JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a defendant's Second Appeal from a decree for ejectment from four bighas of land in village Mundia Pistor, tahsil Bazpur, district Nainital, and for recovery of pendeute lite and future damages at the rate of Rs. 20/- per month. 2. The land was taken by the defendant under an agreement, dated the 9th January, 1963. The agreement is unregistered. It has been described as a rent note by way of agreement and is signed both by the owner of the land and the tenant. It was stated by the learned counsel for the appellant before me that the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, was applied in the area where the land in suit is situate, with effect from 1st July, 1969. 3. According to the plaint case, the land was taken by the defendant for purposes of a lime kiln and residence, that a notice dated the 13th June, 1968 was served on the defendant under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, but he did not quit, hence the suit. 4. The defendant denied the execution of the rent note or the existence of any agreement of tenancy between the parties. The defendant claimed to be in cultivators possession of the land on payment of rent. The defendant further pleaded that, according to the plaintiff himself, the land in suit forms part of his grove, consequently the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The defendant has acquired tenancy rights, and was in possession since before July, 1962. He was not liable to ejectment. In the alternative, it was pleaded that even if the defendant was deemed to have taken the land for purposes of residence, shop and lime kiln and keeping wood and coal etc., the defendant having constructed a lime kiln and residential house, he became a licensee with a grant for building purposes, and was consequently not liable to ejectment. The rent note referred to by the plaintiff was said to be a deed of licence with a grant for building purposes. The notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was said to be invalid on the ground that a six months' notice was needed because the land was taken for an industrial purpose. The plaintiffs right to sue was also challenged. 5. The notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was said to be invalid on the ground that a six months' notice was needed because the land was taken for an industrial purpose. The plaintiffs right to sue was also challenged. 5. Following were the issues, on which the parties went to trial : "1. Whether there exists the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties?" "2. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit?" "3. Is the notice in suit valid?" "4. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?" "5. Whether the defendant has acquired the Adhivasi right in the land in suit and as such is not liable to ejectment?" "6. Whether the defendant is holding a permanent licence with grant for building purposes?" "7. Whether the suit is not maintainable as alleged in para 16A in the W.S.?" "8. Whether the plaintiff has sold out his share in the land in suit, if so its effect?" 6. Issue No. 2 was not pressed, when it was taken up for hearing as a preliminary issue on the 2nd December, 1971 before the trial court. On issue No. 1, the trial court held that the defendant was a tenant of the land in suit, on issue No. 5, that the defendant had not acquired any Adhivasi rights over the land in suit, on issue No. 6, that there was no permanent licence with any grant for building purposes, on issue No. 8, that there was no evidence to support the allegation that the plaintiffs had sold their share in the land in suit, on issue No. 7, that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that Anwar Hussain, plaintiff No. 1, had become a major, on issue No. 3, that the tenancy in question was a monthly tenancy terminable on fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of the tenancy, and, therefore, the notice (Ext. 2) asking the defendnat to vacate the land after thirty days of the service of the notice was perfectly valid, and held on issue No. 4, that the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief claimed, it decreed the suit for ejectment and recovery of pendente lite and future damages at the rate of Rs. 20/- per month. 7. 2) asking the defendnat to vacate the land after thirty days of the service of the notice was perfectly valid, and held on issue No. 4, that the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief claimed, it decreed the suit for ejectment and recovery of pendente lite and future damages at the rate of Rs. 20/- per month. 7. Four points were raised before the lower appellate court, first, that the suit was not cognizable by a civil court, second, that the notice was illegal being on short duration, third, that the appellant had become lawful owner of the land under the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and fourth, that the plaintiff had no right to let out the land, hence they had no right to file the suit for the defendant's ejectment. 