ORDER N.M. Mittal, J. - In this writ petition the petitioner seeks to challenge the Chancellor's order dated 7th July, 1982. (Annexure V). He also prays for quashing the Registrar's order dated 13th July, 1982. Some other ancillary reliefs have also been claimed. 2. The petitioner was a lecturer in the Botany Department of Allahabad University. On 6-9-80 an advertisement appeared in Northern India Patrika inviting applications for filling in two posts of Readers in the Department of Botany in Allahabad University. For the sake of brevity henceforth the words `University' and `department' will be used by me for the expression University of Allahabad and department of botany, respectively. One of the two posts advertised was permanent and the other temporary. Since the petitioner possessed the minimum qualifications required for the post, he also applied along with the respondents Nos. 3 and 4. Admittedly, the candidates were interviewed by a duly constituted selection committee and on 27th Feb. 1981 it made a recommendation in favour of the petitioner and respondent No. 4. According to the priority fixed by the Selection Committee, the respondent No. 4 was placed at S. No. 1 and the petitioner was placed at S. No. 2 for the two posts. This recommendation of the selection committee was later accepted by the Executive Council on 14th March, 1981. The second post of the Reader, though it was initially advertised as temporary, had become permanent in the meanwhile due to the resignation of one of the permanent Readers in the department. The post was filled by appointing the petitioner as permanent Reader. The petitioner and the respondent No. 4 both joined their services from 15th March, 1981. It is alleged that the period of probation expired on 14th April, 1982 and the petitioner has since been confirmed as Reader in the department in the University for which a letter of confirmation dated 16th April, 1982 (Annexure II to the petition) was also issued by it. 3. The respondent No. 3 who was also one of the candidates for the two posts, feeling aggrieved by the recommendation of the selection committee and its subsequent acceptance by the Executive Council made a representation to the Chancellor under S. 68 of the U. P. State Universities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 4. The Chancellor on receipt of the representation asked the petitioner to submit his para wise comments. 4. The Chancellor on receipt of the representation asked the petitioner to submit his para wise comments. In the petition it is alleged that this representation was mainly directed against the appointment of respondent No. 4 and it made no allegations against the petitioner. There was no reference to S. 31 (10) of the Act in the representation and, thus, he was never called upon to reply to any such query by the Chancellor. The main grievance in the writ, however, is that by his order dated 7th July, 82 the Chancellor has cancelled the petitioner's appointment on the ground that his appointment was based on an illegal advertisement and the selection committee and the Executive Council had both violated S. 31(10) of the Act. The Chancellor held that since petitioner's case was only for the post of a temporary Reader he could not be appointed as a permanent Reader. The Chancellor, therefore, set aside petitioner's appointment and directed that the post be re-advertised and selection be made afresh. 5. According to the petitioner, the Act, statutes or ordinances do not place any restriction on the right of the University to convert the temporary post into a permanent one and the only requirement of S. 31 (10) of the Act was that no appointment to a post in the University could be made unless it was preceded by an advertisement. It was urged that since the appointment of the petitioner was made only after the post had been duly advertised there was nothing illegal in petitioner's appointment as Reader. The other grievance of the petitioner is that he was neither afforded due opportunity nor the representation made by respondent No. 3 specifically questioned his selection, therefore, the Chancellor's order was illegal being in violation of principles of natural justice. The action of the University could not be said to be not in conformity with the Act, statute or Ordinances within the meaning of S. 68 of the Act. It is for these reasons that the petitioner questions the validity of the Chancellor's order in this writ petition. 6. In the counter-affidavit the respondent No. 3 has admitted that for both the posts each of the candidates had made only one single application without specifying for which of the two posts the application had been made. It is for these reasons that the petitioner questions the validity of the Chancellor's order in this writ petition. 6. In the counter-affidavit the respondent No. 3 has admitted that for both the posts each of the candidates had made only one single application without specifying for which of the two posts the application had been made. An attempt has been made to urge that in paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit the appointment of the petitioner was also questioned where it was asserted that the recommendations made by Selection Committee were the result of nepotism perpetrated by Dr. D. D. Pant, professor & Head of the Department In para 7 reference has been made to some affidavit which is alleged to have been filed by him before the Chancellor but no such document has been made an annexure to the counter-affidavit. The respondent No. 3 further took the plea that the University itself had pointed out the infirmity to the Chancellor that the post advertised was initially temporary and no permanent appointment against it could be made. 7. In the petitioner's rejoinder affidavit it has been clarified that the second post of the Reader, which was initially temporary had become permanent subsequently due to resignation and thus another permanent post of a Reader had become available after the advertisement. It is also pointed out that in view of a note appended to the advertisement the number of posts was liable to be revised. It is, therefore, asserted that the selection committee was competent to make recommendation either for temporary or permanent post as may be available at that time. In view of this, if a permanent post had become available, the appointment against it could be legally made. This, then is the short compass within which the whole controversy lies. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. The respondent initially raised an objection that this Court had no jurisdiction to interfere in the Orders passed by the Chancellor in exercise of his powers under S. 68 of the Act which are final. 9. This objection need not detain me for long. Suffice it to refer to the Supreme Court decisions in : (i) University of Mysore v. G. D. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491 . (ii) Principal, Patna College v. Kalyan Srinivas, AIR 1966 SC 707 . (iii) Board of High School, etc. 9. This objection need not detain me for long. Suffice it to refer to the Supreme Court decisions in : (i) University of Mysore v. G. D. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491 . (ii) Principal, Patna College v. Kalyan Srinivas, AIR 1966 SC 707 . (iii) Board of High School, etc. v. Bagleshwar Pd., AIR 1966 SC 875 . (iv) J.P. Kulshrestha v. Allahabad University, AIR 1980 SC 2141 : 1980 Lab IC 692. The principle that emerges from these cases cannot be put in better words than what were employed by Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the Supreme Court in J. P. Kulshreshtha's case. He observed thus (At p. 693 of Lab IC) "The core controversy in this appeal by special leave rages round the legality of the selection of Readers by the Allahabad University. The fortunes of the litigation, pending for seven years, have ' been fluctuating from court to court. The fine line of distinction between internal autonomy for educational bodies and insulation of their operations from judicial interference on the one hand and the constitutional obligation of the court to examine the legality of academic actions and correct clear injustices on the other is jurisprudential real and the present appeal illustrates the demarcation between the two positions. While legal shibboleths like "hand-off universities" and meticulous forensic invigilation of educational organs may both be wrong, a balanced approach of leaving universities in their internal functioning well alone to a large extent, but striking at illegalities and injustices, if committed by however high an authority, educational or other, will resolve the problem raised by counsel before us in this appeal from a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court." 10. The mandate is clear. In exercise of powers under Article 226 the High Court certainly has the power to set at right any violation of provisions of law or undo a case of injustice without unduly arrogating to itself the job of administering the Universities in matters of internal autonomy of the Universities. 11. On merits, on a perusal of affidavits I find that the crux of the controversy is twofold; firstly whether the principles of natural justice have been violated in this case by not giving a proper opportunity to the petitioner. 11. On merits, on a perusal of affidavits I find that the crux of the controversy is twofold; firstly whether the principles of natural justice have been violated in this case by not giving a proper opportunity to the petitioner. Secondly, whether the appointment of the petitioner had been made after duly complying with the provisions of S. 31 (10) of the Act. 12. It is urged that violation of principles of natural justice has been committed in this case because respondent No. 3 in his representation, apart from alleging at one place only that the two appointments were made by ignoring some provisions of law, had made only a vague attack regarding petitioner's appointment alleging that misleading representation of facts had been made. In the entire representation there is not even a whisper as to in what way the appointment of petitioner was illegal? No ground for assailing the petitioner's appointment has been mentioned therein' Of course, only in the ultimate paragraph a prayer had been made that the entire selection be set aside yet no specific ground was taken as regards the petitioner's (sic) Although in paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit the respondent No. 3 has stated that selection of both the candidates was sought to be quashed on the ground that their names were recommended only as a result of nepotism, I do not find even an iota of such an allegation in the entire representation. I am sorry to find how and on what basis allegations could have been made and that such too by verifying them on personal knowledge. I am surprised at this lack of sense of responsibility shown by respondent No. 3 while making allegation in the counter-affidavit. On a reading of the representation, it appears that mainly the allegations were made against the appointment of Dr. D. C. Pandey and there was no specific allegation therein in respect of the petitioner's appointment. Allegations about granting the same salary lo both the selected candidates was also directed against Dr. D. C. Pandey as it was he who was then getting only Rs. 1250/- P.M. while the petitioner was already getting Rs. 1350/- P.M. If any advantage of this had been taken, it was Dr. D.C. Pandey who had availed it and not the petitioner. D. C. Pandey as it was he who was then getting only Rs. 1250/- P.M. while the petitioner was already getting Rs. 1350/- P.M. If any advantage of this had been taken, it was Dr. D.C. Pandey who had availed it and not the petitioner. In the light of the allegations contained in the representation, the petitioner could have got no idea that his selection also was in jeopardy and could be set aside by the Chancellor and that also on the grounds which were not even disclosed anywhere in the representation. Whatever may have been represented by the University before the Chancellor in respect of his appointment was never made known to him and the petitioner was never afforded any opportunity to offer a reply. Even if the University in its reply had said something on which the appointment of the petitioner could be invalidated, it ought to have been brought to his notice at least before any1 action was taken by the Chancellor. The petitioner was thus clearly deprived of proper opportunity in this case and to that extent the Chancellor's order may not be sustainable.. 13. But before doing that let' me refer again to certain other observations of Supreme Court in J. P. Kulshrestha's case (1980 Lab IC 692) which I think would be not only relevant but appropriate too. The relevant observations is (At p. 695 of Lab IC) "..... Did the Selection committee act illegally in resorting to the interview process to pick out the best? We think not. Any administrative or quasi-judicial body clothed with powers and left unfettered by procedures is free to devise its own pragmatic, flexible and functionally viable processes of transacting business subject, of course, to the basic of natural justice, fair play in action, reasonableness in collecting decisional materials, avoidance of arbitrariness and extraneous considerations and otherwise keeping within the leading strings of the law. We find no flaw in the methodology of `interviews'. Certainly, cases arise where the art of interviewing candidates deteriorates from strategy to stratagem and undetectable manipulation of results is achieved by remote control tactics masked as viva voce tests. This, if allowed, is surely a sabotage of the purity of proceedings, a subterfuge whereby legal means to reach illegal ends is achieved. Certainly, cases arise where the art of interviewing candidates deteriorates from strategy to stratagem and undetectable manipulation of results is achieved by remote control tactics masked as viva voce tests. This, if allowed, is surely a sabotage of the purity of proceedings, a subterfuge whereby legal means to reach illegal ends is achieved. So, it is that court insists, as the learned Single Judge has, in this very case, suggested on recording of marks at interviews and other fair checks like guidelines for marks and remarks about candidates and the like. If the Court is sceptical, the record of the selection proceedings, including the notes regarding the interviews may have to be made available. Interviews, as such, are not bad but polluting it to attain illegitimate ends is bad." What is, therefore, to be guarded against according to the Supreme Court is that only so much of freedom should be enjoyed by the Universities in the matter of management of their internal affairs so as not to let it go berserk or permit it to misuse its powers. To protect the purity of selection, therefore provisions of S. 31 (10) have to be strictly construed. Cases are not uncommon where persons have been inducted to a post through some back door tactics. I do not say that such was the case here, but a possibility of this kind in some cases cannot be ruled out. The court must, therefore, adopt an interpretation which advances this object rather than the one which strikes at it. 14. Two arguments have been advanced in this connection. Firstly it is urged that" S. 31 CIO) of the Act only required the existence of previous advertisement,, which had been duly made in the instant case. Secondly, it is submitted that if for any reason the appointment may be found to be inconsistent with the advertisement, then the note appended at the foot of the advertisement gave sufficient powers to make the appointment. In view of these submissions, it is urged that the petitioner's appointment was valid and could not be cancelled by the Chancellor. 15. Secondly, it is submitted that if for any reason the appointment may be found to be inconsistent with the advertisement, then the note appended at the foot of the advertisement gave sufficient powers to make the appointment. In view of these submissions, it is urged that the petitioner's appointment was valid and could not be cancelled by the Chancellor. 15. In this background let us now examine the provisions of S. 31 (10) of the Act which lays down that: "No selection for any appointment under this section shall be made except after advertisement of the vacancy in at least three issues of two newspapers having adequate circulation in Uttar Pradesh." There is no dispute in this case that a proper advertisement for the post had been made. The only controversy before me is whether the advertisement that appeared in Northern India Patrika dated 6-9-80 could be said to be valid. The admitted facts are that the second post of the Reader was originally advertised as temporary, but later on when a permanent post became available, the appointment was actually made as permanent. 16. It will be noticed that the use of the words `after advertisement of the vacancy' in the section are very significant. It means that only a particular vacancy ought to be advertised and the use of the word `the' before the word `vacancy' lays enough emphasis to require that only a particular type of vacancy for which an advertisement had been made should alone be filled and no other. No appointment will be valid if the advertisement was for one kind of post and the appointment was of some other nature. The use of the word `the' cannot mean otherwise. 16-A. There are certainly strong and valid reasons for holding that selection only to the very post which was advertised must be insisted upon. Also it would not be wrong to assume that many persons, even though highly qualified, would not like to shift their present place of employment, if the post offered was only temporary, even though it may be in the prestigious institution like Allahabad University. The same person may, however, be tempted to apply if only he comes across a chance to get a permanent posting there. It is only human to lean more in favour of a secure and permanent job than to go for an un-secure pasture. The same person may, however, be tempted to apply if only he comes across a chance to get a permanent posting there. It is only human to lean more in favour of a secure and permanent job than to go for an un-secure pasture. By advertising only for a temporary post of Reader, a large number of candidates, though competent, may have shied away from applying for the post, thus, negating the very purpose of advertising a post. The whole object of this exercise is to draw the attention of as large a number of candidates as possible and lure them to apply for the post If any other interpretations were given to the language of S. 31 (10) it will let loose the process of back door appointments, which the courts must endeavour to shut or else the very purpose and efficacy of these provisions would be lost. I, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that appointments by the University must be made only in accordance with the post which was actually advertised and to no other. No changes can be made in the nature of the post at the time of making the appointment merely because a permanent or other better or inferior post had become available. Any appointment made in violation of this can always be set aside by the Chancellor. 17. The question next arises whether the foot-note to the advertisement can provide any relief to the petitioner and in spite of aforesaid defects in the appointment, can it be cured by exercise of power kept in reserve in the foot-note? The Petitioner's learned counsel asserts that benefit can be availed of by the petitioner. Let us examine the foot-note to the advertisement which reads: "The number of posts is subject to revision and the selection committee may make recommendation for all posts whether temporary or permanent available at the time of its meeting." It is urged that by this note the University reserved in itself the power to revise and was empowered to make its recommendations according to the number of posts available at the time of making the recommendations. Admittedly, at the time of making the recommendation one more post of a permanent Reader had become available. Normally a temporary appointment is made either when no permanent post is available or when such a post is needed for a short or limited period only. Admittedly, at the time of making the recommendation one more post of a permanent Reader had become available. Normally a temporary appointment is made either when no permanent post is available or when such a post is needed for a short or limited period only. The counsel urged that in these circumstances, when a permanent post had become available it was unnecessary to make a fresh advertisement or to insist on appointment being made to the temporary post only as advertised. He urged that even on the basis of the earlier advertisement itself, appointment of two readers against the then existing two such permanent post could be legally made. As a matter of fact, for the reasons that I have already pointed out above, I cannot agree to this submission. In view of the language used in S. 31 (10) of the Act no appointment can be made unless the particular vacancy which is sought to be filled up had been duly advertised. I cannot also accept the argument that only a vacancy has to be filled up either permanent or temporary, and the vacancy having been advertised, it can legally be filled up by making either a temporary or. a permanent appointment. However, it is not the vacancy which has to be filled up. What is required to be filled up by the appointment is " the vacancy to a post" which may either be temporary or permanent and this must be preceded by a valid advertisement for the same. 18. What had been advertised in this ease was the "post of a temporary Reader". For the reason that I have given earlier, an appointment could be made only to the post advertised on the basis of such an advertisement. No other kind of appointment could,.therefore, be made. 19. The foot-note also cannot help. It is only says that the `number of posts was subject to revision'. The post advertised here was "one post of temporary Reader". The post was `one' in number which was of a temporary Reader'. What could, therefore, be revised by the university or the selection committee was "the number" of posts and not the kind or "nature" of post. Therefore, what is meant here by revision of the number of posts cannot be a revision of nature or kind of post. The post was `one' in number which was of a temporary Reader'. What could, therefore, be revised by the university or the selection committee was "the number" of posts and not the kind or "nature" of post. Therefore, what is meant here by revision of the number of posts cannot be a revision of nature or kind of post. In view of the particular language of the foot-note, in place of one eves two or more or none at all could have been appointed but only as temporary readers. The foot-note cannot be read to mean that instead of appointing one temporary reader, the university may instead appoint a permanent or say an "ad hoc" Reader in the department. 20. In my opinion, therefore, the footnote to the advertisement in question also cannot help the petitioner. 21. My attention was drawn to a recent decision reported in 1982 All LJ 899, Dr. R.C. Gupta v. Chancellor, Kumaun University where a similar situation arose for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court. In that case a certain number of posts were advertised by the University for appointment of Teachers in various departments of the constituent colleges coming under the University. The concerned posts were only `two' in number according to the advertisement, yet as many as seven appointments were made on the basis of the list recommended by the selection committee in the order of priority. The foot-note appended to the advertisement in that case was in this language: "The University reserves the right to vary the number of vacancies under any category." The foot-note on its language was held to mean that a large number of posts than actually advertised cannot be filled up and any appointment made in excess thereof was held to be invalid. 22. In the instant case; however, the language employed in the foot-note is quite different. Foot-note in that case alone can be said to have been interpreted there. Each foot-note will have to be interpreted on the language employed therein and the decision in 1982 All LJ 991 (or 899?) cannot be said to be a binding authority for the purpose of interpretation of the foot-note in the instant case. Foot-note in that case alone can be said to have been interpreted there. Each foot-note will have to be interpreted on the language employed therein and the decision in 1982 All LJ 991 (or 899?) cannot be said to be a binding authority for the purpose of interpretation of the foot-note in the instant case. In Dwivedi's case the expression used in the foot-note was to "vary the number" of vacancies while in the case in hand the expression in the foot-note is number of posts is subject to revision'. There is a basic difference in the right to revise and the right to vary. To revise only means a reexamination of the existing matter with a view to correct it or to improve it or to consider it once again. The idea being that when one revises he does not replace or destroy, the existing, only reconsideration of it takes place only to improve it or to properly understand it. 23. The word `vary' however, has a quite different connotation. The very conception of the word is changed. It must be change or alteration, making of something new or to modify. In any case the original cannot remain the same if it is varied, but on the other hand, if something is only revised, it may remain the same though with a slight improvement therein. 24. The foot-note in the instant case authorises the University to revise the number of posts which will include the right to increase or decrease the number. It, however, cannot entitle the university to change the nature of the post itself. 25. A feeble attempt was made to argue that the name of the petitioner was recommended by the selection committee not for the temporary post of Reader but was placed at number two in the order of priority to the first post itself which was permanent and for which Dr. D.C. Pandey was recommended on first priority. This argument is devoid of any substance. This was never the stand of the petitioner. Right from the reply to the representations till the filing of this petition, his accepted case has been that to the first post Dr.D.C.Pandey was selected and for the other one petitioner's name was recommended. Such a plea has not been taken in the petition even and I cannot allow it to be raised now. Right from the reply to the representations till the filing of this petition, his accepted case has been that to the first post Dr.D.C.Pandey was selected and for the other one petitioner's name was recommended. Such a plea has not been taken in the petition even and I cannot allow it to be raised now. The plea is without any basis and is rejected. 26. However, the only question that still remains is that in spite of principles of natural justice having been violated should this Court exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in favour of the petitioner, more so in view of my findings earlier that the appointment of the petitioner was not in conformity with the advertisement preceding it as required under the provisions of S. 31(10) of the Act. If the appointment to the permanent post itself was not valid, the same cannot be allowed to be perpetuated by exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. An invalid appointment in this case has got to.be set aside, though there has been violation of the principles of natural justice. This alone cannot entitle the petitioner to the relief claimed. I do not think this would be a fit case where the court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction. 27. Before parting with this petition I have a suggestion to make; when the University advertises for different, kinds of posts it would be better if it insists upon separate applications being given for different type of posts; as in the present case, there were two posts,one for permanent reader in the department and the other for temporary Reader in the department. All the candidates made a single application without specifying as to whether they were applying for the permanent post or for the temporary one.This is bound to create confusion later on. A little care at the time of inviting applications would certainly avoid this kind of controversy at a later stage. 28. In the result the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Costs will be easy.