Judgement SABHAH1T, J. :- This appeal by the petitioner-wife is directed against the order dated 4-11-1979 passed by or Principal Civil Judge, Bangalore City, in Matrimonial Case No.67 of 1978 on his file granting divorce to the husband from the wife on the ground of adultery by the wife. 2. The petition was made by the wife Smt. Swayamprabha for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the ground of cruelty by her husband. The respondent who was arrayed as respondent in the petition resisted the petition. He, however, prayed that divorce might be granted on the ground that his wife was living in adultery. The learned Civil Judge permitted the husband to press the prayer for divorce under S.23-A of the Act, giving opportunity to the other side to file counter. The following issues were raised for hearing:- "(1) Whether the petitioner proves cruelty alleged against the respondent? (2) Whether there is any condonation of cruel treatment by the wife? (3) Whether the respondent has proved adultery alleged against the petitioner? (4) Whether there is any condonation of adultery by the respondent? (5) To what relief, the parties are entitled?" 3. During hearing the petitioner examined herself and two others in support of her case. As against that the respondent examined himself as R.W.2 and also examined six others in support of the case alleged by him. In addition to the oral evidence the petitioner got marked Exts. P1 to P6 and the respondent got marked Exts. D1 to D7. The trial Court appreciating the evidence on record answered issue No.1 in the negative and in that view observed that issue No.2 did not survive for consideration. It answered issue No.3 in the affirmative and issue No.4 in the negative and in that view granted divorce as prayed for by the husband on the ground of adultery by the wife. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the petitioner-wife has come up before this Court with the above appeal. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant strenuously urged before us that the trial Court was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the respondent in the petition proved that the petitioner-wife was living in adultery and as such divorce could not be granted on that ground. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant strenuously urged before us that the trial Court was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the respondent in the petition proved that the petitioner-wife was living in adultery and as such divorce could not be granted on that ground. He further submitted that cruel treatment as alleged by the wife was amply proved. Further, the baseless allegations made by the husband about the character of the wife stating that she was living in adultery constituted in law, sufficient mental cruelty to the wife to enable her to get an order of divorce from the husband. Per contra the learned counsel for the respondent-husband in the appeal argued supporting the judgment and order of the trial Court. The points therefore that arise for our consideration in the appeal are: (1) Whether the Court below was justified in holding that the wife has failed to prove the cruelty alleged by her? (2) Whether the trial Court was justified in holding that the respondent-husband has proved the case alleged by him in the objections filed by him that his wife was living in adultery? (3) If not, whether the allegation against the fidelity of the wife without basis, constituted mental cruelty to the wife? 5. The learned Civil Judge discussing the evidence on record has held that the evidence adduced by the petitioner-wife is not sufficient to constitute cruelty as contemplated under Sec.13 of the Act to enable her to get an order of divorce. We were taken through the evidence on record. The instances of cruelty given by the wife in the course of her evidence are no doubt not proved adequately by the evidence adduced by her. She contended that her husband attempted to drown her by pushing her in the Ulsoor tank. She further averred that be forced her to transfer Rs. 20,000/- which was in her name to the joint name of herself and her husband. She further averred that he forced her to make over the site which was in her name to his name. According to her, he was about to take her under the pretext of pilgrimage to different places with a view to attempt on her life. 20,000/- which was in her name to the joint name of herself and her husband. She further averred that he forced her to make over the site which was in her name to his name. According to her, he was about to take her under the pretext of pilgrimage to different places with a view to attempt on her life. According to her, because of the mental stress she fell ill and was admitted to the hospital on 17-4-1978 and the petition was presented even when she was in the hospital. In order to establish these averments, she examined herself, Lakshmi Devi, P.W.1 and her father Samba Sastry, P.W.3. The learned Civil Judge has rightly pointed out that the instances of cruelly are not proved as a matter of fact and the evidence adduced is insufficient to corroborate the version given by her. On going through the evidence, we find that we have no reason to differ from the finding so given by the learned Civil Judge in this behalf. 