JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal from a decree for recovery of Rs. 9,440/- on the foot of a hundi for Rs. 8,000/- against the defendant-appellant since deceased and now represented by his heirs and legal representatives, and the defendant respondents 2 and 3, the defendant 3 being dead and now represented by his heirs and legal representatives numbered as respondents 3/1, 3/2, 3/3 and 3/4. The plaintiff having died in the meanwhile, his heirs are respondents 1/1 to 1/6. The suit was originally filed in the court of the Civil Judge, Aligarh, and decreed with costs against defendants 1, 2 and 3, and dismissed against defendant 4 who has not been impleaded in this Court, vide judgment and decree, dated 5th December 1957. There was a first appeal from that decree in this Court, being first appeal 178 of 1958. Before that appeal could be heard, there was a statutory change in the appellate jurisdiction and the said first appeal was transferred by this Court to the court of the First Additional District Judge, Allahabad, for hearing. The appeal was dismissed by the court of the First Additional District Judge, vide judgment and decree, dated 28th August, 1970. The present second appeal is directed against the same. The record of the suit was sent for from the District Court, Allahabad, when the second appeal became ripe for hearing. The court of the District Judge, Allahabad, has reported that the record is not available, and presumably it was, destroyed in the fire which engulfed that court's record room in the year 1978. After the decision of the first appeal by the court of the First Additional District Judge, Allahabad, the Record ought to have been sent by that court to the court of the Civil Judge, Aligarh for being consigned to the record room of the District Court, Aligarh. The office of this court did not, however, make any inquiry whether the record of this case was so sent back for being consigned in the District Court, Aligarh. In order, however, to get over the difficulty, the paper book, which was prepared, when first appeal 178 of 1958 was pending in this Court, was passed on to me by the learned counsel for the appellant. In order, however, to get over the difficulty, the paper book, which was prepared, when first appeal 178 of 1958 was pending in this Court, was passed on to me by the learned counsel for the appellant. The paper book contains all the essential papers, and under the circumstances, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents 1/1 to 1/6, who alone were represented in this Court from the side of the respondents, did not object to the use of that paper book for the purposes of decision of the appeal. Copies of the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are available on the paper book of the second appeal, and since the certified copy of the judgment was also in a tattered condition on account of the negligence of the staff of this Court in maintaining the records, the learned counsel for the appellant passed an another copy of the judgment, which has been made part of the paper book of this Court. The office of the Court shall compare it with the certified copy on the record as best as it can. The office of the Court shall, after the decision of this case, make an inquiry from the District Court, Aligarh, whether the record of the suit giving rise to this second appeal is lodged in its record room, and if so, that shall be sent for taxation of costs in the decree of this Court. In case, however, the District Court, Aligarh, reports that the record is not available even in that Court, a certified copy of the decree and judgment of the lower appellate court shall be prepared by the office of this Court and made part of the paper book, which has been passed on to me by the learned counsel, and sent down to the court of the Civil Judge, Aligarh, to be consigned in the District Court of that place along with a certified copy of the judgment and decree of this Court. 2. The hundi, which was the basis of the suit, is dated 10th August, 1945. It was drawn by the first defendant. Nand Kishore Bansal, upon himself. The amount was payable to Haji Nabbu Mian Nathuni Mian. 2. The hundi, which was the basis of the suit, is dated 10th August, 1945. It was drawn by the first defendant. Nand Kishore Bansal, upon himself. The amount was payable to Haji Nabbu Mian Nathuni Mian. The hundi was signed by Badlu as the agent of Nand Kishore Bansal and handed over at Samastipur to Nabbu Mian Nathuni Mian and Nabbu Mian Nathuni Mian and Sham Sunder were impleaded as defendants Nos. 2 and 3. Nand Kishore Bansal appears to have carried on business in the firm name of Salikram Nand Kishore at Kanpur. The hundi was delivered to Nabbu Mian Nathuni Mian who are alleged to have sold it to defendant 4, Shyam Sunder Lal, the proprietor. Radhey Lal Lachhi Ram of Hathras, district Aligarh. They presented the. hundi for payment to defendant l through the Bharat Bank, Kanpur. The hundi was dishonoured by first defendant's son, O. P. Bansal, who was impleaded as defendant 5. According to the plaintiffs, defendant 4 thereafter sold the hundi to him for consideration at Aligarh and he became the owner thereof and entitled to sue on its basis. The hundi was thereafter presented by the plaintiffs to defendant 1 and even a telegram was sent to him, but to no effect, hence the suit. Rs. 8,000/- was the amount of principal and Rs. 1,440/- as interest at eight annas per cent per mensem up to the date of suit. It appears that Nabbu Mian's name was struck off and defendants 4 and 5 became defendants 3 and 4 respectively. 3. The defendants 1 and 5, later on 1 and 4 contested the suit. The execution of the hundi was admitted by defendant 1, who was the appellant in this Court and will be referred, hereafter as the defendant-appellant. But he asserted that payment was not received by him from Nabbu Mian and Nathuni Mian. The receipt of the telegram from the plaintiffs was admitted, but the rest of the plaint case was not admitted. In the additional pleas, it was asserted by the defendant-appellant that the hundi was never presented to him for acceptance of payment, nor was it ever accepted by him for payment to the Bharat Bank Ltd. Any endorsement by the defendant-appellant's son to that effect on the hundi was said to be not binding on him. In the additional pleas, it was asserted by the defendant-appellant that the hundi was never presented to him for acceptance of payment, nor was it ever accepted by him for payment to the Bharat Bank Ltd. Any endorsement by the defendant-appellant's son to that effect on the hundi was said to be not binding on him. it was then alleged that, on the allegations contained in the plaint, the hundi became dead in the eye of law. and could not be endorsed in favour of any other person thereafter. The alleged endorsement and negotiation or sale in favour of defendant 4 or by him in favour of the plaintiffs were both denied, and it was alleged that they were all bogus and fictitious without any consideration and were not legal and enforceable in law. The plaintiff's right to sue was denied. Jurisdiction of the court to try the suit was challenged and the suit was said to he barred by limitation. 4. Lastly, it was urged that since the defendant appellant did not receive any consideration from Nabbu Mian Nathuni Mian in respect of the hundi, no suit could lie for recovery of any amount on its basis. 5. As many as twelve issues were framed by the trial court. On issue 5 it held that the court had jurisdiction. On issues 2 and 8, it held that the hundi was presented to the defendant-appellant within three or four days of its execution. Issues 1, 6, 7, 9 and 10 were then taken up together for consideration by the trial court, and on a detailed discussion of the evidence on the record, it found that neither the hundi nor its endorsement in favour of defendant 3, Shyam Sunder, nor that in favour of the plaintiffs were without consideration, that both of them were endorsees for consideration: and that the plaintiff was a holder in due course and entitled to maintain the suit. On issues 3 and 11, the trial court held that the primary liability was of the defendant-appellant, and there was no satisfactory evidence to show that the plaintiff instituted the suit mala fide or in collusion with defendant 3 (Shyam Sunder). On issue 4. it was held that defendant 4, namely, O. P. Bansal, the son of the defendant-appellant, was not an unnecessary party. On issue 4. it was held that defendant 4, namely, O. P. Bansal, the son of the defendant-appellant, was not an unnecessary party. On issue 12, the trial court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree against defendants 1 to 3 in view of the provisions of Sections 36 and 37, Negotiable Instruments Act, and decreed the suit accordingly against them. It was dismissed against the defendant-appellant's son, probably because he was not a party to the hundi. 6. On first appeal, which was also filed only by the first defendant, the first question raised was about the jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain the suit. The lower appellate court held that there was no substance in the plea and it has not been repeated before me. 7. The second contention raised was that the endorsement on the hundi (Ex. 1-C) does not bear any body's signature nor does it bear any date. The third contention was that that endorsement was without consideration. It would be useful to reproduce the endorsement on the back of the hundi, which is in Nagri script but reproduced here in Roman : "Hundi bechi Radhey Lal Lachhiram Hathras walon ne Bhai Shri Kishan Das Aligarh walon ke hath. Hazar Shri Patri Bhai Nand Kishore Bansal Dalmandi Kanpur." 8. The contention that the endorsement is not signed may be examined in the light of the oral evidence which was produced to prove it. Two witnesses were produced by the plaintiff in addition to himself. In his own statement, the plaintiff stated that he permanently lived at Aligarh, while Shyam Sunder permanently lived at Hathras, and that he, the plaintiff, purchased the hundi from Shyam Sunder at Aligarh and paid cash for it and Shyam Sunder endorsed it to him at Aligarh. He identified the handwriting of the endorsement as that of Shyam Sunder and stated that his firm's name was Radhey Lal Lachhi Ram. The plaintiffs second witness Man Mohan stated that Shyam Sunder was his elder brother and the family was joint. Joint family firm was named Radhey Lal Lachhi Ram and carried on business at Hathras. He sometimes visited Samastipur which was in Bihar in connection with business in chillies. Nand Kishore Bansal (defendant-appellant) also carried on business in chillies. Badlu Ram was his agent. Nabbu Mian Nathuni Mian were the commission agents of both of them at Samastipur. Joint family firm was named Radhey Lal Lachhi Ram and carried on business at Hathras. He sometimes visited Samastipur which was in Bihar in connection with business in chillies. Nand Kishore Bansal (defendant-appellant) also carried on business in chillies. Badlu Ram was his agent. Nabbu Mian Nathuni Mian were the commission agents of both of them at Samastipur. Nabbu Mian died during the pendency of the suit. His son Nathuni Mian was his heir. They owed about Rs. 10,000/- to them, that is the joint family business of Radhey Lal Lachhi Ram. The hundi in question was executed by Badlu Ram in favour of Nabbu Mian Nathuni Mian in the presence of the witness who proved the writings and signatures of Badlu Ram and also stated that all the business of Nand Kishore Bansal (defendant-appellant) at Samastipur was done by Badlu Ram. The hundi was executed for the price of chillies which was due to Nabbu Mian Nathuni Mian from the defendant-appellant. Nabbu Mian Nathuni Mian sold the hundi to them, that is the joint family firm of Radhey Lal Lachhi Ram. The witness identified the endorsement and signatures of Nathuni Mian, dated 10th August, 1945. The hundi was thereafter given to the Bharat Bank, Samastipur, and sold in its favour. It was then presented by Bharat Bank, Kanpur, to the defendant-appellant, but he did not pay. The bank returned the hundi with a letter. Thereupon the brother of the witness sold the hundi to the plaintiff at Aligarh and realised cash consideration from him. The witness also produced a parcha from Nabbu Mian Nathuni Mian, dated 12th August, 1944. The hundi of Rs. 8,000/- was given to the firm Radhey Lal Lachhi Ram by Nabbu Mian Nathuni Mian in that account. Cross-examined, the witness made certain interesting disclosures. He said that his firm did not maintain any books of account in respect of the business in chillies although it maintained accounts of the Kirana business carried on at Hathras. The witness specifically stated that the chillies imported from Samastipur were not entered in the books of account nor were the transactions of their sale recorded. According to the witness, they were not entered (in books of account) in order to evade income-tax. Nabbu Mian Nathuni Mian maintained accounts and the transactions were entered in their books of account and the parchas filed were copies made from them. According to the witness, they were not entered (in books of account) in order to evade income-tax. Nabbu Mian Nathuni Mian maintained accounts and the transactions were entered in their books of account and the parchas filed were copies made from them. About the endorsement in favour of the plaintiff, the witness stated that it was in the handwriting of his elder brother and the money received was not entered in their books of account, that is, the books of account of the joint family fund of Radhey Lal Lachhi Ram. It was not entered in order to evade income-tax. That money was not invested in business nor was it invested in purchase of property. Endorsement of transfer was not obtained from the Bharat Bank, but a letter was received from them. He did not serve any notice on the defendant-appellant nor on Nabbu Mian. In the end, the witness said that he had no paper relating to the purchase of chillies. 9. The last witness for the plaintiffs was Shyam Sunder. He stated that he sold the hundi in favour of the plaintiffs. The endorsement was in his handwriting. He received cash consideration for it. The telegrams sent to Samastipur were filed. He said that he had come for selling the hundi on 12-4-1948, at about 8.00 a. m. and sold it after 3-4 hours. He had sold it for Rs. 8,000. He did not enter the amount in the books of account. The endorsement did not contain his signatures. He did not know the defendant-appellant. He had sent a telegram to the defendant-appellant about the dishonour of the hundi and wrote a letter to Nathuni Mian, but he received no reply and he did not send any registered letter and remained quiet up to the date of suit. 10. As these statements were read in this Court, a further point developed in the course of arguments. The point was whether the consideration for the transfer of the hundi was forbidden by law or of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of the Income-tax law, or was opposed to public policy so that the transaction was void and unenforceable for being unlawful within the meaning of S. 23, Contract Act, 1872. 11. The point was whether the consideration for the transfer of the hundi was forbidden by law or of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of the Income-tax law, or was opposed to public policy so that the transaction was void and unenforceable for being unlawful within the meaning of S. 23, Contract Act, 1872. 11. The last point, which could be said to have been raised by me rather than by the learned counsel for the appellant may be disposed of first. Mr. G. P. Bhargava cited the oft cited ruling of the Privy Council in Siddik Mahomed Shah v. Mt. Saran, AIR 1930 PC 57 (1), wherein it was said that no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward, and contended that the plea of illegality of consideration not having been put forward by the defendant it was not open to the court, and that too a court of second appeal. to raise that point for the first time at its own instance and although it was not raised by the learned counsel, but was merely adopted by him when fell from the court. 12. The point so put raises the question of jurisdiction of this Court. So far as the defendants are concerned they could obviously not raise the plea in this form unless they had inside information which was disclosed by the plaintiff and his witnesses in the course of giving their evidence. The plea raised was that the plaintiff could not sue on the hundi as the transaction was without consideration. The defendants could surely have raised the plea in argument before the trial court after the plaintiffs statements were recorded that the consideration, if any, was unlawful within the meaning of S. 23, Contract Act, 1872, and the contract of sale of the hundi was, therefore, void, and the plaintiff could not sue on the hundi. That was obviously not done because the point did not strike the learned counsel for the defendants in the trial court. He cannot be blamed, for the point does not seem to have occurred to the learned counsel for the defendants in the lower appellate court or even in this Court. That was obviously not done because the point did not strike the learned counsel for the defendants in the trial court. He cannot be blamed, for the point does not seem to have occurred to the learned counsel for the defendants in the lower appellate court or even in this Court. The question so raised is a pure question of law and no evidence is being sought to be produced or relied, upon for making out the point if it could be made out except for the sworn testimony of the plaintiff himself and his witnesses. 13. A court of law cannot be a mute witness to illegalities and cannot lend the aid of the court even where the doing so is prohibited by law. As for example, S. 3. Limitation Act, requires a court to dismiss a suit or an appeal or application if the court finds it to be barred by limitation although limitation is not set up or pleaded as a bar. Here too, if the point so raised is ultimately made out, it would disclose an error of law and jurisdiction apparent on the face of the record and such an error could even be corrected in collateral proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The ruling of the Privy Council cannot be taken to mean that a second appellate court may not dismiss a suit in case it finds that it was barred by time although limitation was not pleaded as a bar before either of the two courts below. In the present case too if it is found on the statements made by the plaintiff and his witnesses that the transaction of purchase of hundi by him was void on account of the illegality attaching to the consideration within the meaning of S. 23, Contract Act, the matter would stand almost on the same footing as the bar of limitation. The court would be upholding the law and public policy by refusing to enforce the hundi in case it finds that the transaction of purchase of it was void because the consideration paid therefore was forbidden by law or of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of the Income-tax Act, or was opposed to public policy. To turn a blind eye to the statement made by the plaintiff and his witnesses that the consideration said to have been paid by him for purchasing the hundi was not entered in the account books in order to evade income-tax, would be, in my opinion, not upholding the law for enforcing which the courts are established, but would be an unpardonable lapse in the performance of its duty by the court. 14. But said Mr. G. P. Bhargava, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, that it was no part of duty of the civil courts or of this Court to prevent the evasion of income-tax. That is undoubtedly so, but the question is whether the transaction of sale of the hundi was void on account of its consideration being unlawful. It needs no showing that evasion of income-tax is forbidden by law, and, at any rate, defeats the provisions of the law under which income-tax is levied and collected. Sale and purchase of hundi for cash consideration is surely not forbidden by law or opposed to public policy. But the sellers evaded income-tax by not entering the consideration alleged to have been received by them in their books of accounts. Indeed, according to them, the entire transaction of sale and purchase of chillies from Samastipur was carried on by them outside the books of account in order to evade income-tax although they maintained books of account in respect of their Kirana business carried on at Hathras. The plaintiff also said in cross-examination that he did not keep bahi khatas. His whole statement under cross-examination shows that he did not remember or know anything that was relevant and which he ought to have known. He was probably relying on the presumptions that go with a negotiable instrument, but the fact remains that he did admit that he did not maintain bahi khatas and also that he could not say whether Shyam Sunder, the seller, maintained bahi khatas or not. The inference is inescapable that the plaintiff purchased the hundi from moneys kept outside books of account and most likely knew that its receipt would also not be entered in any books of account in order to evade income-tax. This inference is proved beyond any shadow of doubt by the plaintiffs own evidence. The inference is inescapable that the plaintiff purchased the hundi from moneys kept outside books of account and most likely knew that its receipt would also not be entered in any books of account in order to evade income-tax. This inference is proved beyond any shadow of doubt by the plaintiffs own evidence. The plaintiff was thus on his own showing a party to the evasion of income-tax in paying the consideration for the purchase of hundi outside the books of account. The consideration for the purchase of the hundi was thus tainted, inasmuch as if such purchases on payments made in such a manner as in the present case were permitted, they would surely defeat the provisions of the income-tax law. The plaintiffs witnesses did not mince matters. They blatantly proclaimed on oath that by not entering the transaction of the purchase and sale of the hundi and the consideration for the same, they intended to evade payment of income-tax. The transaction of the sale and purchase of the hundi was thus clearly carried out in a manner that was forbidden by law, inasmuch as the evasion of income-tax is forbidden by law and at any rate the manner in which the transaction was carried out was intended to defeat, and did probably defeat the provisions of the income-tax law and that being so the sale and purchase of the hundi for consideration paid and received in this manner was surely opposed to public policy. 15. The blatant manner in which the activity of carrying on business outside the books of account was proclaimed in this case by the plaintiffs witnesses on oath and the fact that the statement went unnoticed so far, only proves the obvious that the conscience of the people has been completely dulled in the matter of payment of taxes. I say no more. But this court is under a duty to uphold the laws and to enforce them and not to give a blind eye even when it sees that the transaction which it is being required to enforce by its decree is one which was entered into with knowledge and intention of evading income-tax and thereby defeating the provisions of the income-tax law. I would, therefore, refuse to enforce payment of the hundi on this ground alone. 16. I would, therefore, refuse to enforce payment of the hundi on this ground alone. 16. It was argued that there was nothing illegal or unlawful in the consideration for the sale of the hundi. which was paid by the plaintiff to Radhey Lal Lachhi Ram. It was the good sum of Rs. 8,000/- , which was paid in cash as the consideration, but that is not what made the transaction illegal. Its object and the manner of payment of the consideration made it illegal. The object was to evade payment of income-tax by paying the consideration outside the books of account. The plaintiff also did not maintain any books of account and was most likely aware of the fact that the whole transaction was being carried out outside the books of account in order to evade payment of income-tax. This knowledge makes for the intention, with which the contract of purchase of the hundi was entered into. The object of purchasing the hundi by paying cash consideration from sources outside the books of account with knowledge that it would be kept outside the books of account in order to evade payment of income-tax was surely an object, which, if permitted, tended to defeat the provisions of the Income-tax Act. The object of the purchase of the hundi was, of course, to make money or to make profit out of the business of buying and selling hundis. That business was not illegal, but the carrying on of that business with the knowledge that its transactions would not be entered into in the books of account by either party in order to evade payment of income-tax made the object of carrying on that business in that manner unlawful and such as tended to defeat the provisions of the Income-tax Act. It was surely opposed to public policy. I may, in this context, refer to a decision given by me recently in Ram Sewak v. Ram Charan, : Second Appeal No. 509 of 1970, decided on November 27, 1981 (1982 All LR (SOC) 36 at pp. 