Dinesh Kumar v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Bijnor
1982-10-05
A.N.VARMA
body1982
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - This petition is directed against concurrent orders passed by the Courts below rejecting an application filed by the petitioner who is the landlord of the disputed shop under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 2. The application was filed on assertion that the applicant No. 1 Dinesh Kumar has read only upto 5th class. He left studies in 1967. Thereafter, he worked for sometime as a Home Guard. Now he has been somehow managing to do business in betel, cigarettes and general merchandise in the staircase of his house. The staircase is far too small for the business purposes of the said petitioner. In order that he may effectively carry on, business it was necessary that the disputed shop be released in his favour. The tenant on the other hand is a man of substantial means. He has large landed property and he would not suffer if evicted from the disputed accommodation. 3. The application was contested by the tenant on the assertion that the landlord did not bonafide need the accommodation in dispute. The space in the staircase was sufficient for the sort of business which the landlord was carrying thereon. Besides the landlords are possessed of substantial property and they are doing other business also. In any case, the tenant would suffer very great hardship if evicted because he has no other shop into which he can shift his business. It was wrong to say that the tenant was possessed of substantial agricultural property. The application was, therefore, liable to be dismissed. 4. Both the authorities have rejected the application of the landlords. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the order passed by the Courts below are manifestly unsustainable in law. Neither of the two authorities has made any serious efforts to apply its mind to the case set up by the landlords not even to the difficulties which are staring in the face of the landlords. Learned counsel also submits that the appellate Court also totally misconstrued the landlord's case. It laboured under an obvious misapprehension in assuming that the business which the petitioner No. 1 is carrying on in the stair case consists only of selling betels and cigarettes.
Learned counsel also submits that the appellate Court also totally misconstrued the landlord's case. It laboured under an obvious misapprehension in assuming that the business which the petitioner No. 1 is carrying on in the stair case consists only of selling betels and cigarettes. The appellate Court ignored the fact that the said landlord was also carrying on general merchandise business in the said staircase, the requirements of which are different from a simple shop of betels etc. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that the above contentions are well-founded. The appellate Court has in my opinion dismissed the landlords need rather too summarily and wholly on conjectures and surmises. Learned counsel for petitioner is right in complaining that no serious effort was made by the appellate Court to investigate the needs set up by the landlords. Thus, the appellate Court has observed that if the appellant was not able to carry on his studies he had no one but himself to blame and that if the said landlord was weak in studies, the tenant cannot be made to suffer on that account. 7. It is very difficult to appreciate this logic. The case of the landlords was that Dinesh Kumar was extremely weak in studies, having read only upto 5th class where after he left studies and that too way back in 1967. In this view the appellate Court was not justified in dismissing the need of the landlords by moralising that if Dinesh Kumar was not able to pursue his studies he had no one but himself to thank for. The fundamental question which fell for determination was whether the space in the stair case where Dinesh Kumar was said to be carrying on his business was sufficient. This question would inevitably depend on the tenure and size of the accommodation. It will also depend on the nature of the business being carried on by Dinesh Kumar in that space. 8. So far as the nature of the business is concerned, the complaint of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the appellate Court overlooked the fact that Dinesh Kumar was also carrying on the general merchandise business in the stair case seems fully justified.
8. So far as the nature of the business is concerned, the complaint of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the appellate Court overlooked the fact that Dinesh Kumar was also carrying on the general merchandise business in the stair case seems fully justified. The appellate Court has not taken into consideration the fact that Dinesh Kumar needed the shop not only for the business of selling cigarettes, biris and matches etc, but also for general merchandise. Whether the aforesaid business could be carried on the staircase is, however, another matter. This aspect could satisficatorily be disposed of only if the appellate Court had addressed itself to the dimensions of the space where Dinesh Kumar is carrying on the business as well as its suitability for the business. 9. In regard to the size of the shop of the landlords in the staircase when the site plan was sought to be shown to the appellate Court, it dismissed it with the observation that a site plan cannot serve the purpose of the landlords. These observations are again very difficult to understand. They betray a (sic) judicial approach. The site plan was being shown to substantiate the assertions that the space available with the landlord as extremely small and unsuitable for the sort of business which was being carried on therein. The appellate Court was wholly unjustified in refusing to look into it. 10. Learned counsel for the tenant, however, sought to support the findings of the Courts below on the issue of bonafide need by referring to the certain affidavits and other materials which have been filed by the tenant in the Courts below showing that the landlords are also doing money lending business and other business elsewhere, I find no mention of those facts in the judgment of the appellate Court. If that material is there the appellate Court should advert to that material also in recording its finding. 11. For the reasons stated above I find that the findings of the appellate Court on the issue of bonafide need set up by the landlord have to be set aside as being wholly unsustainable in law, for a reconsideration. 12. Some arguments were also addressed by the learned counsel for the parties whether the need of the landlords other than that of Dinesh Kumar could be considered.
12. Some arguments were also addressed by the learned counsel for the parties whether the need of the landlords other than that of Dinesh Kumar could be considered. It was submitted that the other landlords have also since decided to join Dinesh Kumar in the proposed business or to start the business of their own. The trial Court refused to look into this aspect on the short ground that the application of the landlords not having been amended such material cannot be looked into. The appellate Court on the other hand gave an 'advice' to the landlords that the other landlords should continue to pursue their higher studies. 13. I am, however, expressing no opinion whether the needs of the applicants Nos. 2 and 3 could also be considered at this stage. It will be for the appellate Court to consider the same according to law and in the light of the material existing on the record. 14. As the finding of the appellate Court on the issue of bonafide need is being set aside its finding on the issue of comparative hardship has also to be set aside for a reconsideration as the latter finding was necessarily affected by the former finding given by the appellate Court. 15. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned IIIrd Additional District Judge, Bijnor is quashed. The said Court will now dispose of the appeal filed by the petitioner afresh according to law having regard to the observations made in the judgment. The parties shall bear their own costs of this petition.