N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE third contention advanced by Mr. Vyas was that the gift deed in question was not proved and so the transmission of the right title and interest of the plaintiff no. 1 to and in the suit property had not got transferred to the plaintiff no. 2 and that it continued to be vested in the plaintiff no. 1. The gift deed has been spoken to by the plaintiff and the plaintiff no. 2 has specifically proved it by speaking clearly that it was the plaintiff no. 1 who had executed the gift deed and got it registered after getting it attested by the attesting witnesses all of whom had put their signatures on the deed in question in his presence. The plaintiff no. 2 also stated that as the plaintiff no. 1 was ill-disposed in those days the Registrar was specially summoned to the residence of the plaintiff no. 1 and the registration formality was undertaken. Mr. Vyas however contended that unless an attesting witness was examined to prove the due execution by the plaintiff no. 1 the document in question namely ex. 88 could not be said to have been duly proved. Reliance in support of this plea was sought for from sec. 68 of the Indian Evidence Act the proviso of which clearly lays down that where execution of a document is not specifically denied by the maker thereof an attestant of document duly registered under the provisions of the Indian Registration Act is not compulsory to be examined. Mr. Vyas then stated that there was no acceptance but the evidence of the plaintiff no. 2 clearly shows that he had accepted the gift. The deed itself mentions that there was acceptance of the gift by the delivery of possession. So the gift deed can be said to be duly proved and acted upon. ( 2 ) THE last contention that was vigorously put forward by Mr. Vyas was that by virtue of the provisions of sec. 60 of the Easement Act the licence of the land was irrevocable because the licensee by Dahi acting upon the licence had executed the work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution. ( 2 ) THE last contention that was vigorously put forward by Mr. Vyas was that by virtue of the provisions of sec. 60 of the Easement Act the licence of the land was irrevocable because the licensee by Dahi acting upon the licence had executed the work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution. Both the courts below have held that it was Bai Dahi who had put up the structure and that it is being used for the purpose of her residence. So the incurring of expenses in the execution of the work by the licensee is a matter that stands concluded it being a finding of fact. The next question is whether the work is of a permanent character or not. The work permanent character occurring in sec. 60 has been the subject matter of judicial pronouncement in the case of Dayaram v. Deorao A. I. R. 1926 Nagpur 376. In that case it has been held that even the structure of a kachcha hut by the licensee can be treated as a work of permanent character. Similar is the view of the Nagpur High Court in the case of Dwarka v. Gaurishanker A. I. R. 1943 Nagpur 77. What the authority emphasised is that if there is an intention to put up a structure for residence for an indefinite period the structure though not a permanent one from the engineering point of view can be designated as a permanent structure. In other words the permanency is not related to the material used for the purpose of construction but is stated to be related to the duration for which it is intended to be used. As I accept this principle for the purpose of this appeal I do not deal with the character of the structure which appears to be a hut mostly made of mud walls and of material that may not be of a very long duration. However the circumstances under which this house-maid was given this land for putting up a structure indicate that there was no intention on the part of the plaintiff no. 1 to see that she put up a structure for an indefinite period nor could it be said that Bai Dahi had acted on the license and put up a structure which would be permanent. 1 to see that she put up a structure for an indefinite period nor could it be said that Bai Dahi had acted on the license and put up a structure which would be permanent. It is to be remembered that she had been invited to this place at the time of some ladys delivery in the family and then she was attending to the household work as a maid servant. From the very nature of this invitation it can be said that there was no intention on the part of the licensor to allow her to put up a permanent structure nor can there by any intention on Dahis part to put up a permanent structure. I do not quarrel with the submission that from the circumstances the permanent character of the structure permitted to be put up can be inferred but the very circumstances which I have just now referred to above indicate that there could not have been an implied grant arising from the conduct of the licensor estopping him from claiming the right of his revocation. The essence of clause (a) of sec. 60 is the principle of implied grant arising from the conduct of the licensor which estops him from claiming his right of revocation and clause (b) would apply only in the cases of grants or permission for unlimited character by persons possessing unlimited power. In other words where right of revocation is impliedly reserved or where the licence is granted only for a limited duration clause (b) of sec. 60 would not be attracted. What makes one decide the question is the circumstances in which the defendant was given permission to put a hut on this land in her capacity as the maid servant attached to the family. From the very nature of things the permanent structure could not have been envisaged by the licensor or by the licensee in the sense in which this term is understood in terms of sec. 60 of the Easement Act. Appeal dismissed. .