ORDER : - These two petitions are being disposed of by a common judgment as the controversies involved therein are the same. Both the petitions are directed against concurrent orders passed by the courts below upholding a compromise and rejecting the various objections taken by the petitioner as to the validity thereof. The courts below have found that the compromise in question was validly reached between the parties and that the suit filed by Smt. Lakhpati being suit No.47 of 1968 against the petitioner and one Uma Shanker was rightly disposed of in terms of that compromise. The petitions arise out of two suits namely suit No.47 of 1968 and Suit No.30 of 1970. The latter suit was filed by the petitioner against Uma Shanker aforesaid. As a result of the compromise both these suits have been disposed of on terms thereof. 2. The petitioner was defendant No.2 in suit No.47 of 1968. Uma Shanker was defendant No.1 in that suit. The suit was filed by Smt. Lakhpati for cancellation of a sale deed Dt. 4-10-1963 said to have been executed by her in favour of Rama Shanker. The plaint allegations were that the plaintiffs husband Tapeshwari was the sole proprietor of the plots in suit which were his sir and Khudkasht. Tapeshwari died about 30 years prior to the institution of the suit leaving the plaintiff and his son Parmatma as his heirs. Parmatma also died about 15 or 16 years. The plaintiff thus became the sole owner of the properties of her husband including the plots in dispute of which she became the sole bhumidhar after the abolition of Zamindari. The plaintiff was an illiterate and simple lady depending for everything on Uma Shanker the defendant No.1 in the suit, who was an employee of the plaintiffs husband. The plaintiff reposed full confidence in defendant No.1. Taking advantage of all these things defendant No.1 fraudulently got his own name entered in the revenue records in respect of the disputed plots and thereafter fraudulently got a sale deed executed m favour of her own son-in-law, Rama Shanker, the defendant No.2 in the suit the petitioner herein. The plaintiff never consciously executed any sale deed in favour of defendant No.2 and the same having been obtained by fraud was liable to be cancelled. The plaintiff never consciously executed any sale deed in favour of defendant No.2 and the same having been obtained by fraud was liable to be cancelled. On these assertions the plaintiff prayed that the sale deed standing in the name of the petitioner be cancelled. This suit was filed on 8-2-1968. 3. On 5-11-1973 Uma Shanker aforesaid died, whereupon the plaintiff filed an application for substitution being paper No.81-82 for bringing on records the name of four persons in place of Uma Shanker namely Rampat, Harbali, Km. Sudha and one Shripat. Shripat is said to have died subsequently. The other three heirs are arrayed in the writ petition respectively as respondents Nos.11, 12 and 13. On the same day another application was filed by the petitioner to be appointed as the guardian of Km. Sudha. A third application was filed on the same day namely paper No.80-A purporting to be a compromise signed by the petitioner as well as his counsel Sri Udai Bhan Satsangi, Karunapati Tripathi counsel for the plaintiff, Girish Chandra Shukla counsel for the proposed heirs of Uma Shanker. On the compromise application the court passed an order that the same be put up after the disposal of the substitution matter. Yet another application was filed by Rama Shanker on 28-11-1973 paper No. 82-C purporting to be under O.32, R.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure with a prayer that he be permitted to compromise the matter on behalf of the minor Km. Sudha. By an order Dt. 12-8-1976 the court substituted only Rampat and Harbali, respondents Nos. 11 and 12 herein as the heirs of Uma Shanker and rejected the claim of others to be substituted as the heirs of Uma Shanker. Shesh Nath, respondent No. 14 herein felt aggrieved by the refusal of the court to substitute him and he took the matter in revision which was dismissed whereupon Sheshnath came to this court by way of writ petition which was allowed and the case was remanded. After the remand order which was passed on 10th of Sept., 1980, Km. Sudha was also held to be an heir of Uma Shanker aforesaid. 4. In the meantime on 1-3-1975 Smt. Lakhpati also died leaving behind respondents Nos. After the remand order which was passed on 10th of Sept., 1980, Km. Sudha was also held to be an heir of Uma Shanker aforesaid. 4. In the meantime on 1-3-1975 Smt. Lakhpati also died leaving behind respondents Nos. 3 to 10 as her heirs and legal representatives who were duly substituted in the suit and were represented by the same counsel who represented Smt. Lakhpati namely Karunapati Tripathi. This was done prior to the recording of compromise. 