JUDGMENT A. N. Varma, J - This writ petition is directed against an order passed by the learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Allahabad, allowing an appeal filed by the landlords and setting aside an order passed by the Prescribed Authority, rejecting the application filed by the landlord under Section 21 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for an order of eviction against the petitioners, who are the tenants of the disputed accommodation. 2. The aforesaid application was filed by the landlords on the assertion that one Syed Ali Hyder, the father of the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 and 6 and husband of respondent No. 5 was originally the owner and landlord of the disputed accommodation of which Moharram Khan was the tenant. After the death of Moharram Khan, his wife Smt. Bibban Bibi and sons Phajan Khan and Rajjan Khan, who are arrayed as petitioners Nos. 1, 2 and 3 herein because the tenants. Syed Ali Hyder died in the year 1973, leaving a will. Under the will the disputed house fell to the share of the said respondents, while house No. 341, Rani Mandi, Allahabad in which the landlord were residing in the lifetime of Syed Ali Hyder fell to the share of their step brother, namely, Hassan Abbas. Hassan Abbas initially permitted the landlords to continue to reside in house No. 341. Subsequently, however, he asked them to vacate the said house. Whereupon the landlords were compelled to rent a house No. 88, Rasoolpur, Allahabad at Rs. 50/- per month. This house was given to the landlords on the understanding that they would vacate the same within one year. In this view, the landlords asked the petitioners to let them their house. The petitioner, however, declined to do so. At the end of one year the landlords had to vacate house No. 88 Rasoolpur in pursuance of the assurance which they had given to their landlord. Thereafter they had to rent another house No. 93, Rasoolpur at Rs. 80/- per month. In these circumstances the landlord bona fide required the disputed house for their own use and occupation. 3. The aforesaid application was contested by the petitioners. They asserted that the landlords did not bona fide require the house at all. They were residing comfortably at 93, Rasoolpur. The tenants, on the other hand, would suffer great hardship if evicted from the house. 3. The aforesaid application was contested by the petitioners. They asserted that the landlords did not bona fide require the house at all. They were residing comfortably at 93, Rasoolpur. The tenants, on the other hand, would suffer great hardship if evicted from the house. Their family consisted of a large number of members and they had no other house to reside. 4. The Prescribed Authority dismissed the application holding that the landlords did not bona fitly require the disputed house. They had not been able to establish that they cannot afford to pay Rs. 80/- as rent for house No. 93, Rasoolpur. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the landlords filed an appeal which has been allowed, as mentioned above. 6. Sri T. N. Hukku, learned counsel for the petitioners first contended that the appellate court committed a patent error of law in relying upon certain material consisting of a rejoinder affidavit which contained allegations which went beyond the case pleaded by the landlords. It was submitted that in the original application the only ground urged by the landlords was that they could not afford to pay Rs. 80/- per month as rent for house No. 93, Rasoolpur. No other ground was pleaded, whereas in the rejoinder-affidavit filed on behalf of the landlords several new facts were alleged, including that the landlord of house No. 93, Rasoolpur was also asking the landlords of the disputed house to leave. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties. I find no merit in the above contention. 8. In the first place, I am not satisfied that the rejoinder affidavit filed on behalf of the landlords, a true copy of which is annexed to the counter- affidavit as Annexure CA- 1, travels beyond the basic case pleaded by the landlords in their application under Scion 21. The case pleaded was that the house where the landlords had been residing hitherto is no longer available to them because the same had fallen to the share of their step brother. After the death of their father they were asked to leave that house and they did shift from that house and took up another house on rent at 88. Rasoolpur. The landlords had to leave even this house because the period of one year for which they were allowed to occupy the same had expired. After the death of their father they were asked to leave that house and they did shift from that house and took up another house on rent at 88. Rasoolpur. The landlords had to leave even this house because the period of one year for which they were allowed to occupy the same had expired. It was in these circumstances that the landlords had to rent another house at 93, Rasoolpur on Rs. 80/- per month. The entire pleadings set out in the application have to be considered in examining the question whether the rejoinder-affidavit filed on behalf of the landlords went beyond the pleadings of the parties. I do not agree that the only ground pleaded in the application under Section 21 was that the landlords could not afford to pay the sum of Rs. 80/- as rent for house No. 93, Rasoolpur. The entire background under which the landlords were compelled by circumstances to occupy house No. 93 has also to be kept in view. It was on account of compelling circumstances that the landlord had to rent out house after house after the death of their father. 