ORDER H.N. Mithal, J. - By this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 7-7-82 passed by the Chancellor, Allahabad University. By this order, the Chancellor has set aside the petitioner's appointment as permanent Reader in Botany Department in the University of Allahabad. 2. The facts material for the purposes of this petition may be stated thus : 3. By means of an advertisement dated 4th September, 1980 occurring in the local daily `Northern India Patrika' the Registrar of the University of Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as University) advertised for the posts of Readers - one permanent and one temporary in the Department of Botany. The advertisement set out minimum qualifications that were necessary for being considered to the said posts. Pursuant to the advertisement, the petitioner also applied for the post of Readers along with others. He did not specify whether his application was for the post of permanent or temporary Reader. In the petition, it is asserted that the petitioner had passed his M.Sc. in Botany in 1958 in IInd Division obtaining 5th position and thereafter he worked for Ph.D. and was awarded Ph.D. in his subject in the year, 1982. Thereafter he had been guiding research of several students and had also published a large number of research papers in foreign and other internationally recognised journals. According to him, he was qualified for being considered for the post of Reader, for which the University had invited applications. The petitioner admittedly was appointed as a Lecturer in Botany in August, 1963 and was confirmed in 1971. 4. The respondent No. 3 was also appointed as a temporary lecturer in 1964 having passed his B.Sc. and M.Sc. examinations with agricultural Botany as his main subject. The respondent No. 3 was also confirmed in Feb. 1971. It is alleged that the petitioner was senior to respondent No. 3. The petitioner and the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 who also had applied for the post of Readers, appeared before the selection committee. In its recommendations, the selection committee placed the petitioner at serial No. 1 while the respondent No. 4 was placed at S. No. 2. 1971. It is alleged that the petitioner was senior to respondent No. 3. The petitioner and the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 who also had applied for the post of Readers, appeared before the selection committee. In its recommendations, the selection committee placed the petitioner at serial No. 1 while the respondent No. 4 was placed at S. No. 2. These recommendations were approved by the Executive Council of the University on 14-3-1981, pursuant to which the petitioner was given a letter of appointment as permanent Reader in the Department while respondent No. 4 was appointed against the post advertised as temporary but, as in the meanwhile a permanent vacancy had occurred, he was given appointment as a permanent Reader instead. 5. The respondent No. 3 feeling aggrieved by these appointments submitted a representation before the Chancellor under Section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). After inviting the comments from the petitioner, the Chancellor passed the impugned order and according to him, the petitioner did not possess requisite minimum qualifications. According to him, the appointment was made in violation of statute 11.02 and therefore it was set aside. 6. The contention of the petitioner in this Court is that he did possess the requisite qualifications and the selection committee also did not find him lacking these qualifications when he was interviewed. According to him, the question whether a candidate possessed minimum qualifications or not must be left to the selection committee and the Chancellor can have no jurisdiction to interfere under Section 68 of the Act in such matters. It is urged that the Chancellor has exceeded his jurisdiction under Section 68 of the Act in holding that the petitioner did not possess minimum qualifications required for the appointment of a Reader. It it further urged that the selection committee or the academic Council of the University had not violated any provision of the Act, statute or Regulations and as such also the Chancellor had no jurisdiction at all to interfere in the matter. 7. The petition is mainly contested by the respondent No. 3, although some mild opposition has been made on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 also. Naturally the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have now tried to support the stand taken by the Chancellor. 8. 7. The petition is mainly contested by the respondent No. 3, although some mild opposition has been made on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 also. Naturally the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have now tried to support the stand taken by the Chancellor. 8. For respondent No. 3, it has been contended that the High Court has only committed powers under Article 226 of the Consultation to interfere in the internal affairs of the University and should be most reluctant to exercise its discretionary powers in such matters. His of her submission was that the Chancellor had power to interfere under Section 68 of the Act where it is found that the selected candidate did not possess even the minimum qualifications required for 3 post. It is costly urged that Chancellor's decision that the petitioner did not possess the requisite minimum qualifications was final and the High Court cannot interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. 9. Before entering upon the merits of the case, it would be my duty to first examine the extent to which this Court can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters of the kind. With great ability, the counsel for both the parties have brought before me the various cases dealing with this matter. In University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491 Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) was dealing with a case arising in the following circumstances. 