5. It appears that after the compromise was filed in the court on 28-11-1973, an attempt was made by the petitioner to repudiate the compromise, contending that the compromise ought not to be recorded as the sum of Rs. 5,000/- which is stated therein to have been received by him was in fact not paid to him and that the statement to the contrary in the compromise was wrong. A dispute having arisen as to whether the compromise has been duly entered into between the parties, evidence was led both on behalf of the plaintiff as well as on behalf of the petitioner in the shape of oral testimony. The court considered the evidence on the record and the arguments advanced by the parties and came to the conclusion under its order Dt. 14-12-1976 that a lawful compromise had been validly reached between the parties and that the compromise must, therefore, be recorded. The court below, therefore, directed that the suit be disposed of on terms of the compromise and a compromise decree was drawn up in terms thereof. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order Dt. 14th of Dec., 1976 the petitioner filed an appeal which was subsequently converted into a revision in consequence of the amendments which had come into force in virtue of Central Act No. 104 of 1976. The revision has been dismissed by an order Dt. 10-8-1979. Similar orders were passed in the connected suit namely suit No. 30 of 1970. It may be mentioned at this point that that suit was filed by Rama Shanker for the cancellation of a sale deed Dt. 8-8-1969 which was said to have been executed by Rama Shanker in favour of Uma Shanker on the ground that some one impersonating as Rama Shanker had executed the sale deed in favour of Uma Shanker. It may be mentioned at this point that that suit was filed by Rama Shanker for the cancellation of a sale deed Dt. 8-8-1969 which was said to have been executed by Rama Shanker in favour of Uma Shanker on the ground that some one impersonating as Rama Shanker had executed the sale deed in favour of Uma Shanker. Sri G.N. Varma, learned counsel for the petitioner conceded that if the compromise filed in suit No. 47 of 1968 is upheld by this court the connected writ petition No. 9364 of 1979 must inevitably fail. 7. The first and the main contention of Sri G.N. Varma learned counsel for the petitioner was that the compromise not having been signed either by the plaintiff herself or by her legal representatives, the court cannot record it under Order 23, R.3. The same objection was raised in regard to the heirs of Uma Shanker also. 8. I am unable to accept the above contention. The petitioner has not disputed the fact that the compromise was signed both by him as well as his counsel. That being so in the facts and circumstances of the present case the petitioner ought not to be allowed to challenge the validity of the compromise on the ground that the compromise was not signed by the plaintiff or her heirs or by the heirs of Uma Shanker. It is pertinent to mention that neither the heirs of the plaintiff nor, those of Uma Shanker have challenged the impugned orders. Moreover, as I shall presently show, the interests of the petitioner and the deceased defendant Uma Shanker were clearly severable. The plaintiff was seeking the cancellation of the sale deed which stood in the name of the petitioner. No relief was claimed in that suit against Uma Shanker. Nor are the terms of the compromise prejudicial to Uma Shanker or his heirs in any way. Under the circumstances, the compromise cannot be challenged by the petitioner on the ground that the same was not signed by the plaintiff herself or her heirs or by the heirs of Uma Shanker. It is not disputed that the compromise was signed by the plaintiffs counsel as well as the counsel who appeared for the propose heirs of Uma Shanker. 9. It is not disputed that the compromise was signed by the plaintiffs counsel as well as the counsel who appeared for the propose heirs of Uma Shanker. 9. Further the petitioner is seeking a discretionary relief under Art.226 of the Constitution of India and unless the petitioner shows that he has suffered any prejudice as a result of the absence of the signatures of the plaintiff or he heirs or those of Uma Shanker on the compromise, relief ought not to be granted to him. The petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of certiorari on the aforesaid grounds which as shown above are at best technical grounds not affecting the substance of the case. A writ of certiorari does not issue as a course, that is, ex debito justitiae. 10. It may be mentioned here that the compromise was filed on 28-11-1973 At that time there was no requirement under O.23, R.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the compromise must be in writing signed by the parties. The compromise was thus perfectly in order and in accord with the requirements of O.23, R.3 of the Code of civil Procedure when the same was filed in the court. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that by the time the compromise was recorded on 14-12-1976, the amendment made by the Allahabad High Court in O.23, R.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure had come into force with the publication in the U. P. Gazette Dt. 31-8-1974. By the amendment the words "in writing duly signed by the parties" had been inserted between the words or compromise and or where in O.23, R.3 C.P.C. With the result, that before the recording of the compromise, there was already in operation a mandatory requirement that the compromise in order that the court may take cognizance of it should be in writing and signed by the parties. 