9. In the second place, even if it he assumed for the sake of argument that the rejoinder affidavit referred to above contained some allegations which went slightly beyond the pleadings of the landlords in their application under Section 21 in the strictest sense, I find that the petitioners have not suffered any prejudice at all by such deviation. Normally after the filing of the rejoinder affidavit the tenants are not given any further opportunity to file any affidavit in rebuttal thereof. In the present case, however, I find that the petitioner were allowed to adduce evidence in rebuttal of rejoinder affidavit in the shape of the affidavits of two persons Kallu Khan and Mohd. Ilyas. In this view, I am not persuaded to interfere with the impugned order on the technical plea raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 10. Learned counsel placed reliance on two decisions of this Court reported in 1977 U. P. Rent Control Cases 211 and 1979 U. P. Rent Control Cases (Supplement) 115. I have examined these decisions, but I do not find them of much assistance. In neither of the two cases was the position the same as it exists in the present case. Learned counsel placed reliance on two decisions of this Court reported in 1977 U. P. Rent Control Cases 211 and 1979 U. P. Rent Control Cases (Supplement) 115. I have examined these decisions, but I do not find them of much assistance. In neither of the two cases was the position the same as it exists in the present case. I have already noticed that the petitioners were given opportunity to meet the assertions made in the rejoinder-affidavit at the very initial stage before the Prescribed Authority. There was hence no possibility of any prejudiced being caused to the petitioners. 11. Learned counsel then vehemently contended that there was no evidence in support of the finding that the landlords could not afford to pay the rent of Rs. 80/- per month for house No. 93. It was urged that in order to substantiate this allegation the landlords ought to have disclosed the income of the family. 12. I find no merit in the contention either. The landlords have been asserting from the very beginning that they could not afford to pay Rs. 80/- per month as rent for house No. 93. There was evidence in support of this in the shape of affidavit filed on behalf of the landlords, stating that they could not afford to pay Rs. 80/- per month. The question whether the landlords should have been asked to disclose their precise income is a matter which relates to the quantum of evidence and is not a matter on the basis of which a writ of certiorari may be issued. In any case, this point need not detain me further as the finding of the appellate court also is that even in regard to house No. 93 there is demand by its landlord that the landlords vacate the same. In this view, the finding of the appellate court on the issue of bona fide requirement is entitled to be upheld, in any case. 13. Learned counsel then challenged the correctness of the finding of the appellate court on the issue of relative hardship. He submitted that in the tenants family there are eighteen members, whereas the landlords have much smaller family. In this view, the finding of the appellate court that the land- lords would suffer greater hardship must be rejected as perverse. 14. I am unable to accept this contention. He submitted that in the tenants family there are eighteen members, whereas the landlords have much smaller family. In this view, the finding of the appellate court that the land- lords would suffer greater hardship must be rejected as perverse. 14. I am unable to accept this contention. The finding of the appellate court is that the landlords are under pressure from their own landlords in respect of house No. 93. The further finding is that the landlords have had to vacate house after house, after the death of their father. In these circumstances the mere fact that the number of the members of the family of the tenants is larger than that of the landlords cannot by itself justify the conclusion that the finding of the appellate court is either wrong or perverse. 15. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed, but I make no order as to costs. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioners prays for six months time for enabling his clients to seek alternative accommodation. The request seems reasonable. The enforcement of the order of eviction shall remain stayed for a period of six months from today, provided that the petitioners shall hand over peacefully vacant possession to the landlords before the expiry of six months. The petitioners shall not directly or indirectly induct any other person into the accommodation. The petitioners shall further deposit with the Prescribed Authority or pay to the landlords directly rent month by month for this period of six months. In the event of default, it will be open to the landlords to enforce the order of, eviction forthwith.