Research › Browse › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

1982 DIGILAW 113 (KER)

PADMANABHAN v. OUSEPH

1982-04-02

G.BALAGANGADHARAN NAIR, V.KHALID

body1982
Judgment :- 1. Appellant was the plaintiff in a suit for money with interest at 12% per annum. The trial court granted him a decree in terms of the plaint with future interest at 8 % per annum from the date of suit; but on appeal by the first defendant the lower appellate court reversed the decree and dismissed the suit with costs. On the memorandum of appeal in this Court the appellant paid court fee on the valuation in the lower appellate court which covered the principal amount and interest up to the date of the trial court decree but not on the interest up to the presentation of the second appeal. The appellant resisted, without assigning any reason, the direction of the office to pay court fee on this amount of interest in terms of Explanation.3 to S.52, Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act and Raveendran v. Appukkuttan,1981 KLT. 238. On his insistence the office has placed the matter before the Court. A learned single judge before whom the case came in the first instance has referred it to a Bench. 2. We heard counsel for the appellant and the learned Government Pleader. 3. S.52 deals with the court fee payable in appeals and Explanation.3 on whose proper construction the question depends reads: Unnumbered S. A. of 1982. "Explanation. (3) In claims which include the award of interest subsequent to the institution of the suit, the interest accrued during the pendency of the suit till the date of decree shall be deemed to be part of the subject-matter of the appeal except where such interest is relinquished." 4. In 1981 KLT. 238 a Bench of this Court held on identical facts that the appellant-plaintiff who had not relinquished the interest has to pay court fee on future interest in view of Explanation (3) but the learned judges had no occasion to consider the ground of immunity now raised by counsel for the appellant. The appellant agrees that as he has not relinquished interest he would have had to pay court fee on the interest that had accrued due till the date of the decree were this a first appeal; in other words he contends that the Explanation does not govern second appeals. The appellant agrees that as he has not relinquished interest he would have had to pay court fee on the interest that had accrued due till the date of the decree were this a first appeal; in other words he contends that the Explanation does not govern second appeals. In aid of this contention he refers to the words in the explanation "the interest accrued during the pendency of the suit till the date of decree shall be deemed to be part of the subject-matter of the appeal" arguing that what should be deemed to be part of the subject matter of the appeal is the interest that had accrued during the pendency of the suit till the date of the decree in the trial court. This is relevant and applicable only in relation to a first appeal, so the contention proceeds, and the interest during the pendency of the first appeal which is subsequent to the suit does not form part of the subject matter of this appeal under Explanation.3. He reinforced his contention by appealing to the principle that a statute like the Court Fees Act which imposes pecuniary burdens on the subject should be strictly construed and that a construction that is beneficial to him should be adopted. 5. Despite the language of the preamble that the object of the Act was "to amend and consolidate the law relating to court-fees and valuation of suits" the Act deals not only with court fees and valuation of suits but of appeals also, although "appeals" are not as such mentioned in the preamble. While it is permissible to the enacting part to outstrip the preamble, this result in the Act might be attributed to the well-known principle that "When an appeal is preferred from a decree of a Court of First Instance, the suit is continued in the Court of Appeal and reheard either in whole or in part, according as the whole suit is litigated again in the Court of Appeal or only a part of it. The final decree in the appeal will thus be the final decree in the suit, whether that be one confirming, varying or reversing the decree of the Court of First Instance When an appeal is preferred, the Court of Appeal is really seized of the whole suit though the relief given by it will be limited to the portion of the decree appealed against or objected to under S.561, Civil Procedure Code." (Per Bhashyam Ayyangar J. in Kristnama Chariar v. Mangammal, ILR. XXVI Madras 91,95-96.) This decision and an earlier decision Pichuvayyangar v. Seshayyangar, ILR. 18 Madras 214 were followed and the same principle applied in Chinnakarupan Chetty v. Meyyappa Chetty, AIR 1916 Madras 732 where it was observed that "...the jurisdiction exercised by the Appellate Court is with reference to the further stage of the suit which was disposed of by the first Court." 6. In Bopin Behary v. Jogendra Chandra, AIR. 1917 Calcutta 248, it was laid down that "...proceedings on appeal are for many purposes deemed only a continuation of the suit instituted in the first Court." The learned judges followed among others, 18 Madras 214 and 26 Madras 91. 7. In a subsequent case Jamini Nath v. Midnapur Zamindary Co., AIR. 1923 Calcutta 716, Rankin J. held that suits in S.10, Civil Procedure Code, include appeals, following AIR. 1917 Calcutta 248. The same view was taken and the two Calcutta cases were followed in Raj Spinning Mills v. A. G. King Ltd.,954 Punjab 113. 8. Despite the preamble being what it is, the Act provides for the valuation of appeals and the payment of court fees therein. S.52 which is headed "Appeals" deals with the valuation of an appeal in its several situations. On that there is no dispute. The proviso to the substantive provision refers not expressly but by necessary implication to second appeals but apart from this reference the Section does not in terms deal with second appeals. Nevertheless we did not understand counsel to contend that second appeals stand outside the substantive provision or the Explanations that follow except Explanation.3. Considering the object and terms of the Section such a contention would have been misplaced and untenable. Nevertheless we did not understand counsel to contend that second appeals stand outside the substantive provision or the Explanations that follow except Explanation.3. Considering the object and terms of the Section such a contention would have been misplaced and untenable. On the controversial point whether second appeals are outside the ambit of Explanation (3) the appellant's contention is that what goes into the valuation of the appeal is only the interest that accrued during the pendency of the suit till the date of the decree in the trial court. The interest would continue to accrue even subsequent to the decree of the trial court but in view of the words limiting it to the trial court, the arguments proceeded it should not be deemed to be part of the subject matter of the second appeal. Having regard to the normal and well accepted scope of the expression "suit" and to the circumstance that S.52 as a whole is not confined to first appeals, we feel that the word "suit" means not only the suit during its career in the trial court but includes the first appeal resulting in the decree from which the second appeal is preferred. This is not only consistent with the meaning given to the word "suit" in appropriate contexts, over the years but also with the scheme and object of S.52. The appellant's contention overlooks this meaning of the word "suit" and introduces a measure of disharmony into the Section, The construction which has commended itself to us avoids this disharmony also. We do not think that the intention of Explanation (3) was to treat first and second appeals differently for the purpose of court fee. 9. As for the principle of interpretation invoked by counsel that statutes which impose pecuniary burdens are subject to strict construction, it has little relevance in the present case. S.52, Explanation (3) as we have construed it will avoid what we conceive to be the unreasonable interpretation given by the appellant. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". (Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn. page 199). S.52, Explanation (3) as we have construed it will avoid what we conceive to be the unreasonable interpretation given by the appellant. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". (Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn. page 199). Equally relevant is the kindred rule mentioned by Maxwell at page 203: "Not only are unreasonable or artificial or anomalous constructions to be avoided: it appears to be an assumption (often unspoken) of the courts that where two possible constructions present themselves, the more reasonable one is to be chosen." We have said that our construction will produce a harmonious result. In that context it is best to recall another principle: "Every clause of a statute is to be construed with reference to the context and other provisions of the Act to make a consistent and harmonious meaning of the statute relating to the subject-matter." (Gammon India Ltd. v. Union of India, 1974 SC. 960 page 964). We are of the view that second appeals are within the purview of Explanation (3) to S.52 and that the appellant is liable to pay additional court fee in terms of the office note. The appellant will pay the deficit court fee on or before 26-5-1982.