ORDER K.M. Dayal, J. - These two revisions have been filed under S. 25, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Revision No. 328 of 1981 has been filed against the judgment and order passed in a Small Cause Court case No. 13 of 1980 ordering the ejectment of the defendant from the premises in suit and payment of rent and damages. Revision No. 321 of 1981 has been filed against the judgment and order dated 23-7-1981 dismissing the application of the revisionist for setting aside the ex parte decree and restoring the suit to its original number under O.9 R.13, C.P.C. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff respondent filed a suit for ejectment of the defendant from the disputed premises on the allegation that the disputed premises were let out to the defendant at a rent of Rs. 350 per month. His tenancy had been terminated and consequently he was liable to ejectment. The suit was filed in the court of Judge Small Causes on 17-12-80. On 23-12-1980 notices were ordered to be issued to the defendant. In the meantime the case was transferred to the court of III Addl. District Judge exercising jurisdiction of Small Cause Court. On 17-1-1981 the suit was ordered to be registered in transferee court and notice was issued to defendant fixing 25-2-1981 for filing written statement as well as for settlement of issues. The order-sheet of 25-2-1981 shows that some one on behalf of the defendant went to make enquiries but when the case was called out no one appeared. The report of the process-server on the summons was not in accordance with law. The peon was ordered to be produced before the court on 27-2-1981 for examination, 6-4-81 was fixed for filing written statement and 13-4-1981 for settlement of issues. Notices were ordered to be sent by registered post. The plaintiff was ordered to take steps by 27th February. The order-sheet of 27-2-1981 is not traceable. On behalf of the defendant an application (11-C) was made by one Sri Umesh Chandra Varshney Advocate, for postponing the case on 6-4-1981. Application (11-C) shows that it was moved by the counsel on the ground that the case was fixed for filing written statement but certain papers were required to be seen which could not be found. The papers were to be searched. In the meantime, the case was sought to be adjourned. Application (11-C) shows that it was moved by the counsel on the ground that the case was fixed for filing written statement but certain papers were required to be seen which could not be found. The papers were to be searched. In the meantime, the case was sought to be adjourned. The application was allowed and time till 21-4-1981 was granted. Thereafter it appears than there was strike of Advocates and their clerks. The case was again adjourned. Ultimately the case was fixed for 13-7-81.on that date an application was moved by the counsel that he was to attend marriage of one of his relations and therefore he could not draft the written statement and one month's time was sought for filing written statement. That application was opposed The case was adjourned to the next day i.e. 14-7-1981. On that date an application was moved on behalf of the defendant that be was ill and was not in a position to move out of the bed. An affidavit of one Ganga Saran s/o the defendant was also filed in support of that application. It was also supported by a medical certificate of a registered medical practitioner. That application was opposed and it was rejected by an order passed on the back of the application. The court held that the defendant had been seeking adjournments from time to time. In the application moved a day earlier there was no mention of the defendant's illness. Under the circumstances the medical certificate could not be believed. The affidavit was not considered. After rejecting that application the court recorded the statement of the plaintiff and decreed the suit. Revision No. 328 of 1981 arises out of the same. In that revision the learned counsel for the revisionist raised two questions. The first argument of the learned counsel was that under the circumstances of the case the court below was not justified in rejecting the adjournment application and proceeding ex part. The affidavit (21-C) filed by the son of the defendant relating to the illness of the defendant filed in support of the medical certificate was totally ignored. There was no affidavit from the side of the plaintiff swearing that the defendant was not ill. The previous adjournments were irrelevant and the court should have confined to and given a finding on the basis of the material before it in respect of the particular date. There was no affidavit from the side of the plaintiff swearing that the defendant was not ill. The previous adjournments were irrelevant and the court should have confined to and given a finding on the basis of the material before it in respect of the particular date. If frivolous adjournments were sought earlier, it could not be ground to reject this application. The court had ample power to refuse frivolous adjournments. The court below should not have dismissed the