12. I am unable to accept the above contention. In the first place as I have already demonstrated in the foregoing discussion, the interests of the petitioner and those of Uma Shanker were clearly severable and the absence of the signatures of the heirs of Uma Shanker was of no legal consequence. The same thing can be said with regard to the absence of the signatures of the plaintiffs heirs on the compromise. The same thing can be said with regard to the absence of the signatures of the plaintiffs heirs on the compromise. In the second place, in my opinion, the amendment referred to above could not apply to the compromise in question which had already been filed earlier in 1973. It is true that in matters of procedure there is a presumption that the amendments in an enactment apply to the pending proceedings also as there is no vested right in any procedure prescribed by law. There is, however, an equally well settled principle namely that whatever procedure has been correctly adopted and concluded under the old law, cannot be opened again for the purpose of applying the new procedure. A concluded contract had been filed in the court duly signed by the parties or their counsel, That contract was fully binding on the parties thereto. As mentioned above the compromise which was filed in 1973 was perfectly in accord with the law as it then stood. The new procedure prescribed by the Allahabad Amendment in 1974 would, therefore, be applicable only in so far as the procedure which remained to be followed in the present case after that date. What was duly concluded and completed could not be undone by the change in the procedure. I am fortified in the view which I am taking by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nani Gopali Mitra v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1970 SC 1636 . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that while it is true that as a general rule alterations in the form of procedures are deemed to be retrospective in character, there is an equally old principle which is well settled namely that whatever procedure has been correctly adopted and concluded under the old law cannot be opened again for the purpose of applying the new procedure. The Supreme Court relied on the two decisions of the English Court namely 1936 Ch 237 and (1960) AC 965. 13. My conclusion, therefore, is that the compromise was not required to be signed by the parties personally in the present case in view of what has been stated above. 14. The Supreme Court relied on the two decisions of the English Court namely 1936 Ch 237 and (1960) AC 965. 13. My conclusion, therefore, is that the compromise was not required to be signed by the parties personally in the present case in view of what has been stated above. 14. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent placed reliance on a single Judge decision of this court in the case of Gaya Prasad Singh v. Sheo Murat Singh reported in (1981) 7 All LR 501: (1981 UPLT NOC 93), in which it has been held that the requirement under O.23, R.3 of the Code of civil Procedure that the compromise should be in writing and signed by the parties does not mean that the compromise should be signed by the parties personally. It will be sufficient compliance it the compromise is signed by the partys counsel. I see no reason to take a different view. This decision provides a complete answer to the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 15. The second submission was that the court had directed the compromise to be put up after the disposal of the substitution matter. Technically substitution matter was disposed of only after Sudha was held to be an heir of Uma Shanker in pursuance of the order of remand passed by this court on 10th of Sept., 1980 in the writ petition filed by Sheshnath. The order regarding the compromise was, therefore, illegal on that ground alone. I am not impressed by this argument. By an order Dt. 12th of Aug., 1976 the court had disposed of the substitution matters which were pending before it. It had directed the substitution of only respondents Nos. 11 and 12. The court could hence lawfully proceed to dispose of the matter of compromise also. If Sudha was held to be an heir of Uma Shanker subsequently that would not per se invalidate the compromise. If Km. Sudha acquired any right in consequence of the orders passed in her favour subsequently, she could have herself challenged the order regarding the compromise. But the petitioner cannot claim the right to challenge the compromise on the aforesaid ground. Moreover, as I have shown above no relief was claimed against Uma Shanker in the suit. If Km. Sudha acquired any right in consequence of the orders passed in her favour subsequently, she could have herself challenged the order regarding the compromise. But the petitioner cannot claim the right to challenge the compromise on the aforesaid ground. Moreover, as I have shown above no relief was claimed against Uma Shanker in the suit. Consequently, the compromise could not be challenged on the mere ground that Sudha who was held to be a legal heir subsequently had not signed the compromise. In my opinion, the suit stood fully adjusted by the compromise because the sale stood only in favour of Rama Shanker, the petitioner, and nobody else was affected by the compromise. In a case reported in AIR 1927 PC 57 it was held that a compromise to which some of the parties to a suit alone are parties is not necessarily invalid. It was observed in that case that where a party to a suit transfers his interest in the subject matter to another and the transferee is brought on the record, and the transferors name continues on the record, the compromise effected between the transferee and the opposite party relating to the subject matter was valid even though the transferor was no party to the compromise. Thus, in any view of the matter there is no substance in the second contention either. 16. The third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the compromise was not verified at all. 17. This contention again has no merit at all. On 3-12-1973, an application was filed on behalf of the petitioner on the allegation that the money which in stated in the compromise to have been paid to him had in fact not been paid to him and that he had signed the compromise on the assurance that he would be paid the amount at his residence. On these allegations it was prayed that the compromise be cancelled. This led the court to make an enquiry whether the suit had been adjusted by a lawful agreement or compromise. Both the courts have answered the issue in the affirmative. They have upon an exhaustive consideration of the evidence led by the parties held that the suit had been adjusted by a lawful agreement. The Court was satisfied upon the evidence that the compromise had been validly reached between the parties. Both the courts have answered the issue in the affirmative. They have upon an exhaustive consideration of the evidence led by the parties held that the suit had been adjusted by a lawful agreement. The Court was satisfied upon the evidence that the compromise had been validly reached between the parties. The order sheet of the suit shows that upon dispute having arisen as regards whether the compromise had been reached, the parties were permitted to lead evidence on whether compromise had in fact been reached. Thereupon arguments followed on whether the compromise had been entered into between the parties. Orders were thereafter passed on 14-12-1976, holding that the compromise having been factually and validly reached and the suit having been fully adjusted by a lawful agreement it should de disposed of in terms of the compromise. A perusal of the said impugned order clearly shows that the court had satisfied itself that the dispute had been settled between the parties under a lawful agreement. There was no possibility of any collusion or fraud in entering into the agreement, The court also found that the petitioner had been identified by his counsel and that he had fully received the sum of RS. 5,000/-in consideration of which he had agreed that the sale deed be cancelled. 18. In view of what has been stated it is apparent that the court committed no error in accepting the compromise and passing a decree in terms thereof. The entire exercise undertaken by the court was directed towards satisfying itself whether the suit has been adjusted under the compromise filed by the parties and whether the parties had entered a lawful agreement or compromise towards that end. In my Judgment the order D/-14-12-76, itself tantamounts to verification and recording of the compromise. 19. Learned counsel, however, submitted that after the order dated 14th of December, 1976 the parties were not individually invited to admit or deny the compromise and consequently it cannot be said that the compromise had been entered into. 20. The submission is entirely misconceived. The objection is far too formalistic to merit approval. No form is prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure for the verification of a compromise. 20. The submission is entirely misconceived. The objection is far too formalistic to merit approval. No form is prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure for the verification of a compromise. All that the court has to be satisfied about is that the parties have settled their dispute under a lawful agreement and once the court comes to that conclusion it accepts it and passes a decree in terms thereof. All the formalities contemplated under Order 23 R.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure were duly complied with. Neither the petitioner nor the plaintiffs disputed the fact that they have entered into the compromise. The courts below have rejected the plea of the petitioner that he had not received the sum of Rs. 5,000/- which is stated in the compromise to have already been paid to him as unworthy of reliance. In this view, it cannot be said that the compromise had not been duly verified before the court directed that the suit be disposed of in terms thereof. 21. The next submission was that an application had been filed by Rama Shanker on behalf of Km. Sudha being paper No. 84-C to the effect that permission be granted to him to enter into the compromise on her behalf. Learned counsel contended that before the court could lawfully direct the recording of compromise it was necessary for it to have satisfied itself by passing a speaking order whether the same was to the benefit of the minors. There is no indication whether the court applied its mind to this aspect. I am unable to accept this contention. As mentioned above the sale deed stood in the name of the petitioner. No relief was claimed against Uma Shanker. The terms of the compromise do not indicate that the same is in any way prejudicial to Km. Sudha having regard to the scope of the suit in which the compromise was filed. The compromise cannot hence be challenged on this ground. Moreover, such an objection should properly come from Km. Sudha herself and not from the petitioner. 22. The terms of the compromise do not indicate that the same is in any way prejudicial to Km. Sudha having regard to the scope of the suit in which the compromise was filed. The compromise cannot hence be challenged on this ground. Moreover, such an objection should properly come from Km. Sudha herself and not from the petitioner. 22. Learned counsel then contended that the finding of the court below that the petitioner had received the consideration is manifestly unsustainable in law being based upon inadmissible evidence consisting of the statement of Sri Udai Bhan Satsangi who was the petitioners counsel before he entered into the witness box as a witness for the plaintiff. 23. I find no merit in the above contention. In the first place the compromise cannot be challenged in these proceedings on the ground that the plaintiff did not fulfil her part of the obligations under the compromise. Such a challenge ought appropriately to have been made by a separate suit. In the second place, the issue is entirely one of fact and this court cannot interfere with the concurrent finding recorded thereon unless the same is demonstrated to be vitiated by some error of law. The contention of the petitioner, however, was that the evidence given by Sri Udai Bhan Satsangi was barred by S.126 of the Evidence Act. I cannot agree. The revisional court has found that Sri Udai Bhan Satsangi had appeared for the plaintiff after he had obtained an express permission from the petitioner, Moreover, the findings of the courts below on this issue are based on numerous other facts and circumstances quite apart from the evidence given by Sri Satsangi to the effect that the petitioner wanted to resile from the compromise after the same had been filed which alone could, if at all, attract the application of S.176. I have examined the findings recorded by the courts below on this issue and I do not find that the same can be assailed on any ground. The conclusion is based on relevant facts and circumstances and not being vitiated by any error of law cannot be reviewed in these proceedings. 24. For the petitioner the compromise was also challenged on the ground that the suit was barred by time and consequently the compromise was on the face of it unlawful. The submission has only to be stated to be rejected. 24. For the petitioner the compromise was also challenged on the ground that the suit was barred by time and consequently the compromise was on the face of it unlawful. The submission has only to be stated to be rejected. In the plaint, the plaintiff has clearly asserted that she discovered the fraud committed by the petitioner only in December, 1968 and the suit was filed on 8-2-1968. It cannot, therefore, be said that the suit was prima facie barred by limitation so as to justify refusal by the court to record the same. 25. Learned counsel next submitted that the suit was barred by Section 49 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and hence the compromise cannot be recorded. This submission again is totally without any merit. The plaintiffs sought the cancellation of the sale deed on the ground of fraud. Such a relief could be granted only by the Civil Court and not by the Revenue Court. I do not agree with the learned counsel that before Civil Court could assume jurisdiction there must be some material on the record establishing fraud. As there was no such material, the compromise could not be recorded. I cannot agree. The question is whether on the plaint allegations the court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the suit. On the plaint in the present case the court clearly had jurisdiction to try the suit. That being so the compromise was validly recorded. 26. One of the other submissions raised by the learned counsel was that as soon as the application was filed on behalf of the petitioner repudiating the compromise, the parties should have been relegated to a civil suit. The courts below itself should not have entered into the controversy whether the compromise was or was not obtained by fraud. In support learned counsel placed reliance on a decision reported in AIR 1962 Orissa 110. The submission is completely devoid of any merit. I do not agree that the court before which an application is made for recording a compromise under Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C. must stay its hands and relegate the parties to a regular civil suit as one of the parties to the compromise chooses to repudiate the same. Further no such objection was taken by the petitioner before the courts below. Further no such objection was taken by the petitioner before the courts below. Far from challenging the jurisdiction of the court to proceed with the adjudication of the issue, the petitioner led evidence in support of his plea that the compromise ought not to be recorded because it was obtained by fraud. 27. Another submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that until the compromise is recorded by the court, it cannot be said that any completed contract or agreement has come into existence. Consequently, the compromise application which was filed on 28-11-1973 could not legally be treated as a completed contract. It was urged, the court had no jurisdiction to record the same unless the heirs of the original parties had signed and verified the same. 28. I am unable to accept the above contention. It is firmly established that a compromise decree is nothin but a contract with the seal of the court super-added to it. In my opinion, the compromise filed by the parties on 28-11-73 was by its own force a completed contract whereby the parties agreed that the suit be adjusted in terms incorporated therein. All that remained to be accomplished after the filing of the compromise was the verification thereof. The only question which remained to be considered by the court thereafter was to satisfy itself whether the suit had been adjusted as represented by the parties in that compromise. 29. Yet another submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that any party to a suit can challenge the validity of a compromise as well as of the order passed by the court recording the same. Accordingly, it was urged it is open to the petitioner also to contend that the compromise is invalid because it was not signed by the plaintiff or her heirs or by the heirs of Uma Shanker. In support, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on two decisions reported in AIR 1969 SC 1118 and AIR 1927 Oudh 222 at page 223. 30. I find no merit in the above contention either. I have already observed above on the strength of a Privy Council decision, AIR 1927 PC 57, that a compromise to which some of the parties to the suit alone are parties is not per se invalid. It would depend on the facts of each case. 30. I find no merit in the above contention either. I have already observed above on the strength of a Privy Council decision, AIR 1927 PC 57, that a compromise to which some of the parties to the suit alone are parties is not per se invalid. It would depend on the facts of each case. In the present case the interests of Uma Shanker and Rama Shanker were clearly severable. As for the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in neither of them were the interests of the parties severable. In both the decisions it was found that the interests of parties not joining the compromise were inseverable from those joining it. The said decisions are hence clearly distinguishable. 31. In the end I may notice a submission of the learned counsel for the respondents. He urged that it there are numerous heirs of a deceased defendant and if the estate is sufficiently represented by some of them, the failure to implead some of the other heirs would not necessarily result in the abatement of the suit. In support, learned counsel placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1966 SC 792 . In my opinion, there is considerable force in this submission and the same is fully supported by the aforesaid decision. It is not disputed that the respondents Nos. 11 and 12 were the legal heirs of Uma Shanker and they were duly brought on the record before the compromise was recorded. Under the circumstances, the fact that Km. Sudha was substituted later on and that she had no occasion to participate in the proceedings which resulted in the passing of the compromise decree would not materially affect the conclusions. 32. There remains one more submission to be considered. Sri G.N. Varma submitted that the heirs of Uma Shanker became necessary parties entitling them to challenge the compromise in view of the fact that in suit No. 30 of 1970 Uma Shanker had been arrayed as a defendant. In that suit, the petitioner was challenging the sale deed said to have been executed by him in 1969 in favour of Uma Shanker. From these facts it is clear that Uma Shanker also had substantial interest in suit No. 47 of 1968. The submission is without any merit. In that suit, the petitioner was challenging the sale deed said to have been executed by him in 1969 in favour of Uma Shanker. From these facts it is clear that Uma Shanker also had substantial interest in suit No. 47 of 1968. The submission is without any merit. The validity of the compromise in suit No. 47 of 1968 has to be judged with reference to the pleadings of the parties in that suit and not suit No. 30 of 1970. As mentioned above suit No. 47 of 1968 was directed mainly against Rama Shanker and not Uma Shanker. 33. It may be mentioned that Sri S.C. Agarwal who appeared for Km. Sudha in this petition made an attempt to challenge the legality of the impugned orders. It is difficult to see how Km. Sudha can challenge the impugned orders without filing any petition against the same. However, Sri S.C. Agarwal merely repeated the submissions which were made by Sri G.N. Varma in regard to which I have already made my comments. 34. No other points were urged in support of these petitions. 35. In the result, both the petitions fail and are dismissed. The respondents Nos. 3 to 10 shall be entitled to their costs from the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 6503 of 1979. There will, however, be no order as to costs in writ petition No. 9364 of 1979. Petition dismissed.