52 and 53 : AIR 1982 All 177 ). In that case, the parties had agreed to carry on business in partnership, and I have observed : "There was no illegality in that. 52 and 53 : AIR 1982 All 177 ). In that case, the parties had agreed to carry on business in partnership, and I have observed : "There was no illegality in that. The carrying on of business for earning profit was also lawful But the parties further agreed in the course of carrying on their business that they would conceal some part of their business activity and would not enter certain items in the books of account maintained by them, in order to evade payment of income-tax and sales-tax. It needs no showing that evasion of income-tax and sales-tax is forbidden by law and at any rate defeats the provision of the laws under which income-tax and sales-tax are levied and collected. The object of the agreement to carry on business in partnership was to earn profits. The further object was that part of the profits will be earned in such a way or retained in such a manner as to evade the payment of taxes. That was forbidden by, and defeated the provisions of the tax laws. Therefore, the object of the agreement was, in part at least forbidden by law and such as defeated the provisions of law. Further, it cannot be disputed that evasion of taxes is opposed to public policy. What is permitted is lawful avoidance of taxes, or in other words to so arrange ones affairs as to reduce the incidence of taxes to the minimum leviable under the law, but evasion of the law, or falsification of accounts, or deliberate non-payment of taxes though due, or attempt to avoid payment of taxes by violating the tax laws is certainly not permitted. I have therefore, not the slightest hesitation in holding that the agreement between the parties in so far as it related to earning of concealed profits, or concealment of the profits earned by falsification of accounts, was wholly void and no court could enforce the agreement by directing an enquiry into the amount, or the destination, of the concealed profits in order to enforce the recovery of the share therein of one party from another." 17. Even so, I must deal with the contention raised in this second appeal on behalf of the appellant. The first contention was, as noticed above, that the endorsement is not signed. Even so, I must deal with the contention raised in this second appeal on behalf of the appellant. The first contention was, as noticed above, that the endorsement is not signed. Shyam Sunder, the last witness for the plaintiff, stated that the endorsement on the hundi was in his handwriting. The objection is that they may be so, but he had not signed it. According to the commercial practice, persons carrying on business in a. firm name often sign the firm name to indicate that the document has been executed on behalf of the firm, and the only question is whether the person, who wrote the firm name, had the authority to do so. In law commercial, it was not unusual to find persons signing the firm name instead of their own. Similarly, in the case of joint family firm also, the Karta sometimes signs the firm name, in which the joint family carries on business. The surest evidence of this practice is to be found in S. 23, Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. C. 61). which is in the following terms : "23. No person is liable as drawer, indorser, or accepter of a bill who has not signed it as such, Provided that- (1) Where a person signs a bill in a trade or assumed name, he is liable thereon as if he had signed it in his own name. (2) The signature of the name of a firm is equivalent to the signature by the person so signing of the names of all persons liable as partners in that firm." 18. Shyam Sunder had the authority to sign the firm name Radhey Lal Lachhi Ram of Hathras, and that he did sign the name of the firm for endorsing the hundi in favour of the plaintiff, Shri Krishna Dass of Aligarh, are facts which are clearly proved by the evidence on the record. The decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Construction Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 526 was cited before me to show the meaning of the word "sign". In para 6 of the report of that decision at p. 527 of AIR the Supreme Court observed : "In Webster's New World Dictionary the word "sign" means to write one's name on, as in acknowledging authorship, authorising action, etc. "To write one's name is signature. In para 6 of the report of that decision at p. 527 of AIR the Supreme Court observed : "In Webster's New World Dictionary the word "sign" means to write one's name on, as in acknowledging authorship, authorising action, etc. "To write one's name is signature. S. 3 (56) of the General Clauses Act, 10 of 1897, has not defined the word "sign" but has extended its meaning with reference to a person who is unable to write his name to include "mark" with the grammatical variations and cognate expressions. This provision indicates that signing means writing one's name on some document or paper. In Mohesh Lal v. Busunt Kumaree, (1881) ILR 6 Cal 340, a question arose as to what "signature" meant in connection with S. 20 of the Limitation Act, IX of 1908. It was observed that "where a party to contract signs his name in any part of it in such a way as to acknowledge that he is the party contracting, that is a sufficient signature". It was further observed that the document must be signed in such a way as to make it appear that the person signing it is the author of it, and if that appears it does not matter what the form of the instrument is, or in what part of it the signature occurs." 19. It is the firm Radhey Lal Lachhi Ram of Hathras, in which name the two brothers carried on business, which was required to sign the hundi by way of endorsement. The firm, as such, could not sign its own name, for, firstly there are more than one person in the firm name, and secondly it may be that they are names of the ancestors, and not of the present partners of the firm. There were' two ways, in which the fact that the endorsement on the hundi was made on behalf of both the brothers, who carried on business in the name of Radhey Lal Lachhi Ram, could be indicated. One was for the person authorised to sign his name and add that he was signing his name for the firm. The other mode was to sign the firm name itself. In a way, it was the signature of the firm that was required and that object was achieved by writing the firm name by a person authorised to sign on behalf of the firm. The other mode was to sign the firm name itself. In a way, it was the signature of the firm that was required and that object was achieved by writing the firm name by a person authorised to sign on behalf of the firm. The above Supreme Court decision does not lay down anything to the contrary. This inference is supported by the decision of a case in Ma Hnin E v. Maung Tun Yin, (1936) 161 Ind Cas 528 : AIR 1936 Rang 27, where it was held that where an endorser gets another person to write his name for him, on a negotiable instrument, it is validly signed. The case of Chella Balayya v. Kanuparthi Subbaya, (1917) ILR 40 Mad. 1171 : AIR 1918 Mad 24, relied upon by the Rangoon High Court is another case on the point where the endorsement of Challa Balayya was made by another person by writing the words "Nishani mark" of Challa Balayya on behalf of and by the authority of Challa Balayya. That was also held to be an endorsement by the signature of Challa Balayya within the meaning of S. 15, Negotiable Instruments Act. 20. Another point urged on behalf of the defendant appellant was that the amount of Rs. 10,000/- had already been paid by Nathuni Mian by way of a compromise in the criminal complaint, which was filed by the appellant Nand Kishore against Nathuni Mian. I do not think any account could be taken of that in the present case although a copy of the compromise, that was arrived at, has been filed, but it is not very clear whether the payment related to hundi in question or as a settlement of the entire account between the parties. Moreover, the effect of the payment said to have been made by Nathuni Mian to Ram Nath, who was the son of Nand Kishore Barisal in that criminal case, is not very clear, and I do not think that this Court will be justified in allowing that argument to be raised. Indeed, it appears to me that the lower appellate court is right in observing that the alleged payment of Rs. Indeed, it appears to me that the lower appellate court is right in observing that the alleged payment of Rs. 10,000/- by Nathuni Mian to the son of Nand Kishore Bansal, in fact, lends support to the case of the plaintiff who was the real endorsee of the hundi, for, even if the initial consideration for the hundi was assumed to have failed by reason of non-supply of chillies by Nabbu Mian Nathuni Mian, the payment of Rs. 10,000/- filled the gap. 21. The last point urged was that the endorsement in favour of the Bharat Bank was not struck off by that Bank. It is undisputed that the Bharat Bank returned the hundi dishonoured with a letter. The lower appellate court has observed that the firm Radhey Lal Lachhi Ram could as the holder the hundi in due course, have cancelled the endorsement made in favour of the Bharat Bank. What Shyam Sunder, however, did was to make another endorsement in favour of the plaintiff. The earlier endorsement in favour of Bharat Bank clearly stood superseded. The letter of the Bharat Bank was produced at the trial and there is nothing to show that the Bharat Bank claimed any title to or interest in the hundi. The case Hazarimal v. Sonraj, AIR 1959 Raj 84 , was relied upon by the lower appellate court in this connection, and I think rightly so. 22. In the result, although the hundi was duly endorsed by M/s Radhey Lal Lachhi Ram of Hathras, who were holders in due course, to the plaintiff, the consideration for the same was unlawful within the meaning of S. 23, Contract Act 1872. That vitiated the transaction and rendered it void. The appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree under appeal are set aside and the suit is dismissed, but, in the circumstances, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.