JUDGMENT N.N. Sharma, J. - This is a plaintiff's appeal directed against the judgment and decree by Sri V.C. Jain, learned Civil Judge, Kanpur, dated 6 December 1973, in Civil Appeal No. 231 of 1973, arising out of Original Suit No. 1131 of 1971. The appeal was dismissed and the order of learned Munsif was affirmed by the impugned judgment and decree. 2. It appears that plaintiff was employed as a clerk in the office of Labour Commissioner. . . Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh, in 1948. The appointment was under the orders of Labour Commissioner. Plaintiff worked on the post of noter and drafter on 30 July 1954, and when he was served with two charge-sheets by the Deputy Labour Commissioner about his participation in some demonstration in his office on 29 and 30 July 1964, in contravention of rules 5 A(i), 5A(ii) and 7(i) of the Uttar Pradesh Government Servants Conduct Rules. He was placed under suspension by the Deputy Labour Commissioner and the enquiry was entrusted to S.R.C Mathur, another Deputy Labour Commissioner. Plaintiff submitted its reply to the charges on 28 August 1964. The enquiry officer submitted his report on 3 October 1964. On conclusion of enquiry he found the charges proved against the appellant. 3. On 20 January 1965, Labour Commissioner issued a notice to plaintiff to show cause as to why he must not be dismissed from service. Appellant was also required to submit representation, if any, by 5 February 1965. Labour Commissioner dismissed the plaintiff from service on 19 February 1965, with immediate effect. 4. Plaintiff filed the suit on 17 May 1971, for declaration that his dismissal from service was illegal and ultra vires. He must be held as in service with full benefits on the date of institution of the suit. The consequential relief of mandatory injunction was also sought directing defendant (State of Uttar Pradesh, not to give effect to the said dismissal order and to treat him in continuous service. Costs of the suit were also claimed. 5. Defence was that the enquiry was conducted after affording all reasonable opportunities to the plaintiff. Plaintiff himself did not avail full opportunity and absented himself during disciplinary proceedings. The Deputy Labour Commissioner was appointing authority of all the ministerial staff and the enquiry officer was not biased against the plaintiff-appellant. Plea of limitation was also raised in defence. 6. 5. Defence was that the enquiry was conducted after affording all reasonable opportunities to the plaintiff. Plaintiff himself did not avail full opportunity and absented himself during disciplinary proceedings. The Deputy Labour Commissioner was appointing authority of all the ministerial staff and the enquiry officer was not biased against the plaintiff-appellant. Plea of limitation was also raised in defence. 6. Learned Munsif found that dismissal order was invalid ; he also found that the suit was barred by time. His findings were affirmed in appeal by the impugned judgment and decree. 7. Plaintiff has filed the second appeal. 8. I have heard learned advocates for the parties and perused the record. 9. Sri Murlidhar, learned advocate for the appellant, attacked the dismissal order on the ground that the appointing authority of appellant was Labour Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner could not have initiated disciplinary proceedings against the appellant nor could have served him with the charge. Learned advocate for appellant could not produce any rule relating to the departmental proceedings specifically applicable to the appellant. However, there was a reference to rule 55A of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, which simply requires that after conclusion of the enquiry, if the proposed penalty is of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, the Government servant will be supplied with a copy of proceedings under rule 55 along with notice to show cause against the action proposed to be taken. However, there is specific finding about observance of this rule by the Court below which is borne out by the record and so it could not be seriously pressed that there was violation of rule 55A which could have vitiated the order of dismissal in this case. 10. Learned advocate for appellant argued that the enquiry in this case was initiated by Udaibir Singh, Deputy Labour Commissioner, who was not the punishing authority. He could not have validly served the charges on the appellant and so the proceedings were vitiated. 11. It appears that Deputy Labour Commissioner was made the appointing authority of all the ministerial staff vide Gazette Notification No. 2869 (L)/ XXXVI (Bk. 535-53, dated 1 July 1955. Thus the Deputy Labour Commissioner was made the appointing authority of all the ministerial staff and acted as such at the time of initiation of this enquiry and service of charge sheet. 535-53, dated 1 July 1955. Thus the Deputy Labour Commissioner was made the appointing authority of all the ministerial staff and acted as such at the time of initiation of this enquiry and service of charge sheet. Sri Murlidhar, advocate, relied upon Manihar Singh v. Superintendent of Police, A.I.R. 1969 Assam and Nag. 1, which laid: "The framing of charges, the holding of an enquiry into them, the suspension of the civil servant during the enquiry, the notice to show cause are all steps in exercise of disciplinary powers. All these steps are required to be taken by the disciplinary authority and not by a delegate of that authority. In the absence of a statutory provision permitting expressly or impliedly delegation of disciplinary powers, an authority other than the disciplinary authority has clearly no power to frame on own its initiative, charges against a civil servant and hold an enquiry into them A.I.R. 1969 M.P. 193 Followed." 12. It appears that in that case one Manihar Singh who was a constable of Laban at House at Shillong was charge-sheeted by additional circle inspector of police and on conclusion of enquiry was dismissed by Superintendent of Police. Under the rules these all steps had to be taken by the disciplinary authority and o such conduct of enquiry and submission of charge-sheet by additional circle Inspector of police was held as illegal. In this connexion that Court relied upon Shardul Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, A.I.R. 1966 M.P. 193. It appears that, that authority was overruled by the Supreme Court in 1970 F.L.R. 81, which posited : "Article 311 does not in terms require that the authority empowered under that provision to dismiss or remove an official, should itself initiate or conduct the enquiry preceding the dismissal or removal of the officer or even that enquiry should be done at his instance. The only right guaranteed to a civil servant under that provision is that he shall not be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to, that by which he was appointed. The guarantee given under Article 311 (1) does not include within itself a further guarantee that the disciplinary proceedings resulting in dismissal or removal of a civil servant should also be initiated and conducted by the authorities mentioned in the Act." 13. The guarantee given under Article 311 (1) does not include within itself a further guarantee that the disciplinary proceedings resulting in dismissal or removal of a civil servant should also be initiated and conducted by the authorities mentioned in the Act." 13. Rule 13 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, is worded as below : "13. Authority to institute proceedings.-(1) The President or any other authority empowered by him by general or special order may- (a) institute disciplinary proceedings against a Government servant ; (b) direct a disciplinary authority to institute disciplinary proceedings against any Government servant on whom that disciplinary authority is competent to impose under these rules any of the penalties specified in rule 11. (2) A disciplinary authority competent under these rules to impose any of the penalties specified in Cls. (i) to (iv) of rule 11 may institute disciplinary proceedings against any Government servant for the imposition of any of the penalties specified in Cls. (r) to i(ix) of rule 11 notwithstanding that such disciplinary authority is not competent under these rules to impose any of the latter penalties." Thus the authority to institute disciplinary proceeding, may be different from the authority prescribed for removing a Government servant. Such authority may not be competent to impose all the penalties prescribed as contemplated by sub-rule (2) aforesaid. So it is obvious that the order of dismissal does not contravene any rule or article and is unassailable. 14. On the question of limitation it was argued that appellant was prosecuting a writ petition in this Court instituted in 1965, and withdrawn on 28 November 1969, and so he could not be quick in filing the suit. He was well entitled for condonation of the aforesaid period under S. 14 of the Indian Limitation Act as he must not suffer on account of the ill-advice of his advocate. 15. It appears that the order of dismissal was passed on 19 February 1965 ; plaintiff did not attack the order of dismissal up to 1971. Although he was well aware about its pending writ petition under which he was challenging the vires of Government Servant Conduct Rules, breach of which by the plaintiff was the subject of enquiry. 16. 15. It appears that the order of dismissal was passed on 19 February 1965 ; plaintiff did not attack the order of dismissal up to 1971. Although he was well aware about its pending writ petition under which he was challenging the vires of Government Servant Conduct Rules, breach of which by the plaintiff was the subject of enquiry. 16. Learned Court below rightly pointed out that in order to attract the benefit of S. 14 of the Limitation Act it must have been shown by plaintiff'-appellant that during this period he had been prosecuting any civil proceeding founded upon the same cause of action. Since it could not be shown in this case that same cause of action was being prosecuted by the appellant in the writ petition aforesaid which was withdrawn by him on 28 November 1969, so that period cannot be excluded in this case and as the period of three years had already expired when the present suit was filed, the claim was also barred by limitation. 17. No other point was pressed before me in this appeal. 18. In the result the appeal is dismissed. Impugned judgment and decree are affirmed ; costs of this Court shall be easy.