8. The lower appellate court held that section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was not applicable to the suit, and the matter was governed section 242 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 19 and raised three questions for its determination in the appeal : "(1). Whether the suit was triable by the revenue court," "(2). Whether the appellant had acquired any rights in the land as against the respondent and was not liable for ejectment" and "(3). Whether the notice was not in accordance with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act." 9. The lower appellate court observed that "the deed of lease clearly shows that the parties had contracted a monthly lease" and therefore, it could be terminated by serving a thirty days' notice. As to the objection that the lease could be terminated only for some special need, the lower appellate court observed that the lessors' power to terminate the lease was not restricted by such statement in the deed and that "if the lessor has violated any stipulation which is not material to the transaction, the other side can only claim compensation from the lessor". With these observations, the lower appellate court held that "the notice of termination of lease was perfectly in accordance with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act". The first and the second points were taken up together for consideration by the lower appellate court. With these observations, the lower appellate court held that "the notice of termination of lease was perfectly in accordance with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act". The first and the second points were taken up together for consideration by the lower appellate court. It held that a grove holder was not a tenant as defined in section 3(23) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, and, therefore, section 180 of the U. P: Tenancy Act did not apply to a suit by a grove-holder. and the jurisdiction of the civil court was not barred. It was further observed that the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, was not applicable in the area where the land in suit is situate in the year 1968 when the suit was filed. Any subsequent changes could not take away the jurisdiction of the civil court. It was observed that "section 230-A of the Kumaun Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act does not apply to sub-tenants of grove land". That provision conferred Adhivasi rights on subtenants and occupants of land other than grove land. The ultimate finding of the lower appellate court was that the suit was triable by the civil court and not by the revenue court and the appellant did not acquire any rights in the land. In the result, it dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree of the trial court. 10. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant before me was that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit, and since the finding recorded by the trial court on issue No. 2 on the 2nd December, 1971, which forms part of the English note, has not been annexed to its judgment, I was misled by the statement contained therein under the heading of findings on issue No. 2 that: "This issue has been decided by my predecessor on 2-12-1971 holding that this court has jurisdiction". I have said that I was misled by this statement in the judgment of the trial court, because I thought that by its order, dated the 2nd December, 1971, the trial court had held on the merits of issue No. 2 that the civil court has jurisdiction. I never suspected that issue No. 2 was given up as not pressed by the defendant. I never suspected that issue No. 2 was given up as not pressed by the defendant. Even the judgment of the lower appellate court does not give any inkling of this fact and the lower appellate court has proceeded to decide the question of jurisdiction on the merits. A copy of the finding of the trial court on issue No. 2 contained in its English note was not made part of the judgment in spite of a direction to that effect. The English note further shows an endorsement on its margin, presumably by the learned counsel for the defendant, that the issue is not pressed. Being so misled, I heard arguments on the merits of the question whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and having heard full arguments on the point, I proceed to decide the point on the merits although, in my opinion, it was not open to the defendant-appellant to press the plea having given it up before the trial court. I must, also observe that it was not open to the lower appellate court to entertain the plea that the civil court has no jurisdiction to try the suit after issue No. 2 had expressly been given up by the defendant as not pressed before the trial court. 