10. The petitioner had questioned the appointment of one Anniah Gowda on the post of Research Reader as being illegal in the face of the prescribed qualifications. By a writ of quo warranto, the petitioner sought the appointment of Sri Gowda to be quashed and for directing the University to appoint the petitioner himself to that post. The High Court held that the appointment was invalid and, therefore, it quashed the. resolution of the Board of appointment of the University. The High Court, however, did not grant the petitioner a writ of mandamus directing that he be appointed to the said post. One of the qualifications prescribed for the post was "a first class or high second class master's degree" of an Indian University or an equivalent qualification of a foreign University in the subject concerned. The High Court, however, did not grant the petitioner a writ of mandamus directing that he be appointed to the said post. One of the qualifications prescribed for the post was "a first class or high second class master's degree" of an Indian University or an equivalent qualification of a foreign University in the subject concerned. The Board of appointment consisted of the Vice-Chancellor and two specialists who interviewed four applicants and after considering the academic qualifications of various candidates and after their performance at the interview came to the conclusion and appointed Sri Gowda as the most suitable and qualified person. This report was duly approved by the Chancellor and an appointment was given to Sri Gowda. Before he could take charge, the petitioner filed a petition challenging the appointment. The High Court in its decision had concentrated mainly on the first part of his qualifications and since the candidate had obtained 50 per cent marks it held that he did not possess a "high second class" degree at the Master's stage. The High Court, however, did not consider whether the candidate the second qualification. In this respect the Supreme Court in its judgment, at page 496 (of AIR) observed: "The High Court does not appear to have considered the question as to whether it would be appropriate for the High Court to differ from the opinion of the Board when it was quite likely that the Board may have taken the view that the degree of Master of Arts of the Durham , University, which appellant No. 2 had obtained was equivalent to a high second class Master's degree of an Indian University. This aspect of the questions (sic) purely to an academic matter and Courts would naturally hesitate to express a definite opinion, particularly, when it appears that the Board of experts was satisfied that appellant No. 2 fulfilled the first qualification. If only the attention of the High Court had been drawn to the equivalent furnished in the first qualification we have no doubt that it would not have held that the Board had acted capriciously in expressing the opinion that appellant No. 2 satisfied all the qualifications, including the first qualification." The Supreme Court in that decision went on to observe as under : "We are unable to see the point of criticism of the High Court in such academic matters. The Boards of appointment are nominated by the Universities and when recommendations made by them and the appointments following on them are challenged before the Courts, normally the Court should be slow to interfere with the opinion expressed by the experts. There is no allegation about mala fides against the experts who constituted the present Board and so, we think, it would normally be wise and safe for the Courts to leave the decision of academic matters to experts who are more familiar with the problems they face than the Courts generally can be." With this note of caution, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the High Court and upheld the appointment. 11. Reference may next be made to the case of Principal Patna College, Patna v. Kalyan Srinivas Raman, AIR 1966 SC 707 where the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court had observed (at p. 713) : "In dealing with matters relating to orders passed by the authorities of educational institutions the High Court normally should be very slow to pass ex parte interim orders under Article 226 of the Constitution because matters falling within the jurisdiction of the educational authorities should normally be left to their decision, and the High Court should interfere with them only when it thinks it must do so in the interest of justice." 12. In yet another case which was decided on 27th August, 1962 but was reported much later in AIR 1966 SC 875 (Board of High School and Intermediate Education U.P. Allahabad v. Bagleshwar Prasad), Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was observed : "In dealing with writ petitions against the orders of the Universities or Education Boards, cancelling the examination results of candidates who were declared to have been passed it is necessary to bear in mind that educational institutions like the Universities or the Boards, set up Enquiry Committee to,deal with the problem posed by the adoption of unfair means by candidates and normally it is within the jurisdiction of such domestic tribunals to decide all relevant questions in the light of the evidence adduced before them. In the matter of adoption of unfair means, direct evidence may sometimes be available but cases may arise where direct evidence is not available and the question will have to be considered in the light of probabilities and circumstantial evidence. In the matter of adoption of unfair means, direct evidence may sometimes be available but cases may arise where direct evidence is not available and the question will have to be considered in the light of probabilities and circumstantial evidence. This problem which educational institutions have to face from time to time is a serious problem and unless there is justification to do so, courts should be slow to interfere with the decision of domestic Tribunals appointed by educational bodies like the Universities. 