JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, Member - This is a plaintiff's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 9-8-1978 by the learned Commissioner, Garhwal Division, Pauri, setting aside the judgment and decree dated 29-8-1977 by the learned trial court thereby dismissing the suit under section 209 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record. 3. The facts of the case in brief are that the plaintiff claimed to be sirdar on the basis of a finding by the civil court in an injunction suit filed earlier by the defendant which was dismissed, holding the plaintiff Bishan Das Sethi to be sirdar. However, the defendant claimed to be sirdar himself on the basis of the entry' in the records and on the basis of succession from his father Abdul Aziz. The learned trial court decreed the suit but the learned Commissioner allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the finding of the civil court is res judicata with the parties and in support cited rulings reported in AIR 1973 Alld. 283, AIR 1967 Alld. 442, AIR 1943 Alld. 430, AIR 1927 Alld. 803 and 1971 RD 253. He further argued that no oral or documentary evidence have been considered by the learned Commissioner and that the material documentary evidence had been ignored. In support, he cited rulings reported in 1980 RD 294 and AIR 1958 Alld. 54. Lastly, he argued that the law was not that a person could not be sirdar without being recorded as such and there was no need of a recorded entry before filing a suit under Section 209 of the UPZA and LR Act. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the plaintiff was not recorded sirdar and was not recognised as such, that he should have also sought declaration along with ejectment. He argued that the plaintiff case is also that he became sirdar by adverse possession and it is obvious that a suit for mere ejectment could not succeed without getting himself declared sirdar and so recorded. The learned counsel argued that under Section 209 (1) of the Act, unless the land in dispute formed part of the holding of a bhumidhar or sirdar, no suit would lie. The learned counsel argued that under Section 209 (1) of the Act, unless the land in dispute formed part of the holding of a bhumidhar or sirdar, no suit would lie. He further argued that the entries in the records showed possession of the dependant in 1345, 1354, 1356, 1358, 1359Fs and there after in 1373, 1375 and 1377F and also recorded in the main tenants column in the Khatauni 1378-80F. He argued that the civil court judgment in the injunction suit would not be applicable as the suit was filed against Bundu's brother Jani and not against Bishan Das Sethi and the finding of the civil court was beyond the scope of the suit. He argued that this judgment about sirdar rights without jurisdiction and in 1963 the civil court had no jurisdiction to declare sirdari rights and cited ruling reported in AIR 1954 SC 340 in support of his contention that a decree passed without jurisdiction is a nullity and so it could not be res judicata, both these grounds having factual strength, and suffice independently to contradict the application of even general res judicata. 6. Against the applicability of the general principle of res judicata, he further cited rulings reported in AIR 1971 SC 2228 and page 2355, AIR 1977 Alld. 56, 1974 RD 259 and 1980 AIR 55. He further argued that a question relating to jurisdiction is not res judicata and that for applying res judicata a copy of the plaint and written statement had to be filed which was not done in the instant case. He further argue that in respect of no oral or documentary evidence being considered. Since the question of law involved are important their decision does not leave scope for consideration of the finding of fact. 7. The main point for decision in this case are whether an entry in records as land-holder or a declaration of title is necessary for an ejectment under Section 209 of the Act and whether a finding of sirdari title in an injunction suit in civil court can be res judicata against title of another person in subsequent suit in revenue court. 8. For the first question reference to Section 209 of the Act is necessary, which provides that the land in suit must form part of the holding of a bhumidhar (or sirdar, In the year the suit was filed) or asami. 8. For the first question reference to Section 209 of the Act is necessary, which provides that the land in suit must form part of the holding of a bhumidhar (or sirdar, In the year the suit was filed) or asami. This necessarily requires a recorded entry of rights in Khatauni in favour of a person who wants to file a suit under Section 209. The word `holding' has not been defined in the UPZA and LR Act but under Section 3 (26) of the Act it is provided that this word shall have the meaning assigned to it in the U.P. Tenancy Act. Under the U.P. Tenancy Act in Section 3 (7), tie term `Holding' is defined as a parcel or parcels of land held under one lease engagement or grant, or in the absence of such lease, engagement or grant under one tenure and in the case of a Thekadar includes the Theka area. This definition necessitates an agreement between the two parties if it is a case of a lease, engagement, grant or a Theka which invariably result into entry in the Khatauni known in Hindi as 'Khatauni khata' which is a better representative word for the meaning of holding.`Khata or `holding' is a recorded entry or account of land in the Khatauni showing the number of the khata, the name, parentage and address of the land holder, the plot numbers, areas and rent and their totals, comprising plots of one type or category of tenure. The word `holding' is closely related to such entry in Khatauni and for all intents and purposes is a synonym of such entry, known as Khatauni khata in Hindi. This view is confirmed by the definition that is a `land held under one tenure' tenure here is nothing else but khata an entry against a specific number in the Khatauni. 9. To apply this concept in the present case, where the plaintiff has only shown a right over a certain land by way of judicial finding, it may be pointed out that the holding is not just a right but land held under one tenure and it goes without saying that a tenure is represented by a records entry in Khatauni, and can be achieved only through proper declaration of rights which in turn demands an entry of the tenure in accordance with law. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that in the Full Bench ruling in Darshan Singh v. Kanwar Singh, 1981 R.D. 295 `holding' has been given the meaning equivalent to Hindi term Khatauni khata and has been used as such. 10. In view of the provisions of Section 209 of the Act, it becomes clear that the plaintiff being not recorded as sirdar, could not seek ejectment unless he also sought declaration of his rights. 11. In respect of the other question as to whether the finding by a civil court about sirdari rights could act as res judicata, one might consider the application of general principle of res judicata, in Dhan Sing v. Joint Director of Consolidation, A.I.R. 1973 Alld. 283 a question arose whether the decision of issue number 3 about the tenancy rights of Dhan Singh decided by a revenue court on reference, would act as res judicata in consolidation court between the same parties. Following the ruling in AIR 1927 Alld. 803 and AIR 1943 Alld. 340. it was held that the finding would act as res judicata in the subsequent suit. The substance of the decision relied upon is, `if the court itself accepts the issue to be one relevant to the enquiry and necessary for the determination of the case, and that issue is argued out by both the parties and a judicial decision come to, it is not open subsequently for either of the parties or their successors-in-interest or the person claimed through them, to say, that the issue does not constitute res judicata'. In spite of the use of general principle in respect of an issue only in the above case, it is also observed that the earlier court deciding the issue was competent to decide the same, having jurisdiction in the matter. In 1971 KD 253, the earlier ruling in Jodhan v. Board of Revenue, A.I.R. 1967 Alld. 442 has been followed, and the general doctrine of res judicata born of the limitations under Section 11 of the CPC was applied in respect of the civil court having jurisdiction to try the issue, it was held that since injunction suit could not be decided without giving a finding on the title of the parties, the civil court has within its jurisdiction to decide the issue. In the earlier and important ruling (AIR 1967 Alld. In the earlier and important ruling (AIR 1967 Alld. 442J the question was whether the plaintiff Ramdhani was sole sirdar or consider with Jodhan and Natha. The finding of the civil court that Ramdhari was not the sole tenant, was held to act as res judicata in the subsequent suit under Section 176 of the UPZA and LR Act in the revenue court. The observations of the Hon'ble High Court were for the application of general principle of res judicata, irrespective of the fact that the Munsiff had no jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit. The main consideration was in respect of the applicability of the general principle of res judicata even though Section 11 of the CPC would not apply. 12. From the above, the two points become clear, that the question whether civil court had jurisdiction to try any question whether civil court had jurisdiction to try any particular issue case not gone into depth and further question, whether a decision by the civil court in such circumstances, would still be res judicata in a revenue suit before a revenue court having specific jurisdiction. The ruling in AIR 1967 Alld. 442 cannot, therefore be held to apply to the present case and is found to be clearly distinguishable. The exposition of less of Law in the subsequent ruling of the Allahabad High Court (DB) reported in AIR 1977 Alld. 56 is more revealing and issue discussed later. That view as latest has to be followed. 13. In AIR 1954 SC 340 , it was held in this case that- "It is a fundamental principle that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage or execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, stricken at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of the parties." Regarding an issue decided relating to a subject in the exclusive jurisdiction of other court a similar principle will have to be applied. It has further been held in AIR 1971 SC 2355 that a question relating to jurisdiction of the court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by erroneous decision to the court such decision can not operate as res judicata in the subsequent proceedings. Since the decision in the instant case, in being challenged on the ground of want of jurisdiction, such decision also must suffer from the weakness of non-finality and can hardly operate as res judicata. 14. The question of exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue court and consequences has been discussed by the Hon'ble Hight Court in the ruling reported in AIR 1977 Alld. 56. It was held that- "Any finding recorded by revenue court in previous suit under Section 229-C of the Act will be a finding on point which it has no jurisdiction to decide and such a finding cannot act as res judicata. Therefore, under Section 11, Civil Procedure Code or even on general principles, any incidental finding recorded by the revenue court in a suit under Section 229-C before the commencement of Act No. 15 1956 to the effect, that the defendant was a sirdar, could not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding for determination of that right." How that only revenue court has exclusive jurisdiction to decide title of a tenure holder, the same principle holds good for a finding, though given of yet only incidentally arrived at by a civil court. While considering the value of a finding in the matter of application of general principle of res judicata, the distinction noted in the ruling reported in AIR 1969 Alld. 407 must also be kept in mind. It was held in this ruling that- "A clear distinction has to be maintained d and in fact has been maintained by the Act between a finding and a decision or decree. Whether the Assistant Collector in a suit filed in his court regarding bhumidhari rights, remitted an issue to that effect to the court of Munsif for decision under Section 332 and the Munsiff recorded his finding on that issue, the finding was not a decision but only a finding under Section 332 (2). His finding was not operative. It was even not appealable by itself. His finding was not operative. It was even not appealable by itself. It could not also operate as res judicata because the case in which the finding was recorded was not finally decided within the meaning of Section 11 Civil Procedure Code. Actually it was not decided at all. There can be a bar of res judicata only if there is an executable judgment, the bar of res judicata follow not from a finding but from a decision." 15. About a finding given by civil court without jurisdiction another ruling in Kamla Prasad Singh v. Ramnath, A.I.R. 1980 Page 55 by the Hon'ble High Court Allahabad may be cited. In this case, it was held that, "In the view that the civil court had no jurisdiction it cannot be said that the trial of issues between the parties by the civil court will not occasion failure of justice for whatever findings are given in this case by the civil court could still be challenged by the parties before the revenue court on the ground that the civil court had not jurisdiction to decide any question about sirdari rights and the judgment of civil court being without jurisdiction." It is seen that a finding whether incidentally given or as a part of a suit, has always been distinguished from a decree in its value to act as res judicata. And a finding without jurisdiction on the subject sutlers the worst fate, it can be nothing more than an assistance to the main decision and such incidental finding must remain subject to final adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction. 16. From the above decisions on the relevant aspects, it is obvious that an incidental finding, given of necessity but without any direct jurisdiction under the law, and which does not have the force of declaration of title, will not act as res judicata in a subsequent suit for declaration of title. Further since such finding, in any execution proceedings, does not result into making entries in the record of rights according to the finding, it will also not act as res judicata in a suit under Section 209 of the UPZA and LR Act, in view of the requirements of a holding. 17. In consequence, this appeal fails on both the questions of jurisdiction and res judicata and is accordingly, dismissed with costs.