6. That takes us to the next question as to whether the husband has proved the allegation that his wife the petitioner was living in adultery. The husband has examined himself as R.W.7 and he has, in support of his case, examined six other witnessess. It is no doubt true that adultery can rarely be proved by direct evidence. It has to be established mainly by circumstantial evidence and the evidence of surrounding circumstances. In the instant case, the husband has pressed into service the following circumstances and factors to establish that his wife was living in adultery:- (1) His wife was seen going on the scooter with Rangaswamy while going to the school; (2) She once went to Mysore with Rangaswamy and according to the husband, she stayed with Rangaswamy in Mysore, in a hotel; (3) The petitioner-wife was found with Rangaswamy in his house at about 2-30 P.M. on 20-8-1976 when nobody else was there in the house; (4) According to R.W.4 Parimala, a maid-servant of the respondent, Rangaswamy was found in the house of the petitioner-wife and both the petitioners-wife and Rangaswamy were found in a compromising position when she suddenly opened the door during Dasara of 1977; (5) Some writings of Rangaswamy were found at Exs. D-1 and D-2. D-1 and D-2. (7) The learned Civil Judge, discussing the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that these factors were established in evidence and relying on them, he came to the conclusion that the husband-respondent was successful in establishing the allegation of adultery by his wife beyond reasonable doubt. (8) The learned counsel for the appellant-wife urged before us that none of these circumstances were adequately proved. He further submitted that the evidence was highly artificial, contradictory and was not consistent with broad probabilities. It was not even consistent with the pleading of the husband. Hence he submitted that the learned Civil Judge was not justified in relying on those circumstances and factors in arriving at the conclusion that the petitioner-wife was' living in adultery. He no doubt submitted, relying on the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah v. Prabhavati ( AIR 1957 SC 176 ), that the onus of proving alleged adultery was on the person who made the allegation and that the same should be proved beyond any reasonable doubt as in a criminal case. He further pressed into service for the same proposition the decisions of the Supreme Court rendered in Earnist John White v. Mrs. Kathleen Olive White ( AIR 1958 SC 441 ) and in the case Smt. Chandra Mohini Srivastava v. Shri Avinash Prasad Srivastava ( AIR 1967 SC 581 ). It is no doubt true that in these decisions, the Supreme Court observed that a matrimonial offence should be proved as in a criminal case and the guilt should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court has revised its view and in Dr. N.G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane ( AIR 1975 SC 1534 ) it has been held by a Bench of three Judges that the burden of proof in a matrimonial case is as in a civil case and not as in a criminal case, that It is by preponderance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court in para 23 of the judgment in the case has observed thus: 7. "23. But before doing so, it is necessary to deal the ground of certain misconceptions, especially as they would appear to have influenced the judgment of the High Court. The Supreme Court in para 23 of the judgment in the case has observed thus: 7. "23. But before doing so, it is necessary to deal the ground of certain misconceptions, especially as they would appear to have influenced the judgment of the High Court. First, as to the nature of burden of proof which rests on a petitioner in a matrimonial petition under the Act. Doubtless, the burden must lie on the petitioner to establish his or her case for, ordinarily, the burden lies on the party which affirms a fact, not on the party which denies it. This principle accords with commonsense as it is so much easier to prove a positive then a negative. The petitioner must therefore prove that the respondent has treated him with cruelty within the meaning of Section 10 (1) (b) of the Act. But does the law require, as the High Court has held, that the petitioner must prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt? In other words, though the burden lies on the petitioner to establish the charge of cruelty, what is the standard of proof to be applied in in order to judge whether the burden has been discharged? "24. .The normal rule which governs civil proceedings is that a fact can be said to be established if it is proved by a preponderance of probabilities. This is for the reason that under the Evidence Act, Section 3, a fact is said to be proved when the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. The belief regarding the existence of a fact may thus be founded on a balance of probabilities. A prudent man faced with conflicting probabilities concerning a fact-situation will act on the supposition that the fact exists, if on weighing the various probabilities he finds that the preponderance is in favour of the existence of the particular fact. As a prudent man, so the court applies this test