11. Learned counsel for the defendant-appellant in the lower appellate court had relied upon section 331 of the U.P. Zamindar Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and although the judgment the trial court is dated the 1st July 1974, and that of the lower appellate court is dated 1st December, 1975, no notice was taken of sub-section (1-A) of section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, which was introduced in 1969. According to the statement made before me by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act became applicable to the area, where the land in suit is situate with effect from the 1sst July 1969. Obviously, the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, must have been applicable when the suit was filed. Learned counsel for the defendant-appellant conceded that the U.P. Tenancy Act was applicable and contended that the suit was of a nature maintainable under section 180 of that Act although the plaintiff was a grove-holder. Obviously, the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, must have been applicable when the suit was filed. Learned counsel for the defendant-appellant conceded that the U.P. Tenancy Act was applicable and contended that the suit was of a nature maintainable under section 180 of that Act although the plaintiff was a grove-holder. Learned counsel relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Deo Narain v. Board of Revenue, 1973 Rev Dec 345 : 1974 All LJ 16, in which it was held that even if prior to 1947 a suit under section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act may not have been maintainable in relation to grove land, such a suit was competent after the amendment of the U.P. Tenancy Act, by U.P. Act No. X of 1947. If that were the position, section 242 of the U.P. Tenancy Act barred the institution of the suit in a civil court, and, on the abolition of Zamindari and repeal of the U.P. Tenancy Act, the question, which could be raised, was whether the suit was liable to be stayed under rule 4 and abated under rule 5 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms rules. The lower appellate court did not advert to these aspects of the matter. It proceeded on the basis that section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act was not applicable to the suit because a grove holder was not a tenant as defined in section 3(23) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, and a suit under section 180 could not, therefore, be filed by a grove holder. That is not the correct position in view of the Division Bench ruling of this court in Deo Narain v. Board of Revenue, 1973 Rev Dec 345 : 1974 All LJ 16 (supra). Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that the suit giving rise to this second appeal could not be filed under section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. 1939 and section 242 thereof did not bar the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain it. Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that the suit giving rise to this second appeal could not be filed under section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. 1939 and section 242 thereof did not bar the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain it. Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act applies only to land as defined in the U.P. Tenancy Act (vide clause (10) of section 3 thereof) which means "land which is let or held for growing of crops, or as grove land or for pasturage "and" it includes land covered by water used for the purpose of growing `Singhara or other produce, but does not include land for the time being occupied by buildings or appurtenant thereto other than building which are improvements". Improvements are defined in clause (8) of section 2 of that Act. In the present case, the land was let out for purposes of residence Sifalaposh, which means covered by Chhapper and for construction of lime kiln, keeping shop and storing wood and coal. It was the defendant's own case that the land had been let out for building purposes. There were buildings existing on the land when the suit was filed, and the vacant land was appurtenant to the buildings. These facts took the land out of the definition of land to which section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act applied. To put the matter briefly, section 180 applied only to land occupied for agricultural purpose. Even where land occupied by a person for agricultural purposes was occupied the another person otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force, but the latter erected a building thereon or did something on the land which had the effect of destroying its character as agricultural land, the former could not sue the latter in a revenue court under section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, but had to sue him in a civil court, inasmuch as it was no longer `land' as defined by the U. P, Tenancy Act. 12. The objection to the jurisdiction of the civil court to try the suit was thus without any merit and was rightly given up by the defendant as not pressed, in the trial court. 13. The next question which, therefore, arises is whether the transaction witnessed by the deed, Ext. 12. The objection to the jurisdiction of the civil court to try the suit was thus without any merit and was rightly given up by the defendant as not pressed, in the trial court. 13. The next question which, therefore, arises is whether the transaction witnessed by the deed, Ext. 9, was a permanent licence with grant for building purposes or was a lease, and in case it were found that it was a lease, whether the lease stood determined by the notice, Ext. 2. The deed, Ext. 9, is signed by both the parties but is unregistered. Therefore, it could not be an instrument of a lease from year to year, or for any term, exceeding one year. It does not reserve a yearly rent. The finding of the trial court was that the deed did not grant any permission to the defendant to erect any permanent building on the land, and it further recited that in case the rent was not paid from month to month, the owner will have a right to eject the tenant. According to the trial court there was thus no permanent licence with any grant for building purposes. On the question about the validity of the notice, raised by issue No. 3, the trial court found that the rent was payable from month to month and in case of failure to pay the rent in each month the owner was entitled to evict the tenant, and thus, the tenancy was a monthly tenancy "terminable on 15 days notice expiring with the end of the tenancy and the notice asking the defendant to vacate the land in dispute after thirty days of the service of notice is perfectly valid." The lower appellate court endorsed these findings with the observation that the deed clearly shows that the parties had contracted a monthly lease and the objection that the lease could be terminated only for some special need did not restrict the lessors' power to terminate the lease and if he had violated any stipulation the lessee can only claim compensation but could not resist ejectment. 14. The inescapable consequence of the fact that Ext. 9 is unregistered is, that it cannot be regarded to be an instrument of lease. 14. The inescapable consequence of the fact that Ext. 9 is unregistered is, that it cannot be regarded to be an instrument of lease. If on its terms, it purports to create a lease from year to year or for any term exceeding one year, it would be inadmissible in evidence and could only be looked at for the collateral purpose of finding out the nature of the defendants' possession or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. Never the less, the defendants' possession would in that case be protected by section 53A of the Transfer of property Act and the plaintiff would be precluded from ejecting the defendant except on the terms on which he was, if at all, liable to ejectment under those terms. provided, of course, the defendant was willing to perform his part of the contract. If, on the other hand, the terms of the deed brought about a lease from month to month, as held by the two courts below it would be admissible as evidence of that transaction, as if the terms contained therein constituted the oral agreement which was followed by delivery of possession, although even here it would not amount to an instrument of lease inasmuch as it was unregistered. However, since all leases other than those from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving an yearly rent can be made by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession, the deed would be admissible to prove the terms of the oral agreement. 15. Looking at the terms of the deed in this view of the law, I find that although under the terms of the deed Ext. 9, the parties did contemplate the continuance of the defendant's possession indefinitely, and presumably for a term exceeding one year, the parties did not intend to make the deed an instrument of lease for a term exceeding one year or from year to year. As noticed above, the rent reserved is a monthly rent. 9, the parties did contemplate the continuance of the defendant's possession indefinitely, and presumably for a term exceeding one year, the parties did not intend to make the deed an instrument of lease for a term exceeding one year or from year to year. As noticed above, the rent reserved is a monthly rent. The relevant terms of the deed are : &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&;g fd fdjk;k 20 :i;s ekfld Qjhd uEcj vOoy nks;e dks vnk djsaxsA &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& ;g rS ik;k fd fdjk;knkjh dh dksbZ fe;kn eqdfjZj ugha gS tc rd nksuksa Qjhd cuh jgsxh blh rjg dk;e jgsaxs fdUrq fdjk;s dh vnk;xh ekfld vnk u djus ij ekfydku Qjhd nks;e dks vf/kdkj gksxk fd og viuh fdjk;snkjh ds csn[ky djk nsus dk gd fcuk fdlh vge t:fj;kr ds ugh gksxk vkSj ftldh rloht dk ifjp; Qjhd vOoy dks tk;t :i esa fn;k tkosxkA ;g fd viuh ethZ ls Qjhd vOoy fdjk;snkj rdZ dj ldrs gSa fdUrq ubZ fdjk;snkjh djus ds le; rd fdjk;k vnk djds vkjkth cjkg jkLr ekfydku ds gokys djsaxs mudks fdlh Hkh lwjr ls fdlh nwljs dk dCtk fdjk;snkjh djkus dk etkt u gksxk vkSj u gh fdjk;snkjh ds vUnj dksbZ iq[rk rkehjkr dks djkus dk vf/kdkj gksxkA tc rd fd Lohd`fr ekfydku u gks D;ksafd vkjkth bLrseky fjgk;l [k'kiks'k [kqn Qjhd vOoy o nqdku pwuk HkV~Vh iq[rk pwuk cukus dh vf'k;k;s ds okLrs o ydM+h dks;yk vkfn j[kus ds bLrseky dks izkIr dh gS&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&A 16. There is no habendum and no transfer of any right to enjoy the property in the deed. The deed does talk of Kirayedari, but does not create any lease by conveying or transferring the right to enjoy the property whether for a certain time or in perpetuity. It only shows that the term of the Kirayedari was not settled and it would continue indefinitely, until its determination for non-payment of rent. But if rent was paid there will be no right to eject the defendant without any pressing need 'and without duly informing the defendant of the same. There is thus no transfer of any right to enjoy the property. The duration is uncertain, instead of being certain, and can be brought to an end, instead of being in perpetuity. Further, sub-letting is expressly prohibited, and construction of pucca building is also - expressly prohibited. There is thus no transfer of any right to enjoy the property. The duration is uncertain, instead of being certain, and can be brought to an end, instead of being in perpetuity. Further, sub-letting is expressly prohibited, and construction of pucca building is also - expressly prohibited. All these terms go to establish that the deed was not an instrument of lease and has correctly been described as an agreement for payment of rent for the occupation of land for the purposes of residence by the defendant, for keeping a lime shop, and lime kiln and storing wood and coal. The mere fact that the consideration was described as rent and the transaction was described as tenancy does not establish that the deed (Ext. 9) purported to create the lease. It was merely an agreement to let out land for the purposes of residence and establishing a lime kiln etc. The deed cannot be said to have required registration. 17. The defendant came into possession of the property under the terms of the said agreement (Ext. 9) and paid rent at Rs. 20/- per month stipulated thereunder. The question is, whether he was in possession as a tenant and if so whether his tenancy was from month to month or from year to year under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, or that his possession was merely that of a licensee. The fact that the nature of the defendant's possession was permissive can admit of no doubt. The question is, if it were a mere licence, whether it was coupled with any such grant or was granted for any such purpose as made the licence irrevocable. The agreement (Ext. 9) clearly stipulates that the defendant will have no right to raise any pucca construction, although it also talks of Dukan Chuna Bhatti Pukhta Chunna Banane Ki Ashiyaya Ke Waste. It is not clear whether the word Pukhta qualifies the words "Dukan Chunna Bhatti" which occur before it or the word "chuna" which occurs after it in the said clause. Even if lime kilns are generally made of pucca bricks, they are not necessarily permanent structures of the kind contemplated by section 60(b) of the Easements Act, 1882. It is not clear whether the word Pukhta qualifies the words "Dukan Chunna Bhatti" which occur before it or the word "chuna" which occurs after it in the said clause. Even if lime kilns are generally made of pucca bricks, they are not necessarily permanent structures of the kind contemplated by section 60(b) of the Easements Act, 1882. Since the deed contained an express prohibition against raising any pucca construction and expressly speaks of a Chhapper covered residence, its terms seem to suggest that the licence was revocable and not irrevocable. The word Puktha probably governs the word 'Chuna'. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the terms of the lease (Ext. 9) did not grant any such licence as to make it irrevocable under section 60 of the Easements Act. 18. One of the purposes, for which the land was let out, was the purpose of manufacturing lime. That seems to be the dominant purpose, for, the storage of wood and coal seem to have been connected with it, and all the 4 bighas of land could not be needed for a Chhappar covered residence of the defendant. The land appears to have been given for the purposes of establishing a lime kiln. That was surely a manufacturing purpose within the meaning of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The further question, which arises, is that although the deed (Ext. 9) was not an instrument of a lease from year to year, and a lease from year to year could only be created by a registered instrument, could the mere fact that the letting of the land was for a manufacturing purpose bring about a lease from year to year under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 19. Sections 106 and 107 of the Transfer of Property Act have to be read harmoniously. It cannot be said that in face of the prohibition contained in section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act against the creation of any lease from year to year or for a term exceeding one year except by registered instrument, signed by the lessor and the lessee both, section 106 would create a lease from year to year on proof of the firm facts that the letting was for a manufacturing purpose and there was no contract to the contrary. If the two provisions are read harmoniously, section 106 is to be confined to those cases where the terms of lease for a manufacturing purpose though created by a registered instruments are silent as to its duration or as to the period of notice required for its termination. The terms of the agreement, Ext. 9, are silent as to the period of duration and as to the period of notice required for its termination. It is signed by both the lessor and the lessee, but is unregistered. It has been found that it was not an instrument of lease, but could be only an agreement to lease which could be read as an agreement for the grant of a lease. If the agreement was for the grant of a lease from year to year, the lease could only be brought into existence by executing a registered deed. That was not done, but the defendant was put into possession on those terms. The possession of the defendant is protected by section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and the plaintiff cannot eject the defendant except on the terms agreed to by him. In this view of the matter though no lease from year to year could be said to have come into existence by virtue of Ext. 9, yet the possession of the defendant being protected under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, the transaction would be deemed to be a lease from year to year so that on the terms contained in Ext. 9, the defendant could not be ejected except by serving a six months' notice and in case the rent was paid, only if the plaintiffs' need for the land was pressing and the nature of the need was duly communicated to the defendant. 20. I accordingly hold that the defendant would not be liable to ejectment on a mere 30 days notice that was served, vide Ext. 2. 21. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon certain cases to show that the benefit of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act could not be given to the defendant. 20. I accordingly hold that the defendant would not be liable to ejectment on a mere 30 days notice that was served, vide Ext. 2. 21. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon certain cases to show that the benefit of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act could not be given to the defendant. The first such case relied upon by him was of Sadhob Bhotra v. Hori, AIR 1973 Orissa 21, wherein it was held that, in the absence of a specific plea raised in the written statement that the defendant was entitled to protection under section 53-A, the Court was not justified in applying the provision of that Section. The next case relied upon by the learned counsel was that of Ram Prasad v. Chhajju, AIR 1964 All 300 . In that case also it was observed that the plea of part performance, which was not raised either in the trial court or in the first appellate court, could not be raised for the first time in Second Appeal in view of the fact that the plaintiff respondent did not have the opportunity to show that he is a transferee without notice of the transfer or of part performance of the contract. 22. In Delhi Motor Co. v. U.A. Basrurkar, AIR 1968 SC 794 , which was the next case cited on this point, the Supreme Court held that section 53A is available only as a defence to a lessee and not as conferring a right on the basis of which the lessee can claim rights against the lessor, inasmuch as it is meant only to bring about a bar against the enforcement of rights by a lessor in respect of property of which the lessee had already taken possession, but does not give any right to the lessee to claim possession or to claim any other right on the basis of an unregistered lease. Suffice it to say that these cases work more against the plaintiff respondent than against the defendant-appellant. It was the plaintiff-respondents, who had relied on the document, which is Ext. 9, as a lease. It was the defendant-appellant's case that the document was not admissible for want of registration. Suffice it to say that these cases work more against the plaintiff respondent than against the defendant-appellant. It was the plaintiff-respondents, who had relied on the document, which is Ext. 9, as a lease. It was the defendant-appellant's case that the document was not admissible for want of registration. The court having found that the document was admissible, inasmuch as it was not an instrument of lease, it was bound to take the terms of the document into consideration for deciding the question whether the defendant could be evicted on a month's notice as claimed by the plaintiffs or was a permanent licensee or, at any rate, was entitled to six months' notice. All these pleas have been raised in the written statement. Indeed, but for the prohibition in the document against the erection of permanent structures in view of the fact that there are some permanent structures on the land and the defendant appellant is in permissive possession the proper inference to draw would be, if the document was not read in evidence and the aid of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act was not taken that the licence of the defendant appellant could not be revoked by the plaintiff-respondents, inasmuch as the defendant-appellant had erected a work of permanent character on the land and had incurred expenses in its execution. 23. The case of Manzoor Ali v. Lal Devi, AIR 1951 All 396 , was cited to show that in considering the question whether a lease is for manufacturing purpose, the court must look to the original intention of the parties which can be gathered from the deed itself and not to the subsequent conduct of the lessee. On the facts of that case, it was held that the lease was not for a manufacturing purpose. In Dwarka Singh v. R.S. Ahuja, 1969 All LJ 849, a Division Bench of this Court held that where a shop was let out for making photographs and selling articles of photography, the lease was for a mixed purpose and it could not be said that it was for a manufacturing purpose. 