13. Reference may also be made here to the case of Dr. J.P. Kulshrestha, AIR 1980 SC 2141 : 1980 All LJ 571. In that case the sole point for interpretation was. what is `high second class'? The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that marks above 54 per cent could be said to be high second class. The Supreme Court in paragraph 1 of the report observed : "The core controversy in this appeal by special leave rages round the legality of the selection of Readers by the Allahabad University. The fortunes of the litigation pending for seven years, have been fluctuating from Court to Court. The fine line of distinction between internal autonomy for educational bodies and insulation of their operations from judicial interference on the one hand and the constitutional obligation of the Court to examine the legality of academic actions and correct clear injustices on the other is jurisprudentially real and the present appeal illustrates the demarcation between the two positions. While legal shibboleths like `hand off universities' and meticulous forensic invigilation of educational organs may both be wrong, a balanced approach of leaving universities in their internal functioning well alone to a large extent, but striking at illegalities and injustices, if committed by however high an authority, educational or other will resolve the problem raised by the counsel before us in this appeal from a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court." 14. Thus it follows that only in those cases where there had been any violation of law or injustice done even though by wrong interpretation of a provision, the Court has the power to strike. 15. The same view was also held by a Division Bench of this Court in `Paras Nath Dwivedi v. Chancellor Sampurna Nand Sanskrit Vishwa Vidyalaya, 1982 All LJ 961. 15. The same view was also held by a Division Bench of this Court in `Paras Nath Dwivedi v. Chancellor Sampurna Nand Sanskrit Vishwa Vidyalaya, 1982 All LJ 961. In that case, the person who was appointed did not possess the doctorate degree in Shankar Vedant, subject concerned but instead, he had doctorate degree in Vyakaran. It was held that this appointment was in clear disregard of mandate of statutes 11.01 (1) and 11.02 of the Statutes. Such appointment required to be quashed as the doctorate in the subject of `Vyakaran' could not legitimately be regarded as a doctorate in the subject of 'Shankar Vedant'. The Chancellor in that case, though had applied a wrong statute in setting aside the appointment, High Court refused to interfere since the substance of the matter was not affected. The order passed by the Chancellor was, therefore, upheld. 16. There is another case of this Court in Ghazanfar Rashid v. Secretary Board of High School, AIR 1979 All 209 : 1979 All LJ 676. The Full Bench in this case held (Para 8) : "If the examination committee relying on the report of the screening committee as well as on the answers of examinees bona fide arrives at the conclusion that the examinees used unfair means in answering the questions, it is not open to the High Court to interfere with that decision merely because the High Court may take a different view on reassessment of those circumstances." 17. All these decisions, although strike a note of caution to the Courts not to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution lightly in the matters concerning internal management of the Universities or other autonomous bodies, nevertheless hold that the Court had the right to do so where it becomes necessary in an appropriate case so to do. 18. There is, therefore, ample authority for holding that the High Court, in the exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, has got the power to strike out the decision of the University or its authorities in appropriate cases notwithstanding the rule of caution and prudence not to do so unless absolutely necessary. The objection by the respondents that the Court should not entertain this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution at all, is not valid. The objection by the respondents that the Court should not entertain this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution at all, is not valid. It would be seen, on a consideration of the merits, later whether the Court should or should not interfere in this case or whether the Court can at all grant any relief to the petitioner. 19. Having considered, the scope of Court's jurisdiction in the matter, it will now be better to understand as to what exactly is the nature of the dispute. According to statute 11.02 as amended in U.P. by Allahabad University 9th Amendment Statute, 1980 published in U.P. Gazette extraordinary dated 20-6-80, the minimum qualifications required for appointment to the post of a Reader are as under : (i) Good academic record with doctorate degree or equivalent published work, and active engagement in research or innovation in teaching methods or production of teaching materials, and (ii) five years' experience of teaching or research including at least 3 years as lecturer or in an equal position: Provided that the requirements contained in sub-clause (ii) may be relaxed in the case of a candidate who, in the opinion of the selection committee, has outstanding research work to his credit." The main dispute in this petition is whether the petitioner was possessed of a "Good academic record" or not. It is admitted on all sides that the petitioner possessed a doctorate degree and also had published work to his credit. It is also admitted that he had more than five years' experience in teaching and also of guiding research and also had outstanding research work to his credit. The sole point for consideration therefore, is whether the petitioner possessed 'good academic record' also? 20. What is a good academic record is not defined anywhere in the Act, statute or ordinance. There is nothing in them to throw any light on this question. We have, therefore, to look upon the ordinary dictionary meaning of the word `good'. In Black's dictionary `good' is defined as valid, sufficient in law, effectual, unobjectionable, sound responsible, solvent, able to pay amount specified. The word 'academic' had been defined by Black as pertaining to college, University or preparatory school. According to the ordinary dictionary meaning, therefore, good academic record' should mean a sound or unobjectionable record pertaining to college or University. In Black's dictionary `good' is defined as valid, sufficient in law, effectual, unobjectionable, sound responsible, solvent, able to pay amount specified. The word 'academic' had been defined by Black as pertaining to college, University or preparatory school. According to the ordinary dictionary meaning, therefore, good academic record' should mean a sound or unobjectionable record pertaining to college or University. 20-A. The record of the academic achievement at school and University levels in our State are High School and intermediate examinations conducted by the U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education and by the University at the graduate and master's level Therefore, "good, academic record" should normally mean academic achievement of a candidate at these four examinations. This does not create any difficulty. The real difficulty comes when one is called upon to define as to what is `good academic record'. 21. One of the arguments raised on behalf of the respondent was that a person obtaining as low as 48 per cent marks cannot be deemed to possess a good academic record' which ought to be regarded only as `average'. The petitioner, however, contended that the IInd Division itself was meant for academically good students and any candidate placed in IInd Division must be deemed to possess a good academic record'. Since in the Act or elsewhere it is not defined as to what is good academic record, one must look elsewhere to resolve the rival contentions in this respect. 22. Sri Naithani, learned counsel for the appellant in this connection urged that from time to time amendments have been made in the University Statutes which laid down minimum qualification required for appointment to various posts. Initially prior to 1980, the minimum qualification prescribed for Readers post in science subject was : "(a) A doctorate in the subject of study concerned or published work of a high standard in that subject, and (b) consistently good academic record that is to say overall record of all assessments throughout the academic career of a candidate with first class or high second class (that is to say, with an aggregate of more than 54 per cent marks) Master's degree or equivalent degree of a foreign University in such subject. 23. It emerges from it that a candidate must possess the following qualifications : (a) either a doctorate in the subject of study concerned. 23. It emerges from it that a candidate must possess the following qualifications : (a) either a doctorate in the subject of study concerned. or a published work of high standard in that subject, and (b) (i) consistently good academic record meaning overall assessment of the entire academic record. with (ii) First class or high second class (more than 54 per cent marks) in master's degree. or equivalent degree of a foreign University in such subject. After the amendment of the University Statutes in 1980 the relevant provision i.e., statute 11.02, now stands, as under : (i) good academic record with a doctorate degree or equivalent published work, and active engagement in research or innovation in teaching methods or production of teaching materials, and (ii) 5 years' experience of teaching or research including at least three years as lecturer or in an equivalent position: Provided that the requirement contained in such clause (ii) may be relaxed in the case of a candidate who, in the opinion of the selection committee, has outstanding research work to his credit. An analysis of the present minimum qualification as laid down in statute 11.02 will be as under : (A) (i) good academic record with (ii) (a) doctorate degree, (b) equivalent published work, along with (1) other active engagement research, in or (2) innovation in teaching methods, Or (3) production of teaching materials, and (B) (i) five years' experience of teaching, or (ii) research with at least three years as lecturer or in an equivalent position. On a comparison of the minimum qualifications prescribed at two different times for a post of a Reader in the University, one will notice that as far as the academic record is concerned for merely it was required to be `consistently good' and only for the Master's degree 'a first class or high second class' was essential. Even here care was taken to specify that high second class would mean an aggregate of 54 per cent marks. This was, however, done after the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sri J.P. Kulshrestha v. University of Allahabad, AIR 1980 SC 2141 : 1980 All LJ 571. The question arises why after all this change in the minimum qualification had been made? This was, however, done after the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sri J.P. Kulshrestha v. University of Allahabad, AIR 1980 SC 2141 : 1980 All LJ 571. The question arises why after all this change in the minimum qualification had been made? The comparison of the minimum qualification prescribed earlier and now would suggest that while earlier consistently good academic record which included overall assessment throughout the academic career of a candidate with a first class or high second class in master's degree was necessary but now these requirements have been reduced to a mere good academic record. Now even a doctorate degree may not be necessary provided in the alternative a candidate possessed published work of a High Standard with either active engagement in research, or innovation in teaching methods or production of teaching materials. It is also required that a candidate must have either five years' experience in teaching or three years' experience as a lecturer with research. I have carefully examined the qualifications now laid down in Statute 11.02 and compared them with those which were contained in Statute 11.01 and 11.02 earlier and I find that there is distinct slant in the qualifications which are indicative of the legislative The emphasis is now more on teaching experience or research, or in the guidance of the research work, rather than on the academic record of a candidate. The rigidity in the standard of academic record laid down earlier, therefore, has been mellowed down to just possession of `a good academic record'. The intention appears to be clear that a person seeking appointment as a Reader must be better equipped to guide research work and he himself must have done considerable research work. Consistently high standard of academic record of a candidate, therefore, has been relegated considerably. This makes legislative intent very clear. 24. Apart from the above, the Board of Intermediate Education as also the Universities have fixed minimum passing marks which in some cases may be 33 per cent or 36 per cent. A candidate getting less than this minimum is considered to be unfit even for being granted a certificate or degree in the concerned examination and he fails. However, once he crosses this minimum, his ranking may be either in the first division, second division or the third division. A candidate getting less than this minimum is considered to be unfit even for being granted a certificate or degree in the concerned examination and he fails. However, once he crosses this minimum, his ranking may be either in the first division, second division or the third division. Those candidates who secure 60 per cent or more in the aggregate are placed in the first division and may be considered academically to be very good. Even in this division those who secure 75 per cent or more in any Paper are awarded distinction, in that paper or subject. Similarly those candidates who get below 60 per cent marks but secure 45 per cent or more in aggregate are placed in the IInd Division and these may be classified as academically good. The rest who pass are placed in the third Division. The second division, therefore, ranges from 45 per cent or 48 per cent or to just below 60 per cent. A student who gets 48 per cent or one who secures 59 per cent or just below 60 per cent are both placed in the second division, although the former may be said to have got a low second division and the latter a 'high second division'. However, since 1980 this distinction of high second division or low second division has been done away with. What is "High Second class" was subject-matter of decision by the Supreme Court in J.P. Kulshrestha v. University of Allahabad's case, 1980 All LJ 571 (supra) and it was held therein that a person obtaining at least 54 per cent marks or more alone could be said to have earned a `high second class'. 25. Therefore, in my opinion any candidate who has secured at least a second division in his enter academic career must be held to possess a good academic record', within the meaning of Statute 11.02. Since there are no qualifying words before the phrase 'good academic record', it must necessarily follow that the legislative or the University never intended to place any such further restriction. Had it been otherwise there is no reason why in the statute itself, the words with high second class could not have been repeated while amending the existing statute in 1980. Had it been otherwise there is no reason why in the statute itself, the words with high second class could not have been repeated while amending the existing statute in 1980. The only inference possible is that in order to select a person to the post of Reader it was only intended that any candidate securing at least second class during the entire academic career must be eligible for being considered for the post but it was his Research achievements which would determine his final selection on a comparative assessment of the merits of all the candidates. Therefore, merely because the petitioner could not secure high second division marks and obtained only marginal marks to secure a second division cannot make any difference. 26. There is another aspect of this matter. The percentage of marks secured by a candidate comes up for consideration at two stages, once when the selection committee considers which of the candidates possess minimum qualification so as to be called for the interview and again when all the candidates qualified for interview have been interviewed and the academic accomplishments of each candidate are before the selection committee and it is called upon to make a comparative assessment of the merit of each candidate for making a final selection. Of course even at this time percentage of marks obtained at the various examinations may also be taken into consideration. At the initial stage therefore, it should suffice that a candidate has secured at least IInd Division throughout his academic career, irrespective of the fact whether he got a low or a high percentage of marks. The question of possessing minimum qualification is relevant only at that stage and one need not peep deeper into the record then to find out his percentage of marks and it should suffice if he obtained a second division, which according to me is what is meant by a 'good academic achievement'. 27. It is, therefore, held that having secured at least a second division throughout his academic career, the petitioner did possess the qualification of having a good academic record for being considered as a candidate by the selection committee for the post of Reader in the University. 28. This leads us now to the question as to who should and can decide the question as to whether a candidate possessed the requisite minimum qualification. 29. 28. This leads us now to the question as to who should and can decide the question as to whether a candidate possessed the requisite minimum qualification. 29. It was urged on behalf of the petitioners that whenever a statute fixes minimum qualification it should be possible to draw a distinct line to separate all those who possess minimum qualifications and those who do not. For example possession of a doctorate degree is something definite and on its basis it is possible to separate candidates having this minimum qualification. But if a person does not possess a doctorate degree and instead he has equivalent published work to his credit this definite line of distinction will vanish and much will depend on the assessment of the quality of published work and whether it measures up to the standard of a doctorate degree. Who then will decide whether a particular published work of a candidate is equivalent to doctorate degree? The answer must necessarily be that the selection committee which consists of experts in the subject alone would be competent to decide this. If this assessment has been made by the selection committee one way or the other can it be called as violation of any provision if the Chancellor holds a different view. It is there only where it is possible to draw a distinct on the basis of minimum qualifications laid down that it may be possible for to say whether the person possesses the minimum qualification or not, the violation of such a condition can entitle the Chancellor to step in and exercise his powers under section 68 of the Act. 30. Reliance for this purpose can be rested on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Paras Nath Dwivedi v. Chancellor, Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwa Vidyalaya, 1982 All LJ 961. In that case the candidate recommended by the selection committee and appointed by the University possessed doctorate in some other subject than the concerned subject. The Chancellor's order of interference was rightly upheld by the Bench. 31. Where, however, this is not possible, the selection committee alone should be ` held to be the final authority to decide whether the candidate possessed the equivalent minimum qualifications or not. 32. Statute 11.02 at several places uses phrases which cannot be defined with certainty and have to be assessed on merit by experts. 31. Where, however, this is not possible, the selection committee alone should be ` held to be the final authority to decide whether the candidate possessed the equivalent minimum qualifications or not. 32. Statute 11.02 at several places uses phrases which cannot be defined with certainty and have to be assessed on merit by experts. The phrases `equivalent published work', active engagement in research `innovation in teaching methods', `production of teaching materials' as used in sub-clause (d) and the phrase 'an equivalent position' as mentioned in sub-clause (ii) of this statute are examples. Wherever such a phrase will come up for consideration, the selection committee must be left to decide it and to judge whether a particular candidate possessed any of such minimum qualifications as to make him eligible for selection to the concerned post. The very purpose of constituting the selection committee appears to be to leave such matters exclusively in the hands of those men of the committee who are qualified in that specialised branch of learning and also possess experience in that field. 33. It would be seen that according to Section 31 (4) of this Act, the selection committee, for the appointment of a Reader in the University consists of : (i) Vice Chancellor, (ii) Head of the Department concerned, (iii) Three experts to be nominated by the Chancellor. 34. The scheme of the Act lays down an elaborate procedure for appointment of Teachers and Readers under Chapter VI of the Act. Section 31 deals with the appointments of the teachers in the University also. Sub-section (4) thereof deals with the constitution of the selection committee, according to which the Vice-Chancellor, the Head of the Department concerned and three experts to be nominated by the Chancellor constitute the selection committee. Sub-clause (5) deals with the manner in which a panel of experts for each subject has to be prepared. Only an expert who is on the panel can be nominated by the Chancellor for a selection committee. According to sub-section (6) the recommendations of the selection committee must have the concurrence of at least one of the experts. Sub-section (7-A) then empowers the selection committee to recommend up to three names in order of preference for any post. Only an expert who is on the panel can be nominated by the Chancellor for a selection committee. According to sub-section (6) the recommendations of the selection committee must have the concurrence of at least one of the experts. Sub-section (7-A) then empowers the selection committee to recommend up to three names in order of preference for any post. Sun-section (10) provides that no selection for any appointment shall be made except when an advertisement of the vacancy has been made in at least three issues of two newspapers having adequate circulation in U. P. 35. In the instant case also, the selection committee had been duly constituted and there is no dispute about the validity of its constitution. The Head of the Department of the concerned subject and three experts make the selection committee dominated by four experts besides the vice-chancellor, who acts as Chairman of the selection committee also. After providing for