application for adjournment on the ground of previous laches and in doing so it failed to exercise the discretion vested in it, judicially. The affidavit (21-C) could not have been ignored. The learned counsel for the opposite party argued in reply that the defendant had been seeking adjournments again and again and consequently the Court was justified in rejecting the application for adjournment. I am unable to agree. In case the court below was satisfied that earlier adjournments were frivolous it should have refused the same. After granting an adjournment it could not contend that it was frivolous. When the adjournment was sought on 14-7-1981 the material before the court below was one medical certificate and one affidavit. Neither the medical certificate nor the affidavit filed by the son of the defendant could have been rejected without any evidence in rebuttal. The plaintiff did not file a counter affidavit nor it gave any other evidence to prove that the defendant was not ill. There was no material before the court below on the basis of which it could hold that the defendant was not ill. Adjournment is a matter of discretion but it has to be exercised judicially and not on irrelevant considerations. In the instant case the court below did not exercise the discretion judicially and acted illegally in exercise of its jurisdiction in refusing adjournment on the ground of past laches. 3. The other question raised by the learned counsel for the defendant was that the Judge Small Causes had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of suit. The learned counsel argued that the subject-matter of suit was not merely a building but it was building and open piece of land. Several machines were fixed thereon i the shape of a factory. He relied upon a case reported in Durga Prasad v. Moti Lal Gupta, 1981 All Rent Cas 579. In that case a Dal Mill was in dispute. Several machines were fixed thereon i the shape of a factory. He relied upon a case reported in Durga Prasad v. Moti Lal Gupta, 1981 All Rent Cas 579. In that case a Dal Mill was in dispute. The mill was run with electric power and fixed in a hall. It was held by Hon'ble the Chief Justice, who heard the revision, that the dominant intention of lease was running of Dal Mill and not use of building. Consequently the Explanation added in Article 4 of the Second Schedule appended to the Small Cause Courts Act was not attracted. Article 4 of the Second Schedule reads as under: "4. A suit for possession of immovable property or for the recovery of an interest in such property, but not including a suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee from a building after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of compensation for use and occupation of that building after such determination of lease. Explanation -For the purpose of this Article, the expression, 'building' means a residential or non-residential roofed structure and includes any land (including any garden), garages and outhouses, appurtenant to such building and also includes any fittings and fixtures affixed to the building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof." 4. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, argued that the lease was for the building and the relationship between the parties was that of a landlord and a tenant. The crux of the case was not dependent upon the use of the building but it was dependent upon the relationship between the parties as landlord and tenant. The learned counsel relied upon a case 1978 U.P.R.C.C. 140 : 1978 All LJ 139, M/s. Nirmal Dai v. Smt. Krishna Devi. In that case another learned Judge, held that buildings residential or non-residential were covered by the Explanation, and it was the building which was let out and consequently the Court of Small Causes had jurisdiction to try the case. The Dal Mill was covered by the Explanation according to this decision. The learned single Judge placed reliance on sub-clause (3) of S. 15 of the Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972. The learned single Judge also relied upon a proviso to sub-cl. (3) of S. 15 added in the Provincial Small Cause Act by U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act No. 37 of 1972. The learned single Judge placed reliance on sub-clause (3) of S. 15 of the Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972. The learned single Judge also relied upon a proviso to sub-cl. (3) of S. 15 added in the Provincial Small Cause Act by U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act No. 37 of 1972. Section 15, Provincial Small Cause Court Act, provides for the jurisdiction of the Courts of Small Causes. Sub-section (1) provides that the suits mentioned in the Second Schedule of the Act were not cognizable by the Courts of Small Causes. Sub-sections (2) and (3) prescribed the limits of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Courts of Small Causes. The jurisdiction of the Courts of Small Causes was up to one thousand rupees. By the proviso added by U.P. Act No. 37 of 1972, pecuniary jurisdiction was extended up to Rs. 5,000/- in case of suits for eviction of a lessee by a lessor. It had nothing to do with the subject matter of the suit nor it superseded the provisions of sub-s. (1) of S. 15. The case of Durga Prasad (1981 All Rent Cas 579) (supra) was decided later on. The case of Messrs Nirmal Dal Mills v. Smt. Krishna Devi (supra) was also considered. The learned counsel for the respondent further relied upon a case reported in Uttamchand v. S.M. Lalwani, AIR 1965 SC 716 . That was a case under Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1955. Section 3 (a) of that Act defined "accommodation". That definition is quite different from the definition of `building' in U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The definition of "accommodation" in the M. P. Accommodation Control Act has no bearing in the case of a `building' under the present Act. The U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act No. 13 of 1972, which is hereinafter referred to as the Act. We are not much concerned with the various Rent Acts. What is to be decided in the instant case is whether the explanation to Article 4 of Second Schedule of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act covered the property in the present suit. What was let out by the lease in the instant case was not merely the building. We are not much concerned with the various Rent Acts. What is to be decided in the instant case is whether the explanation to Article 4 of Second Schedule of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act covered the property in the present suit. What was let out by the lease in the instant case was not merely the building. The rent note reads as under: "Atah Uprokt Chhota Tin Shade Aur 24 (Chaubis) Feet Se Bana Huwa Bada Tin Shade Wa Ketheri Wa Bhumi Mai Are Mashine Wa Shan Mashin Wa Motar Das Hars Powar No. 1388 Komptan Parkinsan Mai Swich Wa Starter Wa Kanekshan Bijli Ko Apne Karbobar Chirai Lakri Ke Liye 3. 1-1975 Waste 11 Mah 320 Rupe Mahwar Swami Mahaode Se Kiraye Par Liye Hai." 5. It is thus apparent that the building was only one of the items which were leased out. Besides the building (sheds) open piece of land and other properties in the shape of machinery of Saw Mill including motor and electric connection were also leased. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that in the Explanation. "building" meant residential or non-residential structure. The Explanation further included land, garages, outhouses appurtenant to such building and also included any fittings and fixtures affixed to the building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. It is true that if a building is let out, it may include open piece of land for beneficial enjoyment thereof, may be in the shape of lawn, drive or otherwise vacant land, may be having fittings like fans, lights, air-conditioner or coolers, sanitary fitting, heaters and so on. Those fittings are meant for beneficial enjoyment of the building itself. But where the purpose is to run a factory and the building is merely to cover or protect the machinery, stocks etc, it cannot be said that the machinery fitted in it was for beneficial enjoyment of the building itself. In that case the building will be for the protection of the valuable machinery which is the subject matter of lease. In the instant case I find that not only two tin sheds but open piece of land and various machines for running the business were let out. All these things cannot be termed as building or buildings or cannot be said to be installed for beneficial enjoyment of the building which were two sheds and a Kothari. In the instant case I find that not only two tin sheds but open piece of land and various machines for running the business were let out. All these things cannot be termed as building or buildings or cannot be said to be installed for beneficial enjoyment of the building which were two sheds and a Kothari. I agree with the view of the learned Chief Justice in the case of Durga Prasad (1981 All Rent Cas 579) (supra) and hold that the lease in the present case was not of a building with open land and fitting for mere beneficial enjoyment of the building. The lease was in respect of a factory which also had some covered portion necessary for running the same. The suit between landlord and tenant in respect of such a lease was not cognizable by the Small Causes Court. In the instant case the judgment and decree passed by the court below has to be set aside. As it has been found that the Court of Small Causes has no jurisdiction to try the suit the decree fails. 6. In the result the judgment and decree passed by the court below is set aside. The revision is allowed and the court below is directed to return the plaint for presentation to the proper could it, accordance with the rules. 7. Coming No. 321 of 1981, as the decree has itself been set aside in revision No. 328 of 1981 this revision has become infructuous and no order is required thereon. However, as the suit has been restored the ex parte decree is set aside and the revision is allowed. 8. Parties are directed to bear their own costs in the circumstances of the case.