The petitioner is a forest contractor and he has been opera­ting in the Khasi Hills for quite some time. He entered into an agreement on 23.12.77 with the owners of a private forest called Mayang, who allowed the petitioner to operate the said forest for a period of 10 years. The Chief Forest Officer of Khasi Hills District Council also granted the prayer for extension by his order dated 23.2.79 upto July, 1981. By a letter dated 25.6.80 the petitioner was however stopped from operating the forest. This letter was issued by the Chief Forest Officer who also ordered that the newly felled trees may be seized. Feeling aggri­eved at this order, the petitioner filed a suit in the Court of learned Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner being Title suit No. 27 (T) 80 in which a prayer for injunction was also made, and an ad-interim order was initially issued. In the reply to the show cause notice, an objection was taken about the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the matter. The learned trial Court over-ruled the objection. On an appeal being preferred before the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner, it has been held that the suit was barred in view of the provisions in the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Management and Control of Forests) Act, 1958, brevimanu the Act, and more particularly by its section 35 which reads as below :- "No suit or legal proceedings shall lie against the Exe­cutive Committee or the officers for anything done or purported to have been done in good faith under this Act and in pursuance of any lawful notice or order issued under this Act and the Rules made thereunder". 2. The submission of learned Advocate General, Meghalaya who has appeared for the petitioner is that none of the pro­visions of the Act, nor even section 35 has barred the jurisdiction of the civil court. It is stated that the provision of section 35 is a kind of immunity section, and not a debarring section. It is contended that in fact the District Council who is the framer of the Act could not have ousted the civil Court's jurisdiction as that would have been beyond the legislative competence of the District Council. It is stated that the provision of section 35 is a kind of immunity section, and not a debarring section. It is contended that in fact the District Council who is the framer of the Act could not have ousted the civil Court's jurisdiction as that would have been beyond the legislative competence of the District Council. It is brought to our notice that the Act had not received the assent of the President and as such it cannot over­ride the right made available by Civil Procedure Code. 3. As, I am seized in the case at hand with an enactment of the District Council which has derived its law-making powers from para 3 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, I enter­tain no doubt that such an enactment cannot prevail over a law made by the parliament. As is the Code of Civil Procedure. Had it been that a Central enactment or a State law having received the assent of the President would have contained a provi­sion like section 35 of the Act, it would have been an examinable question whether civil Court's jurisdiction had been taken away by necessery implication. But as the provision relied on by the opposite parties finds place in a District Council enact­ment. I would not read any barring provision in section 35 either expressly or by necessary implication. Really, if it had sought to do so, it may as well be that section 35 would have been ultra vires. As is known courts avoid an interpretation of a statutory provision which would make it ultra vires. For this reason alone, I would accept the submission of learned Advocate General that section 35 is in the nature of an immunity clause. It may be pointed out that the Act at hand is not the only statute to contain such a protection. Among others, section 37 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 also contains a similar provision. 4. This section had come up for interpretation before 2 Division Bench of the Madras High Court in South Madras Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. vs. Industrial Tribunal, (1950-51) 2 Indian Factories Journal 97. Among others, section 37 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 also contains a similar provision. 4. This section had come up for interpretation before 2 Division Bench of the Madras High Court in South Madras Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. vs. Industrial Tribunal, (1950-51) 2 Indian Factories Journal 97. To appreciate what was stated therein we may note the section : "Protection of action taken under the Act-No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or inten­ded to be done in pursuance of this Act or any rules made there under." It was stated by the Bench that this is a kind of immunity section with which one is familiar with all enactments; and that such a section has never been understood to oust the jurisdic­tion of civil courts. 5. I would respectfully agree with the above view especially because, as already stated, the District Council could not have ousted the jurisdiction of the civil court. As Shri Das was liow-ever at pains to convince me thatse ction 35 did oust the jurisdiction if not expressly by necessary implication, I am to deal with the kernel of his arguments built up not only by relying oa section 35 but other provisions in the Act conferring a right of appeal etc. to the person aggrieved with the order of Chief Forest Officer. According to him the Act having provided the remedies availabb, recourse to those remedies alone is permissible. Reference was made by Shri Das to a number of decisions star­ting from Pasmore vs. Oswald Twistle Urban District Council, 1898 AC 387 and ending with M. Chayanna vs. K. Narayana, AIR 1979 SC 1320 . The principle enunciated in all these decisions is that if a statute had created a right and had also spelt out the remedy to enforce the right, that remedy alone is to "be taken recourse to. The law in this regard has been well summar­ised in para 23 of Premier Automobiles vs. K.S. Wadke, AIR 1975 SC 2238 , which had dealt with this aspect qua an industrial dispute. Of the four principles enunciated, the first three are relevant and they are as below : "(1)- If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the civil Court. Of the four principles enunciated, the first three are relevant and they are as below : "(1)- If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the civil Court. (2). If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor conc­erned to choose his remedy for the relief which is compe­tent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3). If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act." 6. It cannot be held in the case at hand that the right which the petitioner had sought to enforce in the civil Court has emanated from any provision of the Act, it was rather one under the general law of the land, as it had flowed out of an agreement between him and the owners of Mayang Forest. It was therefore the election of the suitor to choose his remedy. 7. It cannot therefore be held on any reasoning that the Civil Court's jurisdiction has been barred. As the learned Additional Depozy Commissioner had set aside the order of injunction on the ground of lack of jurisdiction by the trial court, his order has to be undone. Though Shri Das submitted that the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner was satisfied on merits also about the acti on of the Chief Forest Officer and had vacated the order of injunction for that reason as well, I do not think if that can reasonably be read in the order. If the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner had stated anything on the merits that was while dealing with the question that the action of the Chief Forest Officer was not in good faith, which as would be seen is an essential requirement for section 35 of the Act to operate. If the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner had stated anything on the merits that was while dealing with the question that the action of the Chief Forest Officer was not in good faith, which as would be seen is an essential requirement for section 35 of the Act to operate. While dealing with this aspect he had stated that forests are national wealth and it is for their preservation and management that the forest officials have been given powers and so it cannot be pre­sumed that such officers do not generally act in good faith in exercise of their powers. This statement cannot be said to be a discussion of the question whether the petitioner had a prima facie case or not. This apart, there is not even a whisper in the order, really in none of the orders, about the balance of convenience or irreparable loss, which are also required to be borne in mind, apart from the prima facie nature of the case, while deciding a injunction matter. 8. According, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded back to learned Additional Deputy Commissioner who would decide whether on merits the order of injunction should have been passed or not. In coming to this decision, the learned Court below would apply his mind to the aforesaid three requirements which are to be considered while passing an order of injunction. Till this is done, the stay order as passed by this Court would continue. This may not, however, stop the progress of the suit; and so let the trial Court proceed with the adjudication.