JUDGMENT K.P. Singh, J. - In this writ petition three submissions have been made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners. Firstly that the revisional court has patently erred in accepting the claim of Gajraj whose claim had not been recognised in the earlier litigation. The second contention raised on behalf of the Petitioners that admission contained in the pleadings in the earlier litigation cannot be relied upon subsequently by the contesting opposite parties. In this connection the learned Counsel for the Petitioners has placed reliance upon the observations made in Ramabai Shriniwas Nadgir Vs. The Government of Bombay, AIR 1941 Bom 144 . 2. The third contention raised on |behalf of the Petitioners that in view of the ruling reported in Smt. Krishnawati Vs. Shri Hans Raj, AIR 1974 SC 280 previous self-serving statements by a party in other proceedings cannot be used as substantive evidence in subsequent proceedings against that party. 3. In my opinion none of the contentions has any force. 4. As regards the first contention it is noteworthy that the learned Counsel for the Petitioners has utterly failed to satisfy me that the claim of Gajraj was not recognised in the earlier litigation. It is ture that the claim of the Petitioners' transferor was accepted by the trial court in the earlier litigation, but on appeal by one of the Defendants that suit was dismissed. In that suit opposite party No. 2 Gajraj was a Defendant. Since he had not filed appeal against the judgment of the Trial Court, it has been contended that the judgment of the Trial Court became final against Gajraj. It has not been demonstrated to me that in earlier litigation Gajraj had any interest in the separate and specified property. Annexure 6' attached with the writ petition indicates that he had filed a written statement in the earlier litigation along with Dhani Ram and Natthu and had claimed sirdari right in the disputed land hence when that suit was dismissed, it is difficult to conceive that the ultimate judgment was against Gajraj or that the judgment of the Trial Court had become final against Gajraj. To my mind the contentions of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners in this regard are totally devoid of merits. 5. To my mind the contentions of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners in this regard are totally devoid of merits. 5. As regards the second contention it is noteworthy that a DivisionBench of Bombay High Court in the ruling mentioned supra has observed as below: ...A party is not bound by an admission in his pleading except for the purposes of the suit in which the pleading is delivered. It frequently happens that a party is prepared in a particular suit to deal with the case on a particular ground and to make an admission, but that admission is not binding in any other suit and certainly not for all time. 6. Relying upon the above observations the learned Counsel for the Petitioners has contended that the consolidation authorities have patently erred in placing reliance upon the admission of the Petitioners' predecessor-in interest in the earlier litigation. 7. To my mind this contention has also no force in view of the ruling Basant Singh Vs. Janki Singh and Others, AIR 1967 SC 341 . An admission by a party in plaint signed and verified by him may be used as evidence against him in other suits, hence there is no patent error in the impugned judgment on this score. In Bishwanath Prasad and Others Vs. Dwarka Prasad and Others, AIR 1974 SC 117 the admission contained in the earlier written statement was accepted by their lordships of the Supreme Court while deciding the case. 8. In view of the aforesaid circumstances the second contention raised on behalf of the Petitioners also fails. 9. As regards the third contention it is sufficient to indicate that the admission relied upon by the consolidation authorities in the instant case is not only the admission of Gajraj but also the admission of Natthu, who was predecessor-in-interest of the Petitioners. This contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners in the circumstances of the present case is misconceived as the admission relied upon by the consolidation authorities was not self-serving. It is evident that the contesting opposite party Gajraj relied upon his claim upon the admission of Natthu, who was husband of the transferee of the Petitioners. Therefore, the third contention raised on behalf of the Petitioners fails. 10. In the result, all the contentions raised on behalf of the Petitioner fail, and the writ petition is dismissed in limine.