JUDGMENT K.M. Dayal, J. - The present second appeal has been filed by the Defendant arising out of judgment and decree of the Court below in a partition suit. The suit was filed for division of plot No. 945 (area 68 decimal) situated in village Dilari, Pargana Thakurdwara, district Moradabad. The plot was Bhumidhari tenure of the parties. During consolidation proceedings an application was made by Defendant Chhattar Singh and Plaintiff Komal Singh for permitting them to make constructions and use the disputed land for Abadi purposes. That permission was granted by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) on 14-6-1966. It is Ex. 6 on record. That permission shows that it was subject to rights of third person if any, involved in the land. Thereafter it appears that land was being used for Abadi purposes and a portion of it was also being cultivated. Komal Singh filed a suit against Lekhraj Singh and Chhattar Singh for separation of his 1/3rd share over the plot in dispute. The suit was filed in the Court of Munsif Moradabad. It was mentioned in the plaint that this plot was earlier Bhumidhari property of the parties. During consolidation operations the houses were constructed under the permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and it was made a Chak of Abadi in the name of all the sharers. It was claimed that over a portion of that land sugarcane was also grown and the shares of the parties in the produce of the sugarcane as well as over the land were joint. A division by meats and bounds was sought. 2. Written statement was filed by Lekhraj Singh. Lekhraj Singh took an objection that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction as the disputed property was Bhumidhari property and also under cultivation. The objection has been overruled by both the Courts below. 3. Admittedly the share of the parties was l/3rd and the permission was granted to Plaintiff Komal Singh and Defendant Chhattar Singh for using the land for construction of buildings. 4. The learned Counsel for the Defendant-Appellant Lekhraj Singh has raised three questions before me. The first question related to the fact that he had pleaded ouster and adverse possession; secondly, prior partition was set up and thirdly the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide the case. 5. The first point about ouster and adverse possession had been dealt with in issues Nos. 2 and 3. The first question related to the fact that he had pleaded ouster and adverse possession; secondly, prior partition was set up and thirdly the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide the case. 5. The first point about ouster and adverse possession had been dealt with in issues Nos. 2 and 3. The finding of fact recorded by both the Courts below is that there is no ouster or adverse possession and the Plaintiff had a share in the property. It is evident from Ex. 6 permission granted by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) on 14-6-66 that Komal Singh was very much in possession over that plot. Consolidation operations terminated thereafter. Had there been ouster or adverse possession a dispute should have been raised before the consolidation authorities. The present suit was filed in the year 1968 within two years of the permission granted by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). The limitation u/s 209 of Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act for ejectment is 12 years. The same is the position under the Limitation Act, 1963. In case a co-sharer is ousted the same period of limitation has to be applied. Thus there was no question of maturing rights by ouster and adverse possession. The title of the Defendant was denied by the Plaintiffs. The judgment of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dated 27-7-1967 shows that the consolidation proceedings were going on in the village at that time. He failed to prove the extinguishment of the title of the Plaintiffs before the consolidation authorities. 6. The second objection is about oral partition. There were proceedings u/s 145 read with Sections 107/117 Code of Criminal Procedure which were decided on 10-1-1976. Komal Singh and Chhattar Singh filed a written statement in those proceedings too. It is paper No. Ex-A 10 on the record. From a portion of Ex. A 10, it appears that some portions of the land were separate though the other para shows that the entire land was joint. This document has come into existence long after the suit was filed. It can not be treated as an admission of Plaintiff. Even if it is taken as a whole no partition is culled out. There is no other reliable evidence of private partition. Possession of any co-sharer over a piece of joint property does not amount to partition. Possession of one co-sharer is possession of all. It can not be treated as an admission of Plaintiff. Even if it is taken as a whole no partition is culled out. There is no other reliable evidence of private partition. Possession of any co-sharer over a piece of joint property does not amount to partition. Possession of one co-sharer is possession of all. This goes to show that there was no actual partition by meats and bounds though the parties might have been in possession of portions of the land separately for the sake of enjoyment and convenience. When a final decree has to be prepared and encroachment by constructions of any co-sharer over any portion of the joint land is found that party may be allotted that portion subject to adjustment of equities of other parties. This question is not relevant at this stage. And I hold that there was no private partition by meats and bounds. It may further be pointed out that no issue on private partition was framed and it appears that the issue of private partition was not pressed seriously by the Appellant at earlier stage. 7. The third objection relates to jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The learned Counsel for the Appellant argued that the disputed land continued to be recorded as Bhumidhari of the parties. It was also assessed to land revenue. No declaration u/s 143 of Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 has been made. Mere permission granted by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) u/s 5(2) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act 1953 would not tantamount to declaration u/s 143. Some portions of the land were being cultivated and used for agricultural purposes. Consequently the land will continue to be 'land' as defined in Sub-section (14) of Section 3 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The learned Counsel relied upon Section 331 of the Act that the suit should have been filed before the Revenue Court. 8. The learned Counsel for the Respondent, however, contended that there was an amendment in Section 331 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and Section (1A) was enacted. The learned Counsel relied upon Section 331 of the Act that the suit should have been filed before the Revenue Court. 8. The learned Counsel for the Respondent, however, contended that there was an amendment in Section 331 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and Section (1A) was enacted. (1A) Notwithstanding anything in Sub-section (1), an objection that a Court mentioned in column 4 of Schedule II, or, as the case may be, a Civil Court, which had no jurisdiction with respect to the suit, application or proceeding, exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by any appellate or revisional Court unless the objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. According to the learned Counsel for the Respondents there were two requirements when the question of jurisdiction was raised. The first requirement was that the objection must have been raised at the earliest stage before the settlement of issues and the second requirement of that section was "unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. 9. It is true that an objection to jurisdiction of Civil Court was taken in the written statement. But it has also to be proved that there was a failure of justice due to trial by the Civil Court. The learned Counsel has not been able to point out that any such failure of justice has been pleaded or proved. The learned Counsel for the Appellant, however, relied upon the Full Bench case of Dhyan Singh v. Indra Pal Singh 1973 AWR 106 . The facts of that case were quite different. An earlier suit was filed and contested between the parties. Subsequently another suit was filed in which reliance was placed on the decision of the earlier case. It was contended by the Defendant that the earlier suit was not cognizable by the Civil Court and consequently the judgment and decree passed in that suit were without jurisdiction and liable to be ignored. The matter was referred to a Full Bench due to difference of opinion. It was contended by the Defendant that the earlier suit was not cognizable by the Civil Court and consequently the judgment and decree passed in that suit were without jurisdiction and liable to be ignored. The matter was referred to a Full Bench due to difference of opinion. The Court held as under: Sub-section (1A) of Section 331 debarred a litigant from raising the question of jurisdiction either of the civil or the revenue Court in an appellate or revisional Court unless the two conditions mentioned in it are satisfied. In our opinion this provision applies to an objection taken in the same proceeding, but in an appellate or revisional Court. It governs objections to the jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain the same case. It does not apply where an objection to the jurisdiction of a Court to try a suit is taken in some subsequent proceeding where the decision in the previous suit is relied upon. In the present case the objection was that the previous partition suit was decided by the Civil Court without jurisdiction. This objection is being taken in a subsequent suit. Sub-section (1A) is not applicable. It could not debar this Court from entertaining and deciding such an objection in accordance with law. Since we have held that the Civil Court had jurisdiction, it is unnecessary to decide whether the Defendant was debarred from raising such an objection on the ground that this plea was not taken in the partition suit and so it was barred by the might and ought rule of res-judicata. 10. The Full Bench nowhere laid down that prejudice was not to be proved if objection to the jurisdiction is taken at the initial stage. I am unable to agree with the learned Counsel for the Appellant. In a Division Bench case, Sabha Chand and Others Vs. Narayan Singh and Others, (1981) AWC 161 it was held that failure of justice due to lack of jurisdiction has to be proved. I am unable to agree with the learned Counsel for the Appellant. In a Division Bench case, Sabha Chand and Others Vs. Narayan Singh and Others, (1981) AWC 161 it was held that failure of justice due to lack of jurisdiction has to be proved. The Bench laid down: In order to meat the situation the Legislature intervened and enacted Section 331 (1A) (added by the U.P. Act No. 4 of 1969), which lays down that it is not open to a party to raise the question of absence of jurisdiction unless the objection was taken by it in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity or before the settlement of issues. Even if such an objection is raised, the party has further to prove that there has been failure of justice and he suffered on account of the Civil Court taking cognizance of the suit. Two conditions must be satisfied before the question of jurisdiction can be raised before an appellate or revisional Court. Firstly, the objection must be taken before the trial Court at the earliest stage and secondly, the party must show that there has been failure of justice on account of the suit being tried by the Civil Court. If either of the two conditions are not fulfilled, it is not open to a party to raise the question of jurisdiction before the appellate Court or the revisional Court and a decree or order passed by the Civil Court shall be valid notwithstanding the provisions contained in Section 331 of the Act. 11. The third objection of the Appellant also fails. The present appeal has no merits. It is accordingly dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.