facts of the case and the correct position was that several incidents, which were the basis of the grounds, were found false and the prosecution commenced in that connection had ended in acquittal of the Petitioner. It is indeed an amusing situation that while on the one hand it was being submitted with great vehemence that the copy of the grounds of detention had not been served on the Petitioner, on the other hand, the criticism was levelled that the incidents forming the subject matter of the grounds were false inasmuch as the prosecution based thereon had ended in acquittal. In order to make the correct facts available to us we scrutinised the grounds of detention from the original record placed before us. After a perusal of the grounds Sri Purwar, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, referred to grounds No. 4 and 7 and confined his attack to those grounds. Ground No. 4 recited that in the night of 12/13-3-1979 the Petitioner had with five other associates and armed with unlicensed weapons assembled in a room in the Panchayatghar in village Bhaniawala, police station Doiwala, District Dehradun, with a view to committing dacoity in ihe house of Sri Kalam Singh Pradhan. On being challenged by the police force they opened fire but the Petitioner was apprehended with a country made 12 bore pistol with five live cartridges. Consequently one prosecution u/s 399/402 and 307 IPC (Crime No. 72) and the other u/s 25 Arms Act (Crime No. 73) were commenced, against the Petitioner but on account of the terror which he had created the witnesses shrank from deposing the correct facts with the result that the Petitioner was acquitted. The aforesaid ground concluded with a specific allegation that the Petitioner had by a series of offences and criminal acts committed by him caused such panic in the locality that there was a serious threat to the maintenance of public order. With regard to this ground a certified copy of the judgment dated 15-1-1981 was produced before us by which the Petitioner as well as other accused were acquitted by Sri V.K. Agarwal, Additional Sessions Judge, Dehradun. We are unable to appreciate as to how this fact of acquittal can be of any assistance to the Petitioner. It is not one of those cases in which the order of detention proceeded under a misapprehension that the case was actually pending whereas the fact was that the case was already decided. As already mentioned, the ground itself recited that the acquittal had been secured by the Petitioner in that case. It is not one of those cases in which the order of detention proceeded under a misapprehension that the case was actually pending whereas the fact was that the case was already decided. As already mentioned, the ground itself recited that the acquittal had been secured by the Petitioner in that case. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner also submitted that in the judgment there was no such observation that the witnesses were terrorised or were not available or were not deposing the truth. We are not in these proceedings concerned with the grounds on which the acquittal was recorded. There is abundant authority for the proposition that it might be in some cases not possible to obtain the conviction of a hazardous person by the ordinary mode of prosecution but irrespective of such acquittal it may be felt necessary to resort to preventive measures in order to curb the activities of such a person which would otherwise threaten the public order. We shall later in course of our judgment refer to the decisions which deal with this aspect of the case. 6. The other objection raised with regard to the grounds of detention related to the incident narrated at item No. 7 in the grounds of detention. This ground was to the effect that the Petitioner had been enlarged on bail on 24-8-1981 in a prosecution under Sections 293, 279, 338 and 307, 412 IPC (Crime No. 37) and on 12-10-1981 he along with five other companions had assembled at about 1.30 a.m. in village Gorakhpur, Police station Kotwali after making preparation for committing dacoity in the house of Sri Fazir Mohammad and the accused persons were prosecuted and committed to the Court of Session for trial under Sections 399/402 and 307 IPC. Again a certified copy of the judgment dated 18-5-1982 was produced before us which revealed that the Petitioner had been acquitted by Sri J.K. Mathur, Additional Sessions Judge, Dehradun by his aforesaid order. Obviously this judgment was delivered long after the date of detention order passed by the District Magistrate. Therefore, it cannot be contended on the basis of this subsequent decision of acquittal that the grounds of detention were vitiated and the detention of the Petitioner became illegal. Obviously this judgment was delivered long after the date of detention order passed by the District Magistrate. Therefore, it cannot be contended on the basis of this subsequent decision of acquittal that the grounds of detention were vitiated and the detention of the Petitioner became illegal. As a matter of fact, the result of a prosecution whether it is acquittal or conviction, particularly after the passing of the detention order, is not relevant for the purpose of testing the validity of the detention. As we have already indicated, such judgments may become relevant where there is, for instance, a wrong recital in the grounds to the effect that the prosecution was pending against the detenu whereas on the date of detention it had already concluded and the accused stood acquitted. Even with regard to the findings of acquittal recorded after the detention order, they would not be of any consequence inasmuch as the basic object of applying the preventive measures is different from the object of prosecuting and convicting the delinquent person. Even though it may not at the moment be possible to bring home his guilt to the accused person, yet if he is causing depredations on a massive or frightful scale that would be an adequate ground for detaining him with a view to preventing him from indulging in such activities. It is precisely on this test that the validity of a detention order has to be examined and not by applying the test as to whether prosecution instituted against a person on account of those incidents has actually succeeded or proved abortive. This fundamental distinction of the two types of remedies was brought out clearly in several decisions of the Supreme Court. As observed by Ray, C.J. in Haradhan Saha Vs. The State of West Bengal and Others, AIR 1974 SC 2154 : The power of preventive detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence, ft is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence, ft is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may be made before or during prosecution An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution. 7. The above passage, if we may say so with respect, elucidates that the same facts may sometime furnish common grounds both for criminal prosecution and for passing an order of preventive detention and it endorses the view that one is not a bar to the other since the cardinal objects of the two proceedings are different. The above passage also makes it clear that an order of acquittal passed in a criminal case commenced against a detenu whether prior or subsequent to the order of detention has no bearing on it. 8. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner, however, relied on a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Bimla Dewan Vs. Lieutenant-Governor of Delhi, AIR 1982 SC 1257 and contended that where some of the grounds of detention related to instances of criminal prosecution against the detenu and in many of them the detenu was acquitted, the order of detention would be invalid as none of those instances in which the detenu was acquitted could legitimately be taken into consideration for detaining the detenu u/s 3(2) of the National Security Act. Our attention was specifically drawn to paragraphs 6, 8 and 9 of the report which dealt with those instances of incidents in which the prosecution of the detenu had resulted in acquittal. We have carefully gone through those passages and we find that paragraphs 8 and 9 only deal with the potentialities of the events which formed the subject matter of grounds Nos. 25 to 27 and 29 to 32 mentioned in the grounds of detention. We have carefully gone through those passages and we find that paragraphs 8 and 9 only deal with the potentialities of the events which formed the subject matter of grounds Nos. 25 to 27 and 29 to 32 mentioned in the grounds of detention. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court after examining the factual repercussions of those incidents came to the conclusion that they were bereft of any potentiality to interfere with and had no effect upon public tranquility and order, and hence could not constitute a ground for detention under the National Security Act. It is only instances No. 1 to 22 and 24 and 28 which related to criminal cases founded on the incidents mentioned in those grounds of detention which have been separately dealt with in paragraph 6 of the reports. There is nothing in the narration of facts to indicate as to whether acquittals in those cases had been awarded prior to or after the order of detention or that the detention order was passed under a misapprehension with regard to the fact as to whether the criminal cases arising from those incidents were pending at the time of the detention or had already concluded. Hence, it is difficult to agree with the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the ratio of Smt. Bimla Dewan's case is that the order of acquittal passed against the detenu in criminal cases launched against him on the basts of those very facts which also constituted the grounds of detention destroyed the validity of the detention order. There is not a single fact stated in Smt. Bimla Dewan's case which may give support to such contention. On the other hand, there is a catena of decisions clearly expressing the opinion that the result of a prosecution commenced against a detenu has no bearing on the order of detention which has to be decided on other criteria. The earlier view of the Supreme Court in a Division Bench decision, Biram Chand Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, AIR 1974 SC 1161 was disapproved in the later case of Hardhan Saha (Supra). The ratio of Biram Chand's case was that the detaining authority cannot take recourse to two parallel and simultaneous proceedings nor can he take recourse to a ground which is the subject matter of a trial. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, AIR 1974 SC 1161 was disapproved in the later case of Hardhan Saha (Supra). The ratio of Biram Chand's case was that the detaining authority cannot take recourse to two parallel and simultaneous proceedings nor can he take recourse to a ground which is the subject matter of a trial. This basic proposition itself is no longer good law as the consistent view of the Supreme Court in other rulings is that the two proceedings, namely preventive and punitive are entirely distinct from each other and are inspired by different objectives. Hardhan Saha's case from which the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court has already been quoted was a decision by five Judges and is the leading case. It appears that in Smt. Bimla Dewan's case the earlier ruling by a larger Bench was not cited and the other authorities of the Supreme Court uniformally following that decision were also not noticed. In fact, the arguments advanced on behalf of the Petitioner in Smt. Bimla Dewan's case appear to have been not seriously resisted by the Respondents counsel and as Varadarajan, J. remarked: The learned Counsel for the Respondents did not submit anything to controvert that submission of Mr. Ram Jethmalani. 9. It does not admit of any doubt that where there are contrary decisions of the Supreme Court, the former decision of a larger Bench has to be followed- See Mattulal Vs. Radhe Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1596 . The same rule about precedents was enunciated in the case of the The State of U.P. Vs. Ram Chandra Trivedi, AIR 1976 SC 2547 , and it was laid down in paragraph 22: It is also to be borne in mind that even in cases where a High Court finds any conflict between the views expressed by larger and smaller benches of this Court, it cannot disregard or skrit the views expressed by the larger Benches. The proper course for a High Court in such a case... is to try to find out and follow the opinion expressed by larger benches of this Court in preference to those expressed by smaller benches of the Court which practice hardened as it has into a rule of law is followed by this Court itself. 10. The proper course for a High Court in such a case... is to try to find out and follow the opinion expressed by larger benches of this Court in preference to those expressed by smaller benches of the Court which practice hardened as it has into a rule of law is followed by this Court itself. 10. It may be pertinent to point out that the other notable decisions of the Supreme Court on this point also adopted the same line of reasoning. Thus, Mohd. Salim Khan Vs. Shri C.C. Bose and Another, AIR 1972 SC 1670 it was held that the mere fact that the Petitioner was discharged in a criminal case relating to certain incidents does not mean that no valid order of detention could be passed against him in connection with those very incidents or that such an order can be characterised as 'malafide'. The detaining authorities might well feel that though there was not sufficient evidence for a conviction the activities of that person which they had been watching, were of such a nature as to justify the detention order. This case followed the earlier five Judge decision in the case of Sahib Singh Dugal Vs. Union of India (UOI), AIR 1966 SC 340 . Similarly, Suru Mallick Vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 2305 is also an authority for the proposition that when serious offences are committed which disrupt communication and prejudicially affect the maintenance of essential services to the community, persons in charge of law and order will be armed with authority to detain the persons if no specific instances can be established in a criminal court for want of evidence or where witnesses are not willing to come forward. Similarly, in another Division Bench decision in the case of Babulal Das Vs. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 606 Krishna Iyer, J. ruled that the fact that the Petitioner was discharged by a court for the same crime does not bar on the power to detain. Similarly, in another Division Bench decision in the case of Babulal Das Vs. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 606 Krishna Iyer, J. ruled that the fact that the Petitioner was discharged by a court for the same crime does not bar on the power to detain. Thus, the tenor of all the decisions of the Supreme Court on this point is that the two powers, namely, the one to bring a culprit to book by prosecuting and punishing him and the other by imposing a check upon his criminal activities, which is followed, unwatched would put public order in jeopardy are distinct from each other; they are qualitatively different and their object and purpose are also distinct from each other. One cannot impinge on the other and both may simultaneously or otherwise be pressed into service for achieving the desired objective. A pragmatic approach to this proposal cannot slur over the fact that even though on account of some difficulties adequate evidence to convict a culprit may not be available, yet it does not absolve the administrative authorities of the responsibility of applying an immediate brake on the anti-social activities of a hazardous person by keeping him in detention to serve an immediate purpose. 11. Thus, we find no force in the submission made on behalf of the detenu that his detention was rendered illegal on the ground that an incident which formed the subject matter of the grounds of detention was also common to a criminal prosecution instituted against a person which culminated in his acquittal. 12. We find that this petition is devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed.