ORDER :- The plaintiff is the Karta and Manager of a Joint Hindu Family called Raheja Sons (H.U.F.) which carries on business in the name and style of Shri Tirupati Builders. The plaintiff entered into an agreement with the Life Insurance Corporation of India (defendant No.1) for the purchase of the suit property at Dadasaheb Phalke Road, Parel, Bombay under an agreement of sale dated 21st Jan. 1981. Life Insurance Corporation which is defendant No.1 is the owner of the suit property which consists of several structures, some of which are used as a cinema studio. One T. Tarachand was a tenant of Life In­surance Corporation in respect of the said entire property including the said Studio. T. Tarachand died on or about 18th September 1972. Defendants 2 to 8 are his surviving heirs and legal repre­sentatives. They claim tenancy rights in respect of the said property as the heirs of the deceased tenant. Defendant No.9, Roop Tara Studios, is a partnership firm in which originally T. Tarachand was a partner. The said partnership firm claims that the tenancy rights of the said im­movable property were held for the benefit of the partnership. One N.L. Mehta Cinema Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. is defendant No.10. 2. The Life Insurance Corporation advertised for the sale of the said pro­perty in "as is where is" condition some time in June 1980. The plaintiff had sub­mitted a tender for Rs. 37,50,000/-. De­fendant No.9 M/s. Roop Tara Studios had submitted a tender for Rs. 20,07,000/- and N.L. Mehta Cinema Enterprises Private Limited (Defendant No.10) had submitted a tender for Rs. 21,06,000/-. There were other tenders also. The plaintiff's tender being the highest, was accepted by the Life Insurance Corporation by a letter dated 4th July 1980. Thereafter a formal agreement between the plaintiff and Life Insurance Corpora­tion was entered into on 21st Jan. 1981. 3. Prior to the agreement of sale there were proceedings between the Life In­surance Corporation and the heirs of T. Tarachand in respect of the suit pro­perty. Life Insurance Corporation had terminated the tenancy in respect of the suit property and had instituted proceed­ings under the Public Premises Eviction Act for eviction of defendants 2 to 8. Defendants 2 to 8 thereupon filed a writ petition in, this court challenging the ap­plication of the Public Premises Evic­tion Act to the premises owned by the Life Insurance Corporation. The Writ Petition was allowed. Defendants 2 to 8 thereupon filed a writ petition in, this court challenging the ap­plication of the Public Premises Evic­tion Act to the premises owned by the Life Insurance Corporation. The Writ Petition was allowed. An appeal is pending from the decision in the writ peti­tion. 4. It is the case of defendants 2 to 10 that defendant No.9 entered into an agreement with defendant No.10 in June 1980 whereunder defendant No.10 agreed to buy the business of defendant No.9 in respect of their studio division together with its goodwill and tenancy rights in respect of the said immovable property. Thereafter by an agreement dated 23rd Sept. 1980 entered into be­tween defendants 2 to 9 on the one hand and defendant No.10 on the other hand, the defendants 2 to 9 agreed to assign to defendant No.10 the studio business of defendant No.9 together with its stock-in-trade, goodwill and tenancy rights in the said immovable property. Defendant No.10 claims to have paid to defendants 2 to 9 a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs on 23rd Sept. 1980 and to have obtained possession inter alia of the said studio on that day from defendants 2 to 9. De­fendant No.10 thus claims to be in pos­session of the studio premises since 23rd Sept. 1950. 5. The plaintiffs have filed the pre­sent suit on or about 1st Sept. 1981 against defendants 1 to 10. In the plaint the plaintiff has asked for specific per­formance of the agreement of sale dated 21st Jan, 1981 as against defendant No.1. They have sought in addition, a declara­tion that the agreements entered into be­tween defendants 2 to 9 on the one hand and defendant No.10 on the other hand are null and void and have asked for a cancellation of these agreements. They have asked for a declaration that defen­dants 2 to 9 are not in actual or symbo­lic occupation or possession of the suit property. They have also asked for a declaration that defendant No.10 has no right, title or interest in respect of the suit property and is a trespasser and have asked for possession of the pre­mises from the defendant No.10. The present notice of motion is taken out by the plaintiff for the appointment of a receiver of the said immovable property, especially of the studio premises and for other reliefs set out in the motion. 6. The present notice of motion is taken out by the plaintiff for the appointment of a receiver of the said immovable property, especially of the studio premises and for other reliefs set out in the motion. 6. Defendants Nos.2 to 10 have raised certain preliminary objections to the notice of motion. The first prelimi­nary objection is to the effect that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as against defendants 2 to 10 in view of the provisions of S.28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter re­ferred to as the Bombay Rent Act). De­fendants Nos.2 to 10 have submitted that under S.9A of the Civil P.C. the issue as to jurisdiction must be tried at the stage of the Notice of Motion as a preliminary issue and suit against defendants 2 to 10 should be dismissed on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction. 7. Under S.28 of the Bombay Rent Act the Court of Small Causes alone has jurisdiction to entertain and try any suit or proceedings between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises and to decide any application made under that Act and to deal with any claim or question arising out of the Act or any of its provisions. Admittedly the present suit is not a suit between a landlord and a tenant for recovery of rent or posses­sion of any premises. According to the defendants Nos.2 to 10 however, the claim in the suit against them is a claim arising out of the Bombay Rent Act and its provisions and hence it is covered by S.38 of the Bombay Rent Act. Now it is true that in order that a claim should arise under the provisions of the Bom­bay Rent Act, it is not necessary that the claim should be between a landlord and a tenant. Section 28 is wide enough to cover all questions which arise out of the Bombay Rent Act even though the parties may not have the legal relation­ship of a landlord and a tenant. Section 28 is wide enough to cover all questions which arise out of the Bombay Rent Act even though the parties may not have the legal relation­ship of a landlord and a tenant. The Su­preme Court, in the case of Sushila Kashinath Dhonde v. Harilal Govindji Bhogani reported in AIR 1971 SC 1495 has held that it is not necessary that there should be a relationship of land­lord and tenant between the parties for a matter to be covered by Sec.28. No doubt, one type of action contemplated under that section viz., a suit or pro­ceeding for recovery of rent or posses­sion of any premises may be between a landlord and a tenant; but in respect of other matters dealt with in that section it is not necessary that the relationship of a landlord and a tenant should exist between the parties before the Court. In the case before the Supreme Court the suit was to enforce a charge under the provisions of S.18 of the Rent Act. It was held as covered by S.28 of the Bombay Rent Act. There is a similar observation in an early case of Messrs. Importers and Manufacturers Ltd. v. Pheroze Framroze Taraporewala reported in AIR 1953 SC 73 . In the present case we have to examine whether the claim of the plaintiff against defendants 2 to 10 is a claim which arises under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. It is now well established that in order to decide this question one has to examine the substance of the case in the plaint and not merely the manner in which the claim framed. Ingenuity in drafting cannot confer jurisdiction on a court. According to the defendants Nos.2 to 10 the suit is in substance for eviction against defendants Nos.2 to 8 who are the heirs of the tenant and against de­fendant No.9 who claim to be the ten­ants and for obtaining possession from their proposed transferee defendant No.10. According to these defendants there was admittedly a tenancy in re­spect of the suit property created by the first defendant in favour of T. Tarachand and defendants 2 to 8 are the heirs of that tenant. There is some dispute as to whether tenancy is now a statutory tenancy or a contractual ten­ancy. According to these defendants there was admittedly a tenancy in re­spect of the suit property created by the first defendant in favour of T. Tarachand and defendants 2 to 8 are the heirs of that tenant. There is some dispute as to whether tenancy is now a statutory tenancy or a contractual ten­ancy. Defendants Nos.2 to 9 have pur­ported to enter into an agreement to transfer the business of defendant No.9 together with its tenancy rights, stock-in-trade and good-will in favour of de­fendant No.10 in purported exercise of their rights under the notification issued under Sec.15 of the Bombay Rent Act. According to these defendants the dis­putes between them and the plaintiff in the suit are thus under the Bombay Rent Act and they ought to be tried before the Court of Small Causes. This conten­tion is not tenable. The plaintiff has claimed reliefs against defendant No.10 on the ground that they are trespassers and have no right, title or interest in the suit premises. It is true that in order to decide whether defendant No.10 is trespasser on the premises or not, it will be necessary to examine the provi­sions of S.15 of the Bombay Rent Act and the notification issued under it. But the court does not cease to have juris­diction simply because, in order to de­cide the title of a person to any pro­perty, it may incidentally have to examine the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. In substance the suit against defendant No.10 is a suit on the basis of trespass and as such the suit cannot be considered as covered by S.28 of the Bombay Rent Act. As against defen­dants Nos.2 to 9, it is the plaintiff's case that they have parted with all their rights in the suit premises. They have also parted with possession of the suit premises. They therefore have ceased to be tenants of the suit premises. The plaintiff has therefore merely sought a declaration against defendants 2 to 9 that they are no longer in possession of the suit premises. The plaintiff has also asked for a cancellation of certain agree­ments executed between defendants 2 to 9 and defendant No.10 on the ground that these documents are illegal and/or null and void. Such a suit also cannot be considered as a suit which is covered by S.28 of the Bombay Rent Act. The plaintiff has also asked for a cancellation of certain agree­ments executed between defendants 2 to 9 and defendant No.10 on the ground that these documents are illegal and/or null and void. Such a suit also cannot be considered as a suit which is covered by S.28 of the Bombay Rent Act. In fact the court of Small Causes would not have jurisdiction to grant the relief of cancellation of documents. In substance, therefore, the claim of the plaintiff in the suit does not fall under S.28 of the Bombay Rent Act. 8. My attention was drawn to the case of Thakkar Keshavalal Mohanlal v. Parekh Amrutlal Harilal reported in AIR 1973 SC 1099 . In that case a suit had been filed before the Competent Court under S.28 of the Bombay Rent Act for eviction both against the tenant as well as his sub-tenant. The sub-­tenant contended that since the claim against him was a claim in trespass, S.28 would not apply to the suit against him and the court had no jurisdiction to entertain a claim against him. In nega­tiving this contention the Supreme Court observed that the suit was essen­tially a suit between a landlord and ten­ant; and the joinder of the sub-tenant in such a suit would not make the suit any the less a suit between a landlord and a tenant. The court referred to its earlier decision in Hiralal Vallabhram v. Kasturbhai Lalbhai reported in AIR 1967 SC 1853 and observed that a suit on the basis of trespass was clearly a suit which was not covered by the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. In substance the claim of the plaintiff is in trespass against defendant No.10. Such a claim does not fall under S.28 of the Bom­bay Rent Act. It is true that in the pre­sent case the tenants are also made par­ties to the suit. But no relief of eviction or possession is asked for against the tenants. This is not merely a technical camouflage as the defendants 2 to 10 would like to submit, because in sub­stance, it is the plaintiff's case that the tenants have parted with their posses­sion of the premises and have also part­ed with their right title and interest as tenants. The plaintiff therefore seeks a declaration that the tenants have ceased to be tenants. The plaintiff therefore seeks a declaration that the tenants have ceased to be tenants. Whether the plaintiff's case is correct or not is a matter which will be decided at the final hearing of the case after evidence is led. But what­ever be the merits of the plaintiff's case, the fact remains that the basis of the suit against defendants Nos.2 to 9 is that they have abandoned all their rights as tenants. Accordingly plaintiffs have not claimed any relief of possession against defendants Nos.2 to 9 but are content with a declaration against them that they are no longer in possession or occupation of the suit premises. Under these cir­cumstances it is not possible to hold that the claim in the suit against defendants 2 to 9 is a claim against tenants for possession. Thus the suit against defendants Nos.2 to 10 is not covered by the provisions of S.28 of the Bombay Rent Act. This court therefore has jurisdiction, to entertain the present suit not merely against defendant No.1 but also against defendants Nos.2 to 10. 9. The next preliminary objection raised on behalf of defendants Nos.2 to 10 is to the effect that the plaint dis­closes no cause of action against defen­dants Nos.2 to 10. The plaint should therefore be rejected under the provi­sions of O.7, R.11 of the Civil P.C. Now, the present suit is a suit for speci­fic performance of an agreement for sale entered into between the plaintiff and defendant No.1. Ordinarily in a suit for specific performance, persons who are not parties to the contract of which specific performance is sought, cannot be joined as party defendants. In this connection a reference may be made to a decision of this Court in the case of Luckumsey Ookerda v. Fazulla Cassumbhoy reported in (1880) ILR 5 Bom 177 where it was held that a stranger to a contract of which specific performance is sought, cannot be a party to the suit. In that case the plaintiff had joined another person who claimed a charge on the land which was agreed to be sold and had asked for a declara­tion that that, person was not entitled to any charge upon the said land. The court held that the latter defendant had been improperly made a party. Similar­ly in the case of Mt. In that case the plaintiff had joined another person who claimed a charge on the land which was agreed to be sold and had asked for a declara­tion that that, person was not entitled to any charge upon the said land. The court held that the latter defendant had been improperly made a party. Similar­ly in the case of Mt. Nagi v. Damodar Jagobaji reported in AIR 1948 Nag 181, Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) held that in a suit for specific performance of agreement for sale of land, strangers claiming independent title are not pro­per parties to the suit. He observed that the scope of a suit for specific perform­ance of an agreement for sale of land, coupled with a prayer for possession cannot be enlarged and the suit turned also into a title suit. The plaintiff could take action against strangers only after he had perfected his title by obtaining specific performance. He cited the ob­servation of Lord Eldon in the case of Mole v. Smith (1820) Jac 490 to the effect that when a bill is filed for specific performance it should not be mixed with a prayer for relief against other persons claiming an interest in the estate. Lord Eldon observed: "It is to be regretted that this opinion will prevent the parties from having the question between them so effectively de­cided as it might otherwise have been; but I cannot, to avoid an inconvenience in a particular case, sanction a proceed­ing which I consider to be inconsistent with the rules of pleading, and which, if recognised, might lead to much difficulty and confusion in the proceedings of the Court." The only exception to this rule is in the case of a voluntary purchaser from the vendor and a purchaser who takes with notice of the agreement. Such persons can be joined as party defendants in a suit for specific performance. The reason is that any person who has taken the property subject to the plaintiff's rights can always be joined as a party defen­dant. In this connection a reference may also be made to the decision in Prem Sukh Gulgulia v. Habib Ullah, AIR 1945 Cal 355. There is therefore considerable substance in the contention of defendants Nos.2 to 10 that they are not proper parties to a suit for specific performance. Mr. In this connection a reference may also be made to the decision in Prem Sukh Gulgulia v. Habib Ullah, AIR 1945 Cal 355. There is therefore considerable substance in the contention of defendants Nos.2 to 10 that they are not proper parties to a suit for specific performance. Mr. Ashok Sen, learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that just as a pur­chaser with notice and a voluntary pur­chaser can be joined in a suit for speci­fic performance, in the present case, de­fendant No.10 who has taken the pro­perty with notice of the plaintiff's agree­ment with defendant No.1 can also be joined. But this submission cannot be ac­cepted because defendant No.10 is not a person who has purchased the right, title and interest of the vendor in the suit property with notice of the agree­ment of which specific performance is sought assuming for the time being that defendant No.10 has taken possession with notice of the plaintiff's claim. The agreement for the sale between plaintiff and defendant No.1 is an agreement for sale of a lessor's interest in the suit property. Admittedly at the date when the agreement of sale was entered into, there was a tenancy in respect of the property which was agreed to be sold subject to such existing tenancy. Defen­dant No.10 purports to have agreed to acquire the tenant's interest in the suit property, from defendants 2 to 9. The agreements between defendants 2 to 10 inter se are in respect of the tenants' interest in the property. Defendants 2 to 10 therefore are not concerned with the landlord's interest in the premises at all. In that sense they are, therefore, strangers to the agreement of sale which is in terms only in respect of the land­lord's interest in the property. Prima facie therefore the plaintiff cannot join defendants 2 to 10 in the present suit. 10. The matter may also be looked at from a slightly different angle. The plaintiff is merely a person who has en­tered into an agreement to purchase an immovable property. He has a right to obtain specific performance of the agree­ment of sale and perfect his title. But, by virtue of an agreement of sale the plaintiff does not get any interest in the property which is agreed to be sold to him. The plaintiff is merely a person who has en­tered into an agreement to purchase an immovable property. He has a right to obtain specific performance of the agree­ment of sale and perfect his title. But, by virtue of an agreement of sale the plaintiff does not get any interest in the property which is agreed to be sold to him. The plaintiff, therefore, does not have in praesenti any interest in the pro­perty which he has agreed to purchase. He cannot, therefore, take any action against the tenants of the property, the sub-tenants of the property or even tres­passers on the property. He may be entitled to seek protection of the property which is agreed to be sold to him. By virtue of the agreement of sale he is en­titled to the benefits of the obligations which arise out of the contract and which are annexed to the ownership of the immovable property which he has agreed to purchase. He may also be able to call upon the seller to protect the property in the same manner as an owner of ordinary prudence would, un­til the properly is conveyed to him. In this connection a reference may be made to the case of Sashi Bhusan v. Rai Chand, AIR 1950 Cal 333 . Since how­ever he does not himself have any interest in the property he cannot sue third parties who claim to have an interest in the property which is agreed to be sold. In that sense also it is possible that the plaintiff may not be able to sustain his cause of action against defen­dants Nos.2 to 10. 