JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - A suit for specific performance of an agreement dated 31-7-73 has been decreed by the trial court but instead of granting relief for specific performance, it has only granted relief for refund of Rs. 10,000/- paid as advance to the defendant. The defendant being aggrieved was come up in appeal The plaintiffs on the other hand have filed cross-objection and have prayed that the entire suit ought to have been decreed by the court below. 2. The defendant was the owner of plots Nos. 1682 (area 5-7-12) and 1683 (area 0-17-0), the total area being 6-4-12. A registered agreement was executed between the defendant and the plaintiffs on 31st July, 73 under which a sum of Rs. 10,000/- was advanced to the defendant and it was agreed that the defendant will execute the sale deed in respect of his aforesaid two plots in favour of the plaintiffs for a consideration of Rs. 20,000/- . The period for executing the sale deed was agreed to be up to 31st Dec. 73. On 7-12-73, the plaintiffs served a notice on the defendant to execute the sale deed which was replied to on 19-12-73 completely repudiating the execution of the agreement. As a consequence, the plaintiffs filed the suit on 3rd Jan, 1974. 3. In the written statement submitted by the defendant he denied having executed the agreement and asserted that his property was worth Rs. 60,000/- and there was no occasion for him to sell it for a paltry sum of Rs. 20,000/- he denied having received Rs. 10,000/- as an advance and asserted that he did not have any dealings with the plaintiffs. On the other hand, he had dealings with the plaintiffs father Chokhey Lal from whom he had taken Rs. 200/- once and again in July, 73 another loan of Rs. 200/- was taken. At that time Chokhey Lal had insisted that he must be given some kind of security in writing for the laon advanced and in that connection, the parties had gone to Khurja where the document was executed. It is alleged that the scribe was in collusion with the plaintiffs father and the agreement in dispute had been manipulated by fraud and mis-representation by them. 4. On these pleadings, the trial court framed as many as 7 issues which are quoted below :- 1. It is alleged that the scribe was in collusion with the plaintiffs father and the agreement in dispute had been manipulated by fraud and mis-representation by them. 4. On these pleadings, the trial court framed as many as 7 issues which are quoted below :- 1. Whether the defendant had agreed to sell the plots Nos. 1682 area 4-7-12 and 1673 area 0-17-0 to the plaintiff on 31-7-73 for Rs. 20.000/- ? 2. Whether the defendant had received a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as the earnest money from the plaintiff on 31-7-73? 3. Whether the defendant had executed an agreement of sale dated 31-7-73 in favour of the plaintiff? 4. Whether the impugned agreement of sale is invalid and unenforceable? 5. Whether the father of the plaintiff had managed to obtain impugned document on contract of sale dated 31-7-73 by fraud upon the defendant? 6. Whether the properties in dispute are valued above Rs. 60,000/- and the disputed transaction is injurious to the defendant? 7. Relief? 5. Dealing with issues Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 together the court came to the conclusion that the defendant had executed the agreement in question and had also received Rs. 10.000/- at the time of executing the same. Further finding was that the document dated 31-7-73 had not been obtained by practising any fraud on the defendant. On issue No. 6 the court recorded a finding that the property was not worth Rs. 60,000/- as claimed by the defendant. While dealing with issue No.4 the court came to the conclusion that in view of the provisions contained under S. 157-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the property of a scheduled caste/scheduled tribe person cannot be transferred and, therefore a decree for specific performance could not be granted to the plaintiff. In view of this it refused to exercise its discretion in awarding the decree for specific performance in plaintiffs favour. Finally dealing with issue No. 7 the court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to the refund of advance of money paid by them. Consequently the suit of the plaintiffs was decreed only for refund of Rs. 10,000/- with proportionate costs. No interest on this amount was also awarded. 6. Shri Haider Hussain, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has urged that in the present case the payment of Rs. Consequently the suit of the plaintiffs was decreed only for refund of Rs. 10,000/- with proportionate costs. No interest on this amount was also awarded. 