Judgement K. C. AGARWAL, J. - Finding a conflict between Sudarshan Pal Singh v. 2nd Addl. District Judge (1980 (UP) RCC 379) and Smt. Kamini Khare v. Ram Naresh (1979) 5 All LR 547) : (1979 All LJ 1263) Hon. N.D. OJha, J., has referred this case for decision by a larger Bench. 2. This writ petition has been preferred by a tenant against an order of the Additional District Judge refusing to admit additional evidence in the revision filed before him under S.25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to take evidence in revision. 3. For deciding the point referred, it is necessary to point out the scope of powers conferred by S.25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The provincial Small Cause Courts Act had been enacted in 1887 with a view to obtain speedy and cheap justice, and early decision in small causes. Section 5 of that Act conferred power on the State Government to establish Courts of Small Causes at any place within the territories under its administration. In deciding a suit, the Small Cause Court is required by Section 17 of the Act to follow the procedure prescribed in the Civil P.C. save in so far as otherwise provided by that code or by this Act. Sec.7 and Order 50 of the Civil P.C. are relevant in this regard. Whereas Section 7 mentions some of the provisions of the Code which would not be applicable to the Courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, O.50 gives the list of various Orders and Rules which would not apply to it. Amongst the Orders not extended to the Courts under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, one of them is Order XII. In fact the Provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and that of the Civil P.C. are supplementary to each other. 4. Order XII Rule 27 of the Civil P.C. confers right on a Court of appeal to admit additional evidence. But, since that Order has expressly been excluded from application to Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, neither Order 41 Rule 27 in terms nor in principle can be applied for taking additional evidence. 4. Order XII Rule 27 of the Civil P.C. confers right on a Court of appeal to admit additional evidence. But, since that Order has expressly been excluded from application to Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, neither Order 41 Rule 27 in terms nor in principle can be applied for taking additional evidence. So far as a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is concerned, the Court has a much narrower power than that of the first appellate court. Under Section 25, the Court can interfere only when the decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of Small Causes was act according to law. Order 41 R.27 cannot, therefore, be pressed into service for admitting additional evidence in revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 5. The question that next arises is whether additional evidence can be admitted in a case under S.25 by a Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. Section 17, as observed above, requires the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure to be followed in all suits and in all proceedings pending out of such suits. Section 151 is not one of the provisions mentioned in the list excluded from application to the Courts constituted under the Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. Hence, S.151, since it has not been excluded, applies, which preserves the inherent powers of the Court. Every Court is constituted for the purpose of doing justice according to law and must, therefore, be deemed to possess as a necessary corollary, and has inherent in its very constitution, all such powers as may be necessary to do the right and undo the wrongs in the course of the administration of justice (1856-6 Moo Ind App 393) (PC). In fact, Section 151 does not confer but only saves the inherent jurisdiction 6. In N.S. Mills v. Union of India ( AIR 1976 SC 1152 ), the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the nature and scope of inherent powers of the Court. In doing so, it referred to the following passage with approval; "The inherent power has its roots in necessity and its breadth is co-extensive with the necessity". (See Theoretical Basis of Inherent Powers Doctrine - Text import prepared by Jim or Carrigan - Publication of National College of the State of Judiciary U.S.A.). 7. In doing so, it referred to the following passage with approval; "The inherent power has its roots in necessity and its breadth is co-extensive with the necessity". (See Theoretical Basis of Inherent Powers Doctrine - Text import prepared by Jim or Carrigan - Publication of National College of the State of Judiciary U.S.A.). 7. An inherent power is right, ability or faculty of doing a thing without its being delivered or conferred. The inherent power of a Court to do justice, in fact, flows from the well recognised principle of equity, justice and good conscience which applies to courts deciding a suit under the Small Cause Courts Act Sec.40 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, gives a list of various sections of the said Act applicable to Courts of Small Causes. One of the sections mentioned in Section 40 is Section 37. Sub-section (2) of S.37, which is relevant for our purposes, is quoted below : "In cases not provided for by sub-section (1) or by any other law for the time being in force, the Court shall act according to justice, equity and good conscience." 8. A Court of Small Causes, therefore, is also required to keep in view justice, equity and good conscience while deciding a suit. The inherent power, which has been preserved by S.151, is only one of the many aspects of the aforesaid principle of justice, equity and good conscience, which is to be kept in view while administering justice between the parties. 9. In Padam Sen v. State of U.P. (AIR 1961, SC 218), the Supreme Court has held (at p. 218): - "The inherent powers of the Supreme Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and, therefore, it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 when the exercise of those powers is in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the notifications of the Legislature. It is also well recognised that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code." 10. It is also well recognised that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code." 10. To the same effect is the view taken by the Supreme Court in Ram Chand and Sons" Sugar Mills v. Kanhaiya Lal ( AIR 1966 SC 1899 ). 11. After a review of the various provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and the Code of Civil Procedure, we find that there is no prohibition contained in either of the two enactments expressly or impliedly providing for the bar of admitting additional evidence. What O.50 R.1, (b) did by excluding Order XII was only that this provision will not apply to revisions. But, the fact that Order XII, R.27 has been excluded does not lead to the conclusion that the Court cannot in exercise of its inherent power admit additional evidence when the ends of justice requires the same to be done. 12. In Zafaruddin v. Madan Mohan ( AIR 1960 All 612 ) and Ram Bharose v, Ganga Singh (AIR 1931 All 727 (FB), this Court held that a Court of Small Causes has inherent powers. Therefore, there is no doubt that the Court of Small Causes can in exercise of its inherent power admit additional evidence. However, when that power could be exercised and in what manner, that is a different question and that should not be mixed up with the jurisdiction of the Court to admit additional evidence. 