11. These, however, are matters to be decided at the final hearing of the suit. It is not possible at the stage of the notice of motion to hold that under the provisions of O.7, R.11 of the Civil P.C. plaint should be rejected as not disclosing any cause of action. By and large the provisions of O.7, R.11 are contemplated to apply to the rejection of a plaint as a whole where it discloses no cause of action against the defen­dants. Where there is a joinder of causes of action and joinder of parties and a decree can be passed in respect of some of the causes of action against some of the defendants, provisions of O.7, R.11 cannot be invoked. Where there is a joinder of causes of action and joinder of parties and a decree can be passed in respect of some of the causes of action against some of the defendants, provisions of O.7, R.11 cannot be invoked. My attention was drawn to the case of Balwant Sineh v. State Bank of India (FB) reported in AIR 1976 Punj and Har 316 where a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court held that pro­visions of O.7, R.11 will be attracted only in a case where by reason of the plea that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action the plaintiff would be wholly non-suited. This rule would have no application to the cases where a plaint discloses a cause of action in re­spect of a part of the claim against some of the defendants. At the highest, in the present case a part of the cause of ac­tion would be found defective against some of the defendants. It is therefore not a fit case where the provisions of O.7, R.11 can be applied. In any case such provisions cannot be invoked in a notice of motion taken out by the plain­tiff for appointment of a receiver and in­junction. 12. Mr. S.D. Parekh, learned counsel for defendants Nos.2 to 10 drew my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, AIR 1977 SC 2421 in which the Supreme Court observed that if on a meaningful - not formal - reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue the trial court should exercise its power under O.7, R.11, of the Civil P.C., taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. The case does not lay down that in a case where only a part of the claim may be defective against some of the defendants, it is the duly of the court to reject the plaint under O.7, R.11. The ratio of that case has no ap­plication to the facts of the present case. 13. Mr. Parekh, learned counsel for defendants Nos.2 to 10 also submitted that the suit against defendants Nos.2 to 10 should be dismissed at the stage of the notice of motion. The ratio of that case has no ap­plication to the facts of the present case. 13. Mr. Parekh, learned counsel for defendants Nos.2 to 10 also submitted that the suit against defendants Nos.2 to 10 should be dismissed at the stage of the notice of motion. It is not possible to accept this contention or to hold that in a notice of motion taken out by the plaintiff for receiver and injunction it is the duty of the court to dismiss the suit because it has prima facie come to a con­clusion that the suit is not maintainable against some of the defendants. This is a matter which will be adjudicated upon at the hearing of the suit or in a proper proceeding and not at the stage of the present notice of motion. 14. The question whether a Receiver should be appointed of the said property is therefore required to be considered on the merits of the case. It is submitted by the plaintiff that the original tenants, whether statutory or contractual, have abandoned their rights; there is a tres­passer viz. defendant No.10 who is in occupation and therefore it is necessary to protect their rights and that a Receiver should be appointed of the pro­perty in dispute. The defendants Nos.2 to 10 contend that defendant No.10 is not a trespasser. According to these de­fendants under the notification issued under S.15 of the Bombay Rent Act it is possible for a party to transfer his busi­ness as a going concern together with stock-in-trade, goodwill and tenancy rights, even though the tenancy rights may be only as statutory tenants. The contention of these defendants is con­trary to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court recorded in Vasant Tatoba Hargude v. Dikkaya Muttaya Pujari re­ported in AIR 1980 Bom 341 . Defendants 2 to 10 also contend that the tenancy continues to be a contractual tenancy as there is an alleged waiver of the notice to quit. It is not necessary to examine these contentions at the interlocutory stage. Defendants 2 to 10 also contend that the tenancy continues to be a contractual tenancy as there is an alleged waiver of the notice to quit. It is not necessary to examine these contentions at the interlocutory stage. But they are relevant at present only for the purpose of showing that rightly or wrongly, defendant No.10 claims to be in possession under a sem­blance of title and he claims to be in possession as a person who has entered into an agreement with defendants 2 to 9 to purchase the business of defendant No.9 as a going concern together with stock-in-trade, goodwill and tenancy rights of the suit premises. 15. There is a dispute as to whether defendant No.10 entered into possession prior to the agreement of sale between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 or thereafter. There has been considerable argument on both sides on the question of possession of defendant No.10 in re­spect of the suit premises. It seems that original tenant T. Tarachand was a part­ner in the defendant No.9's firm. The 9th defendant had hired certain equipment and machinery for the studio from a third party, one Samulla Sunny. After the death of the said Sunny a suit was filed for the administration of his estate, being Suit No.6053 of 1980 in the Bom­bay City Civil Court at Bombay. In that suit a Receiver was appointed inter alia of the equipment and machinery which were lying in the suit premises Pursuant to the order in that suit the Court Re­ceiver had gone to take all inventory of the said machinery lying in the suit pre­mises and had sealed the said premises. Thereafter the plaintiff filed a suit in the Bombay City Civil Court being Suit No7303 of 1980 against some of the defen­dants as well as the L.I.C. in which also a Receiver was appointed. There are various reports of the Receiver in that suit as well as at the ad interim stage in the present suit. Both the part it's are relying upon various re­ports which have been made by the Re­ceiver. From a perusal of these reports one thing at least is clear viz. that the Receiver had not put her lock on the premises. The premises were locked when the Receiver went there and she put her seal on the premises. Both the part it's are relying upon various re­ports which have been made by the Re­ceiver. From a perusal of these reports one thing at least is clear viz. that the Receiver had not put her lock on the premises. The premises were locked when the Receiver went there and she put her seal on the premises. Ultimately when the studio premises which had been locked throughout and on which there were seals of the Receiver appointed in these various initiations were opened by the Receiver, the premises were open­ed with the keys which were in the pos­session of defendant No.10. It is not necessary to go into the question as to how defendant No.10 obtained the keys of the premises, but the fact remains that the keys of the locks on the premi­ses were with defendant No.10. In view of this fact, prima facie, it is not possible to hold, as contended by the plaintiffs, that the premises were abandoned premises and that nobody was in possession of these premises either when a Receiver was appointed in the City Civil Court Suit No.6053 of 1980 or at any time thereafter. Self-occu­pied premises in the city of Bombay are extremely valuable. They may fetch for its occupier a large sum of money. It is difficult to accept the contention of the plaintiff that such valuable premises which may fetch for its possessor an amount running into lacs of Rupees would be simply abandoned by anybody, and would require a Receiver to take possession of the same in order to pre­serve them. Defendants 2 to 9 cannot be said to have abandoned the premises. They have entered into an agreement to transfer inter alia their rights in these premises to defendant No.10. Defendant No.10 appears to have been in possession of the suit premises under such an agree­ment before the filing of the suit. At present, therefore, the premises are not in an abandoned state. 16. We have next to examine whe­ther the plaintiff has a present right to possession of these premises. Assuming for the sake of argument that the posses­sion of defendant No.10 is wrongful the plaintiff today has no interest in the property in dispute. He is merely a per­son who has entered into an agreement to purchase the property. 16. We have next to examine whe­ther the plaintiff has a present right to possession of these premises. Assuming for the sake of argument that the posses­sion of defendant No.10 is wrongful the plaintiff today has no interest in the property in dispute. He is merely a per­son who has entered into an agreement to purchase the property. He has not paid the full purchase price to the ven­dor nor has he obtained a conveyance in his favour. As such, he cannot claim any right to immediate possession of the suit property. 17. Mr. Parekh, learned counsel for the defendants Nos.2 to 10 has challeng­ed the plaintiff's right to obtain specific performance of the agreement of sale. He has alleged that the terms of the agreement of sale are different from the terms on which tenders were invited. He has alleged certain breaches of the agreement on the part of the plaintiff and he has also submitted that L.I.G.; the first defendants are in the position of trustees of the property because they hold this property for the benefit of their policy holders. He has further submitted that at the stage when the tenders were opened, and before the tender of the plaintiff was accepted, defendant No.9 had raised his bid to Rs. 38,50,000 which was Rs. 1 lac more than the bid of the plaintiff. Relying upon the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Kasturi Lal v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1980 SC 1992 as well as Ramana Dayaram Shelly v. The International Airport Authority, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628 , he has submitted that it was the duty of the Life Insur­ance Corporation to accept the highest bid and they acted wrongfully in ac­cepting the bid of the plaintiff. According to him this could be a fit case where the court should not exercise its discretion in granting specific performance of the agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff. 18. At the interlocutory stage it is not necessary to examine the merits of the case. But these submissions merely highlight the fact that the plaintiff does not have an immediate right to posses­sion of the property in respect of which they have entered into an agreement of sale. 18. At the interlocutory stage it is not necessary to examine the merits of the case. But these submissions merely highlight the fact that the plaintiff does not have an immediate right to posses­sion of the property in respect of which they have entered into an agreement of sale. In fact specific performance of an agreement of sale is a discretionary re­medy which may or may not be granted. It is quite possible that in a given case the party who asks for specific perfor­mance may, even when successful, get only damages in lieu of specific perfor­mance. Therefore, unless the plaintiff gets a decree of specific performance in his favour, he does not get a right to possession. He cannot, therefore, at the interlocutory stage dispossess somebody who is in possession prior to the filing of the suit. In view of this position, it is not possible to uphold the contention of the plaintiff that a receiver should be appointed of the property described in Exhibit "A" to the plaint. It may be noted that in the present proceedings the landlord namely, the Life Insurance Corporation has not advanced any arguments and has submitted to the orders of the court. The plaintiff is, however, entitled to some protection in respect of the property which he has agreed to purchase so that his rights may be pro­tected in the event of his succeeding in the suit. Accordingly, I pass the follow­ing order : Defendants 2 to 10, their servants and agents are restrained from in any man­ner disposing of alienating, encumber­ing, inducting any third party or creat­ing or recognising any right in favour of any third party in respect of the pro­perty described in Exhibit "A" to the plaint or parting with possession thereof or any part thereof. Defendants 2 to 10, their servants and agents are also re­strained from altering the condition of the property described in Exhibit "A"' to the plaint or any part thereof. Defendant No.10 his servants and agents are further restrained from parting with the possession of the said pre­mises or any part thereof in favour of defendants Nos.2 to 9 or any of them. Defendants 2 to 10, their servants and agents are restrained further from exe­cuting a deed of assignment pursuant to the agreement in question entered in­to between them. The undertaking given by defendants 2 to 10 on 22nd Sept. 1981 is vacated. Defendants 2 to 10, their servants and agents are restrained further from exe­cuting a deed of assignment pursuant to the agreement in question entered in­to between them. The undertaking given by defendants 2 to 10 on 22nd Sept. 1981 is vacated. Ad interim orders to continue till 15th June 1982. The receiver to make an in­ventory in respect of the property Exhi­bit "A" to the plaint including the goods lying in the studio premises and to pre­pare a list of all persons in occupation of the property Exhibit "A". Inventory to be made by the Court Receiver imme­diately by removing the seal of the stu­dio premises and re-fixing the same after the inventory is completed. Ad interim orders to stand vacated on 15th June 1982 and the Receiver to remove her seal forthwith thereafter. Mr. Parekh learned counsel for the defendants 2 to 10 applies that the plain­tiff should deposit in court a sum at Rs. 28,12,500 which, according to him is the balance purchase price payable in respect of the agreement for sale. Mr. Amin, learned counsel for the plaintiff states that the balance purchase price of Rs. 23,12,500 has been deposited by the plaintiffs with their attorneys M/s. Bachubhai Munim and Co. In view of this statement application rejected. Costs to be costs in the cause. Ordered accordingly.