6. Shri Haider Hussain, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has urged that in the present case the payment of Rs. 10,000/- as advance to the defendant-appellant has not been proved. According to him, only Rs. 200/- had been taken as loan earlier and it was during second loan of Rs. 200/- that the document in dispute was executed. He, therefore, submitted that no decree for Rs. 10,000/- could be passed, against the defendant-appellant. The evidence to the contrary, however, is much more weightier. The plaintiffs had filed two original pronotes executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiffs father Chokhey Lal. Although the defendant had denied having executed them, the plaintiffs got the same examined by fingerprint expert and his report is Ex. 7 on the record. The expert was examined as P. W. 1 and there was nothing in his statement which may go to discredit his opinion. However, what the learned counsel for the appellant urged is that no witness or scribe of the pronote was examined and even plaintiffs father did not appear in the witness box. In these circumstances from the expert report only this much can be said to have been proved that these pronotes bear thumb impressions the defendant but these documents, standing by themselves, cannot prove that the loan as indicated therein had been advanced to the defendant or that the defendant had in fact received the money mentioned therein. It is true that the opinion of the expert only shows that the thumb impressions on the two pronotes, Exs. 32 and 33 dated 3-10-68 and 26-8-63 were of the defendant. There is however no direct evidence to show that these two documents had been executed after they have been scribed and that at the time of their execution the sum mentioned therein was paid. However, Ex. 36 a registered agreement dated 31-7-73, is on the record and this had not been proved to have been executed by the defendant. This document mentions that the parties had agreed regarding sale of defendant's land for Rs. 20,000/- against which Rs. 10,000/- had been received by the defendant as per details given at the foot of the document. 36 a registered agreement dated 31-7-73, is on the record and this had not been proved to have been executed by the defendant. This document mentions that the parties had agreed regarding sale of defendant's land for Rs. 20,000/- against which Rs. 10,000/- had been received by the defendant as per details given at the foot of the document. While recording the details of the payment it is mentioned that Rs. 10,000/- have been received by payment of money due under two pronotes for Rs. 2,000/- and Rs. 2,400/- respectively against which a sum of Rs. 9,562/- was due and which had been left with the purchasers to be paid over to Chokhey Lalin adjustment of the money due under the pronotes. The balance amount of Rs. 438/- only was agreed to be paid to the vendee at the time of the registration. This agreement was registered and a sum of Rs. 438/- appears to have been paid before the registrar as is apparent from the endorsement made by him in accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act. 7. The question, therefore, arises whether in spite of the fact that the pronotes may not have been proved a mention of the receipt of this money by the defendant in the manner described in the agreement would be sufficient proof of the fact that Rs. 10,000/- had been paid to the defendant or not? Sri S.N. Misra learned counsel for the respondent referred to me a case Sri Kapaleeswarar Temple v. Tirunavukarasu, AIR 1975 Mad 164 . That case, however, is of no help. In that case a debt had become time barred and the debtor entered into a fresh obligation in favour of the creditor to pay the amount. It was held that it amounted to a fresh contract and could be made the basis of action for recovering the promised amount. That, however, is not the position here. Certain amount is alleged to be due from the defendant and under an agreement executed between the plaintiff and the defendant it is alleged that this liability has been paid off. The document records adjustment of the payment which was liable to be made under the deed itself. Since the deed is signed by the defendant wherein he acknowledges having received a sum of Rs. The document records adjustment of the payment which was liable to be made under the deed itself. Since the deed is signed by the defendant wherein he acknowledges having received a sum of Rs. 9,562/- by adjustment of the pronote it would not be necessary for the plaintiffs to further prove that such a loan did exist. It would suffice if such payment is made and there is proof of that fact. Two pronotes have been discharged and the originals have been filed on record over which there is an endorsement by Chokhey Lal regarding receipt of money due there under these discharged pronotes have been filed by the plaintiffs. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that after the pronotes had been paid off in normal circumstances they should have come from the custody of the defendant. He further asserted that payment had not been made by the defendant. If the defendant had made the payment, the pronotes would certainly have gone to his custody. In this case the payment has been made by the plaintiffs and this was on the basis of undertaking given by them in the deed Ex. 36 itself. In these circumstances, it was necessary that the pronotes duly discharged by Chokhey Lal should remain in the custody of the plaintiffs until such time as the defendant gives a clear chit regarding receipt Rs. 10,000/- to the plaintiffs. If what the learned counsel for the appellant urges was correct, then in the situation like the present one the plaintiffs would have been unable to give any proof of the fact that they had, in fact, discharged the defendant's obligation under the pronotes by paying money to Chokhey Lal. The argument is without any substance and must be rejected. From the evidence, therefore, it is obvious that a sum of Rs. 10,000/- had been paid in the manner as indicated in Ex. 36. 