necessary safeguards in this respect, the legislature has left the matter of selection entirely in the hands of the selection committee. Necessary safeguards have been provided in Section 31 of the Act and every effort has been made to ensure that selections are made on merit alone. It is in this background that the entire question of selection of a candidate should be judged. In the instant case, the selection committee did not object to the candidature of the petitioner. It interviewed him and finally recommended his name for appointment to the post of permanent Reader which was ultimately endorsed by the executive council of the University also. Till that time no one raised any objection. Respondent No. 3 also did not raise any question either before the selection committee or the Executive Council that the petitioner did not possess requisite minimum qualification and that he ought not to be considered by the selection committee. The point was first raised in the representation against the petitioner's appointment. The objection was upheld by the Chancellor while passing his order under Section 68 of the Act. 36. Question arises when can the Chancellor interfere in such an appointment in exercise of his powers under Section 68 of the Act? 37. It would be appropriate to mention here that an advertisement had appeared in the local Northern India Patrika dated 6-9-80 and no one questioned the validity of the advertisement. 36. Question arises when can the Chancellor interfere in such an appointment in exercise of his powers under Section 68 of the Act? 37. It would be appropriate to mention here that an advertisement had appeared in the local Northern India Patrika dated 6-9-80 and no one questioned the validity of the advertisement. Admittedly, one permanent and the other temporary posts of Readers had been advertised. The advertisement contained the prescribed minimum qualification for eligibility for the post of Reader in accordance with Statute 11.02 38. The petitioner and the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were amongst the applicants for the two posts and all of them had appeared before the selection committee. The selection committee vide its report dated 27th February 1981 made its recommendation in the following language : "The selection committee after considering the relevant merits of the candidates decided to recommend that the following be appointed Readers in `Botany in order of preference as indicated below : (1) Dr. Devesh Chandra Pandey. (2) Dr. Sudhir Chandra. The selection committee also recommended that the initial salary of Readers of both the above candidates be the same." 39. This recommendation was accepted by the Executive Council by its resolution No. 64 dated 14th March, 1981 and pursuant to it letters of appointment were issued. 40. The respondent no. 3 thereafter made a representation to the Chancellor under Section 68 of the Act questioning the validity of the selection and praying that the petitioner's selection be set aside and appointment be made afresh by another selection committee. A copy of the representation made by the respondent no. 3 is Annexure III to this petition. From this representation, it appears that the sole ground on which the appointments were questioned was that the academic record of respondent no. 3 was for better than that of the petitioner and petitioner had been selected by misrepresentation of facts. It is also alleged that full details of the marks obtained by the petitioner had not been placed before the selection committee. 41. It may, however, be noted here that in this representation the respondent no. 3 did not make any allegation of bias or mala fides against either any expert or any other member of the selection committee. 42. It is also alleged that full details of the marks obtained by the petitioner had not been placed before the selection committee. 41. It may, however, be noted here that in this representation the respondent no. 3 did not make any allegation of bias or mala fides against either any expert or any other member of the selection committee. 42. On a consideration of this representation, the Chancellor by his order dated 27-6-82 held that the petitioner did not possess a 'good academic record' and he did not possess the minimum qualification. The appointment of the petitioner was, therefore, set aside. 43. The petitioner has challenged the validity of this order urging firstly that section 68 of the Act did not empower the Chancellor at all to interfere in the selection made by the selection committee, secondly, it is submitted that the selection committee there had committed no violation of any provision of the Act, statute or regulation and for this reason also the Chancellor could not act under this section. 44. For a proper appreciation of these arguments, let me first examine the provision of Section 68 here which may be reproduced as below : "68. 44. For a proper appreciation of these arguments, let me first examine the provision of Section 68 here which may be reproduced as below : "68. Reference to the Chancellor : If any question arises whether any person has been duly elected or appointed as, or is entitled to be, member of any authority or other body of the university, or whether any decision of any authority or officer of the University including any question as to the statute or ordinance made or approved by the State Government or by the Chancellor is in conformity with this Act or the statutes or the ordinance made thereunder the matter shall be referred to the Chancellor and the decision of the Chancellor thereon-shall be final: Provided that no reference under this section shall be made- (a) more than three months after the date when the question could have been raised for the first time, (b) by any person other than an authority or officer of the University or a person aggrieved: Provided further that the Chancellor may in exceptional