JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, C.J. 1. Finding a difference of opinion between Single Judge decisions on the status of notification or declaration of vacancy under Section 12 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, a learned Single Judge has referred this group of writ petitions for decision to a Division Bench. 2. Some of the writ petitions have been filed directly against notification of vacancy ; while one other has been instituted after an order of allotment or release had been passed. One question is if a revision under Section 18 of the Act or even a writ petition to this Court lies or is maintainable against the notification of vacancy. The other and more important problem is whether in a revision under Section 18 of the Act or in a writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, the finding on the existence of vacancy can be reconsidered on its merits on facts, on the ground that it is a finding on a jurisdictional fact. Chapter III of the Rent Control Act, 1972 deals with 'regulation of letting'. It consists of Sections 11 to 19. Section 11 provides that no person shall let out any building except in pursuance of an allotment order issued under Section 16. Section 16 authorises the District Magistrate to make an order of allotment in respect of a building which is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant. He can also release such a building to the landlord. Section 12 lays down various situations in which the landlord or the tenant is deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. Under sub-section (4) of Section 12, in such cases the building shall, for the purposes of that Chapter, be deemed to be vacant. 3. Rule 8 of the Rules framed under that Act provides the procedure for ascertainment of vacancy. It says that the District Magistrate shall, before making any order of allotment or release in respect of any building which is alleged to be vacant under Section 12 or to be otherwise vacant or to be likely to fall vacant, get it inspected. The inspection shall so far as possible, be done in the presence of the landlord and of the tenant or other occupant. The inspection shall so far as possible, be done in the presence of the landlord and of the tenant or other occupant. The substance of the report is to be placed on the notice board of the office of the District Magistrate for inviting objections, if any. Any objection received is decided after considering the evidence that the objector or any other person may adduce. On the expiry of three days from the date of posting of the report or after the disposal of the objections, if any received, the District Magistrate is to consider the case and pass an order of allotment or release or otherwise as the case be. 4. The proviso to Section 16 (1) (which was added by U. P. Amendment Act No. 28 of 1976) states that in the case of a vacancy referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 12, the District Magistrate shall give an opportunity to the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, of showing that the said section is not attracted to his case before making an order of allotment under clause (a). It is at the stage of considering the applications for allotment that the landlord or the tenant is required to be given an opportunity of hearing to show, inter alia, that no vacancy had, in fact or in law, existed within meaning of Section 12 (4). Sub-section (5) (a) of Section 16 provides another opportunity to the landlord or any other person claiming to be a lawful occupant of the building to apply to the District Magistrate for review of the order of allotment or release. If the District Magistrate is satisfied that the order of allotment or release was not passed properly he can revoke the order and put back the evicted person in possession. Sub-section (7) of Section 16 provides that every order under this section shall, subject to any order made under Section 18, be final. 5. The noteworthy thing is that Section 16 provides that the District Magistrate shall pass the orders mentioned in it. Sub-section (7) makes such an order final subject to Section 18. Section 18 previously gave a right of appeal, but after the 1976 Act it provided a revision to the District Judge. 6. 5. The noteworthy thing is that Section 16 provides that the District Magistrate shall pass the orders mentioned in it. Sub-section (7) makes such an order final subject to Section 18. Section 18 previously gave a right of appeal, but after the 1976 Act it provided a revision to the District Judge. 6. The question whether an order deciding the objections under Rule 8 or notifying vacancy can directly be subjected to a writ petition, came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Trilok Singh and Co. v. District Magistrate, Lucknow, 1976 AWC 610 (SC). It was held that the notification of vacancy by itself does no injury and causes no prejudice to the interest of any party. The Court observed :- "A notification of the vacancy is a step-in-aid of an order of allotment or release and it is only when such an order of allotment or release is passed that the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, can have a grievance. Orders of allotment and release are, in the first instance, reviewable by the District Magistrate himself and an order passed by the District Magistrate under Section 16 is appealable under Section 18." The Court held that a writ petition against the declaration or notification of vacancy simpliciter was premature. The proper stage for challenging the notification of vacancy will be after an order of allotment or release has been passed. It was submitted that in Trilok Singh's case (supra) the Supreme Court considered the provisions of the Rent Control Act as they stood prior to their amendment by the Amending Act No. 28 of 1976. That decision is hence no longer applicable. We are not impressed by this submission. The Amending Act of 1976 added a proviso to Section 16 (1) of the Act. It stated : "Provided that in the case of a vacancy referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 12, the District Magistrate shall give an opportunity to the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, of showing that the said section is not attracted to his case before making an order under clause (a)." 7. Under this proviso, the District Magistrate has to afford an opportunity while considering the question of making an order of allotment or release. Under this proviso, the District Magistrate has to afford an opportunity while considering the question of making an order of allotment or release. It is true that in paragraph 8 of Trilok Singh's case (supra) the Supreme Court observed :- "The Act does not provide for a hearing at the stage when the District Magistrate passes an order of allotment or release." 8. TO that extent the law is changed. Now the Act provides for such a hearing; but that, in our opinion, makes no difference because this hearing is at the stage of passing the order of allotment and not at the stage of notification of vacancy contemplated by Section 12. The status or the effect of the notification of vacancy under Section 12 remains as it was, namely, it does no injury and causes no prejudice to the interest of any party. In our opinion, Trilok Singh's case is equally applicable after the 1976 amendment of the Rent Control Act and a writ petition directed against the notification or declaration of vacancy simpliciter is premature. Writ Petition No. 2836 of 1981 (Mohd. Islam v. District Judge and another) is directed against the District Judge's order passed in a revision under Section 18 of the Rent Control Act, 1972. 9. IN this case learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the finding on the question of existence of vacancy is a finding on a jurisdictional fact and is liable to be reconsidered in revision or in a writ petition on its merits by reappraisal of the evidence relating to it. 10. WHAT is a jurisdictional fact. In Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1621 S. K. Das, J. observed (Paragraph 15) :- "The jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal may depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon the existence of some particular fact. Such a fact is collateral to the actual matter which the tribunal has to try and the determination whether it exists or not is logically prior to the determination of the actual question which the tribunal has to try." Similarly in Raman and Raman Ltd. v. State of Madras, AIR 1956 SC 463 , the Supreme Court observed :- "There may be cases where the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal may depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon the existence of some particular fact. Such a fact is collateral to the actual matter which the inferior tribunal has to try, and the determination of whether it exists or not is logically and in sequence prior to the determination of the actual question which the inferior tribunal has to try." The Court then observed :- "In such a case, in certiorari proceedings a court can enquire into the correctness of the decision of the inferior tribunal as to the collateral fact and may reverse that decision if it appears to it, on the material before it to be erroneous." 11. It is thus clear that jurisdictional fact is a fact which is collateral to the actual matter which a tribunal or authority is empowered to decide or determine. A question or matter which is an integral part of the issue which the tribunal has been authorised to decide is not a collateral or a jurisdictional fact. In Raman and Raman's case (supra), it was argued that Section 64-A which conferred upon the State Government revisional power in law provided that the State Government will at first decide, the collateral fact, namely whether the order passed by any authority or officer subordinate to the State Government was in fact, illegal, irregular or improper and then alone the State Government can revise the order. The Supreme Court rejected the submission. It held that- "In order to satisfy itself whether the order of an authority subordinate to it was legal, regular or proper, the State Government was not deciding the existence of a collateral fact but the issue itself as to the legality, regularily or propriety of the order. The satisfaction of the State Government in this respect would be an expression of its opinion and not the determination of a fact upon which depended its jurisdiction to exercise its powers under Section 64-A." 12. The U. P. Rent Control Act of 1947 authorised the District Magistrate to fix the rent of accommodations constructed prior to the mentioned date. The Supreme Court in Chaube Jagdish Prasad v. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi, AIR 1959 SC 492 = 1959 AWR 287 SC held that the question whether a building was newly constructed was a collateral or jurisdictional question the finding whereon was revisable. Under Section 7-A of the Delhi, Ajmer and Merwar Rent Control Act, the Rent Controller could fix standard rent for newely constructed buildings. Under Section 7-A of the Delhi, Ajmer and Merwar Rent Control Act, the Rent Controller could fix standard rent for newely constructed buildings. The Supreme Court held that the question if the construction was new was a jurisdictional question. If the Rent Controller decided the fact wrongfully and assumed jurisdiction where he had none the matter would be open to reconsideration. 13. The jurisdiction of an industrial tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act was dependent upon the term 'industrial dispute' as defined under the Act. The Supreme Court in Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal U. P., AIR 1957 SC 532 held that the finding whether a dispute is an industrial dispute within meaning of the Act so that the Act was applicable to it relates to a condition precedent and so it was a jurisdictional fact. 14. In all these cases the preliminary question was if the Act is at all applicable so that its other provisions authorising enquiry by its tribunal may apply. Determination of such a point arises at the threshold and has nothing to do with the subject-matter of enquiry entrusted by the provisions of the Act. The question whether the determination of such a preliminary or jurisdictional fact has also been finally entrusted to the authority created by the Act is another question which does not arise here and so we do not deal with or elaborate on it. It is evident that the decision of the issue or matter which a tribunal is authorised to decide or determine is not a decision on a collateral or jurisdictional fact. Under the Rent Control Act of 1972 the District Magistrate has been authorised to pass an order of allotment or release, vide Section 16 of the Act. As an integral part of that proceeding, the District Magistrate has to decide whether an accommodation is vacant. The Supreme Court has pointed out that the notification or determination of vacancy is a step-in-aid to the passing of an order of allotment or release. It is thus an integral part of the proceedings for allotment or release. It is one facet of the issue which the District Magistrate has been authorised to decide, namely, allotment or release of an accommodation. A decision 6n the question whether a building or accommodation is vacant or otherwise is not a decision on a collateral or jurisdictional fact. It is thus an integral part of the proceedings for allotment or release. It is one facet of the issue which the District Magistrate has been authorised to decide, namely, allotment or release of an accommodation. A decision 6n the question whether a building or accommodation is vacant or otherwise is not a decision on a collateral or jurisdictional fact. Hence the legal position that a finding on a jurisdictional fact is amendable to reconsideration on certiorari or revision on its merits cannot be utilized. The finding on the various aspects of the question will be open to reconsideration by a higher court authorised to reconsider them on grounds mentioned in the provisions of the Act. 15. Previously Section 18 provided for an appeal to the District Judge. The appeal lay on facts. All aspects of the order of allotment or release could be gone into by the District Judge in appeal. But after the 1976 amendment the right of appeal has been repealed and, in its place, provision for a revision has been made. The revision lies on what may in short be called jurisdictional errors only. The finding of the District Magistrate including the finding on the question of vacancy would be liable to be adjudged by the District Judge in a revision only on the grounds mentioned in Section 18. It cannot be interfered with either in a revision under Section 18 or in a writ petition in this court as if the revision or the writ petition could be treated like a first appeal wherein it is permissible to reappraise the evidence and reconsider the findings of fact on their merits. We agree with the decision in Chatarsen v. District Judge, 1979 U. P. RCC 379 while, in our opinion, the decisions in Beant Singh v. Vth Additional District Judge, 1979 U. P. RCC 530 = 1979 AWC (SOC) page 76 and Rajendra Kumar v. District Judge, 1979 AWC 594 do not lay down the correct law. 16. In the result, writ petitions nos. 9120 of 1980, 1737 of 1982, 1058 of 1982 and 14310 of 1981 are dismissed on the ground that they are premature. We however, make no order as to costs. Let the papers of writ petition no. 2836 of 1981 Mohammad Islam v. District Judge and another, be returned to the learned Single Judge for decision, with this opinion. Petitions dismissed.