9. The only other question that remains to be decided is whether the plaintiffs were entitled to the decree for specific performance of the agreement. The court below has refused to exercises its discretion in their favour merely because of the provisions contained in 5.157-A of U.P. Z. A & L. R. Act. 36. 9. The only other question that remains to be decided is whether the plaintiffs were entitled to the decree for specific performance of the agreement. The court below has refused to exercises its discretion in their favour merely because of the provisions contained in 5.157-A of U.P. Z. A & L. R. Act. The contentions of Sri Misra for the respondent is that on that date of the suit that provision did not include persons of scheduled caste within its ambit and the provision had been made applicable to members of scheduled castes also by means of U.P. Act 34 of 1974 which came subsequent to the filing of suit. The bar contained in S. 157-A was initially only against the right of transfer by a member of scheduled tribe in favour of a person not belonging to scheduled tribe. This provision was introduced by S. 9 of U.P. Act No. 4 of 1969 which was preceded by U.P. Ordinance III of 1969 and was first enforced with effect from 6th June, 1969. The agreement in suit was executed on 31-7-73. On that date the provisions of S. 157-A were in the following terms : "157-A. Restriction on transfer of land by members of scheduled castes :-(1) Without prejudice to the restrictions contained in Sections 153 to 157 no Bhumidhar, sirdar or Asami belonging to a scheduled tribe shall have the right to transfer by way of sale, gift, mortgage or lease any land to a person not belonging to. a scheduled tribe except with the previous approval of the Collector. (2) On an application being given in that behalf in the prescribed manner, the Collector shall make such enquiries as may be prescribed.[Para Explanation : In this Chapter, the expression scheduled tribes means the scheduled tribes specified in relation to Uttar Pradesh under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution." 10. This provision was, however, amended in 1974 by U.P. Act No. 34 of 1974 which came into force on 7th Dec, 1974. By this amendment, for the words `scheduled tribe' the expression `scheduled caste or scheduled tribe' was introduced. This provision was, however, amended in 1974 by U.P. Act No. 34 of 1974 which came into force on 7th Dec, 1974. By this amendment, for the words `scheduled tribe' the expression `scheduled caste or scheduled tribe' was introduced. Also a proviso was added after sub-clause (1) in the following language : "Provided that a bhumidhar with transferable rights or asami belonging to a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe may, without such approval transfer by way of mortgage without possession, his interest in any holding as security for a loan taken by way of financial assistance for agricultural purposes as defined in the Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Credit Act, 1973 from the State Government by way of Taqavi or from a co-operative land development bank, or from the State Bank of India or from any other bank which is a scheduled Bank within the meaning of clause (e) of See.2 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 or from the U.P. State Agro-Industrial Corporation Limited." From the above it will be noted that in 1969 when this provision was introduced there was no restriction on the right of a member of scheduled caste against the transfer of his property by way of sale etc. These restrictions were placed for the first time his 1974. On the date of the agreement i. e., 31st July, 73 or on the date of suit i. e. 3-1-74 the restriction did not exist at all. 11. Apart from this these provisions clearly indicate that there is no absolute bar on the right to transfer as such. A transfer could be made by a member of scheduled caste or scheduled tribe with the permission of the Collector. Transfer could also be made by them voluntarily and without the permission of the Collector if the vendee was also a member of the scheduled castes or scheduled tribe. The total effect of the restriction contained in this section is that and the members of the scheduled caste and scheduled tribes could still transfer their property in favour of another member of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes without even seeking Collector's permission before doing so. They could also make not transfer even in favour of persons belonging to a scheduled castes or scheduled tribes but in that case prior permission of the Collector would be essential. They could also make not transfer even in favour of persons belonging to a scheduled castes or scheduled tribes but in that case prior permission of the Collector would be essential. These provisions, there for indicate that these are restrictions on voluntary transfers by a member of the scheduled caste and scheduled tribe. To illustrate my point, take the example of a member of the scheduled caste or scheduled tribe whose property was under mortgage from before 1969 and the same had been tribe to auction in realisation of the amount due under the mortgage decree, will the restrictions under S. 157-A still apply ? There also it may be necessary that the property may be auctioned by the court and may be purchased by a person who may