JUDGMENT A.N. Verma, J. - This writ petition is directed against concurrent orders passed by the courts below refusing to set aside an ex parte decree for ejectment of the petitioners from an accommodation of which the respondent No. 3 is the owner and landlady. 2. The aforesaid suit was decreed ex parse on 14-5-1977. It appears that the summons issued to the petitioners were treated as having been duly served on them by refusal. On 9-8-1977 the petitioners filed an application for setting aside of the ex parte decree along with an affidavit stating that the petitioners have neither been served with any summonsee nor had they refused to accept the same. The andorsements to the contrary on these summonsees are false. In fact, the petitioners came to know of the ex parte decree from the plaintiff'- respondent herself in connection with an appeal which the plaintiff' had filed under section 22 of the U P. Act No. 13 of 1972 against the order passed by the Prescribed Authority, rejecting her application for an order of eviction of the petitioners. In the course of talks between Smt. Prabha, petitioner No. 3 herein, and the plaintiff-appellant in that appeal, Smt. Prabha came to know of the fact that a suit had been filed against the petitioners and that the same has been decreed on 14-5-1977. The petitioners got the record immediately inspected and found that the information received by Smt. Prabha was correct. The suit had been decred ex parte against them without any notice to the petitioners. 3. The application was opposed by the plaintiff. The trial court rejected the application of the petitioners on the ground that in view of the endorsements made on the summonses which were sought to be served on the petitioners it must he presumed that the petitioner had been duly served in the suit. In regard to the delay in filing the application, the trial court observed as follows : "Secondly the service of knowledge is not consistent and it is also not believable that Smt. Sushma will depose any things against the applicant because she is residing s at Kanpur and the address is admitted her Applicant and the service is effected for all the applicants upon his address." The trial court further observed that the security filed by the petitioners was defective. It was, however, not indicated as to what the defect was. With these findings the application was rejected. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the petitioners filed a revision which has been dismissed. The revisional court has observed that the plea of the petitioners that they were not served cannot be accepted because there were summonses on the record showing that the petitioners had refused to accept the summonses. 5. In regard to the question of delay, the revisional court observed that the trial court having disbelieved that the petitioners derived knowledge tinder the circumstances stated by them, there was no occasion for interference with the order passed by the trial court. The revisional court, however, made no comments whether the security furnished by the petitioners under section 17 of the Provincial Small Courts Act was defective or not. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders they filed a revision under section 115 Civil Procedure Code in this Court. It was dismissed on 23rd July, 1979 in view of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in which it was held that no revision lay against such orders. The petitioners thereafter applied for certified copy of the order passed by this Court and on receipt of the same the present petition was filed. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the orders passed by the courts below are manifestly unsustainable in law. Their findings are perverse. In any case, both the courts below have not applied their minds to the case set us by the petitioners as regards both service of notice as well as the delay in filing the application for setting aside of the ex parte decree. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the opinion that the case should go back to the revisional court for a proper disposal of the application filed by the petitioners. 8. So far as the trial court is concerned, it disposed of the issue whether summonses had been served on the petitioners or not by observing that the summons are on the file. They were sent by registered post and hence they will be deemed to have been duly served because of the endorsements of the postman on the registered envelops. The trial court was clearly in error there. They were sent by registered post and hence they will be deemed to have been duly served because of the endorsements of the postman on the registered envelops. The trial court was clearly in error there. No doubt initially there was a presumption of due service of the summonses on the petitioners because of the endorsements appearing on the summonses However, the presumption was not irrebuttal. The petitioners had filed an affidavit denying having received any such summonses or having refused to accept the same. 9. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent states that there was also a counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent controverting these assertions. 10. Be that as it may, the trial court was in error in thinking the endorsements appearing on the summons showing that the petitioners had refused to accept the same were sufficient to dispose of the case. The court had to consider further on the basis of the affidavits filed by the parties whether the plea taken by the petitioners that they had not received any such summonses nor had they refused the same, is true or false. 11. The same mistake has been committed by the revisional court also. The revisional court seems to think that the endorsements appearing on the summons which were alleged to have been tendered to the petitioners were final and conclusive. There is no reference in the orders passed by either of the two courts below to the affidavits tiled by the parties, possibly because of the view which they were taking, namely, that the endorsements of refusal on the summonses were conclusive. 12. In regard to the question of delay in filing the application, it is extremely difficult to make any sense out of what the trial court has observed. The affidavit which was filed on behalf of the petitioners was that of Smt. Prabha who is a resident of Etawah. The trial court has, however, referred to Smt. Sushma, who is no doubt a resident of Kanpur. Both the plaintiff as well as Smt. Prabha are, however, residents of Etawah. It is difficult to see how the fact that Smt. Sushma was a resident of Kanpur had any bearing on the plea taken by the petitioners as to the circumstances and the date on which they derived knowledge of the ex parte decree. 13. Both the plaintiff as well as Smt. Prabha are, however, residents of Etawah. It is difficult to see how the fact that Smt. Sushma was a resident of Kanpur had any bearing on the plea taken by the petitioners as to the circumstances and the date on which they derived knowledge of the ex parte decree. 13. The revisional court has merely endorsed the finding of the trial court without applying its own independent mind. In my opinion, neither of the two courts below has made any serious effort to investigate the question of delay in an objective way. 14. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, however, submitted that the application of the petitioners was also dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the security furnished by them was defective. As already mentioned, the trial court has not indicated as to what the detect was. The revisional court has made no comments on this aspect at all. The order which the trial court passed was a judicial order and it should have given reason why it considered the security furnished by the petitioners defective. In the absence of any reasons disclosed in the impugned order, it is not possible to assume that the security furnished was defective. 15. The revisional court should, therefore, reconsider all the aforesaid matters and give fresh findings thereon. If the revisional court comes to the conclusion that the security furnished by the petitioners was defective and could not be accepted under section 17 of the provincial Small Cause Courts Act, it is obvious that the application of the petitioners under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be liable to be dismissed on that ground alone as compliance with the provisions of section 17 has been consistently held to be mandatory. However, the revisional court should give findings on all these issues arising in the case. 16. In the result, the petition success and is allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Etawah dated 29-11-1978, is quashed. The said court will now dispose of S.C.C. - Revision No. 164 of 1978 afresh according to law, having regard to the observations made in this judgment. The parties shall bear their own costs of this petition.