for finding whether a fact in issue can be said to be proved. The first step in this process to fix the probabilities, the second to weigh them, though the two may often intermingle. The impossible is weeded out at the first stage, the improbable at the second. As a prudent man, so the court applies this test for finding whether a fact in issue can be said to be proved. The first step in this process to fix the probabilities, the second to weigh them, though the two may often intermingle. The impossible is weeded out at the first stage, the improbable at the second. Within the wide range of probabilities the Court has often a difficult choice to make but it is this choice which ultimately determines where the preponderance of probabilities lies. Important issues like those which affect the status of parties demand a closer scrutiny then those like the loan on a promissory note: "the nature and gravity of an issue necessarily determines the manner of attaining reasonable satisfaction of the truth of the issue" Per Dixon, L in Wright v. Wright, (1948) 77 CLR 191 at p. 210; or as said by Lord Denning, "the degree of probability depends on the subject-matter. In proportion as the offence is grave, so ought the proof to be clear. Blyth V. Blyth, 1966-1 All ER 524 at p.536." But whether the issue is one of cruelty or of a loan on a pronote, the test to apply is whether on a preponderance of probabilities the relevant fact is proved. In civil cases this, normally, is the standard of proof to apply for finding whether the burden of proof is discharged. "25. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is proof by a higher standard which generally governs criminal trials or trials involving inquiry into issues of a quasi-criminal nature. A criminal trial involves the liberty of the subject which may not be taken away on a mere preponderance of probabilities. If the, probabilities are so nicely balanced that a reasonable, not a vacillating, mind cannot find where the preponderance lies, a doubt arises regarding the existence of the fact to be proved and the benefit of such reasonable doubt goes to the accused. It is wrong to import such considerations in trials of a purely civil nature." Thus the Supreme Court has, ex cathedra, ruled that we standard of proof in a matrimonial case is as in a civil case and not as in a criminal case; that it is by preponderance of probabilities and not by proving it beyond reasonable doubt. That is also the view taken by this Court in Roland Premkumar Gokuldas v. Mrs. That is also the view taken by this Court in Roland Premkumar Gokuldas v. Mrs. Jyothsna Gokuldas (ILR (1980) 2 Kant 1444). A special Bench of this Court in that case has observed in this regard thus:- 8. "Now, the standard of proof in divorce proceeding in the matter of proving adultery would be as laid down in Halsbury's Laws of England, quoted above, on a preponderance of probability, but the degree of probability depends on the subject-matter and in proportion as the offence is grave, so ought the proof to be dear. Divorce is a civil proceeding and the analogies of criminal law are not apt." This Court in the aforesaid ruling speaking about the nature of evidence required to prove adultery has observed in paras 30 and 31 of the judgment as follows: "30. It is well settled that adultery cannot be proved by direct evidence. Adultery has to be proved mainly by circumstantial evidence. The Court may presume adultery if it is satisfied that guilty attachment subsisted between the parties and that they had opportunities to have guilty intercourse. "31. At the same time, it is necessary to remember that circumstances established must be such as would lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man to the conclusion of adultery." 9. Keeping these salutary principles in the appreciation of evidence in mind, we would presently proceed to appreciate the circumstances pressed into service in the instant cast. In the written statement filed by the husband alleging adultery on the part of his wife, he has stated in para 8 as follows :- "8. In this connection, this respondent submits that the bad character and misconduct of the petitioner and her infidelity towards this respondent came to light only in the first week of February 1978. The petitioner was having illegal connections with other persons. The writings appearing in the application for obtaining transfer certificate in respect of the children would reveal the close association and illegal connection. The petitioner was having illegal connections with other persons. The writings appearing in the application for obtaining transfer certificate in respect of the children would reveal the close association and illegal connection. Further more, the handwriting on the envelope containing notice sent through this Hon'ble Court to this respondent also proves the illegal connection of the petitioner with that person with whom she was having sexual intercourse." Thus, it was rightly commented upon by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent-husband was not bold enough even at the time of filing his objections, to mention the name of Shri. Rangaswamy as the paramour of his wife. On the other hand, even at that time, he was not very much sure about the conduct of his wife and he made a vague allegation stating that she was having illegal connection with other persons not confining it to any one and much less to Shri. Rangaswamy. Thereafter he trotted out the theory that the petitioner was having illicit intimacy with Rangaswamy making a mountain of a mole-hill. One circumstance is the fact that Rangaswamy was visiting the house of the parents of the petitioner-wife and that petitioner was sometimes going on the scooter of Rangaswamy to school, she being a mistress in the primary school. It is not denied even by the father of the petitioner examined as P.W.3 that his daughter the petitioner was sometimes going to school on the scooter of Rangaswamy and that Rangaswamy was visiting their house for the past twenty years, he being a friend and well-wisher of the family. It is not very uncommon in these days for girls and women to travel on the scooters of others if it suite their convenience. It is necessary to recall that social etiquettes do change as time rolls by, in the matter of behaviours of men and women. It was once thought that it was infidel on the part of a lady to talk to any person other then her husband. She was not expected to talk even with her husband In the presence of others. We have several stories in our Puranas which speak of mental adultery of women and such women receiving curses from their husbands who were Rishis. It is needless to point out that these concepts have changed and are changing. She was not expected to talk even with her husband In the presence of others. We have several stories in our Puranas which speak of mental adultery of women and such women receiving curses from their husbands who were Rishis. It is needless to point out that these concepts have changed and are changing. The great philosopher Bertrand Russel in his book "Marriage and Morals" has discussed this aspect at some length and has shown how it was considered bad manners for a lady in the Victorian age even to expose her ankles and how subsequently it became a fashion in the 20th Century for ladies to expose even their knees. The present-day convention appears to be that the ladies dress should be long enough to cover and short enough to rouse curiosity. This we are pointing out only to stress that the concepts about social behaviour and etiquette in society are fast changing as the society is advancing economically and as women are afforded opportunity to attain economic security. Will and Ariel Durant in their ten volume work 'The Story of Civilisation' have advanced the theory that the moral codes differ from age to age because they adjust themselves to historical and environmental conditions and that man's sins may be the relics of his rise rather then the stigma of his fall. The learned Authors, speaking about the talk of laxity of moral values in our times when we are forging the moral values of the Industrial Civilisation, state in their last volume 'The lessons of History':- 'So we cannot be sure that the moral laxity of our times is a herald of decay, rather then a transition between a moral code that has lost its agricultural basis and another that our industrial civilisation has yet to forge' Be that as it may; what we are- keen to point out is that it would be hazardous these days to jump to the conclusion of adultery if a lady is found going on the scooter of some person other then her husband as is found talking with some one other then her husband. In Smt. Chandramohini Srivastava's case ( AIR 1967 SC 581 ), the Supreme Court has pointed out in para 9 of its judgment that merely because a married lady receives some improper letters by a person other then her husband, the Court should not jump to the conclusion that there is an illicit intimacy between them. The Supreme Court has observed thus: "9. It is true that the appellant has denied receiving those letters and has also denied that she ever sent any letter to Chandra Prakash. One can understand this denial in the case of a person like the appellant who was facing a petition for divorce on the ground of adultery. But assuming that those two letters were received by the appellant, that does not in our opinion prove that there was any adultery between the appellant and Chandra Prakash in 1955. We have read those letters and we must say that they are most improper and should not have been written by a person like Chandra Prakash who was married to the cousin of the appellant. But the first thing that strikes us is that the mere fact that some male relation writes such letters to a married woman, does not necessarily prove that there was any illicit relationship between the writer of the letters and the married woman who received them." We quote this because, in the instant case also, the petitioner, lady has denied that she was going on the scooter of Rangaswamy. The same reason as is given by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case holds good here also. Obviously what prompted the lady in the present case to deny that she was moving about on the Scooter of Rangaswamy is that she was facing a divorce petition on the ground of adultery. It is her fear that obviously made her to deny going on the scooter of Rangaswamy though her father admitted that she was going on the scooter of Rangaswamy once in a way. The learned Civil Judge was not justified in making out a circumstance of this saying that a married lady was not expected to go on the scooter of some other person and that her denial further confirms her guilt. 10. The learned Civil Judge was not justified in making out a circumstance of this saying that a married lady was not expected to go on the scooter of some other person and that her denial further confirms her guilt. 10. With regard to the circumstance of the petitioner-wife going to Mysore with Rangaswamy and staying in a hotel with Rangaswamy that night, the learned Civil Judge has disbelieved the version that she stayed with Rangaswamy in a hotel in Mysore. The reason is not far to seek. The respondent-husband has himself in the course of his evidence stated that his wife-petitioner informed him that she was going to Mysore to get the marks card and would stay in the house of Gowramma. But in the cross-examination of the petitioner a definite suggestion has been put to the witness-petitioner that she stayed, with Rangaswamy in the house of Gowramma. This is what the petitioner has stated: "It is false to suggest that on 2-2-1978 I and Rangaswamy stayed for a night as husband and wife in the house of Smt. Gowramma, a teacher at Mysore." Thus it is obvious that the versions changed when the petitioner was cross-examined and when the husband-respondent was examined. One contradicts the other. The learned Civil Judge was rightly constrained to disbelieve that the petitioner-wife stayed in Mysore either in a hotel or in the house of Gowramma with Rangaswamy as wife and husband on the night of 2-2-1978. Merely going to Mysore, may be in the same bus with Rangaswamy, would not be of any great consequence or importance. What was important was the staying together which is held disproved by the learned Civil Judge. Hence this circumstance also would not further the case of the respondent-husband. 11. R.W.4 Parimala in her evidence has no doubt stated that during the Dasara of 1977, she was washing clothes and when she suddenly pushed the door to get some soap powder she found Rangaswamy and the petitioner-wife in a compromising position. This version of the maid-servant as rightly commented upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is highly artificial. It is not consistent with broad probabilities. If the petitioner-wife and Rangaswamy were thinking of any criminal intimacy, it is probable, both being educated people, that they would at least take care to bolt the door from inside. This version of the maid-servant as rightly commented upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is highly artificial. It is not consistent with broad probabilities. If the petitioner-wife and Rangaswamy were thinking of any criminal intimacy, it is probable, both being educated people, that they would at least take care to bolt the door from inside. They would not have kept the door without bolting, in order to enable this maidservant to enter and see them in a compromising position, especially when Smt. Swayamprabha was aware that the maidservant was present in the premises. 12. What is worse is that the evidence of this maid-servant Parimala is tainted. Parimala herself admits that there was no love lost between her and Swayamprabha the petitioner. What is still worse is the fact that if really the maid-servant Parimala, who was not having good feelings towards the petitioner, caught the petitioner and Rangaswamy red-handed, while in a compromising position, it would be highly improbable that she would keep her mouth shut right from 1976 to 1978 without revealing it to anybody. Even according to her own version, she disclosed it for the first time to the respondent-husband in the petition during 1978 when he was feeling worried about the health of his wife as she was admitted to the hospital. Such a conduct on the part of the maid-servant -Parimala reveals the artificiality of her evidence. The learned Civil Judge has, without proper scrutiny of her evidence, swallowed her version which, in our opinion, is not proper. We are unable to place reliance on this artificial version boldly put forward by R.W.4 Parimala. Though learned Civil Judge has swallowed it, we cannot agree with him. 13. That takes us to the next circumstance pleaded that Devakumari examined as R.W.3 saw her husband and the petitioner together in their house when she returned to the house unexpectedly at about 2 p.m. on 20-8-1976. Here again, the learned Civil Judge has placed reliance on the uncorroborated version of the witness without proper scrutiny of the evidence. Devakumari R.W.3 herself admits that her relations with her husband were estranged and that she started living separately from her husband. It is obvious that she would take every opportunity to malign her husband. It may not be out of hatred against the petitioner but it may be for spitting her husband. Devakumari R.W.3 herself admits that her relations with her husband were estranged and that she started living separately from her husband. It is obvious that she would take every opportunity to malign her husband. It may not be out of hatred against the petitioner but it may be for spitting her husband. There is no