circumstances:- (a) act suo motu or entertain a reference after the expiry of the period mentioned in the preceding proviso, (b) where the matter referred relates to a dispute about the election, and the eligibility of the person so elected is in doubt, pass such orders of stay as he thinks just and expedients." Leaving out the irrelevant, an analysis of the section would show that the Chancellor' can exercise powers under the Section only in the following circumstances : (a) when a question arises whether any person had been- (i) duly selected., (ii) duly appointed, or (iii) was entitled to be a member of any authority or body of the University, or (b) if a question arises that decision of- (i) any authority, or (ii) officer of the University is in conformity with the Act, or the statutes or the Ordinance made thereunder, then such matter can be referred to the Chancellor whose decision shall be final. 45. One can at once say that sub-clause (a) of the Section has no application because it only pertains to selection, appointment or entitlement to be member of any body or authority of the University. This problem does not present itself in this case. 45. One can at once say that sub-clause (a) of the Section has no application because it only pertains to selection, appointment or entitlement to be member of any body or authority of the University. This problem does not present itself in this case. Here what I am concerned with is that according to sub-clause (b) a decision of any authority or officer of the University can be referred to the Chancellor if it was not in conformity with the Act, statutes or ordinance. An officer of the University is defined in Section 9 of the Act and it includes the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and the Registrar amongst others. Similarly, Section 19 in Chapter V details the various authorities of the University which includes among others the executive council and the selection committee. Therefore, any recommendation made by the selection committee and /or any decision taken by the Executive Council in respect thereof would amount to decision of an authority or officer of the University. Thus a decision of any of these authorities can be questioned before the Chancellor. This, however, has its own limitation and only if there was any lack of conformity with any provision of the Act etc. then the Chancellor would be entitled to interfere with the order of the Executive Council. According to the Chancellor's order he had assumed jurisdiction under Section 68 of the Act because, according to him, the petitioner did not possess `good academic record' and thus he could not be selected to the post of Reader. For the petitioner it is urged that firstly he possessed a good academic record and secondly whether he possessed a good academic record or not, was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the selection committee and this opinion could not be substituted by the Chancellor with his own opinion. No definite standard or line of distinction is prescribed to judge what is good academic record. In my opinion, on an overall consideration of all the aspects discussed earlier, a candidate must be held to possess `good academic record' if he was able to secure at least a second division in all the examinations throughout his academic career. In such matters ordinarily the final decision for the purpose of being considered by the selection committee, whether any candidate possesses the requisite minimum qualification must be left entirely to the decision of the selection committee. 46. In such matters ordinarily the final decision for the purpose of being considered by the selection committee, whether any candidate possesses the requisite minimum qualification must be left entirely to the decision of the selection committee. 46. I have already considered this point earlier and I have concluded that all candidates who had secured at least a second division throughout their academic career must be held to possess 'a good academic record' within the meaning of statute 11.02 of the University. 47. Similarly, as regards the other requirements of minimum qualification laid down in the statute they also should be left to the decision of the selection committee. It is only in a limited class of cases where the selection committee does not act in conformity with the Act, statutes or the ordinance that the Chancellor has been invested with the power to step in and correct the decision. Since, in this case, the petitioner has been held to possess a good academic record by me, it must follow that his selection was in conformity with the Act, statutes and the ordinance and, therefore, the same could not be legally set aside by the Chancellor on the ground that petitioner did not possess minimum qualifications for selection. In such circumstances, the Chancellor's order under section 68 of the Act dated 7-7-82 insofar as it relates to the petitioner must be held to be illegal. 48. Before parting with this case it may be relevant to mention here that statute 11.02 as it is today suffers from a serious lacuna. In sub-clause (1) thereof while describing the minimum qualifications as "good academic record with doctorate degree etc." there is no mention that the doctorate degree should be in the concerned subject as was the case earlier. This lacuna is likely to be misused and it may be urged in some case that mere possession of doctorate degree is required without any thing more. There, the University may, if it is so advised, take necessary steps to correct the same. 49. In the result, the petition succeeds and the order of the Chancellor dated 7-7-1982 to the extent it affects the petitioner's selection and appointment to the post of Reader to Botany department of Allahabad University is quashed. 50. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs from respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3.