who may or not belong to a scheduled caste scheduled tribe but as auction purchaser the court would be bound to execute the sale deed in his favour on behalf of the mortgagor and from the consideration realised by auction sale the dues of the mortgagees will have to be satisfied. This kind of restriction though, applicable to all cases of voluntary transfers by a member of a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe may not be applicable with equal force in cases where the transfers is not voluntary. Whether transfer made in pursuance of the decree for specific performance would fall in the category in voluntary transfer is yet to be seen. 12. The language of 5.157-A is significant. According to it, the only right to transfer by way of sale etc. has been taken away from the members of the scheduled caste and scheduled tribe. The language implies that these rights of transfer have been restricted and there appears to be valid object behind this provision under the various reforms brought about during the last decade or more, an effort was being made to provide some land to the weaker sections of the society particularly to the members of the scheduled castes or scheduled tribes. It was noticed by the Government that in many cases whenever the land or other benefits were provided to such members the property did not last long in their hands and they fell easy prey to the machinations of large land-holders. It was noticed by the Government that in many cases whenever the land or other benefits were provided to such members the property did not last long in their hands and they fell easy prey to the machinations of large land-holders. Most of the surplus land given to these people had been acquired under the Ceiling Act from these large land-holders themselves, and they had not even able to reconcile themselves to such a situation. In order, therefore, to safeguard the interest of the member of the scheduled caste and scheduled tribe, who are generally illiterate and belonged to the weaker section of the society, it was thought necessary that they should not be allowed to part with their land. Restrictions imposed under S. 157-A contemplate that the Collector will examine the genuineness or suitability of the transaction and also ensure that the members of the Scheduled caste or Scheduled tribe genuinely wanted to transfer his land without there being any foul play against him. It is only a safety valve which has been provided. If this was the object the same safeguard could be adequately provided by the Civil Courts if the property of the member of the scheduled caste or scheduled tribe were to be sold in the realisation of the money due under a decree or a mortgage or, for that matter, even in a suit for specific performance. In a suit for specific performance the court exercises vast discretion in the matter of granting relief and broadly speaking the court uses its equitable jurisdiction in such matters. In my opinion, therefore, the kind of restriction put under S. 157-A of the Act does not take away the right of the court to transfer the property belonging to a member of the scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. Some other safeguards against the sale of property of such members of weaker section of the society have also been imposed under the Money Lending Act and some other similar provisions. However the nature of restriction in those enactments is of absolute nature but that is not the situation in this Act. 13. The restriction on transfer had also been imposed under S. 27 of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. S. 27 thereof reads : "27. However the nature of restriction in those enactments is of absolute nature but that is not the situation in this Act. 13. The restriction on transfer had also been imposed under S. 27 of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. S. 27 thereof reads : "27. Prohibition on transfer of urban property : (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force but subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of S. 5 and sub-sec. (4) of S. 10, no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease for a period exceeding ten years .......... except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority." Here also the section did not put a complete bar against transfer of property and with previous permission of the competent authority a transfer could still be made. The object of making this provision was to prevent persons owning urban land in excess of the ceiling limit from violating the provisions of the Act. In a case arising under that Act in Samuel Thyagaraja Kumar v. K. Sitarama Achar, AIR 1977 Kant 158, the Division Bench of that court held that there is a difference between transfer by operation of law and a transfer by act of parties. The purchaser at court's sale acquires title by operation of law and at such sales title is transferred without a registered deed. The court merely issues sale certificate. The court finally held that S. 27 of the Act had no application to execution sales and its scope was limited to voluntary transfers. 