corroboration to this version. She has not reported the matter to the neighbours. She was introduced to the husband of the petitioner. She has not revealed it to him. That being so, this isolated circumstance spoken by the witness cannot be relied upon without corroboration. The learned Civil Judge has relied on that circumstance also which in our considered view is a patent error. It was also pointed out to us that in Exs. D-1 and D-2 there is the handwriting of Rangaswamy. It may at once be observed that the same has not been proved and it would not in any way further the case of the respondent. D-1 and D-2 are note-books wherein we find the notes on political science for the M.A., course. They are not a bunch of love letters nor do they contain matters personal to the petitioner. Hence they cannot be given any importance. 14. To crown the whole, the husband of the petitioner in his evidence has stated thus: "In February 1978, I entertained suspicion about the character of my wife." That makes it obvious that till February 1978, there was no circumstance whatsoever which even roused the suspicion of the respondent about the fidelity of his wife. On the other hand, it is in the evidence of R.W.3 Devakumari that she told in July 1976 the husband of the petitioner that his wife was having illicit connection with her husband and requested him to keep a watch over her conduct. The assertion of the husband clearly belies such a version. He never even suspected the fidelity of his wife till February 1978. Similarly as pointed out above, if Parimala had discovered the petitioner and Rangaswamy in a compromising position in the Dasara of 1977, regard being had to the broad probabilities, it was very likely that she would have revealed the same to husband soon after the incident especially so when she admits that there was bad blood between her and the petitioner. That again makes it clear that her version also is a mere make believe version and she is a witness brought for the occasion. The learned Civil Judge has followed these artificial, unreliable and improbable versions of these witnesses without proper scrutiny. As stated above, the charge of adultery is a grave one. It goes to demolish the solemn structure of marriage. It has to be taken seriously and the degree of proof required to establish it is of a very high order. The case for divorce cannot be equated to a case of recovery of money on a pronote as pointed out by his Lordship Chandrachud of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. The approach of the learned Civil Judge in appreciating the evidence on record is therefore erroneous being light-hearted and casual. We are unable to place reliance, for reasons discussed above, on the versions of the various witnesses and we are of the considered view that the respondent-husband has failed to establish the grave charge of adultery on the part of his wife the petitioner. That being so, it is obvious that the husband has made baseless and grave allegations on the character of his wife thus causing her mental torture which would justify her claim for divorce from him. 15. It is settled principle of law that levelling allegations of adultery without proper foundation and basis would tantamount to perpetrating mental cruelty on the other spouse. (See AIR 1967 Punj 397; AIR 1963 Punj 242; AIR 1960 Punj 422 and AIR 1979 Punj and Har 71). In a recent decision of the same High Court, namely, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, the said proposition is reiterated by the Chief Justice of that High Court in the case, Paras Ram v. Kamlesh (AIR 1982 Punj and Har 60). The Chief Justice speaking for the Bench has observed that when baseless allegations of adultery are levelled against a spouse it constitutes mental cruelty in the eye of law and it can be made a ground for divorce. In the instant case such allegations are made in the statement of objections of the respondent and under Section 23-A of the Act he was permitted to seek divorce on that ground. An issue was raised in that behalf and we have shown that the husband-respondent has failed to establish adultery against his wife, the petitioner. In the instant case such allegations are made in the statement of objections of the respondent and under Section 23-A of the Act he was permitted to seek divorce on that ground. An issue was raised in that behalf and we have shown that the husband-respondent has failed to establish adultery against his wife, the petitioner. That being so, we have no hesitation to hold that the baseless allegations about adultery would constitute mental cruelty to the wife, the petitioner so as to enable her to seek divorce from her husband. Hence we are constrained to hold, differing from the learned Civil Judge, that the petitioner-wife is entitled to divorce on the ground of mental torture and cruelty and that the learned Civil Judge was not justified in granting a decree for divorce in favour of the husband on the ground of alleged adultery on the part of his wife. 16. In the result the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge are set aside and the petition of the wife for a decree for divorce is hereby granted. On the peculiar circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs throughout.