SABHAHIT, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal under S. 39 (1) (v) of the arbitration Act, 1940, by defendants 1 to 3 before the Prl. Civil Judge, Bangalore dist. , Bangalore, is directed against the order dated 22-3-1978 passed by the Prl. Civil Judge, Bangalore Dist. , Bangalors. on IA No. II in OS No. 165 of 1977, OH his file, rejecting IA No. II for stay of proceedings in the suit viz. , OS No. 165 of 1977. ( 2 ) WHEN the appeal came up for hearing, Sri S. G. Sundaraswamy, learned advocate appearing for the respondent, raised a preliminary objection that this appeal instituted under S. 39 (1) (v) of the arbitration Act lies before a Single Judge of this Court and not before a Division bench. ( 3 ) THAT was resisted by Sri V. Krishnamurthy, learned Advocate appearing for the appellants. He submitted that having regard to the peculiar wordings of S. 39 (l) of the Arbitration Act, the appeal lies only to a Division Bench of this Court which is competent to hear appeals from original decrees passed by the Civil Judge in a suit the value of which exceeds Rs. 20,000. ( 4 ) THE preliminary point, therefore, that arises for our consideration in this appeal is: "whether a Division Bench of this Court is competent to hear the present appeal ? " ( 5 ) THERE is no dispute that the power to institute an appeal is provided for in s. 39 (1) (v) of the Arbitration Act. The relevant portion of the section reads :"39 (1 ). An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order : an order- (i)- (iv) xx; xx xx : (v) Staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an Arbitration agreement ; (vi) xx xx xx: provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court". ( 6 ) THERE is no dispute that IA No. II was instituted in the suit before the learned civil Judge to stay the proceedings and the order passed is rejecting the interlocutory application ; in other words, refusing to stay legal proceedings in the suit where there is an arbitration agreement. ( 6 ) THERE is no dispute that IA No. II was instituted in the suit before the learned civil Judge to stay the proceedings and the order passed is rejecting the interlocutory application ; in other words, refusing to stay legal proceedings in the suit where there is an arbitration agreement. Therefore, the appeal is instituted before the high Court. ( 7 ) THE Karnataka Civil Courts Act, 1964, S. 19 provides for appeals from civil Judges. It reads :"appeals from Civil Judge :-Appeals from the decrees and orders passed by a civil Judge in original suits and proceedings of a Civil nature, shall when such appeals are allowed by law, lie, (1) to the District Court, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit or proceeding is less than twenty thousand rupees ; (2) to the High Court, in other cases". ( 8 ) THEREFORE, there cannot be any doubt that the appeal lies to the High Court. 1. The next question that would arise for our consideration is : 'whether it lies before a Bench of a Single Judge or before a Division Bench ?' ( 9 ) WHEN the appeal lies to the High court, it was submitted by Sri Sundaraswamy, that we have to necessarily refer to the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, to ascertain whether the appeal is to be heard by a Division Bench or by a Single judge. ( 10 ) S. 9 of the Karnataka High Court act speaks of other powers of a Single judge. It reads:"other powers of a single Judge :-The powers of the High Court in relation to the following matters shall be exercised by a single Judge, provided that the judge before whom the matter is posted for hearing may adjourn it for being heard and determined by a Bench of two judges :- (i)- (x) xx xx xx (xi) appeals from interlocutory ord" ers, where such appeals are allowed by law". ( 11 ) THUS, Sri Sundaraswamy submitted that since any order passed under S. 34 of the Arbitration Act partakes the nature of an interlocutory order and since an appeal is provided against such order, the appeal has to be heard by a single Judge and not by a Division Bench. ( 11 ) THUS, Sri Sundaraswamy submitted that since any order passed under S. 34 of the Arbitration Act partakes the nature of an interlocutory order and since an appeal is provided against such order, the appeal has to be heard by a single Judge and not by a Division Bench. ( 12 ) SRI Suridaraswamy pressed into service a Division Bench decision of this court in the case, Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph (1), wherein it is laid down that an order passed under S. 34 of the Arbitration Act is not final. It is stated in paras 1 and 9 of the judgment that an order passed on an application under S. 34 of the Arbitration Act is not a 'judgment, decree or final order' as contemplated in Art. 133 of the Constitution. It is further stated in para 2 of the judgment thus :"a final order is an order which finally determines the point under dispute and brings the case to an end. To constitute a final order it is not sufficient merely to decide an important or even a vital issue in the case. The decision must not keep the matter alive. An order on an application under S. 34, arbitration Act, does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties but leaves them to be determined by the Courts in the ordinary way". ( 13 ) THUS, Sri Sundaraswamy submitted that an order under S. 34 of the Arbitration Act does not become a final order or decree, since the lis does not come to an end and the matter is kept alive. Hence, he submitted that it partakes the nature of an interlocutory order as contemplated in S, 9 (xi) of the Karnataka High Court Act and, so, the appeal is to be heard by a single Judge and not by a Division Bench. ( 14 ) SRI Krishnamurthy resisted the argument. He Invited our attention to the wordings used in S. 39 (1) of the arbitration Act while fixing the forum of appeal. ( 15 ) AS quoted above, S. 39 (1) of the arbitration Act states that an appeal shall he from an order passed under S. 34 of the said Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the court passing the order. ( 15 ) AS quoted above, S. 39 (1) of the arbitration Act states that an appeal shall he from an order passed under S. 34 of the said Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the court passing the order. ( 16 ) THUS, the Legislature, though it was well aware of the fact that an order contemplated under S. 34 of the Arbitration Act was in the nature of an interlocutory order, while providing for the forum, has clarified in its wisdom that an appeal shall lie to that Court which hears appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order. The Legislature does not use its words without any purpose. Every word used in the section is to be given its importance. When therefore, it is specifically stated that the appeal shall lie to that Court which hears the appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, it cannot be stretched to mean that an appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal shall lie from an interlocutory order passed by the Court. That would amount to unwarranted alteration in the section. ( 17 ) IF we were to follow the interpretation advanced before us by Sri Sundaraswamy, it would mean that the Court which is competent to hear an appeal from an interlocutory order would also be competent to hear the present appeal though the section provides specifically that the court competent to hear the appeal is that which is competept to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, whether the impugned order is interlocutory or final. ( 18 ) WE have pointed out above that the Court which is competent to entertain and hear appeals from original decrees passed by a Civil Court, if the value of the subject matter is more than Rs. 20,000, as rightly pointed out by Sri Sundaraswamy, is the High Court. We have to necessarily look to the Karnataka High Court Act for the forum constituted for hearing different matters and, here, S. 5 read with S. 10 (v) of the said Act makes it clear that an appeal to the High Court from the original decree of a Civil Court, with which we are concerned in this case, the subject matter of which is more than Rs. 20,000, shall be heard by a Division Bench. Therefore, the forum that is contempleted under S. 39 (1) of the Arbitration Act is not merely the High Court but a Division Bench of the High Court consisting of two Judges, as provided under S. 5 read with S. 10 (v) of the Karnataka High Court Act, that is competent to hear an appeal from original decrees passed by a Civil Court in which the value of the subject matter exceeds rs. 20,000. ( 19 ) IT is for that reason that we hold that the appeal is competent only before a division Bench of the High Court and that it cannot be heard by a single Judge of the High Court. ( 20 ) THAT being so, we hold that there is no substance in the preliminary objection raised before us and we reject the same. --- *** --- .