A. M. AHMADI, J. ( 1 ) THE Food Inspector Bhuj Municipality filed a criminal complaint No. 164 of 1979 in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Bhuj against the present respondents Nos. 1 2 and 3 for the commission of an offence punishable under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 on the ground that grams (Chhana-dal) were adulterated. In order to lodge a complaint the Food Inspector had sought sanction of the local authority as required by sec. 20 (1) of the Act. That section reads as under:"20 No prosecution for an offence under this Act not being an offence under sec. 14 or sec. 14-A shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorized in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government or the State Government". The prosecution was neither under sec. 14 nor sec. 14-A of the Act. After the institution of the complaint the learned Magistrate recorded the evidence of the Food Inspector and then framed a charge against the respondents Nos. 1 2 and 3 to which they pleaded not guilty. The Food Inspector was recalled for further cross-examination and thereafter the panch witness was examined as a prosecution witness. The statements of the respondents Nos. 1 2 and 3 were recorded under sec. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The said three respondents did not lead any evidence in their defence. After hearing the submissions at the bar the learned Magistrate by his judgment and order dated 5/01/1980 passed an order canceling or dropping the proceedings in the following words: it became necessary for the learned trial Magistrate to pass this order because he came to the conclusion that the prosecution was instituted without a valid sanction (written consent) of the authorized person. The order of sanction was produced on the record at Exhibit 19. The sanction was however granted in cyclostyled form the gaps having been filled in by an office clerk. The Health Officer Shri C. M. Patel was not examined as a witness on behalf of the Department. The question which arose for consideration before the learned Magistrate was whether the sanction or consent was legally valid. The learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that the sanction or consent was given by the Health Officer without application of mind. The Health Officer Shri C. M. Patel was not examined as a witness on behalf of the Department. The question which arose for consideration before the learned Magistrate was whether the sanction or consent was legally valid. The learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that the sanction or consent was given by the Health Officer without application of mind. He therefore came to the conclusion that there was no valid sanction or consent as required by sec. 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and accordingly he directed that the proceedings before him should terminate as the prosecution was not maintainable for want of a valid sanction. Feeling aggrieved by this order the complainant preferred Revision Application No. 16 of 1980 in the Court of the learned Sessions Judge Kachchh at Bhuj. The learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that since the learned Magistrate had framed a charge against respondents Nos. 1 2 and 3 he could only acquit or convict the respondents and therefore the impugned order must be taken to be an order of acquittal within the meaning of sec. 248 of the Code and therefore an appeal could be preferred and the Revision Application would therefore be barred by virtue of sec. 401 of the Code. In this view that the learned Sessions Judge took he came to the conclusion that the Revision Application was not maintainable and dismissed the same. It is against this order of the learned Sessions Judge that the present petition is filed. ( 2 ) THE Supreme Court in Ratilal Bhanji v. State of Maharashtra A. I. R. 1979 S. C. 94 had an occasion to examine the scheme of the relevant provisions of the Code dealing with warrant cases. It pointed out that in a warrant case instituted otherwise than on a police report an order of discharge can be made only after the process has been served and before the charge 19 framed. It further pointed out that if after evidence is led the learned Magistrate is of the opinion that the allegation is baseless he may discharge the accused. If however the evidence discloses a prima facie case it is incumbent on the Magistrate to proceed under sec. 254 and frame a charge against the accused. Once a charge is framed the Magistrate has no power under sec. If however the evidence discloses a prima facie case it is incumbent on the Magistrate to proceed under sec. 254 and frame a charge against the accused. Once a charge is framed the Magistrate has no power under sec. 227 or any other provision of the Code to cancel the charge and reverse the proceedings to the stage of sec. 253 and discharge the accused. In the instant case the Magistrate had already framed a charge after considering the evidence of the Food Inspector. He could not have quashed that charge and therefore the impugned order could never be said to be an order of discharge. After the framing of charge if the accused enters a plea of not guilty the learned Magistrate must proceed with the trial in the manner provided in sec. 254 and 258. Once a charge is framed the Magistrate has no power to discharge the accused because after he has reached the post-charge stage he can either acquit or convict the accused unless he decides to proceed under sec. 325 or 360 of the Code. It is presumably for this reason that the learned Sessions Judge thought that since the post-charge stage was reached the order of the learned Magistrate refusing to convict the accused must be treated as an order of acquittal. Ordinarily that may be so but in a case where the proceedings are dropped for want of jurisdiction or maintainability without a decision on merits one way or the other the order cannot be treated as an order of acquittal. This is so became the learned Magistrate does not come to any conclusion of guilt or otherwise on the merits of the matter. He merely directs the proceedings to be dropped because he thinks that the sine qua non for the institution of the complaint is not satisfied and therefore the complaint is not maintainable meaning thereby that he has no jurisdiction to either convict or acquit the accused. Take a case where at the initial stage the Court frames a charge because in its opinion a prima facie case is made out. After the evidence is recorded; on the accused entering a plea of not guilty the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that the offence if any was committed outside the State. Take a case where at the initial stage the Court frames a charge because in its opinion a prima facie case is made out. After the evidence is recorded; on the accused entering a plea of not guilty the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that the offence if any was committed outside the State. In such a case he would have no jurisdiction either to acquit or convict the accused and therefore the only alternative left to him would be to direct that so far as the proceedings before him are concerned they shall stand dropped. The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider more or less a similar situation in Nagraj v. State of Mysore A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 269. That was a case in which the learned Magistrate committed the accused to the Sessions Court for trial for offences under secs. 307 and 326 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Sessions judge made a reference to the High Court on the ground that the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offences without the sanction of the State Government in view of the provisions of secs. 132 and 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 Several questions were raised in that case but the one with which we are concerned is dealt with in paragraph 18 by the Supreme Court in the following words:"18 The last question to consider is that if the Court comes at any stage to the conclusion that the prosecution could not have been instituted without the sanction of the Government. what should be the procedure to be followed by it i. e. whether the Court should discharge the accused or acquit him of the charge if framed against him or just drop the proceedings and pass no formal order of discharge or acquittal as contemplated in the case of a prosecution under the Code. The High Court has said that when the Sessions Judge be satisfied that the facts proved bring the case within the mischief of see. 132 of the Code then he is at liberty to reject the complaint holding that it is barred by that section. We consider this to be the right order to be passed in those circumstances. It is not essential that the Court must pass a formal order discharging or acquitting the accused. 132 of the Code then he is at liberty to reject the complaint holding that it is barred by that section. We consider this to be the right order to be passed in those circumstances. It is not essential that the Court must pass a formal order discharging or acquitting the accused. In fact no such order can be passed. If sec. 132 applies the complaint could not have been instituted without the sanction of the Government and the proceedings on a complaint so instituted would be void. the Court having no jurisdiction to take those proceedings. When the proceedings be void the Court is not competent to pass any order except an order that the proceedings be dropped and the complaint is rejected". In Ratilal Bhanjis case (supra) also after observing that once a charge is framed the learned Magistrate must either acquit or convict the accused Their Lordships hastened to point out an exception in the following words:"excepting where the prosecution must fail for want of a fundamental defect such as want of sanction an order of acquittal must be passed upon a finding of not guilty turning on the merits of the case and the appreciation of evidence at the conclusion of the trial". In the instant case also the learned Magistrate did not record any finding on the merits of the case. He merely came to the conclusion that the proceedings should be dropped because of want of valid sanction or consent which is the sine qua non under sec. 20 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. He therefore did not record any finding on merits and therefore could not have acquitted or convicted the accused under sec. 248 of the Code. The learned Sessions Judge was therefore wrong in coming to the conclusion that the order passed by the learned trial Magistrate tantamounts to an order of acquittal. It is on this premise that he dismissed the Revision Application as not maintainable. The premise being erroneous the order of the learned Sessions Judge cannot be allowed to stand. ( 3 ) IN the result the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge dismissing the Revision Application as not maintainable is quashed and the matter will go back to the learned Sessions Judge for disposal in accordance with law. The rule is made absolute accordingly. Application allowed. .