24. In Kallu Khan v. Mohd. Mehdi, 1970 All WR (HC) 573, it was held that there was nothing to indicate that the lease was taken for a manufacturing purpose and the contract having been proved to be clearly one of month to month tenancy. 24. In Kallu Khan v. Mohd. Mehdi, 1970 All WR (HC) 573, it was held that there was nothing to indicate that the lease was taken for a manufacturing purpose and the contract having been proved to be clearly one of month to month tenancy. The mere fact that the tenant had installed a machine which was used for book-binding purposes could not convert the tenancy into a lease for manufacturing purposes and there could be no question of requiring a six months' notice to terminate it. In Laxmi Devi v. Chandramani Devi, 1971 All WR (HC) 382 : AIR 1971 All 506 also, it was held that merely because a tenant uses a premises for manufacturing something by fitting machines, that fact by itself is not sufficient to prove that the lease was for a manufacturing purpose. The thing requested to be proved was that under the original contract of lease the parties intended that the lease is for a manufacturing process or purposes. In P.C. Cherivan v. Mst. Darfi Devi, 1979 All LR 622 : 1979 All LJ 1266, the Supreme Court held that the broad test for determining whether a process is a manufacturing process is to see whether it brings out a complete transformation of the old components so as to produce a commercially different article or commodity and in that view held that retreading of tyres was not a manufacturing process. I may here observe that manufacture of lime is a manufacturing process, inasmuch as by burning lime stone the stone is converted into lime which is commercially an entirely different product from the stone from which it was made. In Radha Ballabh v. Bahore Ram Chand, 1955 All LJ 304 : AIR 1955 All 679 , it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that where the original lease is not an yearly lease, renewal by holding over will be deemed to be of a tenancy from month to month or from year to year according to the purpose for which the property is leased, only when there is no "agreement to the contrary". Thus where in a lease for a manufacturing purpose the agreement was that the rent was to be paid every month and the period of the lease was limited to eleven months, the agreement was such an agreement to the contrary and it could not be held that the lease was from year to year or that it was renewed by holding over from year to year. There is no such limitation of time of the lease in the document in question in the present case. The mere fact that the rate of rent specified is monthly, is not such an agreement to the contrary as may be inconsistent with the existence of a lease from year to year. In R.P. Gupta v. K.M. Lal, AIR 1972 All 181 , a learned Single Judge of this court held that where the terms of a lease authorised the tenant to remain in possession so long as he wished, it meant a lease for a term exceeding one year and in the absence of registration of a lease deed containing such a term, the status of the lessee would be that of a tenant from month to month. 25. The real test for finding out whether the lease is for a manufacturing purpose or for any other purpose, where the purposes are mixed, would be to find out the dominant purpose and the dominant purpose of the lease is found to be a manufacturing purpose, the fact that the lease also permits the lessee to live on the land or to keep shop would not convert the lease into one for a commercial or a residential purpose. 26. On a consideration of the terms of the deed, which was relied upon by the plaintiffs-respondents as the deed of lease and for enforcing which they filed the suit, the dominant purpose of the lease appears to have been the manufacture of lime. The lease was for a manufacturing purpose. I have also held that the document (Ext. 9) was not an instrument of lease, but the defendant was nevertheless protected by its terms under section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 The plaintiffs could not complain of any prejudice, inasmuch as their case was that the document was admissible and they wanted to enforce its terms as a lease. 9) was not an instrument of lease, but the defendant was nevertheless protected by its terms under section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 The plaintiffs could not complain of any prejudice, inasmuch as their case was that the document was admissible and they wanted to enforce its terms as a lease. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was, in any view of the matter, entitled to a six months' notice and the thirty days' quit notice, which was served in this case vide Ext. 2, was invalid in law. 27. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed and the suit for the defendant's eviction and recovery of any thing as damages for unlawful use and occupation is dismissed. The parties shall. however, bear their own costs throughout, and if any amounts have been paid or deposited during the pendency of this litigation, they may be appropriated by the plaintiffs towards the rent.