JUDGMENT : B.N. Misra, J. - The Petitioner joined Government service as a constable in November, 1955. In October, 1956 he took training in Wireless and thereafter joined the establishment of O.P. 4, Superintendent of Police (Signals), Cuttack as A.S.I. (Operator). On 1-6-1967, a departmental proceeding was initiated against the Petitioner on the allegation that he had used the official wireless channel for private purposes. O.P. 5, the then S.P. (Signals) and the disciplinary authority of the Petitioner, conducted the enquiry himself. The charge against the Petitioner was that he was alleged to have used W.T. Chennel on 9-12-1966 between 1244 to 1258 and 1426 to 1455 hours to pass personal information regarding syndicate loan of A.S.I. W.T.L.D. Shaw as recorded in the logs of Bhubaneswar W.T. station. As per annexure-2, the Petitioner had represented to the higher authorities that the enquiry should be conducted by some other officer and not O.P. 5. The said representation was rejected by order dated 28-11-1967, annexurc-3. The enquiry was conducted and concluded by O.P. 5 and by order dated 12-10-1968 the Petitioner was dismissed from service. The appellate authority, O.P. 3 modified the order of dismissal to that of removal from service. The Petitioner filed O.J.C. No. 1051 of 1969 in this Court challenging the order of his removal and by order dated 12-5-1972 See Lingaraj Jena v. State of Orissa and Anr. 1972 (1) C.W.R. 998, the writ petition was allowed, the disciplinary proceeding was quashed and the order of removal was set aside. It was, however, left to the discretion of the disciplinary authority to continue the proceeding against the Petitioner if it thought fit to do so. This Court indicated the following four matters in respect of which the disciplinary authority had failed to follow the princlples of natural justice: (1) Non-supply of previous statements of P.Ws. 2 and 3. (ii) Prohibiting questions put by the Petitioner in cross-examination to P.Ws. 2 and 3 as to the contents of their ear her statements for contradicting the same with their present statements. (iii) Refusal of permission to the Petitioner to examine D.Ws. to establish that the sender of a Wireless message in MORSE system cannot be identified at the receiving end. (iv) Rejection of the prayer for production of relevant registers of outlying stations which would have ordinarily recorded the alleged unauthorised messages. (iii) Refusal of permission to the Petitioner to examine D.Ws. to establish that the sender of a Wireless message in MORSE system cannot be identified at the receiving end. (iv) Rejection of the prayer for production of relevant registers of outlying stations which would have ordinarily recorded the alleged unauthorised messages. Thereafter the Petitioner was reinstated in service and he joined his former post on 13-7-1972. At that time the post of S.P. (Signals) had been abolished and O.P. 5 who had been promoted as D.I.G. (Technical) continued to be the disciplinary authority in respect of the Petitioner. Proceedings were re-commenced against the Petitioner by O.P. 5, vide annexure-7 forwarded to the Petitioner on 27-9-1972 with copies of preliminary statements of P.Ws. 2 and 3. The Petitioner represented to the Inspector General of Police, O.P. 2, to entrust the departmental enquiry to some other officer, but this representation was rejected and the enquiry continued. The documents called for by the Petitioner were produced except the records of the wireless stations at Bonai and Rajgangpur. The Petitioner was allowed to engage a lawyer on his behalf. Five P.Ws. were examined in the proceeding. However on 16-2-1974 O.P. 5 refused permission to the Petitioner's counsel to further appear in the enquiry. The Petitioner again made a representation to O.P. 2 and the enquiry was entrusted to Shri G.N. Das who had by then appointed as S.P. (Signals), Cuttack, vide Annexure 18 dated 1-6-1974. The Petitioner examined four witnesses on his behalf and also submitted a written statement of defence. The enquiry report was submitted by O.P. 4. S.P. (Signals) on 21-4-1975 (annexure-20) with the finding that the charge against the Petitioner had been established. A second show cause notice was issued to the Petitioner who submitted his explanation. Finally on 28-8-1975 the Petitioner was awarded the punishment of two black marks, vide annexure-24. The Petitioner filed an appeal against the aforesaid order of O.P. 4 to the Inspector General, O.P. 2. However, this appeal petition was sent to O.P. 5 who was then working as D.I.G. (Technical) for disposal and by order dated 3-5-1977 O.P. 5 rejected the appeal, vide annexure-3D. The Petitioner filed an appeal against the aforesaid order of O.P. 4 to the Inspector General, O.P. 2. However, this appeal petition was sent to O.P. 5 who was then working as D.I.G. (Technical) for disposal and by order dated 3-5-1977 O.P. 5 rejected the appeal, vide annexure-3D. The Petitioner has filed the present application for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of punishment imposed under annexure-24, the order placing him under suspension, vide annexures-10 and 10-A and the order of recovery of subsistence; allowance from his pay. 2. In their counter opposite parties 1 to 4 have denied the allegations of mala fide and bias pleaded by the Petitioner against O.Ps. 4 and 5. It is stated that the proceedings against the Petitioner including the enquiry were conducted in accordance with law and as such the orders passed against the Petitioner were proper and justified. The allegation of the Petitioner that he had been denied the opportunity of property conducting his defence has been firmly denied. 3. As already stated after disposal of O.J.C. No. 1051 of 1969 by this Court, the departmental enquiry against the Petitioner was re-commenced and continued for some time by O.P. 5 who had by then been promoted as D.I.G. (Technical) and thereafter it was continued and concluded by O.P. 4, S.P. (Signals), an officer directly subordinate to the D.I.G. (Technical). Mr. Rath, learned Counsel for the Petitioner has urged that the entire departmental proceedings against the Petitioner have been vitiated on account of bias, mala-fide and denial of adequate opportunity to the Petitioner to conduct his case. In this context it would be useful to refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in S. Parthasarthi Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, . The question then is whether a real likelihood of bias existed is to be determined on the probabilities to be inferred from the circumstances by court objectively, or, upon the basis of the impressions that might reasonably be left on the minds of the party aggrieved or the public at large. The tests of "real likelihood" and "reasonable suspicion" are really inconsistent with each other. We think that the reviewing authority must make a determination on the basis of the whole evidence before it, whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances infer that, there is real likelihood of bias. The tests of "real likelihood" and "reasonable suspicion" are really inconsistent with each other. We think that the reviewing authority must make a determination on the basis of the whole evidence before it, whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances infer that, there is real likelihood of bias. The court must look at the impression which other people have. This follows from the principle that justice must not only be done but seem to be done. If right minded persons would think that there is real likelihood of bias on the part of an inquiring officer, he must not conduct the enquiry; nevertheless, there must be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture would not be enough. There must exist circumstances from which reasonable men would think it probable or likely that the inquiring officer will be prejudiced against the delinquent. The court will not inquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a reasonable man would think on the basis of the existing circumstances t hat he is likely to be prejudiced that is sufficient to quash the decision see per Lord Denning, M.R. in Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon (1968) 3 WLR 694 at p. 707 - etc. We should not, however, be understood to deny that the court might with greater propriety apply the "reasonable suspicion" test in criminal or in proceedings analogous to criminal proceedings. 4. The records of this case reveal the following important features and they must be taken note of. After recommencement of the departmental proceedings against the Petitioner, O.P. 5 placed him under suspension on 30-1-1973 "pending enquiry into his conduct for misuse of wireless channels". Proceedings against the Petitioner had begun in June, 1967 and he had not been placed under suspension till four months after recommencement of the enquiry against him. It is clear from Annexures-10 and 10-A that the Petitioner had not been placed under suspension on any fresh cause of action. The suspension order does not say anything more than that he is placed under suspension for misuse of wireless channels. In para, 6 of the counter filed by the opposite parties it is stated: As the continuance on duty of the Petitioner over the communication channel was found to be risky and prejudicial to public interest, he was placed under suspension. In para, 6 of the counter filed by the opposite parties it is stated: As the continuance on duty of the Petitioner over the communication channel was found to be risky and prejudicial to public interest, he was placed under suspension. No such ground has been indicated in the order of suspension and the plea of risk and prejudice to the public interest appears to be an after-thought. Further, in course of the enquiry, the Petitioner had called for the relevant records of the wireless stations at Sambalpur, Sundergarh, Bonai, Rourkela, Rajgangpur. Keonjhar, Barbil and Bhubaneswar. It is admitted that these eight wireless stations constitute what is technically known as the NET and that whenever any wireless message is sent from any of these stations, the same must be recorded in the log books of all the remaining stations of the NET. The log books of the wireless stations at Sambalpur, Rourkela. Sundergarh, Keonjhar and Barbil were produced during the enquiry and these log books did not show any entry with regard to the personal messages alleged to have been sent by the Petitioner on 9-12-1976. However, the log books of Rajgangpur and Bonai were not produced. No satisfactory explanation is forthcoming as to why these two log books were with-held in spite of the observations of this Court in O.J.C., No. 1051 of 1969. The non-production of relevant registers of the outlying stations amounted to violation of the principles of natural justice. Further, O.P. 5, as the inquiring officer, had permitted the Petitioner to engage a counsel on his behalf, put on 16-2-1974-in course of the enquiry O.P. 5 asked the counsel to withdraw and forbade him from further appearing in the enquiry. Having allowed the Petitioner to be represented by counsel through a substantial part of the enquiry, to suddenly force the counsel to withdraw merely on the ground that he did not appear familiar with the rules relating to the departmental enquiry cannot be said to be the proper way of conducting the enquiry. Having allowed the Petitioner to be represented by counsel through a substantial part of the enquiry, to suddenly force the counsel to withdraw merely on the ground that he did not appear familiar with the rules relating to the departmental enquiry cannot be said to be the proper way of conducting the enquiry. Further, it appears from annexure-13 that while P.W. 1 was being examined before O.P. 5, the Petitioner wanted to ask him whether he could identify an operator merely from the style of tapping of the morse key, but O.P. 5 intervened and stated that there could be no dispute about the question and that one could identify an operator from the manner of morse despatch. This expression of opinion by the inquiring officer during examination of a witness would certainly give rise to a reasonable apprehension in the mind of any reasonable man that it was probable or likely that the inquiring officer was prejudiced against him. The circumstances narrated above indicate that there was real likelihood of bias while the enquiry was being conducted by O.P. 5. The fact that on the representation made by the Petitioner the Inspector General, O.P. 2, had transferred the enquiry from O.P. 5 to O.P. 4, vide Annexure-18 dated 1-6-1974, would clearly support this conclusion. 5. It is worthy of note that after transfer when the enquiry was continued by O.P. 4, the examination of P.Ws. 1 to 5 was already over, O.P. 4 neither saw nor heard these witnesses. Further, it is seen that O.P. 4 had framed a further charge against the Petitioner for his alleged unauthorised absence from 11.50 a.m. to 2. p.m. on 29-1-1974 while the enquiry was pending before O.P. 5. It is stated by the Petitioner that as directed by O.P. 5 he had gone to the High Court to look for his counsel during the aforesaid period and that since he was under suspension that time there was no question of his unauthorised absence. In para 20 of the counter it is stated that as per advice given to O.P. 4 he had framed the additional charge on account of failure of the Petitioner to attend the enquiry during the relevant time on 29-1-1974. The counter is silent as to who had given this advice to O.P. 4. In para 20 of the counter it is stated that as per advice given to O.P. 4 he had framed the additional charge on account of failure of the Petitioner to attend the enquiry during the relevant time on 29-1-1974. The counter is silent as to who had given this advice to O.P. 4. The specific circumstances pleaded by the Petitioner which had compelled him to go to the High Court and look for his lawyer have not been denied. In these premises framing of an additional charge was certainly not called for. Further, in the enquiry report, annexure-20. instead of discussing the evidence of D.Ws. 1 to 4 and its intrinsic value, O.P. 4 has brushed the same aside on the ground that the defence witnesses had been gained over and their statements were the product of their ignorance. The defence witnesses are all Government Officers working in the wireless sections. It is not at all clear what O.P. 4 means in saying that these witnesses had been gained over. This attitude and approach of O.P. 4 clearly indicate bias and prejudice. In the facts and circumstances discussed above we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the proceedings against the Petitioner have been vitiated on account of bias, prejudice and lack of adequate opportunity to the Petitioner to conduct his defence. We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the appeal preferred by the Petitioner to O.P. 2 carpe to be dealt with by O.P. 5 who had himself conducted a part of the enquiry. This should have been avoided. Further, the appellate order passed by O.P. 5 is a bald order and no reasons at all have been ascribed in support of the decision. The order merely says that after perusal of papers nothing justified interference with the orders of the S.P. The order reveals non-application of mind. Courts have repeatedly held that in matters of administrative appeals and revisions where rights of parties are involved orders must be objective and supported by reasons and they must show that the authorities had applied their mind to the facts of the case. Higher the authority, greater is the responsibility see Siba Kumar Misra v. The State of Orissa 48 (1979) C.L.T. 232. For the reasons stated above the appellate order as per annexure 30 cannot be sustained. 6. Higher the authority, greater is the responsibility see Siba Kumar Misra v. The State of Orissa 48 (1979) C.L.T. 232. For the reasons stated above the appellate order as per annexure 30 cannot be sustained. 6. We are aware that in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdictions, courts are not to sit in appeal over the decisions of administrative authorities. However, interference by the court will be justified when an order is palpably wrong, erroneous and perverse. It may be noted that in the enquiry P.W. 1 has asserted that he was able to identify the Petitioner as the sender of the message from the manner in which the latter tapped the morse key. As against this statement of P.W. 1, D.Ws. 1 to 4, each one of whom has wide experience in the field of wireless, have stated that it is impossible to identify the sender of a wireless message merely by the tapping style of the morse key. Surprisingly the inquiring officer (O.P. 4) brushed aside the defence evidence on the absurd ground that D.Ws. 1 to 4 were gained-over witnesses. O.P. 4 substituted his own opinion in the matter as the basis for his conclusion. This he should not have done. He was the inquiring officer and not a witness in the case. His reliance on the activities of the German Intelligence during the last World War was not based on any evidence or authority. The question why the log books of the six outlying wireless stations within the NET did not show any entries regarding the message alleged to have been sent by the Petitioner has not been answered by any of the witnesses nor has the inquiring officer satisfactorily dealt with this matter. Therefore the finding of the inquiring officer is perverse being based on extraneous matters and not on the evidence adduced in the enquiry. 7. In the result this writ application is allowed. The departmental proceedings against the Petitioner and the orders as per annexures - 10, 10-A, 24, 30 and 31 are hereby quashed. There shall be no order as to costs. P.K. Mohanti, A.C.J. 8. I agree. Final Result : Allowed