13. A revision under Section 25 can be entertained on a question of law. The Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with findings of fact. Under Section 25, therefore, the Court cannot admit additional evidence for re-appraising the evidence or for setting aside a finding of fact. It is incorrect to suggest that considerations which prevail in regard to the reception of additional evidence in a first appeal should apply or should prevail in regard to its reception in a revision. In a revision, the Court is required to examine whether the impugned judgment is in conformity with law. The findings of fact recorded by the Judge Small Causes are final and binding on the revisional Court. Additional evidence subsequently discovered by a party cannot be admitted in a revision to demonstrate that the finding given by the Judge Small Causes was erroneous. The findings of fact recorded by the Judge Small Causes are final and binding on the revisional Court. Additional evidence subsequently discovered by a party cannot be admitted in a revision to demonstrate that the finding given by the Judge Small Causes was erroneous. Similarly, with the aid of expression "substantial cause" used in O.XII, Rule 27, no evidence can be filed in a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act to fill in the lacuna. 14. There appears to be no difficulty in taking of a subsequent or new fact into account by a Court under S.25. To prove the subsequent or new fact, evidence may be required, but that would not be considered as additional inasmuch as it could not be and was not before the Judge Small Causes. In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders ( AIR 1975 SC 1409 ), the Supreme Court, while deciding a revision, applied the aforesaid principle, and held (at p. 1410): - "We feel the submissions devoid of substance. First about the jurisdiction and propriety vis-a-vis circumstances which come into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to Court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner or moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated with a view to promote substantial justice subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances." 15. Having held that the subsequent facts could be taken into account, the Supreme Court repelled the arguments made before it that it was illegal to have taken cognizance of subsequent events. While taking the aforesaid view, the Supreme Court referred to the decision of the Federal Court in Lachmeshwar Prasad v. Keshwar Lal (reported in AIR 1941 FC 5) as a leading case on the point. While taking the aforesaid view, the Supreme Court referred to the decision of the Federal Court in Lachmeshwar Prasad v. Keshwar Lal (reported in AIR 1941 FC 5) as a leading case on the point. Gwyer C. J., in the above case, referred to the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of United States in Peterson v. State of Alabama (1934) 294 US 600 at p. 607, and observed : "We have frequently held that in exercise of an appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And, in determining what justice does require the Court is bound to consider any change either in fact or in law which has superannuated since the judgment was entered." 16. This was although a case of appeal where the aforesaid decision was given, but this principle has been applied by the Supreme Court to a revision as well. 17. Following these decisions, the Supreme Court held in Balai Chandra v. Shewdhari. Jadav ( AIR 1978 SC 1062 ) that it is the duty of the Court to take the subsequent change in law or a fact into account and to decide the rights of parties on that basis. 18. In M.M. Quazim v. Manohar Lal, ( AIR 1981 SC 1113 ) the Supreme Court held that subsequent events of vital importance should be taken into account by a Court dealing with an appeal. To the same effect is the law laid down by the Supreme Court in M. Laxmi and Co. v. Dr. Anant R. Deshpande ( (1973) SCC 37) : ( AIR 1973 SC 171 ). It was held in this case that (at p. 177): - "It is true that the Court can take notice of subsequent events. These cases are where the Court finds that because of altered circumstances like devolution of interest it is necessary to shorten litigation. Where the original relief has become inappropriate by subsequent events the Court can take notice of such changes. If the Court finds that the judgment of the Court cannot be carried into effect because of change of circumstances, the Court takes notice of the same. If the Court finds that the matter is no longer in controversy, the Court also takes notice of such events. If the Court finds that the judgment of the Court cannot be carried into effect because of change of circumstances, the Court takes notice of the same. If the Court finds that the matter is no longer in controversy, the Court also takes notice of such events. If the property which is the subject matter of suit is no longer available the Court will take notice of such event. The Court takes notice of subsequent events to shorten litigation, to preserve rights of both the parties and to sub-serve the ends of Justice." 19. From what we have said above, we find that a Court under S.25 can take into account subsequent or new facts which had emerged since the giving of the decision by the Judge of the Small Causes. In taking the new fact into account the Court may sometimes be called upon to amend the pleadings or take documentary or oral evidence and for that purpose the proper course for the Court under Section 25 would be to set aside the order of the Judge Small Causes and send the matter back to him for deciding the rights of the parties on its bask. In Balai Chandra v. Shewdhari Jadav ( AIR 1978 SC 1062 ) (supra), the Supreme Court held (at P 1067): - "Once pleadings are permitted to be amended which bring into focus altogether new or disputed questions of fact which have to be resolved by additional evidence that would be necessary to be led, the function is one of appreciation of evidence, more properly to be undertaken by the trial Court......" 20. Out of the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, one of them was reported in Smt. Kamini Khare v. Ram Naresh (1979 All LJ 1263) (supra). In this case the learned Judge held that no additional evidence could be admitted in Revision under Section 25. We wish to add as and when any occasion which has been narrated by us above arises, the additional evidence may be admitted but in that event also the revising Court will not be entitled to set aside a finding of fact. 21. For what we have said above, we are unable to find my real conflict between Sudarshan Pal Singh v. 2nd Addl. 21. For what we have said above, we are unable to find my real conflict between Sudarshan Pal Singh v. 2nd Addl. District Judge (1980 (UP) RCC 379) (supra) and Smt. Kamini Khare v. Ram Naresh (1979 All LJ 1263) (supra). We have made an endeavour to explain the position of law above. These cases have to be read in the light of the observations made by us in this judgment. 22. Coming to the merits of the case, we do not find any error in the judgment of the Additional District Judge rejecting the application for admitting additional evidence. 23. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with cost. The stay order is discharged. Petition dismissed.