JUDGMENT : B.K. Behera, J. - This appeal has been directed against the judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Dhenkanal, setting aside the judgment and order passed by the learned sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Hindol, convicting the Respondent under Sections 458 and 326 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him thereunder to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years u/s 326 of the Indian Penal Code and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment thereof, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of three months and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year u/s 458 of the Indian Penal Code with a direction that the sentences would run consecutively by accepting the case of the prosecution that at about midnight in the night of the 16th/17th March, 1975, the Respondent, being armed with a Tangi and being accompanied by the acquitted co-accused person, namely, Srikara Sarnal, who had come with a torch light to facilitate the commission of the offence by the Respondent, dealt strokes by the Tangi (M.O. I) on the person of Banshidhar Gadnaik (P.W. 2) while he was sleeping with his wife Kanchan Dei (P.W. 1) with a lantern burning dimly in the house which was witnessed by P.Ws. 1 and 2 after which the Respondent took to his heels being chased by the co-villagers including Rajeswar Gadnaik: (P.W. 5) and Gauranga Sahu (P.W. 6) who could identify the Respondent as the person running away on the basis of the first information report lodged by P.W. 1. investigation proceeded and on its completion, the Respondent and the co-accused person were prosecuted. The plea of the Respondent and the co-accused person was one of denial and false implication. According to the Respondent, he was at Angul during the night in question and that while he was coming to the village of occurrence on the day following, he was assaulted by P.Ws. 5 and 6. In the course of investigation. P.W. 2 and the Respondent had been examined medically. P.W. 10 had examined P.W. 2 and P.W. 11 had examined the Respondent. To establish the charges, the prosecution had examined fourteen witnesses. The Respondent had examined two witnesses in his defence. 5 and 6. In the course of investigation. P.W. 2 and the Respondent had been examined medically. P.W. 10 had examined P.W. 2 and P.W. 11 had examined the Respondent. To establish the charges, the prosecution had examined fourteen witnesses. The Respondent had examined two witnesses in his defence. On a consideration of the evidence, the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Hindol, accepted the prosecution case, rejected the plea of the Respondent and convicted him as stated above. The learned Sessions Judge, however, took a different view and set aside the order of conviction and sentences pasted against the Respondent. 2. Mr. A. Rath, the learned Additional Standing Counsel, has taken me through the relevant evidence and has submitted that the findings recorded by the learned Sessions Judge acquitting the Respondent are unreasonable and perverse calling for interference by this Court in appeal. Mr. J.K. Misra, the learned Counsel for the Respondent, has, however, submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has taken the correct view on the evidence and that although the learned Judge did not record his findings on the entire facts and based his conclusions only on the non-explanation of the injured on the person of the Respondent and the delay in lodging the first information report, even on evidence as to the occurrence, no case had been made out. 3. This Court, in the case of State of Orissa v. Trinath Dash and Ors. 54 (1982) C.L.T. 83, has laid down the principles to be kept in mind while deciding an appeal against acquittal When two views on the evidence are reasonably possible and the order of acquittal does not suffer from illegality, manifest error or perversity, the High Court should, as a matter of judicial caution, refrain from interfering with an older of acquittal. If the main grounds on which the court below has based its order acquitting the accused are reasonable and plausible and may not be entirely and effectively dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal. 4. On a bare perusal of the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge, it would be noticed that he had not carefully considered the evidence and had recorded no findings whatsoever as to whether or not the occurrence had taken place as alleged by the prosecution. 4. On a bare perusal of the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge, it would be noticed that he had not carefully considered the evidence and had recorded no findings whatsoever as to whether or not the occurrence had taken place as alleged by the prosecution. He has recorded a finding that the injuries on the person of the Respondent had not been explained by the prosecution without keeping m mind the principle that the prosecution is not obliged to explain the injuries on the person of an accused per son unless the injuries had been caused during the course at occurrence and that the injuries were not superficial in nature. In this connection, reference may be made to the principles laid down in the case of Jagdish Vs. State of Rajasthan. As would appear from the statement of the Respondent himself, he had sustained injuries on the morning of the 17th March, 1975 which, as alleged by him, was owing to the assault on his person by P.Ws. 5 and 6. The case of the prosecution was that the occurrence had taken place at about midnight on the previous day. Thus there was complete absence of evidence to show that the Respondent had sustained injuries during the occurrence and as a matter of fact, the learned Sessions Judge had not come to any finding that the Respondent had sustained injuries during the occurrence. Although as would be noticed from the evidence of P.W. 11, the injuries including a fracture on the person of the Respondent could not be said to be superficial, in these circumstances, it would not be incumbent on the prosecution to explain the injuries on the Person of the Respondent. 5. The only other ground on which the order of acquittal was passed was the delay mad e by P.W. 1 in lodging the first information report at the police station as on her own admission the first information report had been lodged at about 5 P.M. in the afternoon of the day following the night of occurrence and it was in evidence that the police station was at a distance of about 19 kilometers. According to the Investigating Officer. however. the first information report had been lodged at about 5 A.M. of March 17, 1975. Some of the seizurelists, as would be noticed from the record. According to the Investigating Officer. however. the first information report had been lodged at about 5 A.M. of March 17, 1975. Some of the seizurelists, as would be noticed from the record. had been prepared in the morning of the 17th March. 1975. This would give an indication that the first information report had been lodged by P.W. 1 in the early hours of the 17th March, 1975. as sought to be established by the prosecution. It would, however, be noticed from Ext. 10. the requisition for the medical examination of the Respondent issued by the Investigating Officer, that the time when he was sent to the hospital had been recorded as 11 P.M. and had been corrected to 1 P.M. Similarly, it would appear that the time of examination by the doctor had been recorded on its reverse as 11.30 P.M. and it had been corrected to 2.30 P.M. The doctor (P.W. 11), who had examined the Respondent, had stated in his evidence that on 17-3-1975 "at night 2.3u P.M.", he had examined the Respondent. The time 2.30 P.M. could not come in the night. From all this, it has been submitted by Mr. Misra, that the statement made by P.W. 1 that the first information report had been lodged at 5 P.M. would appear to be more reasonable and probable. The attention of P.Ws. 10 and 13. Investigaring Officer) had not been drawn to the corrections made in the requisition and the injury report and therefore, they should not be condemned unheard. It would, however, appear from the evidence of P.W. 1 and the aforesaid ClIcumstances that it was not quite clear as to when actually the first information report was lodged and it could be, as deposed to by P.W. 5. that it had been lodged at about 5 P.M. Regard being had to this controversy, the learned Sessions Judge should not have recorded an order of acquittal by holding that the delay in making the first information report was fatal to the prosecution and that on that grounds the Respondent was entitled to an acquittal. 6. It is unfortunate that the learned Sessions Judge did not write the judgment in accordance with law by keeping in mind the points for determination and giving reasoned decisions thereon. 6. It is unfortunate that the learned Sessions Judge did not write the judgment in accordance with law by keeping in mind the points for determination and giving reasoned decisions thereon. If a case would surely fail on the ground of want of jurisdiction or on the basis of an undisputed point of Jaw, it may be open to a Sessions Judge to record an order of acquittal by setting at naught the Judgment and order of conviction passed by the trial court only on that ground. But in a case of this nature, where controversial questions of facts and law are involved, the Sessions Judge, presiding over the final court of facts should examine all the aspects of the appeal and record his findings thereon for being properly judged by the higher Courts. The learned Sessions Judge completely went wrong and recorded an order of acquittal only on the aforesaid two grounds and he did not even choose to go into the facts of the case with regard to the occurrence and find out as to whether on the evidence on record the case had been made out against the Respondent. In this connection, the principles laid down in Bhagabat Behuria and Ors. v. Jairam Naik ILR 1970 Cutt. 430 and in State of Orissa v. Surendranath Patnaik 40 (1974) C.L.T. 690, may be seen. In the first-mentioned case, it has been observed that the judgment of the appellate court, should be independent and self-contained so that it may indicate that the appellate court had considered the case in a proper way and the High Court may be able to follow it, without referring to the trial court judgment. In the latter case, it has been observed that as the appellate court though a of differing from the conclusions of the trial court, it should have in its judgment stated cogent and convincing reasons for the same. Conclusions especially on important and salient features of the case must be based on proper discussion and consideration of the relevant evidence on record. Abrupt conclusions without discussion and assessment on the materials on record are bad in law. 7. Conclusions especially on important and salient features of the case must be based on proper discussion and consideration of the relevant evidence on record. Abrupt conclusions without discussion and assessment on the materials on record are bad in law. 7. In the light of the aforesaid observations, I would hold that the learned Sessions Judge had not carefully considered the prosecution case and that of the defence and recorded his order basing on two grounds, as indicated above, one of which was unfounded and the other was controversial. At the stage of hearing, I considered as to whether the matter should be remitted to the court of the learned Sessions Judge for a fresh disposal of the appeal in accordance with law, but having heard the learned Counsel for both the sides and taking into consideration the fact that the case has been going on from the year 1975 and during the investigation and trial, the Respondent has been in custody for about three months, I have accepted the submissions made at the Bar that this Court may finally dispose of the matter on the basis of the evidence on record. 8. Coming to the facts of the prosecution case, evidence was led through P.Ws. 1, 2 and 8 that bitter blood was the ruling relationship between P.W. 1 on the one hand and the Respondent on the other as the co-accused Srikara married the niece of P.W. 2 although the Respondent wanted to get his sister-in-law married in the co-accused Srikara. P.W. 8 is no other person than the niece of P.W. 2. There was no other independent, clear and cogent evidence regarding the strained relationship between the parties. As to the dispute between the parties, Bhaskar Gadnaik, Dandu Samal, Anadi Pradhan and Trailok Pradhan, besides others, had knowledge of it, as deposed to by P.W. 2. The prosecution had not examined any of these persons. Although the prosecution sought to show that the Respondent had threatened P.W.2 with dire consequences, there was no evidence that the matter had been reported to the police authorities. If there had been any meetings of the Panchayat in this connection, none of the members of the Panchayat had testified about it. Even assuming, however, that there was motive on the part of the Respondent and that there had been enmity between the parties, enmity, is well-known, is a double-edged weapon. If there had been any meetings of the Panchayat in this connection, none of the members of the Panchayat had testified about it. Even assuming, however, that there was motive on the part of the Respondent and that there had been enmity between the parties, enmity, is well-known, is a double-edged weapon. The Respondent, in order to feed fat his grudge, might assault P.W. 2. It could as well be that for this enmity, he could falsely be implicated by P.Ws. 1 and 2. Motive, however, adequate cannot sustain a criminal charge. If the evidence against an accused person is, clear, cogent and reliable, the absence of proof of motive is of no consequence See Nachhittar Singh Vs. The State of Punjab. BRACK,,,,,,,,,, The prosecution is not bound to prove the motive in a criminal case See State of Haryana v. Sher Singh and Ors. AIR 1981 S.C. 1021 . What is important, therefore, is to see as to whether the evidence with regard to the occurrence on which the prosecution sought to establish its case was clear and convincing and could be acted upon. 9. A striking and suspicious feature in the case was that the investigating agency even chose to get recorded the statement of P.W. 1 u/s 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the stage of investigation although she was no other person than the wife of the victim (P.W. 2) to tie her down to her previous statement made on oath. In the case of Balak Ram and Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR 1974 S.C. 2165 , the Supreme Court observed: 48. It cannot be overlooked that the statements of Jhilmili Ram Prakash and Aryendra were recorded u/s 164, Code of Criminal Procedure in June 1971, soon after the incident. The Investigating Officer says that he got the statements recorded by way of precaution. That could be true and it would be wrong to find fault with the Investigating Officer merely because he got the statements of these witnesses recorded u/s 164. Nor can the evidence of a witness be discarded for the mere reason that his statement was recorded u/s 164. But the High Court overlooked that the evidence of witnesses whose statements are recorded u/s 164 must be approached with caution. Ram Charan v. State of U.P. 1968 (3) SCR 354 : AIR 1968 S.C. 1270 . Nor can the evidence of a witness be discarded for the mere reason that his statement was recorded u/s 164. But the High Court overlooked that the evidence of witnesses whose statements are recorded u/s 164 must be approached with caution. Ram Charan v. State of U.P. 1968 (3) SCR 354 : AIR 1968 S.C. 1270 . Such witnesses feel tied to their previous statements given on oath and have but a theoretical freedom to depart from the earlier version A prosecution for perjury could be the price of that freedom. It is of course open to the court to accept the evidence of a witness whose statement was recorded u/s 164, but the salient rule of caution must always be borne in mind.... Mr. Misra for the Respondent has submitted and in my view, rightly so, that in view of this suspicious feature, the evidence of P.W. 1 has to be subjected to very close scrutiny. 10. P.Ws. 1 and 2 had testified about the assault on the person of P.W. 2 by the Respondent. P.Ws. 3, 5 and 6 had been examined to establish that the Respondent had been seen running away from the place of the occurrence after the commission of the offences. Of these witnesses, P.W. 3 did not support the case of the prosecution and, he was put leading questions and was cross-examined by the prosecution u/s 154 of the Evidence Act. P.Ws. 5 and 6 had no doubt, supported the case of the prosecution in this regard. Both of them had testified that they had seen the Respondent running away by focusing the torch lights they were holding. But it is pertinent to note that in their statements to the Investigating Officer, they had not stated that they had been able to identify the Respondent by focusing the torch lights with them. As the fact of identification by the focusing of the torch light is very material, while judging the evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 6, the omission of such an important matter while P.Ws. 5 and 6 were under examination by the Investigating Officer could not be characterised in an unconsequential omission and in my view, it would amount to a contradiction under the Explanation to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 5 and 6, the omission of such an important matter while P.Ws. 5 and 6 were under examination by the Investigating Officer could not be characterised in an unconsequential omission and in my view, it would amount to a contradiction under the Explanation to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That apart, both the witnesses claimed to have identified the Respondent while he was running away and evidently they could see only the back portion of the person running away. As deposed to by P.W. 5, the person running away had blackened his face. If so, it would, indeed, be very difficult in that part of the dark night for these two witnesses to clearly identify the person running away. While according to P.Ws. 1 and 2, the Respondent was wearing only a half pant and nothing else on his person, P.W. 6 had testified that the person running away had worn a half pant and a banian. For the aforesaid reasons, I am net prepared to place implicit reliance on the evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 6 and hold that they had seen the Respondent running away from the place of occurrence. P.W. 4 had been examined to depose about an extrajudicial confession said to have made by the Respondent. He had, however, not supported the case of the prosecution and had been cross-examined by it. 11. There thus remains for consideration only the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 who were undoubtedly highly interested witnesses and would be looking for a successful termination of the trial against the Respondent. True, being the inmates of the house where the occurrence had allegedly taken place, they would be competent and natural witnesses and their evidence should not be thrown out on the mere ground that they were husband and wife and there had been enmity between them on the one hand and the Respondent on the other, but their evidence should be examined with great care before its acceptance. As to how the evidence of a relation or a partition witness is to be analysed and appreciated, I would quote the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Hari Obula Reddi and Ors. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1981 S.C. 82 , to the following effect: ...It is well settled that interested evidence is not necessarily unreliable evidence. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1981 S.C. 82 , to the following effect: ...It is well settled that interested evidence is not necessarily unreliable evidence. Even partisanship by itself is not a valid ground for discrediting or rejecting sworn testimony. Nor can it be laid down as an invariable rule that interested evidence can never form the basis of conviction unless corroborated to material extent in material particulars by independent evidence. All that is necessary, is that the evidence of interested fitness should be subjected to careful scrutiny and accepted with caution. If on such scrutiny, the interested testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable or inherently probable it may by itself, be sufficient, in the circumstances of the particular case, to base a conviction thereon. Although in the matter of appreciation of evidence, no hard and fast rule can be laid down, yet, in most cases, in evaluating the evidence of an interested or even a partisan witness, it is useful as a first step to focus attention on the question, whether the presence of the witness at the scene of the crime at the material time was probable. If so, whether the substratum of the story narrated by the witness, being consistent with the other evidence on record, the natural course of human events, the surrounding circumstances and inherent probabilities of the case, is such which will carry conviction with a prudent person. If the answer to these questions be in the affirmative, and the evidence of the witness appears to the court to be almost flawless, and free from suspicion, it may accept it without seeking corroboration from any other source. Since perfection in this imperfect world is seldom to be found, and the evidence of a witness more so of an interested witness, is generally fringed with embellishment and exaggerations, however true in the main, the court may look for some assurance, the nature and extent of which will vary according to the circumstances of the particular case, from the independent evidence. circumstantial or direct, before finding the accused guilty on the basis of his interested testimony. 12. As earlier indicated in this judgment, there would arise a reasonable doubt as to whether the first information report had, in fact, been lodged by P.W. 1 at 5 A.M. on the 17th March. 1975, as deposed to by the Investigating Officer. On her own showing. 12. As earlier indicated in this judgment, there would arise a reasonable doubt as to whether the first information report had, in fact, been lodged by P.W. 1 at 5 A.M. on the 17th March. 1975, as deposed to by the Investigating Officer. On her own showing. P.W. 1 had lodged the report in the after-noon at 5 P.M. There is nothing to show that this could be a confused statement especially because of her positive statement that she had made report in the after-noon besides giving the approximate time of the report. The occurrence had taken place at about midnight. The villagers came to the scene of occurrence thereafter. P.W. 1, as would appear from the evidence, must have taken considerable time before proceeding to the police station and making the report. There was no evidence as to how she could cover a distance of 19 kilometers from her village to the police station during the night time and reach the police station at 5 A.M. It would appear from her evidence that the Gramarakhi Chakradhar and her nephew Narottam besides her husband's elder brother had accompanied her to the police station for making the report. The prosecution did not choose to examine any of those persons. If, as deposed to by her, she had made the report at 5 P.M., the delay in making the report had not been explained. This would vitally affect her evidence in the court. 13. P.Ws. 2 and 3 had testified that the Respondent entered their house the door of which was open and assaulted P.W. 2 by means of a Tangi by dealing blows on his person and this could be seen by them with the dim light of the lantern burning in their house. But as would appear from the evidence of P.W. 2, the lantern was burning very dimly and one could not see distinctly with the light of that lantern. The evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 that the lantern was burning would also appear to be doubtful as the Investigating Officer (P.W. 13) had not testified that he had seen any such lantern in the house and no lantern had been seized in course of the investigation. In this connection, my attention has been invited by the learned Counsel for the Respondent to the case of The State of U.P. v. Hari Prasad and Ors. In this connection, my attention has been invited by the learned Counsel for the Respondent to the case of The State of U.P. v. Hari Prasad and Ors. AIR 1974 S.C. 1740 , in which case, for similar reasons, the existence of the lantern was held to be doubtful and the evidence of identification was not relied on. Evidently to probabilise their evidence of identification, P.Ws. 1 and 2 had testified that after the entry of the Respondent and the dealing of the first blow on P.W. 2 when P.W. 2 cried out, P.W. 1 made the light of the lantern brighter. It would, however, be seen from the evidence of P.W. 2 that he had not made any statement to this effect while under examination by the Investigating Officer. The initial case of the prosecution was that the co-accused person Srikara had accompanied the Respondent and had been standing at the door and as he had been focusing the torch light, the scene of the occurrence was visible to P.Ws. 1 and 2. But this part of the occurrence had been disbelieved by the trial court and it would appear from the evidence that although initially P.Ws. 1 and 2 tried to rope in the co-accused person Srikara, that part of the story was given a go-bye. After all, the co-accused Srikara had married the niece of P.W. 2 and at the stage of trial, P.Ws. 1 and 2 bad given evidence in such a manner as if they had not been able to identify the person standing at the door. 14. P.W. 2 had testified that the Respondent had also a torch light with him. This was not in the evidence of P.W. 1. If as deposed to by P.W. 5, the person running away had blackened his face by colouring or by some other process, it would not be possible for P.Ws. 1 and 2 to clearly and distinctly see the face of the assailant if the same person had run away after the occurrence in that part of the night. 15. P.W. 5 had stated that he had been informed about the occurrence by P.W. 1. This, however, was not in the evidence of P.W. 1 who had, on the other hand, testified that after the co-villagers came, she told none a bout the occurrence. 15. P.W. 5 had stated that he had been informed about the occurrence by P.W. 1. This, however, was not in the evidence of P.W. 1 who had, on the other hand, testified that after the co-villagers came, she told none a bout the occurrence. This would certainly affect the truthfulness of the version given by P.W. 2. If she had distinctly identified the assailant and had seen the occurrence in the manner she claimed to have, in the normal course of human conduct and action, she would disclose the occurrence to the co-villagers suing the Respondent as the assailant. 16. The co-villagers may be in a position to identify some persons residing in the same village in a dark night by the light of the stars or by the gait, features and movements of the persons with which they might have been acquainted, but in the instant case, as the occurrence had taken place inside a house, the question of the light of the stars did not arise and in the circumstances in which they had been placed, and in view of the infirmities and suspicious features in their evidence with regard to identification, as discussed above, it would not be reasonable and proper, in my view, to place implicit reliance on the testimony of P.Ws. 1 and 2 without any independent corroboration, with regard to the complicity of the Respondent. 17. P.W. 10 had noticed six injuries on the person of P.W. 2 which could be caused by a sharp cutting instrument, three of the injuries being grievous and a lacerated wound which could be caused by a hard and blunt object, as deposed to by him, but although he had made a statement in his examination-in-chief that the injury Nos. 1 to 6 could be caused by M.O. I which had been left by the assailant and seized by the Investigating Officer and the lacerated injury could be caused by the handle of M.O. I, he had stated in his cross-examination that the injury Nos. 1 to 6 might have been caused by three different sharp cutting instruments and he had given this opinion evidently because the dimensions of the injuries were different. If three sharp cutting instruments had been used in assaulting P.W. 2. the Respondent could not be the only assailant and it would appear that P.Ws. 1 to 6 might have been caused by three different sharp cutting instruments and he had given this opinion evidently because the dimensions of the injuries were different. If three sharp cutting instruments had been used in assaulting P.W. 2. the Respondent could not be the only assailant and it would appear that P.Ws. 1 and 2 had not presented the truth to the court of trial. Even assuming, however, that injury Nos. 1 to 6 could be caused by M.O. I, the evidence of the doctor could corroborate the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 with regard to the crime, but not with regard to the criminal. There was no evidence that M.O. I belonged to the Respondent. 18. For the aforesaid reasons, I find that the prosecution had failed to establish the charges against the Respondent by its evidence. 19. It has been submitted before me on behalf of the State that the Respondent had taken a false plea of abili at the trial. The Respondent's case was that he was throughout the night of occurrence at Angul and was assaulted in the morning of 17th March, 1975 while he was coming to the village. In this connection, reliance had been placed by the defence on the evidence of D.Ws. 1 and 2. For good and sufficient reasons, the trial court discarded their evidence and in fact, their evidence could not rule out the possibility of the Respondent leaving Angul during the night on a bi-cycle and reaching the place of the occurrence situated at a distance of about 10 miles from Angul. As has been laid by the Supreme Court in the case of Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. AIR 1981 S.C. 911 , the plea of alibi can succeed only if it is shown that the accused was so far away at the relevant time that he could not be present at the place where the crime was committed. The plea of alibi postulates the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the scene of offence by reason of his presence at another place. The Respondent has not been able to establish his plea of alibi by showing that, he was so far away that he could not come to the scene. Thus the plea of alibi set up by the Respondent had failed. The Respondent has not been able to establish his plea of alibi by showing that, he was so far away that he could not come to the scene. Thus the plea of alibi set up by the Respondent had failed. It is the settled principle of law, however, that the prosecution is to prove its case and any stand taken by an accused person can hardly be used as evidence unless the truth of the prosecution case is otherwise established. See Kishan Chand v. Delhi Administration and Anr. AIR 1979 S.C. 1128 . The falsity of the defence cannot establish the prosecution case. If the other circumstances point unfailingly to the guilt of an accused person, it can be considered as an additional link, as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1981 S.C. 765 . In the absence of legal evidence pointing to the guilt of the Respondent, the prosecution cannot take the advantage of the fact that the Respondent had not been able to establish his plea of alibi. 20. I thus find no case for interference with the order of acquittal. I have come to the same conclusion reached by the learned Sessions Judge although for different reasons. 21. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed