GUMAN MAL LODHA, J. — This is a defendants second appeal against whom a decree for eviction has been passed by the Munsif and judicial Magistrate, Ramganj Mandi, on 30th March, 1974, and the same has been affirmed in appeal by the District Judge. 2. The brief facts giving rise to this appeal as alleged by the appellant may now be mentioned and they are as under:— 3. That the plaintiff-respondent Dr. Ram Kumar brought a suit for eviction and arrears of rent against the appellant and his two brothers who are proforma respondents No. 2 and 3 on 14th October, 1971 in respect of a shop situated in Ramganj Mandi on the ground of reasonable and bona fide necessity and arrears of rent amount to Rs. 225/- from 15th January, 1970 to 14th August 1971. Para No. 5 of the plaint in which the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity was mentioned is reproduce as under:— 5-^^;g fd oknh ds nks yM+ds O;Ld gks pqds gSa o Mhty batu dh o vksVkseksckbYl dh Vªsfuax bUnksj o vU; LFkkuksa ls izkIr djds vk x;s gSa o eksVjksa ds fjis;lZ dk /kU/kk izkjEHk dj fn;k gSA muds futh nqdku ;k edku e.Mh esa [kkyh u gksus ls cgqr vlqfo/kk gks jgh gSA e.Mh ls jkst dksVk vkuk tkuk cM+k eqfdy gS o e.Mh esa nwljksa dh esgjckuh ij vkfJr jguk iM+ jgk gSA oknh ds yM+ds ds ikl ?kj nqdku u gksus ls ;gka vLFkkbZ rkSj ls HkS:yky Hkaojyky dh nqdku ij lkeku Mky j[kk gS o /kU/kk oknh ds yM+dksa dk BIi gks jgk gSA oknh Lo;a ukSdj iskk gS o ljdkjh vLirky dksVk esa MkWDVj gS o yM+dksa dk oknh ds lkFk jg dj dk;Z djuk lEHko ugha gSA** The plaintiff served a notice on all the defendants terminating the tenancy by 14th August, 1971. It was also mentioned in the plaint that the shop in question was in a dilapidated condition and could fall down at any time and as such it was necessary to be repaired. 4. The defendants filed their written statement on 15th December, 1971 and among other pleas submitted that the tenancy was a yearly one and the rent fixed was Rs. 151/- per year. The present one was the fourth suit for ejectment since 1954. The earlier suits had been dismissed and the present suit was also filed malafidely. 4. The defendants filed their written statement on 15th December, 1971 and among other pleas submitted that the tenancy was a yearly one and the rent fixed was Rs. 151/- per year. The present one was the fourth suit for ejectment since 1954. The earlier suits had been dismissed and the present suit was also filed malafidely. It was held in the last ejectment suit decided on 9th August, 1968 that the plaintiff had intentionally removed the stones from the suit shop in order to show that the same is in a dilapidated condition. The following reply was given to para-5 of the plaint which reads as under:— 5- ^^;g fd en uEcj 5 vthZ nkok rLyhe ugha gS uk eqíbZ ds yM+ds bl yk;d gh gS fd eksVj ikVZl dh nqdku jkexat e.Mh esa yxkosa cfYd eqíbZ ds yM+ds ukckfyx gS tks i<+ jgs gSA eksVj ikVZl dh nqdku jkexat e.Mh esa dksbZ Hkh yxkuk ilUn ugha djrk exj dksbZ Lis;j ikVZl dh nqdku dksVk esa eqíbZ ds yM+ds djrs gksaxs Hkh rks jkexate.Mh tSls xkao esa ?kkVs dh nqdkunkjh djuk dksbZ ilUn ugha djrkA MkDVj lkgc ;kuh eqíbZ x;s 15&20 lky ls dksVk esa gh jgrs vk;s gSa ftuds dksVk esa futh tk;nkn o nqdkus dkQh gSa jkexat e.Mh esa dHkh Hkh ugha vkrs cfYd muds eq[krkj nqdkuksa dk fdjk;k olwy djrs gSaA eqíbZ dh QeZ y[kirh gS tks ysu nsu djrh gS cfYd nqdkunkjh dk /kU/kk vkt rd ugha fd;k blfy, nqdkunkjh BIi gksus dk loky gh iSnk ugha gksrkA** It was further submitted that the tenancy being yearly one the notice terminating the tenancy of 15 days was invalid. The rent has been paid and there were no arrears against the defendants. The learned Munsiff framed 7 issues. In issue No. 1 it was held that the rent was paid as yearly one but as the rent deed was not a registered one, the tenancy was treated from month to month and not from year to year. In issue No. 2, it was held that the defendants had paid rent up to 15th April, 1971 and the suit was not based on default. The learned Munsif, however, decreed the suit for ejectment on the ground that the plaintiff required the suit shop reasonably and bonafidely. In issue No. 2, it was held that the defendants had paid rent up to 15th April, 1971 and the suit was not based on default. The learned Munsif, however, decreed the suit for ejectment on the ground that the plaintiff required the suit shop reasonably and bonafidely. On appeal the learned District Judge also held that the tenancy was from month to month and the notice terminating the tenancy within 15 days was valid and that the suit shop was required reasonably and bonafidely, by the plaintiff, and the appeal was dismissed. 5. Thus, it would be seen that both the lower courts have given a concurrently finding that the suit-shop was reasonably and bonafidely required by the plaintiff. 6. In this appeal, this Court, framed the following issue and remitted it to the District Judge, Kota:— "Whether having regard to all circumstances of the case including the question whether any other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlored or the tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it." The above issue was framed and remitted on account of the amendment of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1976, by introduction of Section 14 which reads as under :— "Section 14-Restriction on eviction:— (1) No decree for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (b) of sub- section 13 shall be passed unless the Court is satisfied, after taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration, that it is reasonable to allow such eviction. (2) No decree for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (h) of subsection (1) of Section 13 shall be passed if the court is satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. Where the court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only. Where the court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no suit for eviction from the premises let out for commercial or business purposes shall lie against a tenant on the ground set forth in clause (h) of sub-section (1) of section 13 before the expiry of five years from the date the premises were let out to the tenant." 7. The District Judge, Kota, recorded the evidence. The plaintiff examined himself and produced three of his sons in addition to P.W. 4 Rampratap. The defendant produced himself and one Ramkishan. 8. The learned District Judge on a detailed consideration of the entire evidence produced before him, recorded his finding in about 12 typed fullscap pages, holding that the plaintiff has not other reasonable accommodations, & therefore, comparative hardship would be caused to the defendant by passing a decree in favour of the landlord than by refusing to pass it. A number of reasons have been given and one of them which has been debated before me relates to the alternative accommodation available in market No. 2 near the shop of Kan-haiyalal. It has been found that if the plaintiffs son Prakash Chandra or Harimohan wants to do some business, they have got this additional accommodation near the disputed shop. While doing so, the learned District Judge has taken into consideration various events which have happened upto July, 1977. 9. After this (finding was received by this Court, the party aggrieved was required to file objections under Order 41, Rule 26, C.P.C. The finding was received by this Court on 21st January, 1978 as would be obvious from the office order-sheet. No objections were filed. Ultimately on 30th January, 1979, the case was put up before the Court and the Court directed that one months time might be allowed for filing objections if any. After the passing of this order on 30th January, 1979, the respondent plaintiff who is now feeling aggrieved by this finding, did not file any objections, and it was recorded on 3rd March, 1979 that no objections were filed. After the passing of this order on 30th January, 1979, the respondent plaintiff who is now feeling aggrieved by this finding, did not file any objections, and it was recorded on 3rd March, 1979 that no objections were filed. However, the case was listed before this Court on 26th April, 1979, and again on 2nd July, 1979. On this date, i. e. 2nd July, 1979, one months time was again granted. It may be noticed that the case then came up before this Court on 7th August, 1979. Mr. Daleep Singh, the learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr. D K. Soral, the learned counsel for the respondents, were present on that date. It was noticed that no objections were filed against the finding. The learned counsel for the respondents did not make any prayer for permitting him to file objections or for extension of time. Now, the case is being heard in 1982, and it is obvious that no objections have been filed even though the finding was recorded on 12th September, 1977 & the respondent-plaintiff had about 4 5 years time. In the above circumstances, a preliminary objection was taken by Mr. Singh that the Court should not hear Mr. Soral against the finding as no objections have been filed. Reliance was placed by Mr. Singh on the decision of a Division of the Lahore High Court in Partap Singh vs. Achhar Singh (1), wherein, it was observed that where no objections are filed under Rule 26, the Court may in its discretion decline to hear objections at the hearing. 10. Mr. Soral, confronted with the above submission, has submitted that even objections without being filed, this Court can and should consider the objections. He relied upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Mukhtihar vs. Matrdarha (2). The following observations were made in that case:— "The defendant comes here in second appeal and says that this action of the learned District Judge was not warranted by law, and that he ought to have himself considered whether the findings were good or bad finds and should have then decided the case. In support of this contention, the case of Mumtaz Begum vs. Fateh Hussain has been referred to me. In support of this contention, the case of Mumtaz Begum vs. Fateh Hussain has been referred to me. This contention is fully borne out by the ruling relied upon and the learned District Judge ought to have himself considered the correctness or otherwise of the findings returned by the Munsif before deciding the appeal. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Soral on the decision of the Supreme Court in Rallis India Ltd. vs. G. Lakshmi Kanthan (3), in which it was observed as under :— "the scope of remand was limited to a finding whether he had committed any act in his capacity as an employee that would entail his discharge from service while writing the offending letter as a share-holder and not to find out whether he had written that letter as an employee." Having considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the preliminary objections of Mr. Singh should succeed. A party who has failed to file objections for a long period of two years to five years in a case where he wants eviction for bonafide and reasonable necessity deserves no hearing against the finding, and the Court in its discretion should disallow any objections at the belated stags. In the instant case as mentioned above, the plaintiff respondent had the opportunity to file objections throughout after the finding was recorded in 1977. This Court granted time expressly for that purpose. Even then the objections were not filed. I am, therefore, of the opinion that in such a case, a strict view should be adopted and I should refuse to consider the objections against the finding which is in favour of the defendants. 11. Mr. Soral then submitted that the finding is beyond jurisdiction. This contention of the learned counsel for the respondents, is also untenable, because, the issue expressly shows that the Court was to examine the question of alternative accommodation both for the landlord and the tenant and the question should have, been decided after considering that. 11. Mr. Soral then submitted that the finding is beyond jurisdiction. This contention of the learned counsel for the respondents, is also untenable, because, the issue expressly shows that the Court was to examine the question of alternative accommodation both for the landlord and the tenant and the question should have, been decided after considering that. The Court recorded evidence on the point of alternative accommodation The court found that some other accommodation was available to the landlord It cannot be said that it was beyond jurisdiction or beyond the scope of the issue Thus, once the issue was remitted to the first appellate court directing the first appellate court to record evidence on the question of alternative accommodation and the first appellate court in compliance of the order of this Court, recorded the evidence and decided it, the respondent who was a party to the framing of the issue and leading all the evidence now cannot be allowed to take the plea that this evidence should not be looked into and the earlier finding should be accepted. If that is so, he should have pointed out at the time of the framing of the issue that the question of comparative hardship has already been examined & needs no re-examination. In other words, the counsel for the landlord should have pointed out to this Court when the issue was framed and remitted to the first appellate court that the conditions of section 14 were already fulfilled and that no fresh evidence was necessary. This having not been done, the respondents cannot be allowed to enjoy the same opportunity now at this stage. The principles laid down in the decision of K. Veerabasappa vs. The Court of District Judge, Citradurga (4), pointed out by Mr. Soral, require no comments. 12. In view of the above discussion, the principles laid down in the decision of Rallis India Ltd. vs. G. Lakshmi Kanthan (supra) are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 13. Mr. Soral submitted that in Chatar Lal vs. Mahant Ramdas the finding recorded regarding comparative hardship under section 14 of the Act has been treated as a finding of fact. It is not necessary for me to enter into this controversy, because, that finding is not under challenge before me in so far as the merits are concerned. 14. 13. Mr. Soral submitted that in Chatar Lal vs. Mahant Ramdas the finding recorded regarding comparative hardship under section 14 of the Act has been treated as a finding of fact. It is not necessary for me to enter into this controversy, because, that finding is not under challenge before me in so far as the merits are concerned. 14. The result of the above discussion is that since the defendant-tenant has succeeded to make out a case under section 14, regarding comparative hardship in the instant case, the decree for eviction, passed by the two courts below cannot be sustained, and the same is set aside. However, the parties would bear their own costs throughout. The appeal succeeds as indicated above.