JUDGMENT B.D. Agrawal, J. - The petition is for a writ of certiorari to quash the notice dated May 6, 1974, under S. 4 (1) and the notice of the same date, under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and for mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere with the possession of the petitioners on the land in dispute. 2. The land covering an area of 8 acres situate in village Bhagrania, district Pilibhit, was acquired by the State of Uttar Pradesh, respondent No. 1. It comprised of. plot Nos. 38, 39, 41, 31, 42, 43, and 29. The area acquired in respect of plot No. 39 is 4.86 acres. The petitioners are bhumidhars of this entire land. A notification under S. 4 (1) of the Act was issued oar May 6, 1974. It was published in the U.P. Gazette on June 29, 1974. In the Notification sub-s. (4) of S. 17 of the Act was also invoked and it was directed that the provisions of S. 5-A shall not apply. A notification under S. 6 read with S. 17 (1) was also issued on May 6, 1974, and published in the Gazette of June 29, 1974. The public purpose for the acquisition made was declared as construction of Majhola-Birbani Road in district Pilibhit. A notice under S. 9 of the Act was given on Sept. 27, 1974. The petitioners have assailed the acquisition on the ground that the requirements under S. 5-A could not be dispensed with since, according to them, a part of the land involved is neither waste nor arable, but is a grove and further there was no urgency to justify S. 5-A being not observed. The respondents refused these averments. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that there could be no urgency in the instant case justifying the requirement under S. 5-A of the Act being dispensed with. It was argued in this connection that the notification under S. 4 (1) and S. 6 dated May 6, 1974, came to be published in the gazette of June 29, 1974, and there was also time lapse in the issue of notice under S. 9 which was done on Sept. 27, 1974. From this it should be inferred, it is contended, that there was no urgency existing for the acquisition being proceeded with. 27, 1974. From this it should be inferred, it is contended, that there was no urgency existing for the acquisition being proceeded with. From the record it would appear that the proposal for the acquisition of the land was initiated in 1971-72. The construction of Majhola-Barbabi Road in district Pilibhit was found necessary to provide facility to sugarcane growers of the area for their more convenient access to sugar factories. In or about Sept. 1971, the petitioners made a representation to the Minister, P. W. D., U.P. to shift the alignment of the road from their plots to the land vested in the Zila Parishad and the Canal Department. The Executive Engineer submitted his report dated Oct. 19, 1971, to the State Government that in the interest of the construction of a pucca road for the fast moving traffic, it would not be proper to shift the alignment from the plots of the petitioners to the land vested in the Zila Parishad or the Canal Department, since in that event four sharp curves would be introduced and they might add to the length of the road, adding thereby to the cost of the construction thereof. The representation of the petitioners did not, it appears, find favour with the State Government. The petitioners moved the Government again by their applications dated April 27, 1972, and Sept. 12, 1972. This also proved to be of no avail. The Superintending Engineer, III Circle, P. W. D. Bareilly, inspected the site on February 28, 1974, along with the Executive Engineer, P. W. D., Pilibhit and considered the proposed alignment in the context of the construction proposed to be made of bridges over rivers Deoha and Lohia respectively. Sardar Singh, petitioner No. 1, was also associated with the inspection thus made, a detailed survey of the area in question was made up to the first week of June, 1974 and the survey for the selection of sites for the construction of above mentioned bridges was made up to about July 15, 1974. In the report submitted on or about July 19, 1974, the selection of the site for the proposed Lohia Bridge was also indicated. This was interlinked with the finalisation of the alignment for the road in question. In the report submitted on or about July 19, 1974, the selection of the site for the proposed Lohia Bridge was also indicated. This was interlinked with the finalisation of the alignment for the road in question. The notifications for the acquisition having been issued in the meantime by the State Government, the Executive Engineer, P. W. D. Pilibhit, proposed to the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bareilly, on June 26, 1974, that the declaration of the award and the payment of compensation be put off since the finalisation of the site for the bridges could be awaited and in case the alignment of the road was changed ultimately due to the shifting of the site for the bridge, the acquisition may not be regarded necessary to be proceeded with. The U.P. State Bridge Corporation, Lucknow, however, proposed an alternative site for the bridge over Lohia river. Ultimately, it was decided on Aug. 23, 1974 that, due to paucity of funds, it might take long for the bridges over rivers Lohia and Deoha to be constructed and hence possession of the land proposed to be acquired had to be taken without delay in conformity with the approved alignment of the road. This entire background behind the acquisition is explained in paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit. It is evident from this account that various alternatives were taken into consideration by the authorities competent in this behalf and the petitioners also had occasion to put forward their representations which received consideration. 4. Strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 183 . In that case the public purpose for the acquisition made was indicated as the development of an area for industrial and residential purposes. The Supreme Court observed that such schemes generally take sufficient period of time to enable at least summary enquiries under S. 5-A of the Act to be completed without any impediment to the execution of the scheme. In the affidavit filed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer in that case, there was a bare statement stating the alternative case that the Commissioner of Bombay Division had formed the opinion that the land in question was urgently required for the public purpose mentioned therein. In the affidavit filed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer in that case, there was a bare statement stating the alternative case that the Commissioner of Bombay Division had formed the opinion that the land in question was urgently required for the public purpose mentioned therein. No facts or particulars were stated to which the mind of the Commissioner could have been applied in forming the opinion that the situation called for invocation of S. 17 (4) to dispense with inquiries under S. 5-A. At page 186 of the AIR report it was observed that the formation of opinion is a subjective matter with regard to the situations in which administrative authorities have to form certain opinions before taking actions they are empowered to take. Once the Court comes to the conclusion that the authority concerned was acting within the scope of its powers and had some material, either meagre, on which it could reasonably base its opinion, the Court should not, and will not interfere. The purpose of S. 17 (4), it was also pointed out, is not merely to confine action under it to waste and arable land but also to situations in which an inquiry under S. 5-A will serve no useful purpose, or, for some other weighty reasons, it should be dispensed with. The mind of the officer or authority concerned has to be applied to the question whether there is an urgency of such a nature that the summary proceedings under S. 5-A of the Act should be eliminated. 5. In Smt. Kailashwati v. State of U.P., AIR 1978 All 181 , a Division Bench, of which one of us was member, had occasion to consider the decision in the case of Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 183 (supra) and it was pointed out at page 184 : "It is true that in para 39 of the judgment, the Supreme Court made observation to the effect but it would not be correct in our opinion, to say that the Supreme Court laid down exhaustively the list of cases where alone such a power could be exercised. The example taken was only illustrative. The example taken was only illustrative. In Narayan's case before the Supreme Court, neither in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the acquiring body nor in the notification issued, there was any material showing that the State Government had applied its mind to the question that there existed urgency which warranted the elimination of the enquiry contemplated by S. 5-A of the Act, on the special facts and circumstances of the case the Supreme Court dismissed the State Appeal and issued a direction that the enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act be held." 6. In Yesho Nathu Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1980 Bom 221 cited for the petitioners, the view taken taken is not different. In that case need for acquisition was felt from the year 1971. For years together, the State did not at all actively move in the matter with any urgency till it chose to issue a notification under S. 4 (1) four years thereafter. It was held that the urgency clause could not be a substitute for laxity on the part of the State administration in expeditiously initiating acquisition proceedings. Nor can it be invoked to make up for the delay caused only because of the lethargy on the part of the administration. The public purpose envisaged therein was provision for house sites for landless workers and their families and for extension of gaothan which in its nature takes time to be accomplished and there was no clear disclosure of the facts and circumstances necessary for justification for applying the urgency clause. 7. In Smt. Manohari Devi Balwal v. State of U.P., 1979 All CJ 163 relied for the petitioners, the land was required for establishment of industrial and resident's estate. It was held that this, in itself, on the face of it, does not call for any such action, barring exceptional circumstances as to make immediate compensation, without holding even a summary enquiry under S. 5 A of the Act, imperative, the report of the District Industries Officer had been made on March 11, 1978, the notification under S. 4 (1) could not be issued till August, 1978, and the undue delay intervening was not reasonably explained. Reliance was placed on the earlier decision in the case of Dr. Reliance was placed on the earlier decision in the case of Dr. Nanak Chandra Chaturvedi v. State of U.P., 1979 All CJ 105 in which the intervening gap between the date of the notification issued under S. 4 (1) and the publication thereof was referred to observing, however, at the same time that each case had necessarily to depend upon its facts and circumstances. The time which may be consumed generally in the disposed of objections preferred under S. 5-A of the Act is also undoubtedly a relevant circumstance of consideration. 8. Viewed in the light of the above, it may be recalled that in the instant cause, there was a report of the Provincial Works Department, Provisional Division, Pilibit and the Planning Department for the acquisition of the proposed land. The purpose was the construction of pucca road to afford greater facility to sugarcane growers in the area for removing their produce to the factory. The scheme was not such as may generally entail delay in execution. The alternatives, including the change of alignment of the road to fit in with the raising of bridges over the rivers had also been considered. It had been found on expert's opinion that the alignment could not be shifted from the land of the petitioners to the Zila Parishad, or the Canal Department's land as in that event sharp curves would have to be made thereby adding to the cost of construction. The petitioners had made representations to the State Government and the petitioner No. 1 was also associated with the inspection made at the site. It cannot be said in the circumstances that the power to dispense with the enquiry under S. 5-A was exercised in this case in an arbitrary or perverse fashion without regard to the actual or undenied plea or that there was no application of mind to the issue on the part of the authorities concerned. 9. It was next argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the summary enquiry envisaged under S. 5-A could not be dispensed with since the land acquired is not entirely waste or arable land within the meaning of S. 17 (1) of the Act. 9. It was next argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the summary enquiry envisaged under S. 5-A could not be dispensed with since the land acquired is not entirely waste or arable land within the meaning of S. 17 (1) of the Act. The learned counsel referred to the notification made under S. 6 read with S. 17 (1) and submitted that the direction contained therein to the Collector is to take possession of any waste or arable land forming part of the land mentioned in the schedule appended to the notification. The total area of the land acquired is 8 acres which is inclusive of plot No. 39 covering the area of 4.86 acres only. In paragraph 6 of the petition it is averred that plot No. 39/4 belongs to petitioner No. 1 as bhumidhar and that out of the total area thereof which is 14.66 acres land to the extent of 4.77 acres constitutes a grove. In support of the contention for the petitioners reference is made to the extract of the khasra of 1381 fasli which records 2 acres out of 14.77 acres in plot No. 39/4 as grove and 2 acres out of plot No. 39/3 (8.8 acres) as grove. It was argued for the petitioners that there is admission contained in paragraph 13 of the affidavit filed by Sri R. R. Misra, an official of the office of the Land Acquisition Officer, Bareilly. Paragraph 13 reads as under: "13. That the contents of paragraph 11 of the affidavit are denied as stated therein. There is a tube well in plots Nos. 39/3 and 39/4 which are cultivated plots. The total area of plot No. 39/3 is 8.88 acres and the grove exists only over 2 acres area. Plot No. 39/4 is 14.77 acres and the grove exists only over 2 acres thereof. The averments that both the plots No. 39/3 and 39/4 are grove land are denied. It is further submitted that guava tress were planted after 1378F. The lekhpal of the village was examined before the Special Land Acquisition Officer who stated that in the revenue records of 1378 to 1380 F. There was no entry of grove over the plots Nos. 39/3 and 39/4. It is submitted that the area under acquisition had not exceeded to the Abadi area. The lekhpal of the village was examined before the Special Land Acquisition Officer who stated that in the revenue records of 1378 to 1380 F. There was no entry of grove over the plots Nos. 39/3 and 39/4. It is submitted that the area under acquisition had not exceeded to the Abadi area. The averments contrary to it are denied on the date of the notification under Sections 4, 6 and 17 no pacca construction existed over the land in question." 10. In order to be able to claim the benefit of the land being a grove, the burden lay upon the petitioners to establish that the specific portion of plot.No. 39 referred to in the relevant notification, constitutes a grove. Plot No. 39 has a large area on the petitioners' own showing and there is no evidence to show that the grove exists on the particular portion thereof which is under acquisition in terms of the notification. It is not enough to say for this purpose that there are certain trees standing. The number of trees and the situation thereof has as well to be indicated in order that the Court may infer that the trees are there in such number and are so situate as to preclude the land or substantial part thereof from being used for cultivation or any other purpose. In paragraph 13, quoted above, we do not find admission in unequivocal terms with regard to the existence of a grove. On the other hand, there is denial as to the existence of the grove and the contents have undoubtedly to be read as whole. In the counter-affidavit filed by Sri Devi Dass Verma, an official of the P. W. D., Provisional Division, Pilibhit, it is specified that there was some plantation made by the petitioners subsequent to 1972-73 when the representation made by them against the proposed acquisition had failed. The petitioners cannot claim to have succeeded in establishing that the portion of plot No. 39 under acquisition constitutes a grove. The petitioners cannot claim to have succeeded in establishing that the portion of plot No. 39 under acquisition constitutes a grove. In view of S. 17 (4), as amended by U.P. Act VIII of 1974, moreover, it is now clear that the power of dispensation of S. 5-A can be exercised with respect to land other than waste and arable as well, see Somdutt v. State of U.P., 1976-2 All LR 529 : 1977 All LJ 202 and Ramjidas v. State f U.P., AIR 1977 All 544 . In paras 8 and 10 of the affidavit of Sri R. R. Misra, referred to above, we find it specified that the acquisition is for planned development of the area and the State Government considered the report of the Public Works Department and the Planning Department before deciding to make the acquisition. For these reasons as well there is no illegality shown to exist in the summary enquiry under S. 5-A having been dispensed with in this case. 11. For the above, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.