JUDGMENT R.S. Verma, Member. - This review application has been filed against my order dated March 6, 1982 by which I had allowed, under Order XLI, Rule 20, Code of Civil Procedure, the impleadment of Nagpur Palika, Aligarh. 2. In the trial court, the Nagar Palika, Aligarh had been made one of the defendants. Nand Kishore, the contesting defendant, had taken a plea that the Prabandhak Krishi Bhumi had not been impleaded as a party. He perhaps meant the Chairman of the Land Management Committee. An issue was framed on this point and it was answered against the defendant. The plaintiffs suit was decreed on merits by the trial Court. The defendant filed an appeal against that order, and here also he did not mention in the grounds of appeal that the Gaon Sabha was a necessary party in the suit and that the Nagar Palika was not a necessary party. However, without raising such a plea in the written statement or in the grounds of appeal, the defendant's counsel argued in the first appellate court that the suit was not maintainable because the Gaon Sabha had not been impleaded as a party. The learned Additional Commissioner ordered remand of the case and directed the trial court to frame an issue whether the disputed plot was within the Nagar Palika limits or not. 3. The plaintiff felt aggrieved by this order and filed an appeal, in this court against the order of remand in his appeal, the plaintiff-appellant's learned counsel, Sri Devendra Swaroop, did not implead the Nagar Palika and, instead impleaded the Gaon Sabha Kishanpur. A bare reading of the grounds of appeal will disclose that Shri Devendra Swaroop, learned Advocate of the appellant, lost sight of even elementary procedural law. The grounds of appeal are contradictory, confusing and absurd. I would not have ordinarily commented on his competence but for the reason that it is absolutely necessary for a correct appraisal of points involved in this review application. 4. By the time the appeal was ready for final hearing, Shri G.N. Verma, learned Advocate, was engaged from the side of the appellant. On that date, Shri B.B. Paul, learned Advocate for the respondent pointed out that the appeal was not maintainable because the Nagar Palika, Aligarh, had not been impleaded as a party in this appeal, Shri G.N. Verma learned counsel for the appellant, was taken by surprise. On that date, Shri B.B. Paul, learned Advocate for the respondent pointed out that the appeal was not maintainable because the Nagar Palika, Aligarh, had not been impleaded as a party in this appeal, Shri G.N. Verma learned counsel for the appellant, was taken by surprise. He could not have imagined that such an absurd mistake had been committed by his learned colleague, Shri Devendra Swarup, who had drafted and filed this second appeal. 5. On the next date, an application was filed on behalf of the appellant, praying for impleadment of the Nagar Palika on the grounds "That in the plaint the Gaon Sabha was written and later on scored" and "That at the time of writing of memo of appeal in this Hon'ble Court the counsel for the appellant, reading the judgment of the learned Additional Commissioner felt that Gaon Sabha Koil be impleaded, so that the objection of the defendant as found in the lower appellate court could be removed". Against this, an objection was filed by the respondent that "In the memorandum of the appeal, the Nagar Palika was wilfully omitted to be impleaded as one of the respondents". It was also mentioned in the objection that "the application for impleadment of Nagar Palika, Aligarh, is misconceived and belated". After hearing both the learned counsels on the amendment application, I allowed the application on payment of Rs. 100 as costs. 6. Now, a review application has been filed by Shri B.B. Paul, learned counsel for the defendant-respondent on five grounds. The first ground is of general nature that the impugned order is patently illegal, incorrect and that if suffers from manifest error of law. The second ground is that in another appeal I had dismissed that on the preliminary ground that it was defective for non-impleadment of a necessary party. The third ground is that this court omitted to consider the written objection on behalf of the defendant-respondent. Fourthly, the reasons assigned by this court while allowing the application were legally and factually incorrect. Finally, this court erred in law in passing the impugned order and denying the valuable right which had accrued to the applicants. 7. At the outset, Shri G.N. Verma, learned Advocate for the appellant, raised a preliminary objection that this review is not maintainable as it was against an interlocutory order. I think there is no substance in this argument. Finally, this court erred in law in passing the impugned order and denying the valuable right which had accrued to the applicants. 7. At the outset, Shri G.N. Verma, learned Advocate for the appellant, raised a preliminary objection that this review is not maintainable as it was against an interlocutory order. I think there is no substance in this argument. Order XLVII, Rule 1(b), Code of Civil Procedure, lays down that review application lies against a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed. The word 'order' is quite comprehensive to include interlocutory order also. 8. Shri B.B. Paul learned counsel for the petitioner, firstly argued that this court committed an apparent error or mistake by not taking into account his written objection wherein he had said in paragraph 3 that in the memorandum of appeal the appellant's learned counsel had wilfully omitted to implead the Nagar Palika as one of the respondents, and by holding that the learned counsel for the appellant was highly negligent. His argument is that wilful act and negligence are two different concepts and the one excludes the other. I do not agree with this view. Negligence means want of proper care or an act of carelessness or neglect; or omission of duty, especially such care for the interests of others as the law may require. By not impleading the Nagar Palika in this second appeal, Shri Devendra Swarup learned counsel for the appellant, did not act with proper care and failed in his duty as a counsel in exercising such care for the interest of his client as the law required. Even a clerk of a counsel could not have committed such a blunder as he had committed in this case. When the Nagar Palika had been impleaded in the trial court and in the first appellate court and its name found place in the decrees of both the courts below, it was only due to complete carelessness that he impleaded the Gaon Sabha instead of Nagar Palika. The wilful act is, of course, there; but carelessness is also present in that very act. An advocate is highly responsible person and he has, in his trust, the interest of his client and therefore a certain minimum standard is indeed, expected of him. The wilful act is, of course, there; but carelessness is also present in that very act. An advocate is highly responsible person and he has, in his trust, the interest of his client and therefore a certain minimum standard is indeed, expected of him. If he fails to maintain that minimum standard in his acts and, instead commits deliberate or inadvertant blunders, it can be surely said that he has been negligent in the performance of his duty. By wilfully omitting to implead the Nagar Palika in this second appeal, Shri Devendra Swarup, learned Advocate for the appellant, failed to bring to his task that care and competence which was expected from a lawyer; and therein lies the high decree of negligence. That is why I held in my order dated March 6, 1982 that it was due to negligence that the Nagar Palika was not impleaded in this second appeal. It is not correct to say that I had not taken into consideration the written objection of Shri B.B. Paul, learned counsel, regarding wilful omission to implead the Nagar Palika. I was throughout conscious of this fact and that is the reason for my observation in the impugned judgment that "the learned counsel, who drafted the memorandum of appeal, was certainly under the spell of some confounding confusion. A perusal of the memo of appeal also shows that the learned counsel could not understand what was the matter involved in the case.... that the plaintiff-appellant' learned counsel, Shri Devendra Swarup, Advocate, perhaps got confused regarding this issue and he due to confusion, impleaded the Gaon Sabha instead of the Nagar Palika". Thus, the first point, raised by Shri B.B. Paul, learned Advocate, in his argument, has got no force in it. 9. This takes us to the next point, Shri B.B. Paul, learned counsel has argued that the finding of negligence given by me, though wrong, helps him in another way as in A.I.R. 1954, Allahabad, 10, it had been held that "Ordinarily this power should not be exercised at the instance, or in favour of a party who has deliberately or negligently failed to make an application for substitution of names under Order 22, Rule 4 read with Rule 11". That ruling is not applicable because it was given in a case where the suit had abated due to non-substitution of the legal heirs of a deceased party, and that was sought to be cured by having recourse to the provision contained in order 41, Rule 20, Civil Procedure Code which provides for the impleadment of a party in appeal. Though this ruling is not strictly applicable to the facts of this case, the principle of law enunciated therein is entitled to great respect. I am also of the view that ordinarily the power under Order XLI, Rule 20 Civil Procedure Code should not be exercised at the instance, or in favour of a party who has deliberately or negligently failed to make application for impleadment of a necessary party. But in some very exceptional circumstances justice demands that such power should be exercised. No law can make provision for all contingencies because life and human behaviour are so infinitely varied and complex. There are millions and billions of different situations, as well as innumerable shades and facts of these situations. No law can possibly cope with all these, and hence Judges have to take into consideration the spirit of law when confronted with a particular exceptional situation. Then strict adherence to technicalities will be too inadequate a consideration in the dispensation of justice. In the instant case, which is before me a peculiar, exceptional and somewhat disturbing circumstance is clearly present, and treating it as such, I ordered impleadment of the Nagar Palika at a belated stage only with a view to save the appellant from the blunder committed by his counsel. I very much regret the use of strong language against a learned counsel, but the exceptional circumstances demand its mention, otherwise the very ground on which I exercised this exceptional power in my order dated March 6, 1982, I had deliberately refrained from using strong language against the learned counsel for the appellant. I expressed my feeling by writing that the learned counsel "was certainly under the spell of some confounding confusion". But now my order dated March 6, 1982 will be missing, with the result that the order itself will become arbitrary and, therefore, unsustainable. I expressed my feeling by writing that the learned counsel "was certainly under the spell of some confounding confusion". But now my order dated March 6, 1982 will be missing, with the result that the order itself will become arbitrary and, therefore, unsustainable. However, I must emphasise here that in the impugned order dated March 6, 1982 has been vehemently challenged in this review petition and so it has become my painful duty to elaborate upon this point. 10. I have already mentioned earlier that even if the work of drafting this memorandum of appeal had been entrusted to a clerk of a counsel he could not have failed to implead Nagar Palika, because this body was a party in the trial court as well as in the first appellate court and the decrees of both the courts below mentioned it as party. Then, why Shri Devendra Swarup, learned counsel for the appellant, did not implead it as a party and implead the Gaon Sabha in its stead, though the Gaon Sabha had never been a party at any state of the proceedings. A perusal of the memo of second appeal will perhaps, throw some light on the working of his mind. In para 4 of the memo, it was asserted that it was wholly incorrect that the Gaon Sabha was not made a party in the suit. This assertion is itself wrong. In para 5, it was said that though the Gaon Sabha had been made a party, the land in suit was within Municipal limits and therefore impleadment of the Gaon Sabha is not at all necessary. In para 6 he had written that "Because the property is in the Municipal Area there is no necessity to make Nagar Palika a party to the suit and it is only necessary to make Gaon Sabha as a party under Section 80 Civil Procedure Code in respect of the areas which are within the area of a particular Land Management Committee and therefore, Gaon Sabha is not a necessary and proper party. In para 8. In para 8. he wrote that, "Because the suit under Section 229-B in respect of the area of plots which are in the Municipal Areas of Nagar Mahapalika is not necessary and proper party under Order I, Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code as the civil court has no jurisdiction in a suit under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the Nagar Mahapalika is not an Asami". Para 9 of the memo read as follows:- "Because the Nagar Mahapalika being not an Asami even in respect of the areas which are of the Nagar Mahapalika and which are under the ownership of the Nagar Mahapalika to bring a suit under Section 229 of the Act for ejectment against any trespasser or under Section 229-A and therefore any suit under Section 229-B also the Nagar Mahapalika is not a necessary and proper party. I have extensively quoted from the grounds of appeal to show that the statements are incorrect contradictory and sometimes meaningless. They disclose utter confusion, complete incoherence and disregard to facts. I must confuse that in my twenty three years of judicial service, I never came across such a phenomenon. The appellant was, of course, guilty in choosing such an advocate as his counsel, but he does not deserve to be punished for this. Instead he (the appellant) requires protection of the court from the conduct of his learned counsel. Recently the highest court of this country has insisted on the 'humanisation' of the law and has held that an innocent litigant should not be made to suffer for the mistakes of his counsel. In the peculiar circumstances of this case. I earnestly feel that it should be a travesty of justice if the appellant is punished for the blunders committed by his counsel. That is why I allowed the amendment application of the appellant and I do not think that by doing I committed any mistake or error. So, this second point, argued by the learned counsel Sri B.B. Paul does not carry conviction. 11. The next point argued by Sri B.B. Paul is that the question of limitation was not considered by this court while allowing the impleadment application. This is not correct. As the application was belated I allowed it on payment of Rs. 100/- as costs. 11. The next point argued by Sri B.B. Paul is that the question of limitation was not considered by this court while allowing the impleadment application. This is not correct. As the application was belated I allowed it on payment of Rs. 100/- as costs. Sub-rule(2) of Order XLI, Rule 20, Civil Procedure Code was inserted by the Amendment Act of 1976 to provide for the impleadment of a respondent after the period of limitation the condition that the court is required to record reasons and award costs. Both these conditions were fulfilled by this court while adding the Nagar Palika as a respondent in this appeal. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner-respondent then argued that before directing a person to be made a respondent the court must record its satisfaction to the effect that such a person is 'interested in the result of the appeal' and that in the instant case it cannot be said that the Nagar Palika Aligarh is interested in the result of the appeal. He has cited the leading case A.I.R. 1927, Privy Council, 252, wherein it was held that "A defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed and as against whom the right of appeal has become barred, cannot be deemed to be interested in the result of the appeal filed by the plaintiff against the other defendants. It is for the plaintiff-appellant who applies to the court to exercise its power under this Rule to show what is the interest of such defendant". 12-A. At the time of argument on the impleadment application this point had neither been raised in the written objection nor in the oral argument. This ruling had also not been cited at that time. 12-B. Order XLI, Rule 20, Sub-rule (1), Civil Procedure Code nowhere says that the court has to record reasons to show that the person to be added as a respondent, is interested in the result of the appeal. Hence, I did not record reasons to show that the Nagar Palika, Aligarh, added as a respondent, was interested in the result of the appeal. 12-C. But it is true that the newly added respondent must be interested in the result of the appeal. Hence, I did not record reasons to show that the Nagar Palika, Aligarh, added as a respondent, was interested in the result of the appeal. 12-C. But it is true that the newly added respondent must be interested in the result of the appeal. In the case with which A.I.R. 1927 (P.C.) 251 dealt, a finding had been given by the trial court that certain defendants were owners of this suit property; and those very defendants were not impleaded as parties in the appeal, with the result that the decree operated a res-judicata between the plaintiff appellant and those defendants as no appeal had been filed against those defendants within the period of limitation. When application under Order XLI Rule 20, Civil Procedure Code, was given to implead those defendants against whom the appeal had become time barred, and who had thereby got a valuable right in the suit property, that application was rejected. Commenting on that fact the Privy Council observed that "That rule empowers the court to make such party a respondent when it appears to the court that he is interested in the result of the appeal. Giving these words their natural meaning - and they cannot be disregarded - it seems impossible to say that in this case the defendants against whom the right of appeal has become barred, are interested in the result of the appeal filed by the plaintiff against other defendants. It was for the plaintiff-appellant who applied to the court to exercise its powers under this rule, to show what was the nature of their interest and that this he has failed to do...... Assuming that under this rule the court in a proper case might add a defendant as respondent for the purpose of passing a decree against him, their Lordships see no sufficient reason for interfering with the refusal of the appellate court to do so in this instance". 12-D. Here in this case, the Nagar Palika, Aligarh the newly added respondent, had not contested the suit. It had no direct interest in the land in suit. It is only a formal party and the controversy between the parties can be decided in this appeal even without the impleadment of the Nagar Palika. It had acquired no rights of any kind by the dismissal of the plaintiff's case. It had no direct interest in the land in suit. It is only a formal party and the controversy between the parties can be decided in this appeal even without the impleadment of the Nagar Palika. It had acquired no rights of any kind by the dismissal of the plaintiff's case. It was neutral in his litigation, because the disputed land did not belong to it. And yet it was a necessary party to the suit. Why so? why is it that the Legislature, in its wisdom, has made it mandatory that in every suit under Section 229-B, 209 etc. of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the State Government, the Gaon Sabha or the Local Authority concerned must be impleaded as party, even though the disputed land belongs to private parties and the local authority and the State have got no direct interest in it?.... A correct answer to this question will show that, as far as the legislature was concerned, it deemed fit to presume that in every land litigation in U.P. the Local Authority concerned and the State of U.P. have got an interest in the result of such litigation. The U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was passed in the wake of independence. During the freedom-right various ideologies-communistic, socialistic, egalitarian etc. were the guiding force of the leaders of the struggle. One of the strong factors was a genuine concern from the welfare of the poor peasants, along with a realisation that the right regarding landed property was not such that the community as a whole could remain indifferent to it. Socialism had not been accepted, and yet untrammelled right to private landed property, was not recognized. The idea was in a nebulous form. The predominent spirit was that uncontrolled right in respect of, at least, landed property had a tendency to impinge on the interest of poor peasants. So certain positive rights were conferred on the Gaon Sabha and Local Authorities. Not satisfied with that the legislature, which was the representative of millions of people of this State, provided that in every case, where declaration of tendency rights was involved, the Gaon Sabha, the Town Area Committee, the Nagar Palika, the Nagar Mahaplika, as the case may be, must be impleaded as a party to watch the interest of the the community. As if it were not sufficient, it was further provided that the State of U.P. must also be impleaded as a party. Some of the objects of the Legislature were that these juridical persons, through their officers, should watch that parties do not enter into collusive compromise, or defeat the purpose of the said legislation, or transfer land against the provisions of law or enter into any transaction to circumvent the ceiling law regarding land etc. In case the line of succession fails or where none of the parties to the suit has any legal right in the land in suit the Gaon Sabha or the other concerned Local Authority can claim that land according to law. It is immaterial that the suit plots do not belong to these local authorities, none-theless the Legislature has thought that they have vital interest in the result of the litigation. If the Legislature is of this view, the courts of law, must keep the same view while deciding revenue cases. So it will be deemed that in case under Sections 229-B, 209, 176 and others of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the Local Authority concerned is interested in the result of land litigation, which includes appeal result of land litigation, which includes appeal also. 12-E. In such circumstances, rulings given regarding other enactments will not be helpful in considering the concept of necessary party 'or' person interested in the result of the appeal as far as they are involved in connection with litigation under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It is one of the unique features of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act that it has involved the local authority and the State itself in connection with litigation regarding land. It is surely a novel idea and is, to a little extent, in tune with the spirit of times. 12-F. Those who are concerned with revenue law, either as lawyers of Judges instinctively know that in land litigation in Uttar Pradesh the Local Authority and the State of Uttar Pradesh are necessary parties in proceedings under certain sections of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and they also recognize that these juridical persons have a subsisting and also a contigent interest in the result of such proceedings. That is the reason why the respondent's learned counsel raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was not maintainable because of the absence of Nagar Palika and that is why the appellant's learned counsel most promptly applied for impleadment. No elaborate reasoning was required. In fact, no reasoning was at all required. No argument was advanced on that point. And so I did not mention in my impugned order that the Nagar Palika Aligarh was interested in the result of the appeal. However this point was present in my conscious mind. 12-G. The Privy Counsel ruling A.I.R. 1927 P.C., 252 should be read in the context of that very case. The Privy Council conscious of its authority and responsibility, did not make any generalisation and took pains to mention that ".........it seems impossible to say that in this case the defendants .....are interested in the result of the appeal". By further saying that "Assuming that under this rule the court in a proper case might add a defendant as respondent for the purpose of passing a decree against him, their Lordships see no sufficient reason for interfering with the refusal of the appellate court to do so in this instance. Their lordships of the Privy Council appear to have left the question open, and they had envisaged that in a proper case such a power can be exercised. Secondly in A.I.R. 1959 Punj. 277 (Full Bench) it was held that while it was true that in such cases it would be usually found that the person not impleaded has no interest in the result of the appeal, it cannot be laid down as an inflexible rule that such a person must be held in every case as not being interested in the result of the appeal. It was also held in this case that the Privy Council decision does not lay down any such proposition. In A.I.R. 1981, Jammu and Kashmir, 9 (Division Bench) and in A.I.R. 1937 Madras, 741 (Division Bench) it was held that there may be cases in the particular circumstances of which such a persons may be interested in the result of the appeal and in such cases there is nothing to prevent the Appellate Court from making him a respondent to the appeal in the exercise of its discretion under this rule. Thirdly, the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act presumes that concerned Local Body (Gaon Sabha, Nagar Palika etc) and the State of Uttar Pradesh have interest in the result of revenue litigation and that is why they have been statutorily given rights to be impleaded in certain types of litigation. Lastly Order 47 Rule 20, Code of Civil Procedure itself has been amended and a provision has been made in its sub-rule that even after the expiry of the period of limitation defendant can be added as a respondent subject to reason being recorded by the court and the other party being compensated by costs. 13. The last point argued is that by this belated impleadment of the Nagar Palika the respondents have been denied of a valuable right. Order XLI Rule 20, Sub-rule(2) Civil Procedure Code itself provides for this and no grievances can be made against a statute. Secondly, it is incorrect to say that the defendant respondents have been deprived of a valuable right, because as the appeal had been filed against them within limitation the question of their having acquired any vested right in the decree under appeal, does not arise. Thirdly, the Nagar Palika also had no acquired any such rights. The reason is that the disputed land did not belong to the Nagar Palika, and it was only a neurtal party saddled with the duty to watch the interest of the general community of which it was a representatives. 14. No other point was argued in this case. This review petition has not substance in it. No apparent mistake or error has been pointed out. An innocuous view of law on a debatable point cannot be said to be a mistake apparent on the face of the record (See A.I.R. 1959 Bombay, 466). It an elaborate process of reasoning is necessary to arrive at the conclusion that there is an error apparent on the case of the record, it cannot be said that there is an error apparent on the face of the record (See A.I.R. 1981 Gujarat 233, (Division Bench). A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision in reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. (See A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 1372). This review petition deserves to be summarily dismissed. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision in reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. (See A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 1372). This review petition deserves to be summarily dismissed. As the petition was brilliantly argued with vehemence and as some very important points have been raised in the argument, this order has become lengthy. 15. I dismiss this review petition accordingly.