14. Counsel for the respondent referred to the case of Ram Saran v. 1st Addl. District Judge, Rampur, 1981 Rev Dec 252 : 1981 All LJ 794 where Justice S. D. Agarwala of this Court was dealing with the applicability of S. 157-A of U.P. Z. A. & L. R. Act. In that case, the plaintiff had earned a decree for money and in execution thereof some land of the judgment-debtor had been attached. An objection under S. 47 C. P. C. was filed by the judgment-debtor assailing that he belonged to a scheduled caste and therefore in view of S. 157-A of U.P. Z. A. & L. R. Act his land could not be sold for satisfying the decree. An objection under S. 47 C. P. C. was filed by the judgment-debtor assailing that he belonged to a scheduled caste and therefore in view of S. 157-A of U.P. Z. A. & L. R. Act his land could not be sold for satisfying the decree. The objection was dismissed by the executing court and revision also was dismissed by the 1st Addl. District Judge. In the writ petition filed by the defendant-judgment-debtor it was held that the bar is only against voluntary transfer by a member of scheduled caste and does not apply to transfer in pursuance of attachment and auction sale in execution of a decree. 15. In 1981 Rev Dec itself there is another decision reported at page 29 : (1981 UPLT NOC 42) which was rendered by me while interpreting the provisions of S. 157-A. In that cake a decree for specific performance of a contract had been passed against the original owner and his subsequent transferor. In execution objection was taken regarding the bar created by S. 157-A. It was held that only the original owner was a member of scheduled caste but he had already transferred the property to the other defendants before introductions of S. 157-A in the Act. Since at the relevant time he was not even the owner, the decree of specific performance had to be satisfied by execution of sale deed by the subsequent transferrers (who were not members of either a scheduled caste or tribe). It was also held that the objector had merely to sign the deed, though, in fact, he would transfer nothing. 16. In that very decision it is mentioned at one place, relying upon AIR 1938 All 432 (Hakim Inayatullah v. Khalilullah), that a decree for specific performance by itself does not cause transfer of the property but it merely declare the rights of the party. When in pursuance of such a decree question of transferring the property arises then would come the stage when the question of bar created by S. 157-A has to be considered. 17. In view of the above decisions, I am of the view that it is premature to consider this question in this case. At this stage court should only consider whether it was a proper case in which the court should order specific performance or should refuse to do so. 17. In view of the above decisions, I am of the view that it is premature to consider this question in this case. At this stage court should only consider whether it was a proper case in which the court should order specific performance or should refuse to do so. If decree for specific performance of the contract is granted then the execution court will have to decide whether the bar of S. 157-A applied or not. In my opinion, therefore, the trial court erred in holding that because of the restrictions placed under Section 157-A of the Act, the court was debarred from granting a decree for specific performance in favour of the plaintiff. 18. However, coming back to the facts of the case, it does appear that a very heavy rate of interest was charged by the plaintiff, father on the loan advanced to the appellant on the basis of the two pronotes. A mere sum of Rs. 4,400/- within a short span of four years swelled to a little more than Rs. 9,500/- . This money he had to pay by agreeing to transfer his property. To my mind enough advantage had already been taken and though the agreement has been executed in favour of the plaintiffs yet from the evidence on record it is quite apparent that the brain behind the whole scheme is Chokhey Lal, father of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have admitted that they know nothing about the suit and it was their father who was conducting the whole show from behind the scene, there is, therefore, clearly a close knit collusion between father and the sons who all want to deprive the defendant-appellant of his property. I do not think it will be proper and fair exercise of discretion in these circumstances to order specific performance of the agreement dated 31-7-73. Although the trial court has refused to do them on the ground with which I have disagreed earlier but on a consideration of other material by me as above I feel that, in the ultimate analysis the discretion should not be exercised in favour of the plaintiffs for granting specific performance of the agreement for the sale of property. The ends of justice will be met if the money advanced is paid back to the plaintiffs as directed under the decree of the court below. 19. The ends of justice will be met if the money advanced is paid back to the plaintiffs as directed under the decree of the court below. 19. It was urged that the court below did not even award interest on the sum of Rs. 10,000/- for which plaintiffs suit had been decreed. However the grounds of cross-objection do not mention anything about this and all the grounds are confined to S. 157-A of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. This plea therefore cannot be allowed to be raised now. 20. In the circumstances I find no force either in the appeal or in the cross-objection and both of them are accordingly dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout.